Stochastic Neural Analog Reinforcement Calculator

Stochastic Neural Analog Reinforcement Calculator

The Stochastic Neural Analog Reinforcement Calculator (SNARC) is a neural network machine designed by Marvin Minsky. Prompted by a letter from Minsky, George Armitage Miller gathered the funding (a few thousand dollars) for the project from the Office of Naval Research of the U.S. Department of Defense in the summer of 1951 with the work to be carried out by Minsky, who was then a graduate student in mathematics at Princeton University. At the time, a physics graduate student at Princeton, Dean S. Edmonds, volunteered that he was good with electronics and therefore Minsky brought him onto the project. During undergraduate years, Minsky was inspired by the 1943 Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts paper on artificial neurons, and decided to build such a machine. The learning was Skinnerian reinforcement learning, and Minsky talked with Skinner extensively during the development of the machine. They tested the machine on a copy of Shannon's maze, and found that it could learn to solve the maze. Unlike Shannon's maze, this machine did not control a physical robot, but simulated rats running in a maze. The simulation is displayed as an "arrangement of lights", and the circuit was reinforced each time the simulated rat reached the goal. The machine surprised its creators. "The rats actually interacted with one another. If one of them found a good path, the others would tend to follow it." The machine itself is a randomly connected network of approximately 40 Hebb synapses. These synapses each have a memory that holds the probability that signal comes in one input and another signal will come out of the output. There is a probability knob that goes from 0 to 1 that shows this probability of the signals propagating. If the probability signal gets through, a capacitor remembers this function and engages an electromagnetic clutch. At this point, the operator will press a button to give a reward to the machine. This activates a motor on a surplus Minneapolis-Honeywell C-1 gyroscopic autopilot from a B-24 bomber. The motor turns a chain that goes to all 40 synapse machines, checking if the clutch is engaged or not. As the capacitor can only "remember" for a certain amount of time, the chain only catches the most recent updates of the probabilities. Each neuron contained 6 vacuum tubes and a motor. The entire machine is "the size of a grand piano" and contained 300 vacuum tubes. The tubes failed regularly, but the machine would still work despite failures. This machine is considered one of the first pioneering attempts at the field of artificial intelligence. Minsky went on to be a founding member of MIT's Project MAC, which split to become the MIT Laboratory for Computer Science and the MIT Artificial Intelligence Lab, and is now the MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. In 1985 Minsky became a founding member of the MIT Media Laboratory. According to Minsky, he loaned the machine to students in Dartmouth, and subsequently lost, except for a single neuron. A photo of Minsky's last neuron can be seen here. The photo shows 6 vacuum tubes, one of which is a Sylvania JAN-CHS-6H6GT/G/VT-90A.

Mark V. Shaney

Mark V. Shaney is a synthetic Usenet user whose postings in the net.singles newsgroups were generated by Markov chain techniques, based on text from other postings. The username is a play on the words "Markov chain". Many readers were fooled into thinking that the quirky, sometimes uncannily topical posts were written by a real person. The system was designed by Rob Pike with coding by Bruce Ellis. Don P. Mitchell wrote the Markov chain code, initially demonstrating it to Pike and Ellis using the Tao Te Ching as a basis. They chose to apply it to the net.singles netnews group. The program is fairly simple. It ingests the sample text (the Tao Te Ching, or the posts of a Usenet group) and creates a massive list of every sequence of three successive words (triplet) which occurs in the text. It then chooses two words at random, and looks for a word which follows those two in one of the triplets in its massive list. If there is more than one, it picks at random (identical triplets count separately, so a sequence which occurs twice is twice as likely to be picked as one which only occurs once). It then adds that word to the generated text. Then, in the same way, it picks a triplet that starts with the second and third words in the generated text, and that gives a fourth word. It adds the fourth word, then repeats with the third and fourth words, and so on. This algorithm is called a third-order Markov chain (because it uses sequences of three words). == Examples == A classic example, from 1984, originally sent as a mail message, later posted to net.singles is reproduced here: >From mvs Fri Nov 16 17:11 EST 1984 remote from alice It looks like Reagan is going to say? Ummm... Oh yes, I was looking for. I'm so glad I remembered it. Yeah, what I have wondered if I had committed a crime. Don't eat with your assessment of Reagon and Mondale. Up your nose with a guy from a firm that specifically researches the teen-age market. As a friend of mine would say, "It really doesn't matter"... It looks like Reagan is holding back the arms of the American eating public have changed dramatically, and it got pretty boring after about 300 games. People, having a much larger number of varieties, and are very different from what one can find in Chinatowns across the country (things like pork buns, steamed dumplings, etc.) They can be cheap, being sold for around 30 to 75 cents apiece (depending on size), are generally not greasy, can be adequately explained by stupidity. Singles have felt insecure since we came down from the Conservative world at large. But Chuqui is the way it happened and the prices are VERY reasonable. Can anyone think of myself as a third sex. Yes, I am expected to have. People often get used to me knowing these things and then a cover is placed over all of them. Along the side of the $$ are spent by (or at least for ) the girls. You can't settle the issue. It seems I've forgotten what it is, but I don't. I know about violence against women, and I really doubt they will ever join together into a large number of jokes. It showed Adam, just after being created. He has a modem and an autodial routine. He calls my number 1440 times a day. So I will conclude by saying that I can well understand that she might soon have the time, it makes sense, again, to get the gist of my argument, I was in that (though it's a Republican administration). _-_-_-_-Mark Other quotations from Mark's Usenet posts are: "I spent an interesting evening recently with a grain of salt." (Alternatively reported as "While at a conference a few weeks back, I spent an interesting evening with a grain of salt.") "I hope that there are sour apples in every bushel." (see also sour grapes) == History == In The Usenet Handbook Mark Harrison writes that after September 1981, students joined Usenet en masse, "creating the USENET we know today: endless dumb questions, endless idiots posing as savants, and (of course) endless victims for practical jokes." In December, Rob Pike created the netnews group net.suicide as prank, "a forum for bad jokes". Some users thought it was a legitimate forum, some discussed "riding motorcycles without helmets". At first, most posters were "real people", but soon "characters" began posting. Pike created a "vicious" character named Bimmler. At its peak, net.suicide had ten frequent posters; nine were "known to be characters." But ultimately, Pike deleted the newsgroup because it was too much work to maintain; Bimmler messages were created "by hand". The "obvious alternative" was software, running on a Bell Labs computer created by Bruce Ellis, based on the Markov code by Don Mitchell, which became the online character Mark V. Shaney. Kernighan and Pike listed Mark V. Shaney in the acknowledgements in The Practice of Programming, noting its roots in Mitchell's markov, which, adapted as shaney, was used for "humorous deconstructionist activities" in the 1980s. Dewdney pointed out "perhaps Mark V. Shaney's magnum opus: a 20-page commentary on the deconstructionist philosophy of Jean Baudrillard" directed by Pike, with assistance from Henry S. Baird and Catherine Richards, to be distributed by email. The piece was based on Jean Baudrillard's "The Precession of Simulacra", published in Simulacra and Simulation (1981). == Reception == The program was discussed by A. K. Dewdney in the Scientific American "Computer Recreations" column in 1989, by Penn Jillette in his PC Computing column in 1991, and in several books, including the Usenet Handbook, Bots: the Origin of New Species, Hippo Eats Dwarf: A Field Guide to Hoaxes and Other B.S., and non-computer-related journals such as Texas Studies in Literature and Language. Dewdney wrote about the program's output, "The overall impression is not unlike what remains in the brain of an inattentive student after a late-night study session. Indeed, after reading the output of Mark V. Shaney, I find ordinary writing almost equally strange and incomprehensible!" He noted the reactions of newsgroup users, who have "shuddered at Mark V. Shaney's reflections, some with rage and others with laughter:" The opinions of the new net.singles correspondent drew mixed reviews. Serious users of the bulletin board's services sensed satire. Outraged, they urged that someone "pull the plug" on Mark V. Shaney's monstrous rantings. Others inquired almost admiringly whether the program was a secret artificial intelligence project that was being tested in a human conversational environment. A few may even have thought that Mark V. Shaney was a real person, a tortured schizophrenic desperately seeking a like-minded companion. Concluding, Dewdney wrote, "If the purpose of computer prose is to fool people into thinking that it was written by a sane person, Mark V. Shaney probably falls short." A 2012 article in Observer compared Mark V. Shaney's "strangely beautiful" postings to the Horse_ebooks account on Twitter and music reviews at Pitchfork, saying that "this mash-up of gibberish and human sentiment" is what "made Mark V. Shaney so endlessly fascinating".

Kerckhoffs's principle

Kerckhoffs's principle (also called Kerckhoffs's desideratum, assumption, axiom, doctrine or law) of cryptography was stated by the Dutch cryptographer Auguste Kerckhoffs in the 19th century. The principle holds that a cryptosystem should be secure, even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge. This concept is widely embraced by cryptographers, in contrast to security through obscurity, which is not. Kerckhoffs's principle was phrased by the American mathematician Claude Shannon as "the enemy knows the system", i.e., "one ought to design systems under the assumption that the enemy will immediately gain full familiarity with them". In that form, it is called Shannon's maxim. Another formulation by American researcher and professor Steven M. Bellovin is: In other words—design your system assuming that your opponents know it in detail. (A former official at NSA's National Computer Security Center told me that the standard assumption there was that serial number 1 of any new device was delivered to the Kremlin.) == Origins == The invention of telegraphy radically changed military communications and increased the number of messages that needed to be protected from the enemy dramatically, leading to the development of field ciphers which had to be easy to use without large confidential codebooks prone to capture on the battlefield. It was this environment which led to the development of Kerckhoffs's requirements. Auguste Kerckhoffs was a professor of German language at Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) in Paris. In early 1883, Kerckhoffs's article, La Cryptographie Militaire, was published in two parts in the Journal of Military Science, in which he stated six design rules for military ciphers. Translated from French, they are: The system must be practically, if not mathematically, indecipherable; It should not require secrecy, and it should not be a problem if it falls into enemy hands; It must be possible to communicate and remember the key without using written notes, and correspondents must be able to change or modify it at will; It must be applicable to telegraph communications; It must be portable, and should not require several persons to handle or operate; Lastly, given the circumstances in which it is to be used, the system must be easy to use and should not be stressful to use or require its users to know and comply with a long list of rules. Some are no longer relevant given the ability of computers to perform complex encryption. The second rule, now known as Kerckhoffs's principle, is still critically important. == Explanation of the principle == Kerckhoffs viewed cryptography as a rival to, and a better alternative than, steganographic encoding, which was common in the nineteenth century for hiding the meaning of military messages. One problem with encoding schemes is that they rely on humanly-held secrets such as "dictionaries" which disclose for example, the secret meaning of words. Steganographic-like dictionaries, once revealed, permanently compromise a corresponding encoding system. Another problem is that the risk of exposure increases as the number of users holding the secrets increases. Nineteenth century cryptography, in contrast, used simple tables which provided for the transposition of alphanumeric characters, generally given row-column intersections which could be modified by keys which were generally short, numeric, and could be committed to human memory. The system was considered "indecipherable" because tables and keys do not convey meaning by themselves. Secret messages can be compromised only if a matching set of table, key, and message falls into enemy hands in a relevant time frame. Kerckhoffs viewed tactical messages as only having a few hours of relevance. Systems are not necessarily compromised, because their components (i.e. alphanumeric character tables and keys) can be easily changed. === Advantage of secret keys === Using secure cryptography is supposed to replace the difficult problem of keeping messages secure with a much more manageable one, keeping relatively small keys secure. A system that requires long-term secrecy for something as large and complex as the whole design of a cryptographic system obviously cannot achieve that goal. It only replaces one hard problem with another. However, if a system is secure even when the enemy knows everything except the key, then all that is needed is to manage keeping the keys secret. There are a large number of ways the internal details of a widely used system could be discovered. The most obvious is that someone could bribe, blackmail, or otherwise threaten staff or customers into explaining the system. In war, for example, one side will probably capture some equipment and people from the other side. Each side will also use spies to gather information. If a method involves software, someone could do memory dumps or run the software under the control of a debugger in order to understand the method. If hardware is being used, someone could buy or steal some of the hardware and build whatever programs or gadgets needed to test it. Hardware can also be dismantled so that the chip details can be examined under the microscope. === Maintaining security === A generalization some make from Kerckhoffs's principle is: "The fewer and simpler the secrets that one must keep to ensure system security, the easier it is to maintain system security." Bruce Schneier ties it in with a belief that all security systems must be designed to fail as gracefully as possible: Kerckhoffs's principle applies beyond codes and ciphers to security systems in general: every secret creates a potential failure point. Secrecy, in other words, is a prime cause of brittleness—and therefore something likely to make a system prone to catastrophic collapse. Conversely, openness provides ductility. Any security system depends crucially on keeping some things secret. However, Kerckhoffs's principle points out that the things kept secret ought to be those least costly to change if inadvertently disclosed. For example, a cryptographic algorithm may be implemented by hardware and software that is widely distributed among users. If security depends on keeping that secret, then disclosure leads to major logistic difficulties in developing, testing, and distributing implementations of a new algorithm – it is "brittle". On the other hand, if keeping the algorithm secret is not important, but only the keys used with the algorithm must be secret, then disclosure of the keys simply requires the simpler, less costly process of generating and distributing new keys. == Applications == In accordance with Kerckhoffs's principle, the majority of civilian cryptography makes use of publicly known algorithms. By contrast, ciphers used to protect classified government or military information are often kept secret (see Type 1 encryption). However, it should not be assumed that government/military ciphers must be kept secret to maintain security. It is possible that they are intended to be as cryptographically sound as public algorithms, and the decision to keep them secret is in keeping with a layered security posture. == Security through obscurity == It is moderately common for companies to keep the inner workings of a system secret. Some argue this "security by obscurity" makes the product safer and less vulnerable to attack. A counter-argument is that keeping the innards secret may improve security in the short term, but in the long run, only systems that have been published and analyzed should be trusted. Steven Bellovin and Randy Bush commented: Security Through Obscurity Considered Dangerous Hiding security vulnerabilities in algorithms, software, and/or hardware decreases the likelihood they will be repaired and increases the likelihood that they can and will be exploited. Discouraging or outlawing discussion of weaknesses and vulnerabilities is extremely dangerous and deleterious to the security of computer systems, the network, and its citizens. Open Discussion Encourages Better Security The long history of cryptography and cryptoanalysis has shown time and time again that open discussion and analysis of algorithms exposes weaknesses not thought of by the original authors, and thereby leads to better and more secure algorithms. As Kerckhoffs noted about cipher systems in 1883 [Kerc83], "Il faut qu'il n'exige pas le secret, et qu'il puisse sans inconvénient tomber entre les mains de l'ennemi." (Roughly, "the system must not require secrecy and must be able to be stolen by the enemy without causing trouble.")

Data independence

Data independence is the type of data transparency that matters for a centralized DBMS. It refers to the immunity of user applications to changes made in the definition and organization of data. Application programs should not, ideally, be exposed to details of data representation and storage. The DBMS provides an abstract view of the data that hides such details. There are two types of data independence: physical and logical data independence. The data independence and operation independence together gives the feature of data abstraction. There are two levels of data independence. == Logical data independence == The logical structure of the data is known as the 'schema definition'. In general, if a user application operates on a subset of the attributes of a relation, it should not be affected later when new attributes are added to the same relation. Logical data independence indicates that the conceptual schema can be changed without affecting the existing schemas. == Physical data independence == The physical structure of the data is referred to as "physical data description". Physical data independence deals with hiding the details of the storage structure from user applications. The application should not be involved with these issues since, conceptually, there is no difference in the operations carried out against the data. There are three types of data independence: Logical data independence: The ability to change the logical (conceptual) schema without changing the External schema (User View) is called logical data independence. For example, the addition or removal of new entities, attributes, or relationships to the conceptual schema or having to rewrite existing application programs. Physical data independence: The ability to change the physical schema without changing the logical schema is called physical data independence. For example, a change to the internal schema, such as using different file organization or storage structures, storage devices, or indexing strategy, should be possible without having to change the conceptual or external schemas. View level data independence: always independent no effect, because there doesn't exist any other level above view level. == Data independence == Data independence can be explained as follows: Each higher level of the data architecture is immune to changes of the next lower level of the architecture. The logical scheme stays unchanged even though the storage space or type of some data is changed for reasons of optimization or reorganization. In this, external schema does not change. In this, internal schema changes may be required due to some physical schema were reorganized here. Physical data independence is present in most databases and file environment in which hardware storage of encoding, exact location of data on disk, merging of records, so on this are hidden from user. == Data independence types == The ability to modify schema definition in one level without affecting schema of that definition in the next higher level is called data independence. There are two levels of data independence, they are Physical data independence and Logical data independence. Physical data independence is the ability to modify the physical schema without causing application programs to be rewritten. Modifications at the physical level are occasionally necessary to improve performance. It means we change the physical storage/level without affecting the conceptual or external view of the data. The new changes are absorbed by mapping techniques. Logical data independence is the ability to modify the logical schema without causing application programs to be rewritten. Modifications at the logical level are necessary whenever the logical structure of the database is altered (for example, when money-market accounts are added to banking system). Logical Data independence means if we add some new columns or remove some columns from table then the user view and programs should not change. For example: consider two users A & B. Both are selecting the fields "EmployeeNumber" and "EmployeeName". If user B adds a new column (e.g. salary) to his table, it will not affect the external view for user A, though the internal schema of the database has been changed for both users A & B. Logical data independence is more difficult to achieve than physical data independence, since application programs are heavily dependent on the logical structure of the data that they access.

Atomicity (database systems)

In database systems, atomicity (; from Ancient Greek: ἄτομος, romanized: átomos, lit. 'undividable') is the property of a database transaction consisting of an indivisible and irreducible series of database operations such that either all occur, or none occur. It is one of the ACID transaction properties: Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation, Durability. A guarantee of atomicity prevents partial database updates from occurring, because they can cause greater problems than rejecting the whole series outright. As a consequence, an atomic transaction cannot be observed to be in progress by another database client: at one moment in time, it has not yet happened, and at the next it has already occurred in whole (or nothing happened if the transaction was cancelled in progress). An example of transaction atomicity could be a digital monetary transfer from bank account A to account B. It consists of two operations, debiting the money from account A and crediting it to account B. Performing both of these operations inside of an atomic transaction ensures that the database remains in a consistent state, if either operation fails there will not be any unaccountable credits or debits affecting either account. The same term is also used in the definition of First normal form in database systems, where it instead refers to the concept that the values for fields may not consist of multiple smaller values to be decomposed, such as a string into which multiple names, numbers, dates, or other types may be packed. == Orthogonality == Atomicity does not behave completely orthogonally with regard to the other ACID properties of transactions. For example, isolation relies on atomicity to roll back the enclosing transaction in the event of an isolation violation such as a deadlock; consistency also relies on atomicity to roll back the enclosing transaction in the event of a consistency violation by an illegal transaction. As a result of this, a failure to detect a violation and roll back the enclosing transaction may cause an isolation or consistency failure. == Implementation == Typically, systems implement Atomicity by providing some mechanism to indicate which transactions have started and which finished; or by keeping a copy of the data before any changes occurred (Read-copy-update). Several filesystems have developed methods for avoiding the need to keep multiple copies of data, using journaling (see journaling file system). Databases usually implement this using some form of logging/journaling to track changes. The system synchronizes the logs (often the metadata) as necessary after changes have successfully taken place. Afterwards, crash recovery ignores incomplete entries. Although implementations vary depending on factors such as concurrency issues, the principle of atomicity – i.e. complete success or complete failure – remain. Ultimately, any application-level implementation relies on operating-system functionality. At the file-system level, POSIX-compliant systems provide system calls such as open(2) and flock(2) that allow applications to atomically open or lock a file. At the process level, POSIX Threads provide adequate synchronization primitives. The hardware level requires atomic operations such as Test-and-set, Fetch-and-add, Compare-and-swap, or Load-Link/Store-Conditional, together with memory barriers. Portable operating systems cannot simply block interrupts to implement synchronization, since hardware that lacks concurrent execution such as hyper-threading or multi-processing is now extremely rare. In distributed and sharded databases, atomicity is complicated by network latency and the potential for partial failures. While traditional distributed systems often employ locking protocols (like 2PC) to ensure cross-shard atomicity, these can introduce performance bottlenecks. Recent research into distributed ledger consensus suggests alternative models, such as "braided synchronization". This technique, utilized in protocols like Cerberus, intertwines the consensus phases of multiple shards to enforce atomic guarantees without a global ordering of all transactions.

ByLock

ByLock was a smartphone application that allowed users to communicate via a private, encrypted connection. It was launched in March 2014 on Google Play, Apple App Store The app was downloaded over 600,000 times from its launch in April 2014 until March 2016, when it was permanently shut down. The Turkish National Intelligence Organization (Turkish: Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MİT) stated that the app was downloaded mainly in Turkey and the users were “Fetullahist Terror Organisation (FETÖ) which was formerly known as “Gülen movement” members. == Gülen Movement controversy == In Turkey, possession of the app is deemed evidence of membership in the Gülen Movement, which was allegedly connected to the failed Turkish coup d'état attempt in July 2016. Users of ByLock were deemed terrorists in Turkish courts. According to Deutsche Welle, of the 215,000 former ByLock users, an estimated 23,000 have been detained by Turkish authorities. Some believe that the MİT and other Turkish authorities manipulated the ByLock database in order to arrest suspected members of the Gülen Movement. Tuncay Beşikçi, a computer forensic expert in Turkey, emphasized that "the demands to investigate and analyze ByLock data from independent institutions are refused by the Turkish courts. But it is not normal". Tuncay Beşikçi believes that this application is precisely one of the channels for Gülen molecules to communicate and can also monitor the activities of other members of the organization. He also stated that the developers behind the Mor Beyin app, deliberately set a plan in motion that would put thousands of innocent people in prison as a cover for the Gülen movement. In December 2017, Turkish authorities revealed that almost half the people who had been prosecuted for having ByLock on their smartphones would have their legal cases reviewed, as they could have been redirected to the app without their knowledge. Following the failed coup attempt on 15 July 2016, the use of the ByLock messaging application by members of the Gülen Movement was the sole evidence in investigations and prosecutions to justify arrests and convictions for "membership in an armed terrorist organization." However, these decisions have been considered human rights violations by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the United Nations Human Rights Committee, and the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Some of the relevant decisions include the following: === Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights === On 20 July 2021, in the case of Tekin Akgün v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled that the use of the ByLock messaging application, unless supported by other evidence, does not create a reasonable suspicion of a crime. Based on this reasoning, the court found that the detention order violated Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects the right to liberty and security. In the Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Turkey decision on 26 September 2023, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) examined an appeal against a conviction based on the use of ByLock. The Court ruled that the failure to provide an opportunity to challenge the authenticity of the ByLock data violated the right to a fair trial (Article 6 of the ECHR). The Court also stated that the mere use of ByLock could not be considered sufficient evidence for membership in an armed terrorist organization. It further noted that local courts had established an automatic presumption of guilt based solely on ByLock use, creating a broad and unpredictable interpretation of the law, making it nearly impossible for the accused to exonerate themselves. Therefore, the Court concluded that the conviction based on the use of ByLock violated the principle of no punishment without law (Article 7 of the ECHR). On 22 July 2025, in the Demirhan and 238 Others case, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) consolidated the applications of 239 individuals who had been convicted of "membership in an armed terrorist organization" based on their use of ByLock, as determined by 239 separate courts in Turkey. The Court ruled that the convictions violated the right to a fair trial under Article 6 and the principle of no punishment without law under Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The ruling stated that the Turkish courts' "categorical approach" to the use of ByLock lacked legal foundation. In this context, it was emphasized that anyone who had used ByLock could not be convicted of membership in an armed terrorist organization based solely on this reasoning. The ruling also stated that, due to the large number of similar applications, the issue was "systemic in nature" and it called for a national solution to be developed by Turkey. While the Court did not order compensation for the 239 applicants, it emphasized that reopening the trial to ensure the enforcement of the violation ruling was the most appropriate remedy. This ruling, which confirms the violation finding in the Yüksel Yalçınkaya case of 26 September 2023, is considered a continuation of the ECHR's case law concerning trials based on ByLock evidence. === Decisions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee and Working Group === In the İsmet Özçelik and Turgay Karaman v. Turkey decision, dated 28 May 2019 (Application No. 2980/2017), the UN Human Rights Committee ruled that the use of ByLock and allegations of depositing money into Bank Asya could not justify the applicants' arrests. In the Mestan Yayman v. Turkey decision (Opinion No. 42/2018 – 21 August 2018) by the UN Human Rights Council Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, it was stated that using a public messaging application like ByLock cannot be considered criminal evidence, and that the use of such an application falls under the scope of freedom of thought and expression. The dozens of decisions later issued by the UN Human Rights Council Working Group are of the same nature.

Social recruiting

Social recruiting (social hiring or social media recruitment) is recruiting candidates by using social platforms as talent databases or for advertising. Social recruiting uses social media profiles, blogs, and other Internet sites to find information on candidates. It also uses social media to advertise jobs either through HR vendors or through crowdsourcing where job seekers and others share job openings within their online social networks. Social recruiting's effectiveness and return on investment have been difficult to determine, since applicants do not usually apply through the social channels which first attracted them. In May 2013, Maximum Employment Marketing Group released the Social Recruitment Monitor, which ranks the reach, engagement, and interactivity of employers' social recruiting efforts around the world. == Social recruitment software == The social recruitment software market (a form of e-recruitment) is often included in the wider talent management software sector. Bersin & Associates valued the wider talent management market at over $2bn in 2007. Social recruitment increasingly sits at an intersection of a number of fast-moving areas including social networking, recruitment and now cloud computing. Additionally, mobile recruiting has become another hot topic, especially with the rise in tablet and smartphone usage. In 2012, there was a rise of tech companies using social recruiting applications to find and screen applicants. As more companies saw value in filling jobs by putting them on the social platforms where millions of people spend at least 37 minutes daily, there developed a much larger focus on social recruiting among the talent acquisition community. By mid-2013, many major enterprise companies such as Pepsi, Gap, AIG, and Oracle had begun effectively utilizing social recruiting software, making it clear that large corporations were open to automating or streamlining (and ultimately investing in) their social recruiting processes.