The EuroMatrixPlus is a project that ran from March 2009 to February 2012. EuroMatrixPlus succeeded a project called EuroMatrix (September 2006 to February 2009) and continued in further development and improvement of machine translation (MT) systems for languages of the European Union (EU). == Project objectives == EuroMatrixPlus focused on achieving several goals: To continue advance of MT technology (create MT systems for all official EU languages and provide other MT researchers with existing data and infrastructure). To continually expand and investigate different MT approaches and techniques; to stay open to novel combinations of methods of MT. To bring MT to the users. Users post-edit output of statistical models and the system learns from the feedback and improves itself. Two groups of users were aimed at: Professional translators and translation agencies Users who voluntarily translate texts into their native language To contribute to MT research in Europe. To produce sample application for automatic translation of news and web pages and make that application freely accessible. == Outcome == EuroMatrixPlus contributed to MT field in several ways. It continued in development of an open source statistical MT engine Moses. The project worked on research in hybrid approaches to MT (combination of rule-based and statistical techniques). Several “MT Marathons” and annual evaluation campaigns were organized by the project. The project also resulted in releasing of 196 scientific publications. The results of the work were arranged into ten work packages: WP1: Rich Tree-Based Statistical Translation WP2: Hybrid Machine Translation WP3: Advanced Learning Methods for MT WP4: Open Source Tools and Data WP5: "WikiTrans" Translation Environments WP6: Integrated Localisation Workflow WP7: Evaluation Campaign WP8: Project Management and Dissemination WP9: Integrating Slovak Language Resources WP10: HPSG-based Statistical Translation === Software and data === Here is a list of software and data that were released by the project: Appraise – an open source tool for manual evaluation of MT output BURGER – Bulgarian Resource BulTreeBank – Treebank of Bulgarian CSLM toolkit – free tool for training continuous space language models (CSLM) to large tasks Caitra – tool for post-editing MT results Europarl – European Parliament parallel corpus IRSTLM toolkit – tool for training language models Joshua – an open-source statistical machine translation decoder for hierarchical and syntax-based MT MT Server Land – an open-source architecture for MT Moses – statistical MT MultiUN Corpora – parallel corpus extracted from the United Nations Website PCEDT 2.0 – Prague Czech-English Dependency Treebank PEDT 2.0 – English part of the Prague Czech-English Dependency Treebank Slovak corpora – English-Slovak and Czech-Slovak as well as a Slovak-English and a Slovak-Czech parallel corpus Slovak treebank – A dependency treebank TermEx – RBMT-Suited Statistical Terminology Extraction Tool Treex, TectoMT == Funding == The EuroMatrixPlus project was sponsored by EU Information Society Technology program. Total cost of the project was 5 942 121 €, from which the European Union contributed 4 266 896 €. == Project members == To ensure advance in MT, several organizations that are experts in various disciplines (linguistics, computer science, mathematics, translation) were brought together to cooperate on EuroMatrixPlus. The consortium consisted of academic as well as commercial partners. Academic partners were the University of Edinburgh (United Kingdom), DFKI – German Research Centre for Artificial Intelligence (Germany), Charles University (Czech Republic), Johns Hopkins University (United States), University of Le Mans (France), Fondazione Bruno Kessler (Italy), Dublin City University (Ireland). Two institutions joined about one year into the project. These were the L'udovít Štúr Institute of Linguistics (Slovak Republic) and IICT – Institute of Information and Communication Technologies at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (Bulgaria). Commercial partners included Lucy Software and Services GmbH (Germany) and CEET s.r.o. (Czech Republic). Coordination of the project was in hands of DFKI with its Language Technology Lab in Saarbrücken. The principal investigator and scientific coordinator was Hans Uszkoreit, a professor of Computational Linguistics at Saarland University.
Kernel Assisted Superuser
Kernel Assisted Superuser (short: KernelSU) is an alternative method for obtaining root privileges on Android devices. KernelSU implementations are developed as free and open-source software under the terms of the GPLv3 license. == Technical differences == KernelSU differs from other methods in that root access is implemented directly in the kernel. Compared to other root methods that run in userspace, such as Magisk, this has the advantage that commands with su can be executed like normal commands, but still have root privileges. This is not prevented by SELinux or detected by the PlayIntegrity API check, so applications that use it will continue to function. Unlike Magisk, /system/bin/su is a virtual file implemented by hooking system calls with kprobes, and overlayfs is used for systemless modifications to the system partition instead of magic mount. == History == The planning of KernelSU was started in 2018 by developer Jason Donenfeld, also known as XDA user zx2c4. The lack of a root manager app and the difficulty of creating boot images meant that KernelSU was not suitable for productive use, and for a long time this method remained theoretical and could only be used by developers. In 2021, Google launched Generic Kernel Images (GKI for short), which facilitates the creation of a set of device-independent rooted boot images. In response, the developer known on XDA as weishu, who had also worked on projects such as VirtualXposed, adapted KernelSU for GKI-compatible kernels. The adaptation, which was released in January 2023, ensures that any device booting with Linux kernel version 5.10 or higher should be compatible. In addition, the developer also offers a special manager app that, in addition to managing root privileges, also offers overlay-based modding similar to Magisk modules. As of November 2025, 310 developers have contributed to the development of the KernelSU implementation. == Distribution == KernelSU can be installed on all devices that use GKI, as well as on individually supported devices without GKI. Some custom ROMs already have it integrated by default, including ROMs such as CrDroid, Bliss OS, and Evolution X.
Airborne Networking
An Airborne Network (AN) is the infrastructure owned by the United States Air Force that provides communication transport services through at least one node that is on a platform capable of flight. == Background == === Definition === The intent of the US Air Force's Airborne Network is to expand the Global Information Grid (GIG) to connect the three major domains of warfare: Air, Space, and Terrestrial. The Transformational Satellite Communications System network currently provides connectivity for all communication through space assets. The Combat Information Transport System and Theater Deployable Communications provide terrestrial connectivity for theatre based operations. The Airborne Network is engineered to utilize all airborne assets to connect with space and surface networks building a seamless communications platform across all domains. === Capabilities === The capabilities identified by this type of system are vastly beyond that of our current military. This system will enable the Air Force to provide a transportable network, flexible enough to communicate with any air, space, or ground asset in the area. The network will provide a beyond line-of-sight (LoS) communications infrastructure that can be packed up and moved in and out of the designated battlespace, enabling the military to have a reliable and secure communications network that extends globally. The network is designed to be flexible enough to provide the right communication and network packages for a specific region, mission, or technology. Operationally, The AN is designed to be self-forming, self-organizing, and self-generating, with nodes joining and leaving the network as they enter and exit a specific region. The network consists of dedicated tactical links, wideband air-to-air links, and ad hoc networks constructed by the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) networking services. JTRS is a software-defined radio that will work with many existing military and civilian radios. It includes integrated encryption and Wideband Networking Software to create mobile ad hoc networks. It also provides system performance analysis and fault diagnostics automatically, reducing the demand for human intervention and network maintenance. === Intended Use === The AN was designed as the cornerstone for the new military doctrine known as Network Centric Warfare. This doctrine was developed to use information superiority to equip warfighters with more precise information enabling commanders and shooters to make smarter decisions faster. The AN contributes to Network Centric Warfare by enabling commanders to provide real-time information to warfighters in the air and on the ground. Warfighters can then utilize more information and make more educated decisions about how to act in a particular situation. Once the act has been carried out commanders will have immediate information about the result and can make judgments on how to continue. All-in-all the AN was designed to reduce the time necessary to identify a target, make clear and educated decisions to pull or not to pull the trigger, and assess battle == Topologies == There are four main network topologies that will be deployed and vary based on the placement of backbone and subnet class networks. === Space, Air, Ground Tether === Establishing a direct connection to another aircraft or ground node, via a point-to-point link for nodes within LOS or via a Satellite Communications (SATCOM) link for nodes that are beyond line-of-sight is known as tethering. SATCOM links provide connectivity to a network ground entry point. Strike aircraft that accompany C2 aircraft such as an AWACS are tethered via point-to-point links. Finally, C2 or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissnce (ISR) aircraft may connect via a LOS link directly to a network ground entry point. Each of these tethered alternatives works exactly like a hub or switch that has an entry point to a larger network and allows their connected users access to that network. === Flat Ad Hoc === A flat ad hoc topology refers to establishing nonpersistent network connections as needed among AN nodes that are present at a given time. With this network the nodes dynamically “discover” other nodes to which they can interconnect and form the network. The specific interconnections between the nodes are not planned in advance, but are made as opportunities arise. The nodes join and leave the network at will, continually changing connections to neighbor nodes based upon their location and mobility characteristics. === Tiered Ad Hoc === Ad hoc networks can be flat in the sense that all nodes are peers of each other in a single network, as discussed above, or they can dynamically organize themselves into hierarchical tiers such that higher tiers are used to move data between more localized subnets. This network topology can be compared to any conventional deployed network that utilizes routers, switches, and hubs to temporarily connect users. === Persistent Backbone === A network topology characterized by a persistent backbone is established using relatively persistent wideband connections among high-value platforms flying relatively stable orbits. It provides the connectivity between the tactical subnets which are considered edge networks relative to the backbone. This provides concentration points for connectivity to the space backbone as well as to terrestrial networks. This type of network topology is comparable to a conventional permanent network with established data trunks, routers, switches, and hubs to connect users. == Architecture == === Network Management === The platform management system enables operators to manage all on-board network elements. It interfaces and interoperates with the Airborne Network management system to enable operators to manage remote network elements in the airborne network. The network management system monitors the health of the network by passively testing the network for faults and latency. The system will also actively troubleshoot faults with probes to identify and isolate faulty connections, and enables operators to apply network parameters and security changes to all systems based on the status of the network. === Routing/Switching === Routing and switching enables data to be dynamically transmitted over the network to other nodes. Routing protocols must be able to identify nodes transmitted within their own platform and data to be sent to other platforms regardless of the current topology. The routing protocol must also provide seamless roaming by ensuring that no routed packets are lost when a node changes its point of attachment to the network. Maintaining scalability is important in routing as the network is constantly changing. The network must be able to function with numerous levels of platforms, varying numbers of fast moving platforms, and varying amounts of traffic per platform. Routers and switches will use metrics to determine the best paths to take when routing data. The routing protocol utilized for the AN will be an Adaptive Quality of Service routing protocol. === Gateways/Proxies === Gateways and proxies enable the connection numerous technology types regardless of age to communicate across the IP-based network. Gateways and proxies are essential in the operation of this network because so many different technologies are used to communicate in each domain. These systems will facilitate the transition of the legacy on-board infrastructure, transmission systems, tactical data link systems, and user applications to the objective airborne network systems. Therefore, they are only temporary until all platforms use a standardized IP radio for transmission. === Performance Enhancing Proxies === Performance Enhancing Proxies improve the performance of user applications running across the Airborne Network by countering wireless network impairments, such as limited bandwidth, long delays, high loss rates, and disruptions in network connections. Proxy systems are implemented between the user application and the network and can be used to improve performance at the application and transport functional layers of the OSI model. Some techniques that can be employed include: Compression: Data compression or header compression can be used to minimize the number of bits sent over the network. Data bundling: Smaller data packets can be combined (bundled) into a single large packet for transmission over the network. Caching: A local cache can be used to save and provide data objects that are requested multiple times, reducing transmissions over the network (and improving response times). Store and forward: Message queuing can be used to ensure message delivery to users who become disconnected from the network or are unable to connect to the network for a period of time. Once the platform connects, the stored messages are sent. Pipelining: Rather than opening several separate network connections pipelining can be used to share a single networ
Multiple encryption
Multiple encryption is the process of encrypting an already encrypted message one or more times, either using the same or a different algorithm. It is also known as cascade encryption, cascade ciphering, cipher stacking, multiple encryption, and superencipherment. Superencryption refers to the outer-level encryption of a multiple encryption. Some cryptographers, like Matthew Green of Johns Hopkins University, say multiple encryption addresses a problem that mostly doesn't exist: Modern ciphers rarely get broken... You’re far more likely to get hit by malware or an implementation bug than you are to suffer a catastrophic attack on Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). However, from the previous quote an argument for multiple encryption can be made, namely poor implementation. Using two different cryptomodules and keying processes from two different vendors requires both vendors' wares to be compromised for security to fail completely. == Independent keys == Picking any two ciphers, if the key used is the same for both, the second cipher could possibly undo the first cipher, partly or entirely. This is true of ciphers where the decryption process is exactly the same as the encryption process (a reciprocal cipher) – the second cipher would completely undo the first. If an attacker were to recover the key through cryptanalysis of the first encryption layer, the attacker could possibly decrypt all the remaining layers, assuming the same key is used for all layers. To prevent that risk, one can use keys that are statistically independent for each layer (e.g. independent RNGs). Ideally each key should have separate and different generation, sharing, and management processes. == Independent Initialization Vectors == For en/decryption processes that require sharing an Initialization Vector (IV) / nonce these are typically, openly shared or made known to the recipient (and everyone else). Its good security policy never to provide the same data in both plaintext and ciphertext when using the same key and IV. Therefore, its recommended (although at this moment without specific evidence) to use separate IVs for each layer of encryption. == Importance of the first layer == With the exception of the one-time pad, no cipher has been theoretically proven to be unbreakable. Furthermore, some recurring properties may be found in the ciphertexts generated by the first cipher. Since those ciphertexts are the plaintexts used by the second cipher, the second cipher may be rendered vulnerable to attacks based on known plaintext properties (see references below). This is the case when the first layer is a program P that always adds the same string S of characters at the beginning (or end) of all ciphertexts (commonly known as a magic number). When found in a file, the string S allows an operating system to know that the program P has to be launched in order to decrypt the file. This string should be removed before adding a second layer. To prevent this kind of attack, one can use the method provided by Bruce Schneier: Generate a random pad R of the same size as the plaintext. Encrypt R using the first cipher and key. XOR the plaintext with the pad, then encrypt the result using the second cipher and a different (!) key. Concatenate both ciphertexts in order to build the final ciphertext. A cryptanalyst must break both ciphers to get any information. This will, however, have the drawback of making the ciphertext twice as long as the original plaintext. Note, however, that a weak first cipher may merely make a second cipher that is vulnerable to a chosen plaintext attack also vulnerable to a known plaintext attack. However, a block cipher must not be vulnerable to a chosen plaintext attack to be considered secure. Therefore, the second cipher described above is not secure under that definition, either. Consequently, both ciphers still need to be broken. The attack illustrates why strong assumptions are made about secure block ciphers and ciphers that are even partially broken should never be used. == The Rule of Two == The Rule of Two is a data security principle from the NSA's Commercial Solutions for Classified Program (CSfC). It specifies two completely independent layers of cryptography to protect data. For example, data could be protected by both hardware encryption at its lowest level and software encryption at the application layer. It could mean using two FIPS-validated software cryptomodules from different vendors to en/decrypt data. The importance of vendor and/or model diversity between the layers of components centers around removing the possibility that the manufacturers or models will share a vulnerability. This way if one components is compromised there is still an entire layer of encryption protecting the information at rest or in transit. The CSfC Program offers solutions to achieve diversity in two ways. "The first is to implement each layer using components produced by different manufacturers. The second is to use components from the same manufacturer, where that manufacturer has provided NSA with sufficient evidence that the implementations of the two components are independent of one another." The principle is practiced in the NSA's secure mobile phone called Fishbowl. The phones use two layers of encryption protocols, IPsec and Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP), to protect voice communications. The Samsung Galaxy S9 Tactical Edition is also an approved CSfC Component.
Protecting Our Kids from Social Media Addiction Act
Protecting Our Kids from Social Media Addiction Act also known as California SB 976 is a law that was enacted in September 2024 that is meant to address problematic social media usage among minors. The law prohibitions minors to have "addictive feeds" unless they have verifiable parental consent, minor's notifications are also restricted between 12 am to 6 am and during school hours between 8 am and 3 pm it also well requires minors to have default privacies settings and have social media companies to publicly disclose certain metrics about their users. The law was set to take effect in two steps the first being the restrictions on social media feeds, notifications, disclosures from social media companies and default settings which would have taken effect on January 1, 2025, and the age verification provision which would have taken effect on January 1, 2027. However, has faced legal challenges since its enactment delaying its enactment. == Legal Challenges == In November 2024 NetChoice a trade association representing many of the biggest social media companies such as YouTube, Facebook and Instagram sued the attorney general of California Rob Bonta hoping to get an injunction before the first set of the law's provisions would take effect in January of the next year. However, judge Edward Davila would only grant Netchoice's request as to the restrictions on notifications and public disclosures and would deny their request as to the rest of the law. The law was later fully enjoined temporarily by the District Court and Appellant Court pending appeal, and the case is now in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and is pending a decision. === Social media platforms challenges to law === In November 2025 Meta, Google and TikTok filed lawsuits against the law arguing it violates the first amendment.
Inception score
The Inception Score (IS) is an algorithm used to assess the quality of images created by a generative image model such as a generative adversarial network (GAN). The score is calculated based on the output of a separate, pretrained Inception v3 image classification model applied to a sample of (typically around 30,000) images generated by the generative model. The Inception Score is maximized when the following conditions are true: The entropy of the distribution of labels predicted by the Inceptionv3 model for the generated images is minimized. In other words, the classification model confidently predicts a single label for each image. Intuitively, this corresponds to the desideratum of generated images being "sharp" or "distinct". The predictions of the classification model are evenly distributed across all possible labels. This corresponds to the desideratum that the output of the generative model is "diverse". It has been somewhat superseded by the related Fréchet inception distance. While the Inception Score only evaluates the distribution of generated images, the FID compares the distribution of generated images with the distribution of a set of real images ("ground truth"). == Definition == Let there be two spaces, the space of images Ω X {\displaystyle \Omega _{X}} and the space of labels Ω Y {\displaystyle \Omega _{Y}} . The space of labels is finite. Let p g e n {\displaystyle p_{gen}} be a probability distribution over Ω X {\displaystyle \Omega _{X}} that we wish to judge. Let a discriminator be a function of type p d i s : Ω X → M ( Ω Y ) {\displaystyle p_{dis}:\Omega _{X}\to M(\Omega _{Y})} where M ( Ω Y ) {\displaystyle M(\Omega _{Y})} is the set of all probability distributions on Ω Y {\displaystyle \Omega _{Y}} . For any image x {\displaystyle x} , and any label y {\displaystyle y} , let p d i s ( y | x ) {\displaystyle p_{dis}(y|x)} be the probability that image x {\displaystyle x} has label y {\displaystyle y} , according to the discriminator. It is usually implemented as an Inception-v3 network trained on ImageNet. The Inception Score of p g e n {\displaystyle p_{gen}} relative to p d i s {\displaystyle p_{dis}} is I S ( p g e n , p d i s ) := exp ( E x ∼ p g e n [ D K L ( p d i s ( ⋅ | x ) ‖ ∫ p d i s ( ⋅ | x ) p g e n ( x ) d x ) ] ) {\displaystyle IS(p_{gen},p_{dis}):=\exp \left(\mathbb {E} _{x\sim p_{gen}}\left[D_{KL}\left(p_{dis}(\cdot |x)\|\int p_{dis}(\cdot |x)p_{gen}(x)dx\right)\right]\right)} Equivalent rewrites include ln I S ( p g e n , p d i s ) := E x ∼ p g e n [ D K L ( p d i s ( ⋅ | x ) ‖ E x ∼ p g e n [ p d i s ( ⋅ | x ) ] ) ] {\displaystyle \ln IS(p_{gen},p_{dis}):=\mathbb {E} _{x\sim p_{gen}}\left[D_{KL}\left(p_{dis}(\cdot |x)\|\mathbb {E} _{x\sim p_{gen}}[p_{dis}(\cdot |x)]\right)\right]} ln I S ( p g e n , p d i s ) := H [ E x ∼ p g e n [ p d i s ( ⋅ | x ) ] ] − E x ∼ p g e n [ H [ p d i s ( ⋅ | x ) ] ] {\displaystyle \ln IS(p_{gen},p_{dis}):=H[\mathbb {E} _{x\sim p_{gen}}[p_{dis}(\cdot |x)]]-\mathbb {E} _{x\sim p_{gen}}[H[p_{dis}(\cdot |x)]]} ln I S {\displaystyle \ln IS} is nonnegative by Jensen's inequality. Pseudocode:INPUT discriminator p d i s {\displaystyle p_{dis}} . INPUT generator g {\displaystyle g} . Sample images x i {\displaystyle x_{i}} from generator. Compute p d i s ( ⋅ | x i ) {\displaystyle p_{dis}(\cdot |x_{i})} , the probability distribution over labels conditional on image x i {\displaystyle x_{i}} . Sum up the results to obtain p ^ {\displaystyle {\hat {p}}} , an empirical estimate of ∫ p d i s ( ⋅ | x ) p g e n ( x ) d x {\displaystyle \int p_{dis}(\cdot |x)p_{gen}(x)dx} . Sample more images x i {\displaystyle x_{i}} from generator, and for each, compute D K L ( p d i s ( ⋅ | x i ) ‖ p ^ ) {\displaystyle D_{KL}\left(p_{dis}(\cdot |x_{i})\|{\hat {p}}\right)} . Average the results, and take its exponential. RETURN the result. === Interpretation === A higher inception score is interpreted as "better", as it means that p g e n {\displaystyle p_{gen}} is a "sharp and distinct" collection of pictures. ln I S ( p g e n , p d i s ) ∈ [ 0 , ln N ] {\displaystyle \ln IS(p_{gen},p_{dis})\in [0,\ln N]} , where N {\displaystyle N} is the total number of possible labels. ln I S ( p g e n , p d i s ) = 0 {\displaystyle \ln IS(p_{gen},p_{dis})=0} iff for almost all x ∼ p g e n {\displaystyle x\sim p_{gen}} p d i s ( ⋅ | x ) = ∫ p d i s ( ⋅ | x ) p g e n ( x ) d x {\displaystyle p_{dis}(\cdot |x)=\int p_{dis}(\cdot |x)p_{gen}(x)dx} That means p g e n {\displaystyle p_{gen}} is completely "indistinct". That is, for any image x {\displaystyle x} sampled from p g e n {\displaystyle p_{gen}} , discriminator returns exactly the same label predictions p d i s ( ⋅ | x ) {\displaystyle p_{dis}(\cdot |x)} . The highest inception score N {\displaystyle N} is achieved if and only if the two conditions are both true: For almost all x ∼ p g e n {\displaystyle x\sim p_{gen}} , the distribution p d i s ( y | x ) {\displaystyle p_{dis}(y|x)} is concentrated on one label. That is, H y [ p d i s ( y | x ) ] = 0 {\displaystyle H_{y}[p_{dis}(y|x)]=0} . That is, every image sampled from p g e n {\displaystyle p_{gen}} is exactly classified by the discriminator. For every label y {\displaystyle y} , the proportion of generated images labelled as y {\displaystyle y} is exactly E x ∼ p g e n [ p d i s ( y | x ) ] = 1 N {\displaystyle \mathbb {E} _{x\sim p_{gen}}[p_{dis}(y|x)]={\frac {1}{N}}} . That is, the generated images are equally distributed over all labels.
Backdoor (computing)
A backdoor is a typically covert method of bypassing normal authentication or encryption in a computer, product, embedded device (e.g. a home router), or its embodiment (e.g. part of a cryptosystem, algorithm, chipset, or even a "homunculus computer"—a tiny computer-within-a-computer such as that found in Intel's AMT technology). Backdoors are most often used for securing remote access to a computer, or obtaining access to plaintext in cryptosystems. From there it may be used to gain access to privileged information like passwords, corrupt or delete data on hard drives, or transfer information within compromised networks. In the United States, the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act forces internet providers to provide backdoors for government authorities. In 2024, the U.S. government realized that China had been tapping communications in the U.S. using that infrastructure for months, or perhaps longer; China recorded presidential candidate campaign office phone calls—including employees of the then-vice president of the nation, and of the candidates themselves. A backdoor may take the form of a hidden part of a program, a separate program (e.g. Back Orifice may subvert the system through a rootkit), code in the firmware of the hardware, or parts of an operating system such as Windows, for example, device drivers. Trojan horses can be used to create vulnerabilities in a device. A Trojan horse may appear to be an entirely legitimate program, but when executed, it triggers an activity that may install a backdoor. Although some are secretly installed, other backdoors are deliberate and widely known. These kinds of backdoors have "legitimate" uses such as providing the manufacturer with a way to restore user passwords. Many systems that store information within the cloud fail to create accurate security measures. If many systems are connected within the cloud, hackers can gain access to all other platforms through the most vulnerable system. Default passwords (or other default credentials) can function as backdoors if they are not changed by the user. Some debugging features can also act as backdoors if they are not removed in the release version. In 1993, the United States government attempted to deploy an encryption system, the Clipper chip, with an explicit backdoor for law enforcement and national security access. The chip was unsuccessful. Recent proposals to counter backdoors include creating a database of backdoors' triggers and then using neural networks to detect them. == Overview == The threat of backdoors surfaced when multiuser and networked operating systems became widely adopted. Petersen and Turn discussed computer subversion in a paper published in the proceedings of the 1967 AFIPS Conference. They noted a class of active infiltration attacks that use "trapdoor" entry points into the system to bypass security facilities and permit direct access to data. The use of the word trapdoor here clearly coincides with more recent definitions of a backdoor. However, since the advent of public key cryptography the term trapdoor has acquired a different meaning (see: Trapdoor function), and thus the term "backdoor" is now preferred, only after the term trapdoor went out of use. More generally, such security breaches were discussed at length in a RAND Corporation task force report published under DARPA sponsorship by J.P. Anderson and D.J. Edwards in 1970. While initially targeting the computer vision domain, backdoor attacks have expanded to encompass various other domains, including text, audio, ML-based computer-aided design, and ML-based wireless signal classification. Additionally, vulnerabilities in backdoors have been demonstrated in deep generative models, reinforcement learning (e.g., AI GO), and deep graph models. These broad-ranging potential risks have prompted concerns from national security agencies regarding their potentially disastrous consequences. A backdoor in a login system might take the form of a hard coded user and password combination which gives access to the system. An example of this sort of backdoor was used as a plot device in the 1983 film WarGames, in which the architect of the "WOPR" computer system had inserted a hardcoded password-less account which gave the user access to the system, and to undocumented parts of the system (in particular, a video game-like simulation mode and direct interaction with the artificial intelligence). Although the number of backdoors in systems using proprietary software (software whose source code is not publicly available) is not widely credited, they are nevertheless frequently exposed. Programmers have even succeeded in secretly installing large amounts of benign code as Easter eggs in programs, although such cases may involve official forbearance, if not actual permission. == Examples == === Worms === Many computer worms, such as Sobig and Mydoom, install a backdoor on the affected computer (generally a PC on broadband running Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Outlook). Such backdoors appear to be installed so that spammers can send junk e-mail from the infected machines. Others, such as the Sony/BMG rootkit, placed secretly on millions of music CDs through late 2005, are intended as DRM measures—and, in that case, as data-gathering agents, since both surreptitious programs they installed routinely contacted central servers. A sophisticated attempt to plant a backdoor in the Linux kernel, exposed in November 2003, added a small and subtle code change by subverting the revision control system. In this case, a two-line change appeared to check root access permissions of a caller to the sys_wait4 function, but because it used assignment = instead of equality checking ==, it actually granted permissions to the system. This difference is easily overlooked, and could even be interpreted as an accidental typographical error, rather than an intentional attack. In January 2014, a backdoor was discovered in certain Samsung Android products, like the Galaxy devices. The Samsung proprietary Android versions are fitted with a backdoor that provides remote access to the data stored on the device. In particular, the Samsung Android software that is in charge of handling the communications with the modem, using the Samsung IPC protocol, implements a class of requests known as remote file server (RFS) commands, that allows the backdoor operator to perform via modem remote I/O operations on the device hard disk or other storage. As the modem is running Samsung proprietary Android software, it is likely that it offers over-the-air remote control that could then be used to issue the RFS commands and thus to access the file system on the device. === Object code backdoors === Harder to detect backdoors involve modifying object code, rather than source code—object code is much harder to inspect, as it is designed to be machine-readable, not human-readable. These backdoors can be inserted either directly in the on-disk object code, or inserted at some point during compilation, assembly linking, or loading—in the latter case the backdoor never appears on disk, only in memory. Object code backdoors are difficult to detect by inspection of the object code, but are easily detected by simply checking for changes (differences), notably in length or in checksum, and in some cases can be detected or analyzed by disassembling the object code. Further, object code backdoors can be removed (assuming source code is available) by simply recompiling from source on a trusted system. Thus for such backdoors to avoid detection, all extant copies of a binary must be subverted, and any validation checksums must also be compromised, and source must be unavailable, to prevent recompilation. Alternatively, these other tools (length checks, diff, checksumming, disassemblers) can themselves be compromised to conceal the backdoor, for example detecting that the subverted binary is being checksummed and returning the expected value, not the actual value. To conceal these further subversions, the tools must also conceal the changes in themselves—for example, a subverted checksummer must also detect if it is checksumming itself (or other subverted tools) and return false values. This leads to extensive changes in the system and tools being needed to conceal a single change. As object code can be regenerated by recompiling (reassembling, relinking) the original source code, making a persistent object code backdoor (without modifying source code) requires subverting the compiler itself—so that when it detects that it is compiling the program under attack it inserts the backdoor—or alternatively the assembler, linker, or loader. As this requires subverting the compiler, this in turn can be fixed by recompiling the compiler, removing the backdoor insertion code. This defense can in turn be subverted by putting a source meta-backdoor in the compiler, so that when it detects that it is compiling itself