Candace Sidner

Candace Sidner

Candace Lee (Candy) Sidner is an American computer scientist whose research has applied artificial intelligence and natural language processing to problems in personal information management, intelligent user interfaces, and human–robot interaction. She is a research professor of computer science at the Worcester Polytechnic Institute, and a former president of the Association for Computational Linguistics. == Education and career == Sidner majored in mathematics at Kalamazoo College, graduating in 1971. She earned a master's degree in computer science at the University of Pittsburgh in 1975, and completed a Ph.D. in computer science in 1979 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Her dissertation, Towards A Computational Theory of Definite Anaphora Comprehension in English Discourse, was supervised by Jonathan Allen. She worked as a researcher for Bolt Beranek and Newman from 1979 to 1989, and continued to work in industry for the Digital Equipment Corporation (1989 to 1993), the Lotus Development Corporation (1993 to 2000), Mitsubishi Electric Research Laboratories (2000 to 2007), and BAE Systems (2007 to 2010). She took her present position as a research professor at the Worcester Polytechnic Institute in 2009. She served as president of the Association for Computational Linguistics in 1989. == Recognition == Sidner was named a Fellow of the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence in 1991. In 2013, she was named a Fellow of the Association for Computational Linguistics, "for seminal contributions to discourse focus and collaborative dialog".

Kindara

Kindara is a femtech company headquartered in Colorado that develops apps that help women identify their fertile window. The products are used for women trying to get pregnant, or women who want to track their menstrual cycle for overall health. Their latest product, Priya Fertility and Ovulation Monitor, maximizes a woman's chance of getting pregnancy by identifying her most fertile days. == Overview == Kindara was founded in 2011 by husband-and-wife team Will Sacks and Kati Bicknell. The company launched its free mobile application in 2012. Kindara's mobile application allows women to track signs of fertility, such as basal body temperature, cervical fluid, and the position of the cervix to determine when ovulation is occurring. Kindara also sells a thermometer, Wink, which records basal body temperature and syncs automatically to the Kindara fertility application. In 2018, Kindara was acquired by the company Prima-Temp.

The AI Con

The AI Con: How to Fight Big Tech's Hype and Create the Future We Want is a 2025 non-fiction book by linguist Emily M. Bender and sociologist Alex Hanna. It argues that much of what is labeled "artificial intelligence" is a misleading term that obscures ordinary automation while concentrating power in a small number of technology firms. The book was published in May 2025 by Harper in the United States and Bodley Head in the United Kingdom. It was developed alongside the authors' long-running podcast Mystery AI Hype Theater 3000, which critiques exaggerated claims about AI. == Synopsis == The authors present AI as a marketing umbrella that encourages audiences to infer understanding and agency where none exist. They argue readers should treat such language skeptically and to separate specific automated tasks from broad claims of intelligence. The book describes a recurring hype cycle in which corporate narratives justify data and labor extraction, the replacement of human services with cheaper substitutes, and the diversion of attention from present harms to speculative futures. While acknowledging limited uses such as pattern recognition, the authors argue that contemporary systems are best understood as text and media generators shaped by training data and human labor, not as thinking or reasoning entities. A central theme is the social and environmental cost of scaling these systems, including increased energy and water use, the appropriation of creative work for training, and the outsourcing of ghost work to low-paid data workers worldwide. These costs are linked to workplace effects, with the authors arguing that automation rarely eliminates jobs outright and more often degrades them through surveillance, work intensification, and unpaid oversight. As alternatives to passive adoption, the authors propose concrete responses: asking precise questions about what is being automated and why, demanding transparency about data and evaluation, and practicing what they call strategic refusal when deployment conflicts with evidence or values. The book also develops a vocabulary for public debate, rejecting both boosterish and doomerish narratives as grounded in the same assumption that AI is a singular, autonomous force. The authors recommend reading strategies such as favoring trusted human sources over automated summaries and using humor to deflate inflated claims. They describe a link between language to policy and power, arguing that precise terminology can help policymakers and the public resist austerity-driven automation and demand accountability for errors and harms. == Reception == The Guardian praised the book's myth-busting approach and its analysis of how hype erodes cultural and civic life by normalizing synthetic media as a substitute for human judgment. Kirkus Reviews described it as a contrarian account that catalogs concrete risks while cutting through speculative predictions. An interview in Business Insider highlighted the authors' accessible frameworks, including their proposal to describe chatbots as conversation simulators and to evaluate systems in terms of values, labor, and evidence. Coverage in GeekWire emphasized the book's call for resistance through collective bargaining, stronger data rights, and a norm of rejecting deployments that fail basic standards of necessity and evaluation. Some reviews were more critical. A review in LLRX argued that the book's tone could be overly polemical and that it gave limited attention to potential benefits claimed for generative systems. Coverage in the Financial Times, focused on Bender's broader public scholarship, situated the book within her long-standing critique of anthropomorphic narratives about large language models and her advocacy for more democratic oversight of automated systems.

Psychology of reasoning

The psychology of reasoning (also known as the cognitive science of reasoning) is the study of how people reason, often broadly defined as the process of drawing conclusions to inform how people solve problems and make decisions. It overlaps with psychology, philosophy, linguistics, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, logic, and probability theory. Psychological experiments on how humans and other animals reason have been carried out for over 100 years. An enduring question is whether or not people have the capacity to be rational. Current research in this area addresses various questions about reasoning, rationality, judgments, intelligence, relationships between emotion and reasoning, and development. == Everyday reasoning == One of the most obvious areas in which people employ reasoning is with sentences in everyday language. Most experimentation on deduction has been carried out on hypothetical thought, in particular, examining how people reason about conditionals, e.g., If A then B. Participants in experiments make the modus ponens inference, given the indicative conditional If A then B, and given the premise A, they conclude B. However, given the indicative conditional and the minor premise for the modus tollens inference, not-B, about half of the participants in experiments conclude not-A and the remainder concludes that nothing follows. The ease with which people make conditional inferences is affected by context, as demonstrated in the well-known selection task developed by Peter Wason. Participants are better able to test a conditional in an ecologically relevant context, e.g., if the envelope is sealed then it must have a 50 cent stamp on it compared to one that contains symbolic content, e.g., if the letter is a vowel then the number is even. Background knowledge can also lead to the suppression of even the simple modus ponens inference Participants given the conditional if Lisa has an essay to write then she studies late in the library and the premise Lisa has an essay to write make the modus ponens inference 'she studies late in the library', but the inference is suppressed when they are also given a second conditional if the library stays open then she studies late in the library. Interpretations of the suppression effect are controversial Other investigations of propositional inference examine how people think about disjunctive alternatives, e.g., A or else B, and how they reason about negation, e.g., It is not the case that A and B. Many experiments have been carried out to examine how people make relational inferences, including comparisons, e.g., A is better than B. Such investigations also concern spatial inferences, e.g. A is in front of B and temporal inferences, e.g. A occurs before B. Other common tasks include categorical syllogisms, used to examine how people reason about quantifiers such as All or Some, e.g., Some of the A are not B. For example if all A are B and some B are C, what (if anything) follows? == Theories of reasoning == There are several alternative theories of the cognitive processes that human reasoning is based on. One view is that people rely on a mental logic consisting of formal (abstract or syntactic) inference rules similar to those developed by logicians in the propositional calculus. Another view is that people rely on domain-specific or content-sensitive rules of inference. A third view is that people rely on mental models, that is, mental representations that correspond to imagined possibilities. A fourth view is that people compute probabilities. One controversial theoretical issue is the identification of an appropriate competence model, or a standard against which to compare human reasoning. Initially classical logic was chosen as a competence model. Subsequently, some researchers opted for non-monotonic logic and Bayesian probability. Research on mental models and reasoning has led to the suggestion that people are rational in principle but err in practice. Connectionist approaches towards reasoning have also been proposed. Despite the ongoing debate about the cognitive processes involved in human reasoning, recent research has shown that multiple approaches can be useful in modeling human thinking. For instance, studies have found that people's reasoning is often influenced by their prior beliefs, which can be modeled using Bayesian probability theory. Additionally, research on mental models has shown that people tend to reason about problems by constructing multiple mental representations of the situation, which can help them to identify relevant features and make inferences based on their understanding of the problem. Moreover, connectionist approaches to reasoning have also gained attention, which focus on the neural network models that can learn from data and generalize to new situations. == Development of reasoning == It is an active question in psychology how, why, and when the ability to reason develops from infancy to adulthood. Jean Piaget's theory of cognitive development posited general mechanisms and stages in the development of reasoning from infancy to adulthood. According to the neo-Piagetian theories of cognitive development, changes in reasoning with development come from increasing working memory capacity, increasing speed of processing, and enhanced executive functions and control. Increasing self-awareness is also an important factor. In their book The Enigma of Reason, the cognitive scientists Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber put forward an "argumentative" theory of reasoning, claiming that humans evolved to reason primarily to justify our beliefs and actions and to convince others in a social environment. Key evidence for their theory includes the errors in reasoning that solitary individuals are prone to when their arguments are not criticized, such as logical fallacies, and how groups become much better at performing cognitive reasoning tasks when they communicate with one another and can evaluate each other's arguments. Sperber and Mercier offer one attempt to resolve the apparent paradox that the confirmation bias is so strong despite the function of reasoning naively appearing to be to come to veridical conclusions about the world. The study of the development of reasoning abilities is an ongoing area of research in psychology, and multiple factors have been proposed to explain how, why, and when reasoning develops from infancy to adulthood. Recent research has suggested that early experiences and social interactions play a critical role in the development of reasoning abilities. For example, studies have shown that infants as young as six months old can engage in basic logical reasoning, such as reasoning about the relationship between objects and their properties. Furthermore, research has highlighted the importance of parental interaction and cognitive stimulation in the development of children's reasoning abilities. Additionally, studies have suggested that cultural factors, such as educational practices and the emphasis on critical thinking, can also influence the development of reasoning skills across different populations. == Different sorts of reasoning == Philip Johnson-Laird trying to taxonomize thought, distinguished between goal-directed thinking and thinking without goal, noting that association was involved in unrelated reading. He argues that goal directed reasoning can be classified based on the problem space involved in a solution, citing Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon. Inductive reasoning makes broad generalizations from specific cases or observations. In this process of reasoning, general assertions are made based on past specific pieces of evidence. This kind of reasoning allows the conclusion to be false even if the original statement is true. For example, if one observes a college athlete, one makes predictions and assumptions about other college athletes based on that one observation. Scientists use inductive reasoning to create theories and hypotheses. Philip Johnson-Laird distinguished inductive from deductive reasoning, in that the former creates semantic information while the later does not . In opposition, deductive reasoning is a basic form of valid reasoning. In this reasoning process a person starts with a known claim or a general belief and from there asks what follows from these foundations or how will these premises influence other beliefs. In other words, deduction starts with a hypothesis and examines the possibilities to reach a conclusion. Deduction helps people understand why their predictions are wrong and indicates that their prior knowledge or beliefs are off track. An example of deduction can be seen in the scientific method when testing hypotheses and theories. Although the conclusion usually corresponds and therefore proves the hypothesis, there are some cases where the conclusion is logical, but the generalization is not. For example, the argument, "All young girls wear skirts; Julie is a young

Bayesian programming

Bayesian programming is a formalism and a methodology for having a technique to specify probabilistic models and solve problems when less than the necessary information is available. Edwin T. Jaynes proposed that probability could be considered as an alternative and an extension of logic for rational reasoning with incomplete and uncertain information. In his founding book Probability Theory: The Logic of Science he developed this theory and proposed what he called "the robot," which was not a physical device, but an inference engine to automate probabilistic reasoning—a kind of Prolog for probability instead of logic. Bayesian programming is a formal and concrete implementation of this "robot". Bayesian programming may also be seen as an algebraic formalism to specify graphical models such as, for instance, Bayesian networks, dynamic Bayesian networks, Kalman filters or hidden Markov models. Indeed, Bayesian programming is more general than Bayesian networks and has a power of expression equivalent to probabilistic factor graphs. == Formalism == A Bayesian program is a means of specifying a family of probability distributions. The constituent elements of a Bayesian program are presented below: Program { Description { Specification ( π ) { Variables Decomposition Forms Identification (based on δ ) Question {\displaystyle {\text{Program}}{\begin{cases}{\text{Description}}{\begin{cases}{\text{Specification}}(\pi ){\begin{cases}{\text{Variables}}\\{\text{Decomposition}}\\{\text{Forms}}\\\end{cases}}\\{\text{Identification (based on }}\delta )\end{cases}}\\{\text{Question}}\end{cases}}} A program is constructed from a description and a question. A description is constructed using some specification ( π {\displaystyle \pi } ) as given by the programmer and an identification or learning process for the parameters not completely specified by the specification, using a data set ( δ {\displaystyle \delta } ). A specification is constructed from a set of pertinent variables, a decomposition and a set of forms. Forms are either parametric forms or questions to other Bayesian programs. A question specifies which probability distribution has to be computed. === Description === The purpose of a description is to specify an effective method of computing a joint probability distribution on a set of variables { X 1 , X 2 , ⋯ , X N } {\displaystyle \left\{X_{1},X_{2},\cdots ,X_{N}\right\}} given a set of experimental data δ {\displaystyle \delta } and some specification π {\displaystyle \pi } . This joint distribution is denoted as: P ( X 1 ∧ X 2 ∧ ⋯ ∧ X N ∣ δ ∧ π ) {\displaystyle P\left(X_{1}\wedge X_{2}\wedge \cdots \wedge X_{N}\mid \delta \wedge \pi \right)} . To specify preliminary knowledge π {\displaystyle \pi } , the programmer must undertake the following: Define the set of relevant variables { X 1 , X 2 , ⋯ , X N } {\displaystyle \left\{X_{1},X_{2},\cdots ,X_{N}\right\}} on which the joint distribution is defined. Decompose the joint distribution (break it into relevant independent or conditional probabilities). Define the forms of each of the distributions (e.g., for each variable, one of the list of probability distributions). ==== Decomposition ==== Given a partition of { X 1 , X 2 , … , X N } {\displaystyle \left\{X_{1},X_{2},\ldots ,X_{N}\right\}} containing K {\displaystyle K} subsets, K {\displaystyle K} variables are defined L 1 , ⋯ , L K {\displaystyle L_{1},\cdots ,L_{K}} , each corresponding to one of these subsets. Each variable L k {\displaystyle L_{k}} is obtained as the conjunction of the variables { X k 1 , X k 2 , ⋯ } {\displaystyle \left\{X_{k_{1}},X_{k_{2}},\cdots \right\}} belonging to the k t h {\displaystyle k^{th}} subset. Recursive application of Bayes' theorem leads to: P ( X 1 ∧ X 2 ∧ ⋯ ∧ X N ∣ δ ∧ π ) = P ( L 1 ∧ ⋯ ∧ L K ∣ δ ∧ π ) = P ( L 1 ∣ δ ∧ π ) × P ( L 2 ∣ L 1 ∧ δ ∧ π ) × ⋯ × P ( L K ∣ L K − 1 ∧ ⋯ ∧ L 1 ∧ δ ∧ π ) {\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}&P\left(X_{1}\wedge X_{2}\wedge \cdots \wedge X_{N}\mid \delta \wedge \pi \right)\\={}&P\left(L_{1}\wedge \cdots \wedge L_{K}\mid \delta \wedge \pi \right)\\={}&P\left(L_{1}\mid \delta \wedge \pi \right)\times P\left(L_{2}\mid L_{1}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)\times \cdots \times P\left(L_{K}\mid L_{K-1}\wedge \cdots \wedge L_{1}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)\end{aligned}}} Conditional independence hypotheses then allow further simplifications. A conditional independence hypothesis for variable L k {\displaystyle L_{k}} is defined by choosing some variable X n {\displaystyle X_{n}} among the variables appearing in the conjunction L k − 1 ∧ ⋯ ∧ L 2 ∧ L 1 {\displaystyle L_{k-1}\wedge \cdots \wedge L_{2}\wedge L_{1}} , labelling R k {\displaystyle R_{k}} as the conjunction of these chosen variables and setting: P ( L k ∣ L k − 1 ∧ ⋯ ∧ L 1 ∧ δ ∧ π ) = P ( L k ∣ R k ∧ δ ∧ π ) {\displaystyle P\left(L_{k}\mid L_{k-1}\wedge \cdots \wedge L_{1}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)=P\left(L_{k}\mid R_{k}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)} We then obtain: P ( X 1 ∧ X 2 ∧ ⋯ ∧ X N ∣ δ ∧ π ) = P ( L 1 ∣ δ ∧ π ) × P ( L 2 ∣ R 2 ∧ δ ∧ π ) × ⋯ × P ( L K ∣ R K ∧ δ ∧ π ) {\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}&P\left(X_{1}\wedge X_{2}\wedge \cdots \wedge X_{N}\mid \delta \wedge \pi \right)\\={}&P\left(L_{1}\mid \delta \wedge \pi \right)\times P\left(L_{2}\mid R_{2}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)\times \cdots \times P\left(L_{K}\mid R_{K}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)\end{aligned}}} Such a simplification of the joint distribution as a product of simpler distributions is called a decomposition, derived using the chain rule. This ensures that each variable appears at the most once on the left of a conditioning bar, which is the necessary and sufficient condition to write mathematically valid decompositions. ==== Forms ==== Each distribution P ( L k ∣ R k ∧ δ ∧ π ) {\displaystyle P\left(L_{k}\mid R_{k}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)} appearing in the product is then associated with either a parametric form (i.e., a function f μ ( L k ) {\displaystyle f_{\mu }\left(L_{k}\right)} ) or a question to another Bayesian program P ( L k ∣ R k ∧ δ ∧ π ) = P ( L ∣ R ∧ δ ^ ∧ π ^ ) {\displaystyle P\left(L_{k}\mid R_{k}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)=P\left(L\mid R\wedge {\widehat {\delta }}\wedge {\widehat {\pi }}\right)} . When it is a form f μ ( L k ) {\displaystyle f_{\mu }\left(L_{k}\right)} , in general, μ {\displaystyle \mu } is a vector of parameters that may depend on R k {\displaystyle R_{k}} or δ {\displaystyle \delta } or both. Learning takes place when some of these parameters are computed using the data set δ {\displaystyle \delta } . An important feature of Bayesian programming is this capacity to use questions to other Bayesian programs as components of the definition of a new Bayesian program. P ( L k ∣ R k ∧ δ ∧ π ) {\displaystyle P\left(L_{k}\mid R_{k}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)} is obtained by some inferences done by another Bayesian program defined by the specifications π ^ {\displaystyle {\widehat {\pi }}} and the data δ ^ {\displaystyle {\widehat {\delta }}} . This is similar to calling a subroutine in classical programming and provides an easy way to build hierarchical models. === Question === Given a description (i.e., P ( X 1 ∧ X 2 ∧ ⋯ ∧ X N ∣ δ ∧ π ) {\displaystyle P\left(X_{1}\wedge X_{2}\wedge \cdots \wedge X_{N}\mid \delta \wedge \pi \right)} ), a question is obtained by partitioning { X 1 , X 2 , ⋯ , X N } {\displaystyle \left\{X_{1},X_{2},\cdots ,X_{N}\right\}} into three sets: the searched variables, the known variables and the free variables. The 3 variables S e a r c h e d {\displaystyle Searched} , K n o w n {\displaystyle Known} and F r e e {\displaystyle Free} are defined as the conjunction of the variables belonging to these sets. A question is defined as the set of distributions: P ( S e a r c h e d ∣ Known ∧ δ ∧ π ) {\displaystyle P\left(Searched\mid {\text{Known}}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)} made of many "instantiated questions" as the cardinal of K n o w n {\displaystyle Known} , each instantiated question being the distribution: P ( Searched ∣ Known ∧ δ ∧ π ) {\displaystyle P\left({\text{Searched}}\mid {\text{Known}}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)} === Inference === Given the joint distribution P ( X 1 ∧ X 2 ∧ ⋯ ∧ X N ∣ δ ∧ π ) {\displaystyle P\left(X_{1}\wedge X_{2}\wedge \cdots \wedge X_{N}\mid \delta \wedge \pi \right)} , it is always possible to compute any possible question using the following general inference: P ( Searched ∣ Known ∧ δ ∧ π ) = ∑ Free [ P ( Searched ∧ Free ∣ Known ∧ δ ∧ π ) ] = ∑ Free [ P ( Searched ∧ Free ∧ Known ∣ δ ∧ π ) ] P ( Known ∣ δ ∧ π ) = ∑ Free [ P ( Searched ∧ Free ∧ Known ∣ δ ∧ π ) ] ∑ Free ∧ Searched [ P ( Searched ∧ Free ∧ Known ∣ δ ∧ π ) ] = 1 Z × ∑ Free [ P ( Searched ∧ Free ∧ Known ∣ δ ∧ π ) ] {\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}&P\left({\text{Searched}}\mid {\text{Known}}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)\\={}&\sum _{\text{Free}}\left[P\left({\text{Searched}}\wedge {\text{Free}}\mid {\text{Known}}\wedge \delta \wedge \

Software configuration management

Software configuration management (SCM), a.k.a. software change and configuration management (SCCM), is the software engineering practice of tracking and controlling changes to a software system. It is part of the larger cross-disciplinary field of configuration management (CM). SCM includes version control and the establishment of baselines. == Goals == The goals of SCM include: Configuration identification - Identifying configurations, configuration items and baselines. Configuration control - Implementing a controlled change process. This is usually achieved by setting up a change control board whose primary function is to approve or reject all change requests that are sent against any baseline. Configuration status accounting - Recording and reporting all the necessary information on the status of the development process. Configuration auditing - Ensuring that configurations contain all their intended parts and are sound with respect to their specifying documents, including requirements, architectural specifications and user manuals. Build management - Managing the process and tools used for builds. Process management - Ensuring adherence to the organization's development process. Environment management - Managing the software and hardware that host the system. Teamwork - Facilitate team interactions related to the process. Defect tracking - Making sure every defect has traceability back to the source. With the introduction of cloud computing and DevOps the purposes of SCM tools have become merged in some cases. The SCM tools themselves have become virtual appliances that can be instantiated as virtual machines and saved with state and version. The tools can model and manage cloud-based virtual resources, including virtual appliances, storage units, and software bundles. The roles and responsibilities of the actors have become merged as well with developers now being able to dynamically instantiate virtual servers and related resources. == History == == Examples == Ansible – Open-source software platform for remote configuring and managing computers CFEngine – Configuration management software Chef – Configuration management toolPages displaying short descriptions of redirect targets LCFG – Computer configuration management system NixOS – Linux distribution OpenMake Software – DevOps company Otter Puppet – Open source configuration management software Salt – Configuration management software Rex – Open source software

The AI Con

The AI Con: How to Fight Big Tech's Hype and Create the Future We Want is a 2025 non-fiction book by linguist Emily M. Bender and sociologist Alex Hanna. It argues that much of what is labeled "artificial intelligence" is a misleading term that obscures ordinary automation while concentrating power in a small number of technology firms. The book was published in May 2025 by Harper in the United States and Bodley Head in the United Kingdom. It was developed alongside the authors' long-running podcast Mystery AI Hype Theater 3000, which critiques exaggerated claims about AI. == Synopsis == The authors present AI as a marketing umbrella that encourages audiences to infer understanding and agency where none exist. They argue readers should treat such language skeptically and to separate specific automated tasks from broad claims of intelligence. The book describes a recurring hype cycle in which corporate narratives justify data and labor extraction, the replacement of human services with cheaper substitutes, and the diversion of attention from present harms to speculative futures. While acknowledging limited uses such as pattern recognition, the authors argue that contemporary systems are best understood as text and media generators shaped by training data and human labor, not as thinking or reasoning entities. A central theme is the social and environmental cost of scaling these systems, including increased energy and water use, the appropriation of creative work for training, and the outsourcing of ghost work to low-paid data workers worldwide. These costs are linked to workplace effects, with the authors arguing that automation rarely eliminates jobs outright and more often degrades them through surveillance, work intensification, and unpaid oversight. As alternatives to passive adoption, the authors propose concrete responses: asking precise questions about what is being automated and why, demanding transparency about data and evaluation, and practicing what they call strategic refusal when deployment conflicts with evidence or values. The book also develops a vocabulary for public debate, rejecting both boosterish and doomerish narratives as grounded in the same assumption that AI is a singular, autonomous force. The authors recommend reading strategies such as favoring trusted human sources over automated summaries and using humor to deflate inflated claims. They describe a link between language to policy and power, arguing that precise terminology can help policymakers and the public resist austerity-driven automation and demand accountability for errors and harms. == Reception == The Guardian praised the book's myth-busting approach and its analysis of how hype erodes cultural and civic life by normalizing synthetic media as a substitute for human judgment. Kirkus Reviews described it as a contrarian account that catalogs concrete risks while cutting through speculative predictions. An interview in Business Insider highlighted the authors' accessible frameworks, including their proposal to describe chatbots as conversation simulators and to evaluate systems in terms of values, labor, and evidence. Coverage in GeekWire emphasized the book's call for resistance through collective bargaining, stronger data rights, and a norm of rejecting deployments that fail basic standards of necessity and evaluation. Some reviews were more critical. A review in LLRX argued that the book's tone could be overly polemical and that it gave limited attention to potential benefits claimed for generative systems. Coverage in the Financial Times, focused on Bender's broader public scholarship, situated the book within her long-standing critique of anthropomorphic narratives about large language models and her advocacy for more democratic oversight of automated systems.