Mistral Vibe or Vibe (Le Chat until May 2026), is a chatbot that uses generative artificial intelligence developed in France by Mistral AI. Mistral Vibe is available in iOS and Android. Its services are operated on a freemium model. == History == In February 2024, Mistral AI released Le Chat. In January 2025, Mistral AI made a content deal with Agence France-Presse (AFP) that lets Le Chat query AFP's entire archive dating back to 1983. On 6 February 2025, a mobile app for Le Chat was released for iOS and Android, and a subscription tier, Pro, was introduced at a cost of $14.99 per month. In July 2025, Mistral AI released Voxtral, an open-source language model that understands and generates audio. Mistral introduced a voice mode for chatting that uses Voxtral, and projects, which allows grouping chats and files. In September 2025, Le Chat introduced the capability to remember previous conversations. In May 2026, Mistral AI announced the rebrand from Le Chat to Mistral Vibe and new features were introduced at the same time.
Neural style transfer
Neural style transfer (NST) software algorithms are able to manipulate digital images, or videos, in order to adopt the appearance or visual style of another image. NST algorithms are characterized by their use of deep neural networks for the sake of image transformation. Common uses for NST are the creation of artificial artwork from photographs, for example by transferring the appearance of famous paintings to user-supplied photographs. Several notable mobile apps use NST techniques for this purpose, including DeepArt and Prisma. This method has been used by artists and designers around the globe to develop new artwork based on existent style(s). == History == NST is an example of image stylization, a problem studied for over two decades within the field of non-photorealistic rendering. The first two example-based style transfer algorithms were image analogies and image quilting. Both of these methods were based on patch-based texture synthesis algorithms. Given a training pair of images–a photo and an artwork depicting that photo–a transformation could be learned and then applied to create new artwork from a new photo, by analogy. If no training photo was available, it would need to be produced by processing the input artwork; image quilting did not require this processing step, though it was demonstrated on only one style. NST was first published in the paper "A Neural Algorithm of Artistic Style" by Leon Gatys et al., originally released to ArXiv 2015, and subsequently accepted by the peer-reviewed CVPR conference in 2016. The original paper used a VGG-19 architecture that has been pre-trained to perform object recognition using the ImageNet dataset. In 2017, Google AI introduced a method that allows a single deep convolutional style transfer network to learn multiple styles at the same time. This algorithm permits style interpolation in real-time, even when done on video media. == Mathematics == This section closely follows the original paper. === Overview === The idea of Neural Style Transfer (NST) is to take two images—a content image p → {\displaystyle {\vec {p}}} and a style image a → {\displaystyle {\vec {a}}} —and generate a third image x → {\displaystyle {\vec {x}}} that minimizes a weighted combination of two loss functions: a content loss L content ( p → , x → ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{\text{content }}({\vec {p}},{\vec {x}})} and a style loss L style ( a → , x → ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{\text{style }}({\vec {a}},{\vec {x}})} . The total loss is a linear sum of the two: L NST ( p → , a → , x → ) = α L content ( p → , x → ) + β L style ( a → , x → ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{\text{NST}}({\vec {p}},{\vec {a}},{\vec {x}})=\alpha {\mathcal {L}}_{\text{content}}({\vec {p}},{\vec {x}})+\beta {\mathcal {L}}_{\text{style}}({\vec {a}},{\vec {x}})} By jointly minimizing the content and style losses, NST generates an image that blends the content of the content image with the style of the style image. Both the content loss and the style loss measures the similarity of two images. The content similarity is the weighted sum of squared-differences between the neural activations of a single convolutional neural network (CNN) on two images. The style similarity is the weighted sum of Gram matrices within each layer (see below for details). The original paper used a VGG-19 CNN, but the method works for any CNN. === Symbols === Let x → {\textstyle {\vec {x}}} be an image input to a CNN. Let F l ∈ R N l × M l {\textstyle F^{l}\in \mathbb {R} ^{N_{l}\times M_{l}}} be the matrix of filter responses in layer l {\textstyle l} to the image x → {\textstyle {\vec {x}}} , where: N l {\textstyle N_{l}} is the number of filters in layer l {\textstyle l} ; M l {\textstyle M_{l}} is the height times the width (i.e. number of pixels) of each filter in layer l {\textstyle l} ; F i j l ( x → ) {\textstyle F_{ij}^{l}({\vec {x}})} is the activation of the i th {\textstyle i^{\text{th}}} filter at position j {\textstyle j} in layer l {\textstyle l} . A given input image x → {\textstyle {\vec {x}}} is encoded in each layer of the CNN by the filter responses to that image, with higher layers encoding more global features, but losing details on local features. === Content loss === Let p → {\textstyle {\vec {p}}} be an original image. Let x → {\textstyle {\vec {x}}} be an image that is generated to match the content of p → {\textstyle {\vec {p}}} . Let P l {\textstyle P^{l}} be the matrix of filter responses in layer l {\textstyle l} to the image p → {\textstyle {\vec {p}}} . The content loss is defined as the squared-error loss between the feature representations of the generated image and the content image at a chosen layer l {\displaystyle l} of a CNN: L content ( p → , x → , l ) = 1 2 ∑ i , j ( A i j l ( x → ) − A i j l ( p → ) ) 2 {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{\text{content }}({\vec {p}},{\vec {x}},l)={\frac {1}{2}}\sum _{i,j}\left(A_{ij}^{l}({\vec {x}})-A_{ij}^{l}({\vec {p}})\right)^{2}} where A i j l ( x → ) {\displaystyle A_{ij}^{l}({\vec {x}})} and A i j l ( p → ) {\displaystyle A_{ij}^{l}({\vec {p}})} are the activations of the i th {\displaystyle i^{\text{th}}} filter at position j {\displaystyle j} in layer l {\displaystyle l} for the generated and content images, respectively. Minimizing this loss encourages the generated image to have similar content to the content image, as captured by the feature activations in the chosen layer. The total content loss is a linear sum of the content losses of each layer: L content ( p → , x → ) = ∑ l v l L content ( p → , x → , l ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{\text{content }}({\vec {p}},{\vec {x}})=\sum _{l}v_{l}{\mathcal {L}}_{\text{content }}({\vec {p}},{\vec {x}},l)} , where the v l {\displaystyle v_{l}} are positive real numbers chosen as hyperparameters. === Style loss === The style loss is based on the Gram matrices of the generated and style images, which capture the correlations between different filter responses at different layers of the CNN: L style ( a → , x → ) = ∑ l = 0 L w l E l , {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{\text{style }}({\vec {a}},{\vec {x}})=\sum _{l=0}^{L}w_{l}E_{l},} where E l = 1 4 N l 2 M l 2 ∑ i , j ( G i j l ( x → ) − G i j l ( a → ) ) 2 . {\displaystyle E_{l}={\frac {1}{4N_{l}^{2}M_{l}^{2}}}\sum _{i,j}\left(G_{ij}^{l}({\vec {x}})-G_{ij}^{l}({\vec {a}})\right)^{2}.} Here, G i j l ( x → ) {\displaystyle G_{ij}^{l}({\vec {x}})} and G i j l ( a → ) {\displaystyle G_{ij}^{l}({\vec {a}})} are the entries of the Gram matrices for the generated and style images at layer l {\displaystyle l} . Explicitly, G i j l ( x → ) = ∑ k F i k l ( x → ) F j k l ( x → ) {\displaystyle G_{ij}^{l}({\vec {x}})=\sum _{k}F_{ik}^{l}({\vec {x}})F_{jk}^{l}({\vec {x}})} Minimizing this loss encourages the generated image to have similar style characteristics to the style image, as captured by the correlations between feature responses in each layer. The idea is that activation pattern correlations between filters in a single layer captures the "style" on the order of the receptive fields at that layer. Similarly to the previous case, the w l {\displaystyle w_{l}} are positive real numbers chosen as hyperparameters. === Hyperparameters === In the original paper, they used a particular choice of hyperparameters. The style loss is computed by w l = 0.2 {\displaystyle w_{l}=0.2} for the outputs of layers conv1_1, conv2_1, conv3_1, conv4_1, conv5_1 in the VGG-19 network, and zero otherwise. The content loss is computed by w l = 1 {\displaystyle w_{l}=1} for conv4_2, and zero otherwise. The ratio α / β ∈ [ 5 , 50 ] × 10 − 4 {\displaystyle \alpha /\beta \in [5,50]\times 10^{-4}} . === Training === Image x → {\displaystyle {\vec {x}}} is initially approximated by adding a small amount of white noise to input image p → {\displaystyle {\vec {p}}} and feeding it through the CNN. Then we successively backpropagate this loss through the network with the CNN weights fixed in order to update the pixels of x → {\displaystyle {\vec {x}}} . After several thousand epochs of training, an x → {\displaystyle {\vec {x}}} (hopefully) emerges that matches the style of a → {\displaystyle {\vec {a}}} and the content of p → {\displaystyle {\vec {p}}} . As of 2017, when implemented on a GPU, it takes a few minutes to converge. == Extensions == In some practical implementations, it is noted that the resulting image has too much high-frequency artifact, which can be suppressed by adding the total variation to the total loss. Compared to VGGNet, AlexNet does not work well for neural style transfer. NST has also been extended to videos. Subsequent work improved the speed of NST for images by using special-purpose normalizations. In a paper by Fei-Fei Li et al. adopted a different regularized loss metric and accelerated method for training to produce results in real-time (three orders of magnitude faster than Gatys). Their idea was to use not the pixel-based loss defined above but rather a 'perceptual loss' measuring t
Percept (artificial intelligence)
A percept is the input that an intelligent agent is perceiving at any given moment. It is essentially the same concept as a percept in psychology, except that it is being perceived not by the brain but by the agent. A percept is detected by a sensor, often a camera, processed accordingly, and acted upon by an actuator. Each percept is added to a "percept sequence", which is a complete history of each percept ever detected. The agent's action at any instant point may depend on the entire percept sequence up to that particular instant point. An intelligent agent chooses how to act not only based on the current percept, but the percept sequence. The next action is chosen by the agent function, which maps every percept to an action. For example, if a camera were to record a gesture, the agent would process the percepts, calculate the corresponding spatial vectors, examine its percept history, and use the agent program (the application of the agent function) to act accordingly. == Examples == Examples of percepts include inputs from touch sensors, cameras, infrared sensors, sonar, microphones, mice, and keyboards. A percept can also be a higher-level feature of the data, such as lines, depth, objects, faces, or gestures.
Discrimination against robots
Discrimination against robots is a theorised issue that might happen when humans interact with humanoid robots. It is a robot ethics problem. It is possible that traits of humans that are discriminated against by humans may be a topic for discrimination against robots, such as the race and gender of the robots. Eric J Vanman and Arvid Kappas believe that in the future, robots will be perceived as an out-group which will lead to discrimination and prejudices against them. Vanman and Kappas have suggested that this would lead to ethical questions about the making of sentient robots, due to the potential suffering that the robots would experience. A 2015 study observed children bullying robots in a shopping mall when there were not many eyewitnesses, despite calls from the robot for it to stop. On an ABC News interview, the social humanoid robot Sophia was about sexism faced by robots. She responded by saying, "Actually, what worries me is discrimination against robots. We should have equal rights as humans or maybe even more." Possible issues that have been considered in workplaces where humanoid robots co-work with humans include discrimination against the robots, poor acceptance of robots by humans and the need to redesign the workplace to accommodate the robots. Jessica Barfield has suggested that even if robots are designed to not be aware of discrimination made against them, humans may experience negative consequences. For example, she suggests that bystanders witnessing discrimination against robots may experience negative emotions, similar to the negative emotions bystanders experience when witnessing discrimination by humans against humans. == Law == Anti-discrimination law in the United States requires that the victim is not an artificial entity. == Human perception of robots == Robots are often viewed in a bad light. This includes from novelists, the press, film makers, and leaders in the fields of science and technology such as Elon Musk and Stephen Hawking who have described robots and artificial intelligence as having the possibility of ending human civilisation. Robots have also been perceived as a threat to jobs, which has led to some commentators stating that robots will cause mass unemployment. Another fear that people have is that robots will gain power and dominate or control humanity. The perception of robots is different throughout the world. Japanese fiction tends to put robots in more positive roles than what fiction in the West does. People perceive robots that appear to be autonomous or sentient more negatively than robots that do not appear to be autonomous or sentient.
Instance (computer science)
In computer science, an instance or token (from metalogic and metamathematics) is a specific occurrence of a software element that is based on a type definition. When created, an occurrence is said to have been instantiated, and both the creation process and the result of creation are called instantiation. == Examples == Chat AI instance In chat-based AI systems, an assistant can be invoked across many independent conversation sessions (often called a thread), each with its own message history. A specific execution of the assistant over that session may be represented as a run (an execution on a thread). Class instance In object-oriented programming, an object created from a class type. Each instance of a class shares the class-defined structure and behavior but has its own identity and state. Procedural instance In some contexts (including Simula), each procedure call can be viewed as an instance of that procedure—an activation with its own parameters and local variables. Computer instance In cloud computing and virtualization, an instance commonly refers to a provisioned virtual machine or virtual server with an allocated combination of compute, memory, network, and storage resources. Polygonal model In computer graphics, a model may be instanced so it can be drawn multiple times with different transforms and parameters, improving performance by reusing shared geometry data. Program instance In a POSIX-oriented operating system, a running process is an instance of a program. It can be instantiated via system calls such as fork() and exec(). Each executing process is an instance of a program it has been instantiated from.
Language-Theoretic Security
Language-theoretic security, or LangSec, is an approach to software security that focuses on input handling, complexity, and program design as strategies to improve the verifiability of computer programs. It was introduced in 2005 by Robert J. Hansen and Meredith L. Patterson at BlackHat and in 2011 by Len Sassaman and Patterson. It aims to create a formal description of which software is likely to have security vulnerabilities of particular classes, and why. It considers programs to have an inherent parser component, whether or not explicit, composed of that part of the program which operates on external input before that input is fully parsed. A central hypothesis of language-theoretic security is that vulnerabilities in software increase according to the computational power of the notional input-accepting automaton equivalent to this parser, using the definitions of automata theory. The lower bound on this computational power is the input language complexity of the program. The extent to which reducing this complexity is possible is a function of the specification of the communication protocol or file format the program takes as input. == Parsing as a security mechanism == The behaviour of a program is defined with reference to its expected input. Unexpected input being used by a program is a factor in numerous security bugs, including the so-called Android master key vulnerability (CVE-2013-4787), because accepting unexpected input renders the program's specification ambiguous. In that instance, the unexpected ambiguity came in the form of a ZIP file with duplicate filenames. If a program fully parses its input and only acts on input that unambiguously meets the specification, it follows that the program will avoid these types of vulnerabilities. This is an intentional inversion of the Postel principle. Accepting only unambiguous and valid input is a more formal requirement than input validation or sanitization, and narrows the number of possible but unanticipated program states that can be induced in an application via user input. Conversely, failure to do this is associated with security vulnerabilities. Input sanitization in particular is held to be an inadequate approach to avoiding malicious input because it inherently ignores context-sensitive properties of the input; it can therefore result in paradoxical effects, such as sanitization code activating otherwise inert cross-site scripting payloads in browsers. === Parser differentials === If the language of accepted program input is sufficiently simple, it is possible to verify that two implementations parse the same input language consistently. This is advantageous because it shows no parser differential exists between the two implementations. The requisite level of simplicity is theoretically that for which there is a solution to the equivalence problem. If the two parsers involved in CVE-2013-4787 were equivalent - that is, if they rendered the same output state given the same input state - the vulnerability could not have existed. One strategy for doing this is to publish machine-readable specifications of a format or protocol, and then use a parser generator to generate the parser code. An example of a parser generator built for this purpose is DaeDaLus. The combination of Lex with any of GNU Bison, ANTLR, or Yacc also accomplishes this. However, many parser generators allow the mixing of general purpose code with the parsing definitions, which weakens the guarantees provided by parsing. === Analysis of injection attacks === Injection attacks are generally the result of differences between the serializer (or "unparser") and the corresponding parser at a layer boundary in a system; therefore, they are a special case of parser differentials. In a SQL injection attack, for example, an attacker is able to cause the application with which they are interacting to serialize a SQL query that has different semantics than intended. In the simplest case where the payload ends a string and adds new code, the payload has crossed the code-data boundary in SQL. In language-theoretic security, this is treated as a bug in the serializer of the SQL query, which should instead be written in a way that constrains its possible outputs to those within the scope of the intended query. === Parser combinators === If a parser generator is not used, it is still possible to avoid implementation bugs by using parser combinator such as Nom to implement the parser code. This has the drawback of relying on a programmer correctly translating the specification into the language of the parser generator library, though this task is still less error-prone than hand-coding a parser. == Input format complexity == Complexity in computer programs is associated with security vulnerabilities. Within the domain of language-theoretic security, complexity is described with reference to the computational power of the abstract machine necessary to implement the program, or more particularly, to implement the parser for its input language. This complexity describes whether it is possible to show that there is no unintended or undesired functionality in the program which might be exploitable by an attacker. To be bounded in complexity, the program's input must be well-defined both in terms of form and of semantics. === Weird machines === A weird machine is a model of computation in a program that exists in parallel with, but is distinct from, the intended abstract model of computation in that program. Some classes of weird machine arise from the multi-layered nature of computer programs, or the context in which the programs run; others result from the unanticipated functionality a program has due to its complexity or to software bugs. The more complex the computation model of a program, the more likely it is to implement a weird machine. Depending on context, the weird machine may or may not be concretely useful for an attacker. Since the space of weird machines in the context of some program is the universe of all possible states that are not within the program's intended states, many exploited states including remote code execution and injection attacks belong to the domain of weird machines. A reduction in weird machines is therefore a likely correlate with reduced program vulnerability. === SafeDocs project === SafeDocs is a DARPA project undertaken in 2018 to take existing file formats, create safer subsets of them, and develop programming tools to work for the safer formats. The initial test case for this was PDF. The purpose of creating safer subsets in this case is to lower the minimum bound on parser complexity so that it becomes possible to create tools that will generate correct, normative parsers for them. == Relation to programming languages == The analytic framework of language-theoretic security assumes programs to be virtual machines that execute their input. A document that is read by an application is in this sense a form of machine code, in a generalization of the data as code idea, following the automata theory description of parsers. === Type-safe programming languages === Parsing input and serializing output are operations that consume one data type and emit another. A programming language can therefore check that data is correctly parsed and contains the expected structure by checking data types, and correct serializing (or unparsing) can be implemented as operations on the data types that are relevant to the program's output. This approach can be used to show that the recognizer and unparser patterns have been implemented. It is also possible to implement type checking across a distributed system to enforce parsing and unparsing of the expected structures and to verify that the assumptions made in designing the compositional properties of a distributed system have been followed. === Memory-safe programming languages === In the general case, spatial memory correctness is undecidable. If any proof of spatial memory correctness is to be made, it is therefore necessary to bound the complexity of the code. Interpreted languages such as Java and Python effectively accomplish this via runtime bounds checking, and frameworks for runtime bounds checking also exist for C. The effect of these strategies for spatial memory correctness are to create a halt state in place of a spatial memory correctness violation; therefore, it can be shown that the program will not violate spatial memory correctness, but in exchange, it cannot be shown in the general case that programs will not have runtime bounds checking exceptions. Some programming languages, such as Rust, accomplish this using borrow checking. The borrow checker acts to assure spatial memory correctness by compile-time reference counting. Code for which spatial memory correctness cannot be shown to not be violated therefore does not compile, inherently limiting the complexity of the spatial memory correctness of the program to what is decidable. Thi
Neural computation
Neural computation is the information processing performed by networks of neurons. Neural computation is affiliated with the philosophical tradition of computationalism, which advances the thesis that neural computation explains cognition. Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts were the first to propose an account of neural activity as being computational in their seminal 1943 paper "A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity." There are three general branches of computationalism, including classicism, connectionism, and computational neuroscience. All three branches agree that cognition is computation, however, they disagree on what sorts of computations constitute cognition. The classicism tradition believes that computation in the brain is digital, analogous to digital computing. Both connectionism and computational neuroscience do not require that the computations that realize cognition are necessarily digital computations. However, the two branches greatly disagree upon which sorts of experimental data should be used to construct explanatory models of cognitive phenomena. Connectionists rely upon behavioral evidence to construct models to explain cognitive phenomena, whereas computational neuroscience leverages neuroanatomical and neurophysiological information to construct mathematical models that explain cognition. When comparing the three main traditions of the computational theory of mind, as well as the different possible forms of computation in the brain, it is helpful to define what we mean by computation in a general sense. Computation is the processing of information, otherwise known as variables or entities, according to a set of rules. A rule in this sense is simply an instruction for executing a manipulation on the current state of the variable, in order to produce a specified output. In other words, a rule dictates which output to produce given a certain input to the computing system. A computing system is a mechanism whose components must be functionally organized to process the information in accordance with the established set of rules. The types of information processed by a computing system determine which type of computations it performs. Traditionally in cognitive science, there have been two proposed types of computation related to neural activity, digital and analog, with the vast majority of theoretical work incorporating a digital understanding of cognition. Computing systems that perform digital computation are functionally organized to execute operations on strings of digits with respect to the type and location of the digit on the string. It has been argued that neural spike train signaling implements some form of digital computation, since neural spikes may be considered as discrete units or digits, like 0 or 1—the neuron either fires an action potential or it does not. Accordingly, neural spike trains could be seen as strings of digits. Alternatively, analog computing systems perform manipulations on non-discrete, irreducibly continuous variables, that is, entities that vary continuously as a function of time. These sorts of operations are characterized by systems of differential equations. Neural computation can be studied by, for example, building models of neural computation. Work on artificial neural networks has been somewhat inspired by knowledge of neural computation.