Teacher forcing is an algorithm for training the weights of recurrent neural networks (RNNs). It involves feeding observed sequence values (i.e. ground-truth samples) back into the RNN after each step, thus forcing the RNN to stay close to the ground-truth sequence. The term "teacher forcing" can be motivated by comparing the RNN to a human student taking a multi-part exam where the answer to each part (for example a mathematical calculation) depends on the answer to the preceding part. In this analogy, rather than grading every answer in the end, with the risk that the student fails every single part even though they only made a mistake in the first one, a teacher records the score for each individual part and then tells the student the correct answer, to be used in the next part. The use of an external teacher signal is in contrast to real-time recurrent learning (RTRL). Teacher signals are known from oscillator networks. The promise is, that teacher forcing helps to reduce the training time. The term "teacher forcing" was introduced in 1989 by Ronald J. Williams and David Zipser, who reported that the technique was already being "frequently used in dynamical supervised learning tasks" around that time. A NeurIPS 2016 paper introduced the related method of "professor forcing".
Stereo cameras
The stereo cameras approach is a method of distilling a noisy video signal into a coherent data set that a computer can begin to process into actionable symbolic objects, or abstractions. Stereo cameras is one of many approaches used in the broader fields of computer vision and machine vision. == Calculation == In this approach, two cameras with a known physical relationship (i.e. a common field of view the cameras can see, and how far apart their focal points sit in physical space) are correlated via software. By finding mappings of common pixel values, and calculating how far apart these common areas reside in pixel space, a rough depth map can be created. This is very similar to how the human brain uses stereoscopic information from the eyes to gain depth cue information, i.e. how far apart any given object in the scene is from the viewer. The camera attributes must be known, focal length and distance apart etc., and a calibration done. Once this is completed, the systems can be used to sense the distances of objects by triangulation. Finding the same singular physical point in the two left and right images is known as the correspondence problem. Correctly locating the point gives the computer the capability to calculate the distance that the robot or camera is from the object. On the BH2 Lunar Rover the cameras use five steps: a bayer array filter, photometric consistency dense matching algorithm, a Laplace of Gaussian (LoG) edge detection algorithm, a stereo matching algorithm and finally uniqueness constraint. == Uses == This type of stereoscopic image processing technique is used in applications such as 3D reconstruction, robotic control and sensing, crowd dynamics monitoring and off-planet terrestrial rovers; for example, in mobile robot navigation, tracking, gesture recognition, targeting, 3D surface visualization, immersive and interactive gaming. Although the Xbox Kinect sensor is also able to create a depth map of an image, it uses an infrared camera for this purpose, and does not use the dual-camera technique. Other approaches to stereoscopic sensing include time of flight sensors and ultrasound.
G.9972
G.9972 (also known as G.cx) is a Recommendation developed by ITU-T that specifies a coexistence mechanism for networking transceivers capable of operating over electrical power line wiring. It allows G.hn devices to coexist with other devices implementing G.9972 and operating on the same power line wiring. G.9972 received consent during the meeting of ITU-T Study Group 15, on October 9, 2009, and final approval on June 11, 2010. G.9972 specifies two mechanisms for coexistence between G.hn home networks and broadband over power lines (BPL) Internet access networks: Frequency-division multiplexing (FDM), in which the available spectrum is divided into two parts: frequencies below 10 or 14 MHz (specific value can be selected by the access network) are reserved for the access network, while frequencies above them are reserved for the in-home network. Time-division multiplexing (TDM), in which the available channel time is split equally between both networks. 50% of time slots are allocated for the access network, and 50% are allocated to the in-home network.
Visual cryptography
Visual cryptography is a cryptographic technique which allows visual information (pictures, text, etc.) to be encrypted in such a way that the decrypted information appears as a visual image. One of the best-known techniques has been credited to Moni Naor and Adi Shamir, who developed it in 1994. They demonstrated a visual secret sharing scheme, where a binary image was broken up into n shares so that only someone with all n shares could decrypt the image, while any n − 1 shares revealed no information about the original image. Each share was printed on a separate transparency, and decryption was performed by overlaying the shares. When all n shares were overlaid, the original image would appear. There are several generalizations of the basic scheme including k-out-of-n visual cryptography, and using opaque sheets but illuminating them by multiple sets of identical illumination patterns under the recording of only one single-pixel detector, which exposed the image. Using a similar idea, transparencies can be used to implement a one-time pad encryption, where one transparency is a shared random pad, and another transparency acts as the ciphertext. Normally, there is an expansion of space requirement in visual cryptography. But if one of the two shares is structured recursively, the efficiency of visual cryptography can be increased to 100%. Some antecedents of visual cryptography are in patents from the 1960s. Other antecedents are in the work on perception and secure communication. Visual cryptography can be used to protect biometric templates in which decryption does not require any complex computations. == Example == In this example, the binary image has been split into two component images. Each component image has a pair of pixels for every pixel in the original image. These pixel pairs are shaded black or white according to the following rule: if the original image pixel was black, the pixel pairs in the component images must be complementary; randomly shade one ■□, and the other □■. When these complementary pairs are overlapped, they will appear dark gray. On the other hand, if the original image pixel was white, the pixel pairs in the component images must match: both ■□ or both □■. When these matching pairs are overlapped, they will appear light gray. So, when the two component images are superimposed, the original image appears. However, without the other component, a component image reveals no information about the original image; it is indistinguishable from a random pattern of ■□ / □■ pairs. Moreover, if you have one component image, you can use the shading rules above to produce a counterfeit component image that combines with it to produce any image at all. == (2, n) visual cryptography sharing case == Sharing a secret with an arbitrary number of people, n, such that at least 2 of them are required to decode the secret is one form of the visual secret sharing scheme presented by Moni Naor and Adi Shamir in 1994. In this scheme we have a secret image which is encoded into n shares printed on transparencies. The shares appear random and contain no decipherable information about the underlying secret image, however if any 2 of the shares are stacked on top of one another the secret image becomes decipherable by the human eye. Every pixel from the secret image is encoded into multiple subpixels in each share image using a matrix to determine the color of the pixels. In the (2, n) case, a white pixel in the secret image is encoded using a matrix from the following set, where each row gives the subpixel pattern for one of the components: {all permutations of the columns of} : C 0 = [ 1 0 . . . 0 1 0 . . . 0 . . . 1 0 . . . 0 ] . {\displaystyle \mathbf {C_{0}=} {\begin{bmatrix}1&0&...&0\\1&0&...&0\\...\\1&0&...&0\end{bmatrix}}.} While a black pixel in the secret image is encoded using a matrix from the following set: {all permutations of the columns of} : C 1 = [ 1 0 . . . 0 0 1 . . . 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 1 ] . {\displaystyle \mathbf {C_{1}=} {\begin{bmatrix}1&0&...&0\\0&1&...&0\\...\\0&0&...&1\end{bmatrix}}.} For instance in the (2,2) sharing case (the secret is split into 2 shares and both shares are required to decode the secret) we use complementary matrices to share a black pixel and identical matrices to share a white pixel. Stacking the shares we have all the subpixels associated with the black pixel now black while 50% of the subpixels associated with the white pixel remain white. == Cheating the (2, n) visual secret sharing scheme == Horng et al. proposed a method that allows n − 1 colluding parties to cheat an honest party in visual cryptography. They take advantage of knowing the underlying distribution of the pixels in the shares to create new shares that combine with existing shares to form a new secret message of the cheaters choosing. We know that 2 shares are enough to decode the secret image using the human visual system. But examining two shares also gives some information about the 3rd share. For instance, colluding participants may examine their shares to determine when they both have black pixels and use that information to determine that another participant will also have a black pixel in that location. Knowing where black pixels exist in another party's share allows them to create a new share that will combine with the predicted share to form a new secret message. In this way a set of colluding parties that have enough shares to access the secret code can cheat other honest parties. == Visual steganography == 2×2 subpixels can also encode a binary image in each component image. For example, each white pixel of each component image could be represented by two black subpixels, while each black pixel represented by three black subpixels. When overlaid, each white pixel of the secret image is represented by three black subpixels, while each black pixel is represented by all four subpixels black. Each corresponding pixel in the component images is randomly rotated to avoid orientation leaking information about the secret image. == In popular culture == In "Do Not Forsake Me Oh My Darling", a 1967 episode of TV series The Prisoner, the protagonist uses a visual cryptography overlay of multiple transparencies to reveal a secret message – the location of a scientist friend who had gone into hiding.
KLJN Secure Key Exchange
Random-resistor-random-temperature Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise key exchange, also known as RRRT-KLJN or simply KLJN, is an approach for distributing cryptographic keys between two parties that claims to offer unconditional security. This claim, which has been contested, is significant, as the only other key exchange approach claiming to offer unconditional security is Quantum key distribution. The KLJN secure key exchange scheme was proposed in 2005 by Laszlo Kish and Granqvist. It has the advantage over quantum key distribution in that it can be performed over a metallic wire with just four resistors, two noise generators, and four voltage measuring devices---equipment that is low-priced and can be readily manufactured. It has the disadvantage that several attacks against KLJN have been identified which must be defended against. "Given that the amount of effort and funding that goes into Quantum Cryptography is substantial (some even mock it as a distraction from the ultimate prize which is quantum computing), it seems to me that the fact that classic thermodynamic resources allow for similar inherent security should give one pause," wrote Henning Dekant, the founder of the Quantum Computing Meetup, in April 2013. The Cybersecurity Curricula 2017, a joint project of the Association for Computing Machinery, the IEEE Computer Society, the Association for Information Systems, and the International Federation for Information Processing Technical Committee on Information Security Education (IFIP WG 11.8) recommends teaching the KLJN Scheme as part of teaching "Advanced concepts" in its knowledge unit on cryptography. == See Also/Further Reading ==
GCube system
gCube is an open source software system specifically designed and developed to enact the building and operation of a Data Infrastructure providing their users with a rich array of services suitable for supporting the co-creation of Virtual Research Environments and promoting the implementation of open science workflows and practices. It is at the heart of the D4Science Data Infrastructure. == Overview == It is primarily organised in a number of web service called to offer functionality supporting the phases of knowledge production and sharing. In addition, it consists of a set of software libraries supporting service development, service-to-service integration, and service capabilities extension, and a set of portlets dedicated to realise user interface constituents facilitating the exploitation of one or more services. It is designed and conceived to enact system of systems. In fact, its gCube services rely on standards and mediators to interact with other services as well as are made available by standard and APIs to make it possible for clients to use them. For instance, the DataMiner service implements the Web Processing Service protocol to facilitate clients to execute processes. The set of components dealing with Identity and Access Management rely on Keycloak and federates other IDMs thus making the overall Authentication and the Authorization management compliant with open standards such as OAuth2, User-Managed Access (UMA), and OpenID Connect (OIDC)protocols. The Catalogue relies on DCAT, OAI-PMH, and Catalogue Service for the Web to collect contents from other catalogues and data sources and offers its content by DCAT, OAI-PMH, and a proprietary REST API (gCat REST API). Its Continuous Integration/Continuous Delivery pipeline implemented by Jenkins represents an innovative approach to software delivering conceived to be scalable and easy to maintain and upgrade at a minimal cost. == History == gCube has been developed in the context of the D4Science initiative with the support of several EU projects.
Blinding (cryptography)
In cryptography, blinding first became known in the context of blind signatures, where the message author blinds the message with a random blinding factor, the signer then signs it and the message author "unblinds" it; signer and message author are different parties. Since the late 1990s, blinding mostly refers to countermeasures against side-channel attacks on encryption devices, where the random blinding and the "unblinding" happen on the encryption devices. The techniques used for blinding signatures were adapted to prevent attackers from knowing the input to the modular exponentiation function for Diffie-Hellman or RSA. Blinding must be applied with care, for example Rabin–Williams signatures. If blinding is applied to the formatted message but the random value does not honor Jacobi requirements on p and q, then it could lead to private key recovery. A demonstration of the recovery can be seen in CVE-2015-2141 discovered by Evgeny Sidorov. Side-channel attacks allow an adversary to recover information about the input to a cryptographic operation within an asymmetric encryption scheme, by measuring something other than the algorithm's result, e.g., power consumption, computation time, or radio-frequency emanations by a device. Typically these attacks depend on the attacker knowing the characteristics of the algorithm, as well as (some) inputs. In this setting, blinding serves to alter the algorithm's input into some unpredictable state. Depending on the characteristics of the blinding function, this can prevent some or all leakage of useful information. Note that security depends also on the resistance of the blinding functions themselves to side-channel attacks. == Examples == In RSA blinding involves computing the blinding operation E(x) = (xr)e mod N, where r is a random integer between 1 and N and relatively prime to N (i.e. gcd(r, N) = 1), x is the plaintext, e is the public RSA exponent and N is the RSA modulus. As usual, the decryption function f(z) = zd mod N is applied thus giving f(E(x)) = (xr)ed mod N = xr mod N. Finally it is unblinded using the function D(z) = zr−1 mod N. Multiplying xr mod N by r−1 mod N yields x, as desired. When decrypting in this manner, an adversary who is able to measure time taken by this operation would not be able to make use of this information (by applying timing attacks RSA is known to be vulnerable to) as they does not know the constant r and hence has no knowledge of the real input fed to the RSA primitives. Blinding in GPG 1.x