Adversarial stylometry is the practice of altering writing style to reduce the potential for stylometry to discover the author's identity or their characteristics. This task is also known as authorship obfuscation or authorship anonymisation. Stylometry poses a significant privacy challenge in its ability to unmask anonymous authors or to link pseudonyms to an author's other identities, which, for example, creates difficulties for whistleblowers, activists, and hoaxers and fraudsters. The privacy risk is expected to grow as machine learning techniques and text corpora develop. All adversarial stylometry shares the core idea of faithfully paraphrasing the source text so that the meaning is unchanged but the stylistic signals are obscured. Such a faithful paraphrase is an adversarial example for a stylometric classifier. Several broad approaches to this exist, with some overlap: imitation, substituting the author's own style for another's; translation, applying machine translation with the hope that this eliminates characteristic style in the source text; and obfuscation, deliberately modifying a text's style to make it not resemble the author's own. Manually obscuring style is possible, but laborious; in some circumstances, it is preferable or necessary. Automated tooling, either semi- or fully-automatic, could assist an author. How best to perform the task and the design of such tools is an open research question. While some approaches have been shown to be able to defeat particular stylometric analyses, particularly those that do not account for the potential of adversariality, establishing safety in the face of unknown analyses is an issue. Ensuring the faithfulness of the paraphrase is a critical challenge for automated tools. It is uncertain if the practice of adversarial stylometry is detectable in itself. Some studies have found that particular methods produced signals in the output text, but a stylometrist who is uncertain of what methods may have been used may not be able to reliably detect them. == History == Rao & Rohatgi (2000), an early work in adversarial stylometry, identified machine translation as a possibility, but noted that the quality of translators available at the time presented severe challenges. Kacmarcik & Gamon (2006) is another early work. Brennan, Afroz & Greenstadt (2012) performed the first evaluation of adversarial stylometric methods on actual texts. Brennan & Greenstadt (2009) introduced the first corpus of adversarially authored texts specifically for evaluating stylometric methods; other corpora include the International Imitation Hemingway Competition, the Faux Faulkner contest, and the hoax blog A Gay Girl in Damascus. == Motivations == Rao & Rohatgi (2000) suggest that short, unattributed documents (i.e., anonymous posts) are not at risk of stylometric identification, but pseudonymous authors who have not practiced adversarial stylometry in producing corpuses of thousands of words may be vulnerable. Narayanan et al. (2012) attempted large-scale deanonymisation of 100,000 blog authors with mixed results: the identifications were significantly better than chance, but only accurately matched the blog and author a fifth of the time; identification improved with the number of posts written by the author in the corpus. Even if an author is not identified, some of their characteristics may still be deduced stylometrically, or stylometry may narrow the anonymity set of potential authors sufficiently for other information to complete the identification. Detecting author characteristics (e.g., gender or age) is often simpler than identifying an author from a large, possibly open, set of candidates. Modern machine learning techniques offer powerful tools for identification; further development of corpora and computational stylometric techniques are likely to raise further privacy issues. Gröndahl & Asokan (2020a) say that the general validity of the hypothesis underlying stylometry—that authors have invariant, content-independent 'style fingerprints'—is uncertain, but "the deanonymisation attack is a real privacy concern". Those interested in practicing adversarial stylometry and stylistic deception include whistleblowers avoiding retribution; journalists and activists; perpetrators of frauds and hoaxes; authors of fake reviews; literary forgers; criminals disguising their identity from investigators; and, generally, anyone with a desire for anonymity or pseudonymity. Authors, or agents acting on behalf of authors, may also attempt to remove stylistic clues to author characteristics (e.g., race or gender) so that knowledge of those characteristics cannot be used for discrimination (e.g., through algorithmic bias). Another possible use for adversarial stylometry is in disguising automatically generated text as human-authored. == Methods == With imitation, the author attempts to mislead stylometry by matching their style to another author's. An incomplete imitation, where some of the true author's unique characteristics appear alongside the imitated author's, can be a detectable signal for the use of adversarial stylometry. Imitation can be performed automatically with style transfer systems, though this typically requires a large corpus in the target style for the system to learn from. Another approach is translation, which employs machine translation of a source text to eliminate characteristic style, often through multiple translators in sequence to produce a round-trip translation. Such chained translation can lead to texts being significantly altered, even to the point of incomprehensibility; improved translation tools reduce this risk. More simply-structured texts can be easier to machine translate without losing the original meaning. Machine translation blurs into direct stylistic imitation or obfuscation achieved through automated style transfer, which can be viewed as a "translation" with the same language as input and output. With low-quality translation tools, an author can be required to manually correct major translation errors while avoiding the hazard of re-introducing stylistic characteristics. Wang, Juola & Riddell (2022) found that gross errors introduced by Google Translate were rare, but more common with several intermediate translations—however, occasional simple or short sentences and misspellings in the source text appeared verbatim in the output, potentially providing an identifying signal. Chain translation can leave characteristic traces of its application in a document, which may allow reconstruction of the intermediate languages used and the number of translation steps performed. Obfuscation involves deliberately changing the style of a text to reduce its similarity to other texts by some metric; this may be performed at the time of writing by conscious modification, or as part of a revision process with feedback from the metric being targeted as an input to decide when the text has been sufficiently obfuscated. In contrast to translation, complex texts can offer more opportunities for effective obfuscation without altering meaning, and likewise genres with more permissible variation allow more obfuscation. However, longer texts are harder to thoroughly obfuscate. Obfuscation can blend into imitation if the author develops a novel target style, distinct from their original style. With respect to masking author characteristics, obfuscation may aim to achieve a union (adding signals for imitated characteristics) or an intersection (removing signals and normalising) of other authors' styles. Avoiding the author's own idiosyncrasies and producing a "normalised" text is a critical obfuscatory step: an author may have a unique tendency to misspell certain words, use particular variants, or to format a document in a characteristic way. Stylometric signals vary in how simply they can be adversarially masked; an author may easily change their vocabulary by conscious choice, but altering the pattern of grammar or the letter frequency in their text may be harder to achieve, though Juola & Vescovi (2011) report that imitation typically succeeds at masking more characteristics than obfuscation. Automated obfuscation may require large amounts of training data written by the author. Concerning automated implementations of adversarial stylometry, two possible implementations are rule-based systems for paraphrasing; and encoder–decoder architectures, where the text passes through an intermediate format that is (intended to be) style-neutral. Another division in automated methods is whether there is feedback from an identification system or not. With such feedback, finding paraphrases for author masking has been characterised as a heuristic search problem, exploring textual variants until the result is stylistically sufficiently far (in the case of obfuscation) or near (in the case of imitation), which then constitutes an adversarial example for that identification system. == Evaluation == How
Variable data publishing
Variable-data publishing (VDP) (also known as database publishing) is a term referring to the output of a variable composition system. While these systems can produce both electronically viewable and hard-copy (print) output, the "variable-data publishing" term today often distinguishes output destined for electronic viewing, rather than that which is destined for hard-copy print (e.g. variable data printing). Essentially the same techniques are employed to perform variable-data publishing, as those utilized with variable data printing. The difference is in the interpretation for output. While variable-data printing may be interpreted to produce various print streams or page-description files (e.g. AFP/IPDS, PostScript, PCL), variable-data publishing produces electronically viewable files, most commonly seen in the forms of PDF, HTML, or XML. Variable-data composition involves the use of data to conditionally: exhibit text (static blocks and/or variable content) exhibit images select fonts select colors format page layouts & flows Variable-data may be as simple as an address block or salutation. However, it can be any or all of the document's textual content—including words, sentences, paragraphs, pages, or the entire document. In other words, it can make up as little or as much of the document as the composer desires. Variable data may also be used to exhibit various images, such as logos, products, or membership photos. Further, variable-data can be used to build rule-based design schemes, including fonts, colors, and page formats. The possibilities are vast. The variable-data tools available today, make it possible to perform variable-data composition at nearly every stage of document production. However, the level of control that can be achieved varies, based upon how far into the document production process a variable-data tool is deployed. For example, if variable-data insertion occurs just prior to output...it's not likely that the text flow or layout can be altered with nearly as much control as would be available at the time of initial document composition. Many organizations will produce multiple forms of output (aka: multi-channel output), for the same document. This ensures that the published content is available to recipients via any form of access method they might require. When multi-channel output is utilized, integrity between those output channels often becomes important. Variable-data publishing may be performed on everything from a personal computer to a mainframe system. However, the speed and practical output volumes which can be achieved are directly affected by the computer power utilized. == Origin of the concept == The term variable-data publishing was likely an offshoot of the term "variable-data printing", first introduced to the printing industry by Frank Romano, Professor Emeritus, School of Print Media, at the College of Imaging Arts and Sciences at Rochester Institute of Technology. However, the concept of merging static document elements and variable document elements predates the term and has seen various implementations ranging from simple desktop 'mail merge', to complex mainframe applications in the financial and banking industry. In the past, the term VDP has been most closely associated with digital printing machines. However, in the past 3 years the application of this technology has spread to web pages, emails, and mobile messaging.
Riffusion
Riffusion is a neural network, designed by Seth Forsgren and Hayk Martiros, that generates music using images of sound rather than audio. The resulting music has been described as "de otro mundo" (otherworldly), although unlikely to replace man-made music. The model was made available on December 15, 2022, with the code also freely available on GitHub. The first version of Riffusion was created as a fine-tuning of Stable Diffusion, an existing open-source model for generating images from text prompts, on spectrograms, resulting in a model which used text prompts to generate image files which could then be put through an inverse Fourier transform and converted into audio files. While these files were only several seconds long, the model could also use latent space between outputs to interpolate different files together (using the img2img capabilities of SD). It was one of many models derived from Stable Diffusion. In December 2022, Mubert similarly used Stable Diffusion to turn descriptive text into music loops. In January 2023, Google published a paper on their own text-to-music generator called MusicLM. Forsgren and Martiros formed a startup, also called Riffusion, and raised $4 million in venture capital funding in October 2023.
Blended artificial intelligence
Blended artificial intelligence (blended AI) refers to the blending of different artificial intelligence techniques or approaches to achieve more robust and practical solutions. It involves integrating multiple AI models, algorithms, and technologies to leverage their respective strengths and compensate for their weaknesses. == Background == In the context of machine learning, blended AI can involve using different types of models, such as generative AI, decision trees, neural networks, and support vector machines. By combining their results, predictions are more accurate and reliable. This blending of models can be done through techniques like ensemble learning, where multiple models are trained independently and their predictions are combined to make a final decision. Blended AI can also involve combining different AI techniques or technologies, such as natural language processing, computer vision, and expert systems, to tackle complex problems that require a multi-dimensional approach. For example, in a sales scenario AI could be used for lead generation and gathering information from social media such as LinkedIn posts, or understanding a prospect's hobbies and interests. Another blended AI could achieve customer profiling including past interactions and purchasing habits, by them, their industry and growth areas. Blended AI could be used to do predictive analytics to look at historical sales data, market trends, and external factors to generate accurate sales forecasts. This method is critical to gauge and increase "efficiency, revenue, and productivity". Lastly, another could integrate all the information into the CRM to build and maintain better prospect and customer profiles. Blended AI aims to leverage the strengths of different AI techniques and technologies, allowing them to complement each other and create more powerful and comprehensive AI solutions. By combining multiple approaches, blended AI aims to achieve better performance, higher accuracy, improved robustness, and enhanced capabilities in solving diverse and challenging problems.
The Future of Truth (Rosenbaum book)
The Future of Truth: How AI Reshapes Reality is a 2026 book by American filmmaker and author Steven Rosenbaum about how artificial intelligence affects the concept of truth. It was published by Matt Holt Books on May 12, 2026, to positive media attention; on May 19, in response to an inquiry from The New York Times, Rosenbaum acknowledged that the book itself contains multiple misattributed or false quotes that were hallucinated by AIs. == Synopsis == == Development == Rosenbaum has said that he developed the book using AI chatbots as research tools, indicating in his notes what information came from AI and sending those claims to a fact-checker affiliated with the publisher. He has said that he did not use AI tools to write the book itself. He has described AI tools as "a delightful writing companion ... strangely creative and crafty and unusual in all these ways", while acknowledging that sometimes "then it betrays you in ways that are just really quite horrible". Journalist and Nobel laureate Maria Ressa wrote the book's foreword. Taylor Lorenz, Michael Wolff, and Nicholas Thompson wrote blurbs promoting it. == Release and reception == The Future of Truth was published by Matt Holt Books, an imprint of BenBella Books, and distributed by Simon & Schuster. The book's release on May 12, 2026, was described by Futurism as "buzzy" and by The New York Times as "to great fanfare". On May 14, an excerpt was published in Wired under the title "Gen Z Is Pioneering a New Understanding of Truth". On May 17, the Times contacted Rosenbaum regarding a number of quotes that appeared to be falsified or misattributed; the following evening he confirmed that they were the result of AI hallucinations:As I disclosed in the book's acknowledgments, I used AI tools ChatGPT and Claude during the research, writing and editing process. That does not excuse these errors, of which I take full responsibility. I am now working with the editors to thoroughly review and quickly correct any affected passages; any future editions will be corrected. The Times documented several of the errors, including a quote from Kara Swisher that Swisher described as making it "sound like I have a stick up my butt" and a quote from Lisa Feldman Barrett that Barrett described as misrepresenting her views on the nature of emotions, social signals, and truth. The book also misattributed a quote by Meredith Broussard from an interview with Marketplace Tech as having been from her book Artificial Unintelligence and hallucinated several words in a quote from Lee McIntyre, although according to McIntyre it did not misrepresent his views. Wired's editors, in an addendum to the excerpt they published, said that all quotes included in it had been verified as part of their fact-checking process. Rosenbaum told the Times that the series of errors "serves as a warning about the risks of AI-assisted research and verification, that is why I wrote the book. These AI errors do not, in fact, diminish the larger questions that the book raises about truth, trust and AI and its impact on society, democracy and editorial." Maggie Harrison Dupré in Futurism expressed skepticism, writing "The risk of AI hallucinations ... is well-known. If you're going to literally write the book on post-AI truth, you should probably put some more elbow grease into fact-checking your AI-assisted research." Kyle Orland in Ars Technica, responding to Rosenbaum's statement that his error "demonstrates the problem more vividly than any abstract argument could", was similarly skeptical, writing that "if we accept this take, every avoidably obvious mess in the world might be a disguised good because it really helps illuminate the huge mistake. And that can't be right; sometimes 'negligence' is just that." Subsequent comments by Rosenbaum placed more blame on the chatbots, which he told The Atlantic "fucked up the book". Rosenbaum told Ars Technica that fact-checking occurred "incredibly effectively, but not a hundred percent"; Orland observed that "it's worth noting that most writers manage to include zero made-up quotes when they write a book". Rosenbaum said that he had "learned a lesson" and would be "much more suspicious" of AI in the future, but would continue to use AI in his research. Orland responded to Rosenbaum's characterization of AI as "magical" by comparing it to the One Ring from The Lord of the Rings, in that it "convinces many of those who use it that they can control its power properly" when many cannot. Orland highlighted the limits of traditional fact-checking regarding AI, given that fact-checkers are used to assuming that direct quotes are copied word-for-word from the source. Rosenbaum told Orland that the future of fact-checking for AI-researched works "probably includes mandatory source tracing for quotations, better provenance tracking, clearer standards around AI-assisted research, and potentially (more irony here) AI tools that audit citations against primary materials". Patrick Redford in Defector criticized Rosenbaum, alongside other artists tricked by AI, for failing to recognize AI as "the enemy". Will Oremus in The Atlantic described Redford's approach of stigmatizing AI writing as "reasonable", noting the presence of low-quality, seemingly AI-generated verbiage in The Future of Truth—a claim denied by Rosenbaum—before saying that the greater issue is finding the line at which AI assistance in writing becomes a problem. Oremus concluded, "The scandal can't just be that [Rosenbaum] used AI while working on his book, because he acknowledged that up front. He got in trouble because he had used AI badly, failing to check its work on a task at which it is famously unreliable."
Superintelligence ban
Superintelligence ban refers to proposed legal, ethical, or policy measures intended to restrict or prohibit the development of artificial superintelligence, AI systems that would surpass human cognitive abilities in nearly all domains. The idea arises from concerns that such systems could become uncontrollable, potentially posing existential threats to humanity or causing severe social and economic disruption. == Background == The concept of limiting or banning superintelligence research has roots in early 21st-century debates on artificial general intelligence (AGI) safety. Thinkers such as Nick Bostrom and Eliezer Yudkowsky warned that self-improving AI could rapidly exceed human oversight. As advanced models like large-scale language models and autonomous agents began demonstrating complex reasoning abilities, policymakers and ethicists increasingly discussed the need for legal constraints on the creation of systems capable of recursive self-improvement. In October 2025, the Future of Life Institute published a statement calling for "a prohibition on the development of superintelligence, not lifted before there is broad scientific consensus that it will be done safely and controllably, and strong public buy-in." This statement was signed by various public personalities, such as Richard Branson and Steve Wozniak, and AI experts, such as Yoshua Bengio and Geoffrey Hinton. == Rationale == Supporters of a superintelligence ban argue that once AI systems surpass human intelligence, traditional containment, alignment, and control methods may fail. They contend that even limited experimentation with such systems could lead to irreversible outcomes, including loss of human decision-making power or unintended global harm. Some propose international treaties modeled after the nuclear non-proliferation framework to prevent a competitive AI arms race. Opponents argue that a ban would be difficult to define and enforce, given the lack of a precise threshold distinguishing advanced AGI from superintelligence. They also warn that excessive restriction could slow scientific progress, hinder beneficial automation, and encourage unregulated underground research. == Global discussion == Although no government has enacted an explicit superintelligence ban, the idea has been debated within the European Union, United Nations, and several independent AI safety organizations. The Future of Life Institute, Center for AI Safety, and other organizations have called for international cooperation to manage risks associated with the pursuit of superintelligent systems. In 2024 and 2025, proposals for a temporary moratorium on frontier AI research were circulated among major technology firms and research institutes, reflecting growing public concern over the trajectory of AI capabilities.
Use of artificial intelligence by the United States Department of Defense
The United States Department of Defense has been analyzing and employing military applications of artificial intelligence since at least 2014. The program initially focused on drones and other robots, but has also been using large language models for military research and analysis. The current US policy on lethal autonomous weapons is Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, updated in January 2023. == Background == The United States Department of Defense began developing lethal autonomous weapons as early as the Reagan administration. An early version of the Tomahawk missile could have been used to destroy Soviet ships without direct human control; the initiative was abandoned after the United States and the Soviet Union signed START I. By 2014, the United Kingdom, Israel, and Norway had already begun using missiles equipped with artificial intelligence systems. The Department of Defense established a policy on the use of artificial intelligence in 2012. == History == === 2016–2017: Carter secretaryship === In May 2016, secretary of defense Ash Carter stated that his Third Offset strategy would include utilizing artificial intelligence as a military advantage. The New York Times reported that year that the Department of Defense had tested an autonomous drone at an approximation of a Middle Eastern village at Camp Edwards. Deputy secretary of defense Robert O. Work, who advocated for developing artificial intelligence, told the Times that the United States needed to compete with China and Russia by having a tactical advantage they could not easily replicate. The initiative was developed by DARPA beginning in 2015. The use of artificial intelligence in the U.S. military was controversial within the department; in February, Paul Scharre, who worked for the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the secretaryships of Robert Gates and Leon Panetta, published a report about the risks of artificial intelligence for broad military applications. === 2017–2019: Mattis secretaryship === By 2017, the United States Air Force had already begun using artificial intelligence in military robots. The Air Force's use of Neurala, an artificial intelligence company, concerned officials in the Department of Defense after an investigation found that Neurala had accepted money from an investment firm with funding from a state-run Chinese company. The Department of Defense began heavily investing in artificial intelligence after Work established Project Maven, an initiative to encourage the development and integration of artificial intelligence in the military, in April 2017. In May 2018, secretary of defense Jim Mattis privately expressed to president Donald Trump that he needed to establish a national strategy on artificial intelligence, quoting an article from former secretary of state Henry Kissinger that called for a presidential commission on the technology. The Department of Defense established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center the following month. Google began working with the Department of Defense on analyzing drone footage as early as March. Google's involvement in the initiative led to protests from employees and mass resignations. Seeking to quell internal unrest, Google stated it would not renew its contract with the Department of Defense in June. The Department of Defense announced an artificial intelligence contract with Microsoft in October. === 2025–present: Hegseth secretaryship === In December 2025, secretary of defense Pete Hegseth announced GenAI.mil, an artificial intelligence platform for the Department of Defense. In a video announcing the platform, Hegseth stated that Department of Defense workers would be able to "conduct deep research, format documents and even analyze video or imagery." The Department of Defense contracted first Gemini by Google, then ChatGPT by OpenAI, and finally Grok by xAI for the platform. Claude by Anthropic was also contracted by the Department of Defense and was in use on secure servers until it was revealed that Claude had been used in the 2026 operation to capture Nicolás Maduro, who was at the time the leader of Venezuela. This revelation sparked a high-profile dispute over Anthropic's ability to constrain Claude's useage, resulting in the termination of Anthropic's $200 million defense contract. The Department of Defense also moved to label Anthropic a supply chain risk, which was later blocked by a federal judge.