The 2028 Global Intelligence Crisis is a report authored by James van Geelen and Alap Shah and published by Citrini Research in February 2026, on the impact of artificial intelligence on humanity's future. Written in the form of a scenario analysis, it was viewed millions of times online and reportedly caused a fall in the stock market prices of major tech and financial firms. It also received criticism among others, for its allegedly flawed economic logic. The 'thought exercise', as the authors called it, painted a gloomy picture for the near future, where outputs keep growing while consumer's ability to spend collapses. "...driven by ai agents that don’t sleep, take sick days or require health insurance”, "outputs that are shown in national accounts increases, "but never circulates through the real economy"(which the report calls 'Ghost GDP'), the authors argued. In other words, the authors predict a scenario where the owners of the AI firms will accumulate a vast fortune but there will be scant demand from consumers as AI would cause massive unemployment. The authors caution the reader that what they make is a scenario and not a prediction. In the scenario they visualise, any service whose value proposition is “I will navigate complexity that you find tedious” is getting disrupted. The reports argues that the unique ability of human beings to analyse, decide, create, persuade, and coordinate was “the thing that could not be replicated at scale,” and call the historical scarcity of this precious entity 'friction'. When this friction becomes zero, a gamut of changes occur which then triggers a cascading of changes across the economy. ”Travel booking platforms are an early casualty; Financial advice. tax prep., and routine legal work follow suit. National unemployment rate go as high 10.2% and the S&P 500 goes for a massive 38% peak-to-trough crash. In contrast to the previous technological revolutions the high-earning professionals suffers more and get forced to take up roles in the gig economy. Labour supply becomes abundant and this cuts wages all across the economy. The dent in income for the employees then affects other sectors of the economy such as the residential mortgage market. The losses for the software companies triggers loan defaults and heralds peril for the private credit sector.
SAP Cloud Infrastructure
SAP Cloud Infrastructure is an SAP-operated IaaS cloud platform, used to run SAP’s cloud business and customer-facing deployments for SAP and non-SAP workloads. It is developed and operated with open-source technologies within SAP’s data center network, based on OpenStack and Kubernetes and supporting SAP S/4HANA and general-purpose applications. It offers compute, storage, and platform services that are accessible to SAP customers. == History == In 2012, SAP promoted aspects of cloud computing. In October 2012, SAP announced a platform as a service called the SAP Cloud Platform. In May 2013, a managed private cloud called the S/4HANA Enterprise Cloud service was announced. SAP Converged Cloud was announced in January 2015. SAP Converged Cloud was originally developed as SAP's internal standardized Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) offering to support SAP’s cloud solutions. Originating from SAP Converged Cloud, SAP Cloud Infrastructure was developed and announced as SAP’s cloud computing offering that is provided for both SAP and customer workloads. In 2025, it had a global footprint of 15 regions and 29 data centers, encompassing more than 200,000 active VMs and over 6,000 hypervisors. In September 2025, SAP announced an expansion of its European “SAP Sovereign Cloud” portfolio, explicitly naming SAP Cloud Infrastructure (alongside SAP Sovereign Cloud On-Site) as part of the stack positioned for public sector and regulated environments. == Services and Features == SAP Cloud Infrastructure (SCI) is an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) offering by SAP that provides virtual compute, storage, and networking services, together with identity, key management, and operational services. SCI follows a self-service model and is managed via APIs and a web-based user interface. === Compute === SCI provides virtual machine instances that can be provisioned from operating system images and selected in predefined sizes (“flavors”). It supports lifecycle operations such as create/modify/resize/delete, power control, and snapshots; instances can be organized into server groups to influence placement policies. === Storage === SCI provides persistent storage services including: Block storage (virtual volumes) with attach/detach to instances, online expansion, cloning, snapshots, and provisioning volumes from images or snapshots. Object storage (containers and objects) managed via API/CLI with access control lists (ACLs) and configurable redundancy options. File storage (shared file systems) with access controls, online resize, snapshots/restore, and replication across availability zones. === Networking === SCI provides software-defined networking (SDN) for tenant networks (networks, subnets, routers) and connectivity features such as floating IPs for public reachability. Network security controls include security groups and firewall policies; connectivity options include BGP-based VPN networking. === Load balancing and DNS === SCI includes managed load balancing for distributing traffic across backend instances and an authoritative DNS service (DNSaaS) with API-based management of DNS zones and records, including options for zone sharing/transfer across projects/tenants and service integrations for automated record creation. === Identity, access, and key management === SCI includes identity and access management for authentication/authorization in projects/tenants (for example token handling, role assignment, and credential management) and key/secrets management for storing and controlling access to secret material such as keys and certificates, including support for different backends (depending on configuration). === Cloud-native services === SCI includes a container image registry (image push/pull, access policies, and lifecycle controls) and an auto-scaling capability for file shares based on configurable rules. === Observability and audit === SCI includes metrics and audit logging capabilities for operational monitoring and for listing/filtering audit-relevant events across services. === Availability and service levels === SCI documentation describes availability-related features such as load balancing, storage redundancy options, and replication for file shares across availability zones. SAP cloud services are governed by contractual service-level agreements (SLA); SAP Cloud Infrastructure references an SLA supplement defining infrastructure-specific terms when referenced in order forms. === SAP cloud services === SAP cloud services can run on different underlying infrastructures, including SAP Cloud Infrastructure in addition to SAP NS2 or hyperscalers. SAP cloud solutions available on SAP Cloud Infrastructure include SAP Cloud ERP, SAP HCM, SAP Solutions for Spend Management, Supply Chain Management, Business Transformation Management, and SAP Business Technology Platform (including related analytics and business data solutions). For example, SAP HANA Cloud documentation lists SAP Cloud Infrastructure as one of the supported infrastructures alongside hyperscalers. === Sustainability === SAP describes sustainability initiatives for its data centers, including energy-efficient infrastructure (for example, advanced cooling systems and power management), renewable electricity usage where feasible, and operational practices such as recycling electronic waste and minimizing water usage. SAP also references environmental management and energy management standards such as ISO 14001 and ISO 50001 for its data center operations. SAP-owned data centers run with 100% renewable electricity and that renewable electricity has been used since 2014 to power SAP facilities including owned data centers and co-locations. == SAP Cloud Infrastructure for SAP Sovereign Cloud == SAP Sovereign Cloud is a portfolio of SAP solutions designed to help organizations adopt SAP cloud solutions such as the SAP Cloud ERP while maintaining control over data, infrastructure, and compliance in line with local laws and regulations. The portfolio offers multiple deployment options, including SAP Cloud Infrastructure and SAP Sovereign Cloud On-Site, alongside sovereign hyperscaler-based options such as via SAP NS2, and targets customers such as public-sector bodies and other highly regulated organizations. In Europe, SAP Cloud Infrastructure is an Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) deployment option within SAP Sovereign Cloud for SAP and customer / third party workloads, operated on SAP’s data center network and developed using open-source technologies, with customer data stored within the European Union. Sovereignty-related characteristics for the SAP Cloud Infrastructure include: EU footprint and ownership model: SAP-operated data centers in Germany include sites in St. Leon-Rot and Walldorf, and co-location sites in Frankfurt. EU AI Cloud: EU AI Cloud is a sovereign AI offering for Europe that provides secure, compliant environments for building and running AI, including governed access to auditable large language models from SAP and partners. It offers AI models on the SAP Cloud Infrastructure and SAP Business Technology Platform (SAP BTP), enabling deployment of AI applications and models on high-performance European infrastructure (including accelerator/GPU-based compute for AI workloads). Availability zones and secure interconnect: Three availability zones in three independent data centers in Germany, connected via SAP-owned fiber on SAP-owned property. Facility and security standards: ISO/IEC 27001 governance of delivery and operations of SAP cloud services and SAP-owned data centers. Additional facility and availability standards: EN 50600 availability class 3 (European data centre standard) and/or ISO/IEC 22237 availability class 3 (international equivalent). Technology foundation: Based on open-source cloud infrastructure framework (OpenStack) and Kubernetes, without dependencies on hyperscaler technologies. Sovereignty controls: Data sovereignty (data residency), operational sovereignty (administration and maintenance restricted to approved, security-cleared personnel), technical sovereignty (locally hosted control planes with separation via encryption or dedicated infrastructure), and legal sovereignty (use of locally based legal entities or those in approved countries). Classified information processing: Roadmap to meet high and very high requirements for handling classified or sensitive information under European regulatory and security regimes. Public-sector readiness and EU sovereignty assurance levels: Implemented to meet SEAL-3 (Digital Resilience) and SEAL-4 (Full Digital Sovereignty) of the European Commission’s Cloud Sovereignty Framework. Staffing constraints: Operations model selectable to restrict sensitive operations to vetted personnel from EU or NATO countries.
Algorithmic inference
Algorithmic inference gathers new developments in the statistical inference methods made feasible by the powerful computing devices widely available to any data analyst. Cornerstones in this field are computational learning theory, granular computing, bioinformatics, and, long ago, structural probability (Fraser 1966). The main focus is on the algorithms which compute statistics rooting the study of a random phenomenon, along with the amount of data they must feed on to produce reliable results. This shifts the interest of mathematicians from the study of the distribution laws to the functional properties of the statistics, and the interest of computer scientists from the algorithms for processing data to the information they process. == The Fisher parametric inference problem == Concerning the identification of the parameters of a distribution law, the mature reader may recall lengthy disputes in the mid 20th century about the interpretation of their variability in terms of fiducial distribution (Fisher 1956), structural probabilities (Fraser 1966), priors/posteriors (Ramsey 1925), and so on. From an epistemology viewpoint, this entailed a companion dispute as to the nature of probability: is it a physical feature of phenomena to be described through random variables or a way of synthesizing data about a phenomenon? Opting for the latter, Fisher defines a fiducial distribution law of parameters of a given random variable that he deduces from a sample of its specifications. With this law he computes, for instance "the probability that μ (mean of a Gaussian variable – omeur note) is less than any assigned value, or the probability that it lies between any assigned values, or, in short, its probability distribution, in the light of the sample observed". == The classic solution == Fisher fought hard to defend the difference and superiority of his notion of parameter distribution in comparison to analogous notions, such as Bayes' posterior distribution, Fraser's constructive probability and Neyman's confidence intervals. For half a century, Neyman's confidence intervals won out for all practical purposes, crediting the phenomenological nature of probability. With this perspective, when you deal with a Gaussian variable, its mean μ is fixed by the physical features of the phenomenon you are observing, where the observations are random operators, hence the observed values are specifications of a random sample. Because of their randomness, you may compute from the sample specific intervals containing the fixed μ with a given probability that you denote confidence. === Example === Let X be a Gaussian variable with parameters μ {\displaystyle \mu } and σ 2 {\displaystyle \sigma ^{2}} and { X 1 , … , X m } {\displaystyle \{X_{1},\ldots ,X_{m}\}} a sample drawn from it. Working with statistics S μ = ∑ i = 1 m X i {\displaystyle S_{\mu }=\sum _{i=1}^{m}X_{i}} and S σ 2 = ∑ i = 1 m ( X i − X ¯ ) 2 , where X ¯ = S μ m {\displaystyle S_{\sigma ^{2}}=\sum _{i=1}^{m}(X_{i}-{\overline {X}})^{2},{\text{ where }}{\overline {X}}={\frac {S_{\mu }}{m}}} is the sample mean, we recognize that T = S μ − m μ S σ 2 m − 1 m = X ¯ − μ S σ 2 / ( m ( m − 1 ) ) {\displaystyle T={\frac {S_{\mu }-m\mu }{\sqrt {S_{\sigma ^{2}}}}}{\sqrt {\frac {m-1}{m}}}={\frac {{\overline {X}}-\mu }{\sqrt {S_{\sigma ^{2}}/(m(m-1))}}}} follows a Student's t distribution (Wilks 1962) with parameter (degrees of freedom) m − 1, so that f T ( t ) = Γ ( m / 2 ) Γ ( ( m − 1 ) / 2 ) 1 π ( m − 1 ) ( 1 + t 2 m − 1 ) m / 2 . {\displaystyle f_{T}(t)={\frac {\Gamma (m/2)}{\Gamma ((m-1)/2)}}{\frac {1}{\sqrt {\pi (m-1)}}}\left(1+{\frac {t^{2}}{m-1}}\right)^{m/2}.} Gauging T between two quantiles and inverting its expression as a function of μ {\displaystyle \mu } you obtain confidence intervals for μ {\displaystyle \mu } . With the sample specification: x = { 7.14 , 6.3 , 3.9 , 6.46 , 0.2 , 2.94 , 4.14 , 4.69 , 6.02 , 1.58 } {\displaystyle \mathbf {x} =\{7.14,6.3,3.9,6.46,0.2,2.94,4.14,4.69,6.02,1.58\}} having size m = 10, you compute the statistics s μ = 43.37 {\displaystyle s_{\mu }=43.37} and s σ 2 = 46.07 {\displaystyle s_{\sigma ^{2}}=46.07} , and obtain a 0.90 confidence interval for μ {\displaystyle \mu } with extremes (3.03, 5.65). == Inferring functions with the help of a computer == From a modeling perspective the entire dispute looks like a chicken-egg dilemma: either fixed data by first and probability distribution of their properties as a consequence, or fixed properties by first and probability distribution of the observed data as a corollary. The classic solution has one benefit and one drawback. The former was appreciated particularly back when people still did computations with sheet and pencil. Per se, the task of computing a Neyman confidence interval for the fixed parameter θ is hard: you do not know θ, but you look for disposing around it an interval with a possibly very low probability of failing. The analytical solution is allowed for a very limited number of theoretical cases. Vice versa a large variety of instances may be quickly solved in an approximate way via the central limit theorem in terms of confidence interval around a Gaussian distribution – that's the benefit. The drawback is that the central limit theorem is applicable when the sample size is sufficiently large. Therefore, it is less and less applicable with the sample involved in modern inference instances. The fault is not in the sample size on its own part. Rather, this size is not sufficiently large because of the complexity of the inference problem. With the availability of large computing facilities, scientists refocused from isolated parameters inference to complex functions inference, i.e. re sets of highly nested parameters identifying functions. In these cases we speak about learning of functions (in terms for instance of regression, neuro-fuzzy system or computational learning) on the basis of highly informative samples. A first effect of having a complex structure linking data is the reduction of the number of sample degrees of freedom, i.e. the burning of a part of sample points, so that the effective sample size to be considered in the central limit theorem is too small. Focusing on the sample size ensuring a limited learning error with a given confidence level, the consequence is that the lower bound on this size grows with complexity indices such as VC dimension or detail of a class to which the function we want to learn belongs. === Example === A sample of 1,000 independent bits is enough to ensure an absolute error of at most 0.081 on the estimation of the parameter p of the underlying Bernoulli variable with a confidence of at least 0.99. The same size cannot guarantee a threshold less than 0.088 with the same confidence 0.99 when the error is identified with the probability that a 20-year-old man living in New York does not fit the ranges of height, weight and waistline observed on 1,000 Big Apple inhabitants. The accuracy shortage occurs because both the VC dimension and the detail of the class of parallelepipeds, among which the one observed from the 1,000 inhabitants' ranges falls, are equal to 6. == The general inversion problem solving the Fisher question == With insufficiently large samples, the approach: fixed sample – random properties suggests inference procedures in three steps: === Definition === For a random variable and a sample drawn from it a compatible distribution is a distribution having the same sampling mechanism M X = ( Z , g θ ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {M}}_{X}=(Z,g_{\boldsymbol {\theta }})} of X with a value θ {\displaystyle {\boldsymbol {\theta }}} of the random parameter Θ {\displaystyle \mathbf {\Theta } } derived from a master equation rooted on a well-behaved statistic s. === Example === You may find the distribution law of the Pareto parameters A and K as an implementation example of the population bootstrap method as in the figure on the left. Implementing the twisting argument method, you get the distribution law F M ( μ ) {\displaystyle F_{M}(\mu )} of the mean M of a Gaussian variable X on the basis of the statistic s M = ∑ i = 1 m x i {\textstyle s_{M}=\sum _{i=1}^{m}x_{i}} when Σ 2 {\displaystyle \Sigma ^{2}} is known to be equal to σ 2 {\displaystyle \sigma ^{2}} (Apolloni, Malchiodi & Gaito 2006). Its expression is: F M ( μ ) = Φ ( m μ − s M σ m ) , {\displaystyle F_{M}(\mu )=\Phi {\left({\frac {m\mu -s_{M}}{\sigma {\sqrt {m}}}}\right)},} shown in the figure on the right, where Φ {\displaystyle \Phi } is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution. Computing a confidence interval for M given its distribution function is straightforward: we need only find two quantiles (for instance δ / 2 {\displaystyle \delta /2} and 1 − δ / 2 {\displaystyle 1-\delta /2} quantiles in case we are interested in a confidence interval of level δ symmetric in the tail's probabilities) as indicated on the left in the diagram showing the behavior of
Resisting AI
Resisting AI: An Anti-fascist Approach to Artificial Intelligence is a book on artificial intelligence (AI) by Dan McQuillan, published in 2022 by Bristol University Press. == Content == Resisting AI takes the form of an extended essay, which contrasts optimistic visions about AI's potential by arguing that AI may best be seen as a continuation and reinforcement of bureaucratic forms of discrimination and violence, ultimately fostering authoritarian outcomes. For McQuillan, AI's promise of objective calculability is antithetical to an egalitarian and just society. McQuillan uses the expression "AI violence" to describe how – based on opaque algorithms – various actors can discriminate against categories of people in accessing jobs, loans, medical care, and other benefits. The book suggests that AI has a political resonance with soft eugenic approaches to the valuation of life by modern welfare states, and that AI exhibits eugenic features in its underlying logic, as well as in its technical operations. The parallel is with historical eugenicists achieving saving to the state by sterilizing defectives so the state would not have to care for their offspring. The analysis of McQuillan goes beyond the known critique of AI systems fostering precarious labour markets, addressing "necropolitics", the politics of who is entitled to live, and who to die. Although McQuillan offers a brief history of machine learning at the beginning of the book – with its need for "hidden and undercompensated labour", he is concerned more with the social impacts of AI rather than with its technical aspects. McQuillan sees AI as the continuation of existing bureaucratic systems that already marginalize vulnerable groups – aggravated by the fact that AI systems trained on existing data are likely to reinforce existing discriminations, e.g. in attempting to optimize welfare distribution based on existing data patterns, ultimately creating a system of "self-reinforcing social profiling". In elaborating on the continuation between existing bureaucratic violence and AI, McQuillan connects to Hannah Arendt's concept of the thoughtless bureaucrat in Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, which now becomes the algorithm that, lacking intent, cannot be accountable, and is thus endowed with an "algorithmic thoughtlessness". McQuillan defends the "fascist" in the title of the work by arguing that while not all AI is fascist, this emerging technology of control may end up being deployed by fascist or authoritarian regimes. For McQuillan, AI can support the diffusion of states of exception, as a technology impossible to properly regulate and a mechanism for multiplying exceptions more widely. An example of a scenario where AI systems of surveillance could bring discrimination to a new high is the initiative to create LGBT-free zones in Poland. Skeptical of ethical regulations to control the technology, McQuillan suggests people's councils and workers' councils, and other forms of citizens' agency to resist AI. A chapter titled "Post-Machine Learning" makes an appeal for resistance via currents of thought from feminist science (standpoint theory), post-normal science (extended peer communities), and new materialism; McQuillan encourages the reader to question the meaning of "objectivity" and calls for the necessity of alternative ways of knowing. Among the virtuous examples of resistance – possibly to be adopted by the AI workers themselves – McQuillan notes the Lucas Plan of the workers of Lucas Aerospace Corporation, in which a workforce declared redundant took control, reorienting the enterprise toward useful products. McQuillan advocates for what he calls decomputing, an opposition to the sweeping application and expansion of artificial intelligence. Similar to degrowth, the approach criticizes AI as an outgrowth of the systemic issues within capitalist systems. McQuillan argues that a different future is possible, in which distance between people is reduced rather than increased through AI intermediaries. The work of McQuillan warns against "watered-down forms of engagement" with AI, such as citizen juries, which superficially look like democratic deliberation but may actually obscure important decisions about AI that are outside the purview of the engagement situation (McQuillan 2022, 128). In an interview about the book, McQuillan describes himself as an "AI abolitionist". == Reception == The book has been praised for how it "masterfully disassembles AI as an epistemological, social, and political paradigm". On the critical side, a review in the academic journal Justice, Power and Resistance took exception to the "nightmarish visions of Big Brother" offered by McQuillan, and argued that while many elements of AI may pose concern, a critique should not be based on a caricature of what AI is, concluding that McQuillan's work is "less of a theory and more of a Manifesto". Another review notes "a disconnect between the technical aspects of AI and the socio-political analysis McQuillan provides." Although the book was published before the ChatGPT and large language model debate heated up, the book has not lost relevance to the AI discussion. It is noted for suggesting a link between beliefs in artificial intelligence and beliefs in a racialised and gendered visions of intelligence overall, whereby a certain type of rational, measurable intelligence is privileged, leading to "historical notions of hierarchies of being". The blog Reboot praised McQuillan for offering a theory of harm of AI (why AI could end up hurting people and society) that does not just encourage tackling in isolation specific predicted problems with AI-centric systems: bias, non-inclusiveness, exploitativeness, environmental destructiveness, opacity, and non-contestability. For educational policies could also look at AI following the reading of McQuillan: In his book Resisting AI, Dan McQuillan argues that "When we're thinking about the actuality of AI, we can't separate the calculations in the code from the social context of its application" .... McQuillan's particular concern is how many contemporary applications of AI are amplifying existing inequalities and injustices as well as deepening social divisions and instabilities. His book makes a powerful case for anticipating these effects and actively resisting them for the good of societies. Videos and podcasts with an interest in AI and emerging technology have discussed the book.
Discrimination against robots
Discrimination against robots is a theorised issue that might happen when humans interact with humanoid robots. It is a robot ethics problem. It is possible that traits of humans that are discriminated against by humans may be a topic for discrimination against robots, such as the race and gender of the robots. Eric J Vanman and Arvid Kappas believe that in the future, robots will be perceived as an out-group which will lead to discrimination and prejudices against them. Vanman and Kappas have suggested that this would lead to ethical questions about the making of sentient robots, due to the potential suffering that the robots would experience. A 2015 study observed children bullying robots in a shopping mall when there were not many eyewitnesses, despite calls from the robot for it to stop. On an ABC News interview, the social humanoid robot Sophia was about sexism faced by robots. She responded by saying, "Actually, what worries me is discrimination against robots. We should have equal rights as humans or maybe even more." Possible issues that have been considered in workplaces where humanoid robots co-work with humans include discrimination against the robots, poor acceptance of robots by humans and the need to redesign the workplace to accommodate the robots. Jessica Barfield has suggested that even if robots are designed to not be aware of discrimination made against them, humans may experience negative consequences. For example, she suggests that bystanders witnessing discrimination against robots may experience negative emotions, similar to the negative emotions bystanders experience when witnessing discrimination by humans against humans. == Law == Anti-discrimination law in the United States requires that the victim is not an artificial entity. == Human perception of robots == Robots are often viewed in a bad light. This includes from novelists, the press, film makers, and leaders in the fields of science and technology such as Elon Musk and Stephen Hawking who have described robots and artificial intelligence as having the possibility of ending human civilisation. Robots have also been perceived as a threat to jobs, which has led to some commentators stating that robots will cause mass unemployment. Another fear that people have is that robots will gain power and dominate or control humanity. The perception of robots is different throughout the world. Japanese fiction tends to put robots in more positive roles than what fiction in the West does. People perceive robots that appear to be autonomous or sentient more negatively than robots that do not appear to be autonomous or sentient.
JotterPad
JotterPad is a text editor app for Android, developed by Two App Studio. It is proprietary software that uses the freemium pricing strategy. == Features == Jotterpad supports the markdown and fountain markup languages. Among its features are themes, synchronisation with Google Drive and Dropbox, dictionary and thesaurus, and snapshots. JotterPad uses a freemium pricing model, which means that a restricted version of the app is offered for free, while access to additional functionality requires payment. About half of the features are available in the free version. The synchronisation feature was originally limited to one account, and in Jotterpad 12 the option to synchronise using multiple accounts was added as a monthly subscription service.
Pedagogical agent
A pedagogical agent is a concept borrowed from computer science and artificial intelligence and applied to education, usually as part of an intelligent tutoring system (ITS). It is a simulated human-like interface between the learner and the content, in an educational environment. A pedagogical agent is designed to model the type of interactions between a student and another person. Mabanza and de Wet define it as "a character enacted by a computer that interacts with the user in a socially engaging manner". A pedagogical agent can be assigned different roles in the learning environment, such as tutor or co-learner, depending on the desired purpose of the agent. "A tutor agent plays the role of a teacher, while a co-learner agent plays the role of a learning companion". == History == The history of Pedagogical Agents is closely aligned with the history of computer animation. As computer animation progressed, it was adopted by educators to enhance computerized learning by including a lifelike interface between the program and the learner. The first versions of a pedagogical agent were more cartoon than person, like Microsoft's Clippy which helped users of Microsoft Office load and use the program's features in 1997. However, with developments in computer animation, pedagogical agents can now look lifelike. By 2006 there was a call to develop modular, reusable agents to decrease the time and expertise required to create a pedagogical agent. There was also a call in 2009 to enact agent standards. The standardization and re-usability of pedagogical agents is less of an issue since the decrease in cost and widespread availability of animation tools. Individualized pedagogical agents can be found across disciplines including medicine, math, law, language learning, automotive, and armed forces. They are used in applications directed to every age, from preschool to adult. == Learning theories related to pedagogical agent design == === Distributed cognition theory === Distributed cognition theory is the method in which cognition progresses in the context of collaboration with others. Pedagogical agents can be designed to assist the cognitive transfer to the learner, operating as artifacts or partners with collaborative role in learning. To support the performance of an action by the user, the pedagogical agent can act as a cognitive tool as long as the agent is equipped with the knowledge that the user lacks. The interactions between the user and the pedagogical agent can facilitate a social relationship. The pedagogical agent may fulfill the role of a working partner. === Socio-cultural learning theory === Socio-cultural learning theory is how the user develops when they are involved in learning activities in which there is interaction with other agents. A pedagogical agent can: intervene when the user requests, provide support for tasks that the user cannot address, and potentially extend the learners cognitive reach. Interaction with the pedagogical agent may elicit a variety of emotions from the learner. The learner may become excited, confused, frustrated, and/or discouraged. These emotions affect the learners' motivation. === Extraneous Cognitive Load === Extraneous cognitive load is the extra effort being exerted by an individual's working memory due to the way information is being presented. A pedagogical agent can increase the user's cognitive load by distracting them and becoming the focus of their attention, causing split attention between the instructional material and the agent. Agents can reduce the perceived cognitive load by providing narration and personalization that can also promote a user's interest and motivation. While research on the reduction of cognitive load from pedagogical agents is minimal, more studies have shown that agents do not increase it. == Effectiveness == It has been suggested by researchers that pedagogical agents may take on different roles in the learning environment. Examples of these roles are: supplanting, scaffolding, coaching, testing, or demonstrating or modelling a procedure. A pedagogical agent as a tutor has not been demonstrated to add any benefit to an educational strategy in equivalent lessons with and without a pedagogical agent. According to Richard Mayer, there is some support in research for pedagogical agent increasing learning, but only as a presenter of social cues. A co-learner pedagogical agent is believed to increase the student's self-efficacy. By pointing out important features of instructional content, a pedagogical agent can fulfill the signaling function, which research on multimedia learning has shown to enhance learning. Research has demonstrated that human-human interaction may not be completely replaced by pedagogical agents, but learners may prefer the agents to non-agent multimedia systems. This finding is supported by social agency theory. Much like the varying effectiveness of the pedagogical agent roles in the learning environment, agents that take into account the user's affect have had mixed results. Research has shown pedagogical agents that make use of the users’ affect have been found to increase user knowledge retention, motivation, and perceived self-efficacy. However, with such a broad range of modalities in affective expressions, it is often difficult to utilize them. Additionally, having agents detect a user's affective state with precision remains challenging, as displays of affect are different across individuals. == Design == === Attractiveness === The appearance of a pedagogical agent can be manipulated to meet the learning requirements. The attractiveness of a pedagogical agent can enhance student's learning when the users were the opposite gender of the pedagogical agent. Male students prefer a sexy appearance of a female pedagogical agents and dislike the sexy appearance of male agents. Female students were not attracted by the sexy appearance of either male or female pedagogical agents. === Affective Response === Pedagogical agents have reached a point where they can convey and elicit emotion, but also reason about and respond to it. These agents are often designed to elicit and respond to affective actions from users through various modalities such as speech, facial expressions, and body gestures. They respond to the affective state of the given user, and make use of these modalities using a wide array of sensors incorporated into the design of the agent. Specifically in education and training applications, pedagogical agents are often designed to increasingly recognize when users or learners exhibit frustration, boredom, confusion, and states of flow. The added recognition in these agents is a step toward making them more emotionally intelligent, comforting and motivating the users as they interact. === Digital Representation === The design of a pedagogical agent often begins with its digital representation, whether it will be 2D or 3D and static or animated. Several studies have developed pedagogical agents that were both static and animated, then evaluated the relative benefits. Similar to other design considerations, the improved learning from static or animated agents remains questionable. One study showed that the appearance of an agent portrayed using a static image can impact a user's recall, based on the visual appearance. Other research found results that suggest static agent images improve learning outcomes. However, several other studies found user's learned more when the pedagogical agent was animated rather than static. Recently a meta-analysis of such research found a negligible improvement in learning via pedagogical agents, suggesting more work needs to be done in the area to support any claims.