IruSoft

IruSoft

IruSoft (Arabic: آيروسوفت) is an insurance regulatory platform designated for licensing, supervision and inspection of the insurance sector within a country. The platform introduced unique supervision-technology (suptech), insurance-technology (insurtech) and regulatory-technology (regtech) automated modules by which a regulator requires less resources to ensure fairness, transparency and competition and to prevent conflicts of interest in the sector. IruSoft was founded by Abdullah Al-Salloum and owned by the Insurance Regulatory Unit in Kuwait. The Insurance Regulatory Unit optimized processing insurance-sector's customer complaints by issuing Resolution No. (1) of 2022 that introduced IruSoft's complaints public module; an automated resolution center, by which the process of receiving submitted complaints, passing them on to the platforms of licensed insurance companies, tracking matter-related discussions and updates and getting them escalated if unresolved to be discussed by a committee assigned by the unit is integrally automated and analyzed for better key performance indicators.

RFPolicy

The RFPolicy outlines a method for contacting vendors about security vulnerabilities found in their products. It was initially written in 2000 by hacker and security consultant Rain Forest Puppy. It was perhaps the second disclosure policy, following Simple Nomad's. The policy gives the vendor five working days to respond to the reporter of the bug. If the vendor fails to contact the reporter within those five days, the issue is recommended to be disclosed to the general community. The reporter should help the vendor reproduce the bug and work out a fix. The reporter should delay notifying the general community about the bug if the vendor provides feasible reasons for requiring so. If the vendor fails to respond or shuts down communication with the reporter of the problem within five working days, the reporter should disclose the issue to the general community. When issuing an alert or fix, the vendor should give the reporter proper credit for reporting the bug. Context for the history of vulnerability disclosure is available in a history article.

Content management

Content management (CM) are a set of processes and technologies that support the collection, managing, and publishing of information in any form or medium. When stored and accessed via computers, this information may be more specifically referred to as digital content, or simply as content. Digital content may take the form of text (such as electronic documents), images, multimedia files (such as audio or video files), or any other file type that follows a content lifecycle requiring management. The process of content development and management is complex enough that various commercial software vendors (large and small), such as Interwoven and Microsoft, offer content management software to control and automate significant aspects of the content lifecycle. == Process == Content management practices and goals vary by mission and by organizational governance structure. News organizations, e-commerce websites, and educational institutions all use content management, but in different ways. This leads to differences in terminology and in the names and number of steps in the process. For example, some digital content is created by one or more authors. Over time that content may be edited. One or more individuals may provide some editorial oversight, approving the content for publication. Publishing may take many forms: it may be the act of "pushing" content out to others, or simply granting digital access rights to certain content to one or more individuals. Later that content may be superseded by another version of the content and thus retired or removed from use (as when this wiki page is modified). Content management is an inherently collaborative process. It often consists of the following basic roles and responsibilities: Creator – responsible for creating and editing content. Editor – responsible for tuning the content message and the style of delivery, including translation and localization. Publisher – responsible for releasing the content for use. Administrator – responsible for managing access permissions to folders, collections and files, usually accomplished by assigning access rights to user groups or roles. Admins may also assist and support users in various ways. Consumer, viewer or guest – the person who reads or otherwise consumes the content after it is published or shared. A critical aspect of content management is the ability to manage versions of content as it evolves (see also version control). Authors and editors often need to restore older versions of edited products due to a process failure or an undesirable series of edits. Time-sensitive content may also require updates as the subject matter evolves over time. Another equally important aspect of content management involves the creation, maintenance, and application of review standards. Each member of the content creation and review process has a unique role and set of responsibilities in the development or publication of the content. Each review team member requires clear and concise review standards. These must be maintained on an ongoing basis to ensure the long-term consistency and health of the knowledge base. A content management system is a set of automated processes that may support the following features: Import and creation of documents and multimedia material Identification of all key users and their roles The ability to assign roles and responsibilities to different instances of content categories or types Definition of workflow tasks often coupled with messaging so that content managers are alerted to changes in content The ability to track and manage multiple versions of a single instance of content The ability to publish the content to a repository to support access The ability to personalize content based on a set of rules Increasingly, the repository is an inherent part of the system, and incorporates enterprise search and retrieval. Content management systems take the following forms: Web content management system—software for web site management (often what content management implicitly means) Output of a newspaper editorial staff organization Workflow for article publication Document management systems Knowledge management software Single source content management system—content stored in chunks within a relational database Variant management system—where personnel tag source content (usually text and graphics) to represent variants stored as single source "master" content modules, resolved to the desired variant at publication (for example: automobile owners manual content for 12 model years stored as single master content files and "called" by model year as needed)—often used in concert with database chunk storage (see above) for large content objects == Governance structures == Content management expert Marc Feldman defines three primary content management governance structures: localized, centralized, and federated—each having its unique strengths and weaknesses. === Localized governance === By putting control in the hands of those closest to the content, the context experts, localized governance models empower and unleash creativity. These benefits come, however, at the cost of a partial-to-total loss of managerial control and oversight. === Centralized governance === When the levers of control are strongly centralized, content management systems are capable of delivering an exceptionally clear and unified brand message. Moreover, centralized content management governance structures allow for a large number of cost-savings opportunities in large enterprises, realized, for example, through (1) the avoidance of duplicated efforts in creating, editing, formatting, repurposing and archiving content; (2) process management and the streamlining of all content related labor; and/or (3) an orderly deployment or updating of the content management system. === Federated governance === Federated governance models potentially realize the benefits of both localized and centralized control while avoiding the weaknesses of both. While content management software systems are inherently structured to enable federated governance models, realizing these benefits can be difficult because it requires, for example, negotiating the boundaries of control with local managers and content creators. In the case of larger enterprises, in particular, the failure to fully implement or realize a federated governance structure equates to a failure to realize the full return on investment and cost savings that content management systems enable. == Implementation == Content management implementations must be able to manage content distributions and digital rights in content life cycle. Content management systems are usually involved with digital rights management in order to control user access and digital rights. In this step, the read-only structures of digital rights management systems force some limitations on content management, as they do not allow authors to change protected content in their life cycle. Creating new content using managed (protected) content is also an issue that gets protected contents out of management controlling systems. A few content management implementations cover all these issues.

Comparison of OLAP servers

The following tables compare general and technical information for a number of online analytical processing (OLAP) servers. Please see the individual products articles for further information. == General information == == Data storage modes == == APIs and query languages == APIs and query languages OLAP servers support. == OLAP distinctive features == A list of OLAP features that are not supported by all vendors. All vendors support features such as parent-child, multilevel hierarchy, drilldown. == System limits == == Security == == Operating systems == The OLAP servers can run on the following operating systems: Note (1):The server availability depends on Java Virtual Machine not on the operating system == Support information ==

Cryptographic bill of materials

Cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM—also cryptography bill of materials) is a structured inventory of all cryptographic assets present in a software, firmware, device, or system. It enumerates algorithms (and parameters such as key sizes and modes), cryptographic libraries or modules, digital certificates, keys and related material, and protocols in use, and maps their relationships to the components that implement or invoke them. CBOMs are used to improve security analysis, compliance, and cryptographic agility, and are increasingly referenced in guidance for post‑quantum cryptography (PQC) migration. == Definition and scope == A CBOM inventories cryptographic primitives and materials—such as encryption and signature algorithms (with specific variants and modes), key sizes, cryptographic libraries/modules, digital certificates (e.g., X.509), keys and other related cryptographic material, and security protocols (e.g., TLS, IPsec). It also documents dependencies (for example, an application uses an algorithm provided by a library; a protocol uses several algorithms) and can capture certificate lifecycles, cryptographic module certifications (e.g., FIPS 140‑3), and policy conformance metadata. In common practice, a CBOM may be embedded within an SBOM format (such as CycloneDX) or exported as a separate, linked artifact. === Typical CBOM fields === The exact schema varies by implementation, but common fields are summarized below (see CycloneDX CBOM guide and NIST SP 1800‑38B). == Relation to SBOM == A CBOM is complementary to, but distinct from, a software bill of materials (SBOM). Whereas an SBOM lists software components and their versions, a CBOM focuses specifically on the cryptography present and how it is configured and used. For example, an SBOM might enumerate inclusion of a library such as OpenSSL, while the CBOM would identify which algorithms and parameters that library enables (e.g., RSA‑2048, ECDH P‑256, AES‑GCM) and list relevant keys and certificates. The pairing enables both supply‑chain transparency and cryptographic transparency. == History == The term and practice emerged in the early–mid 2020s alongside software‑supply‑chain transparency and PQC planning. The OWASP CycloneDX standard introduced native CBOM support (v1.6 and later), modeling algorithms, keys, certificates, and protocols as first‑class “cryptographic assets” and providing dependency semantics (uses/implements) between software and cryptography. Open tooling from industry and researchers (e.g., IBM's CBOMkit and related generators/viewers) appeared to automate discovery and representation of cryptographic use in the CycloneDX CBOM schema. == Regulatory and policy context == In the United States, policy has emphasized cryptographic inventories as a prerequisite to PQC migration. The White House's National Security Memorandum 10 (2022) directed a government‑wide transition to quantum‑resistant cryptography; the Office of Management and Budget's M‑23‑02 (November 2022) operationalized this by requiring agencies to submit a prioritized inventory of cryptographic systems (with algorithm and key details) by 4 May 2023 and annually thereafter, and tasked CISA/NSA/NIST to develop automated discovery and inventory strategies. A 2024 Office of the National Cyber Director report reiterated that a “comprehensive cryptographic inventory” is the baseline for PQC planning and must be maintained iteratively with both automated and manual discovery. NIST's NCCoE practice guide (SP 1800‑38B, preliminary draft) provides concrete methods for cryptographic discovery and documentation across enterprises, aligning with CBOM‑style representations. CISA later published a strategy to migrate federal agencies to automated cryptography discovery and inventory tools to support continuous reporting. Separately, NSA, CISA, and NIST issued joint guidance encouraging all organisations to prepare cryptographic inventories and roadmaps for PQC, beyond government environments. == Role in quantum readiness and cryptographic agility == Because large‑scale quantum computing threatens widely used public‑key algorithms (e.g., RSA, ECC), organisations are planning multi‑year transitions to post-quantum cryptography. CBOMs enable that planning by identifying where quantum‑vulnerable algorithms appear, prioritising high‑impact systems, and tracking replacements over time. A machine‑readable CBOM also supports cryptographic agility and incident response: if an algorithm, library, or certificate lifecycle becomes non‑compliant or vulnerable, the CBOM indicates which products and systems are affected and where mitigations must be applied first. == Standards and tooling == CycloneDX (OWASP): Native CBOM modelling (v1.6+) for algorithms, certificates, keys/related material, and protocols, with dependency semantics and examples. The project publishes a CBOM guide and use‑case profiles (e.g., certificate and algorithm inventories). NIST NCCoE SP 1800‑38 series: Practice guides for PQC migration include enterprise cryptographic discovery methods that produce CBOM‑like inventories and integrate multiple discovery tools. Government automation initiatives: Following M‑23‑02, CISA issued a strategy to migrate to automated cryptography discovery and inventory tools to support agency reporting and continuous inventory management. Open‑source and vendor tools: IBM's CBOMkit and related components generate, analyse, and visualise CBOMs; the IBM CBOM specification work was upstreamed into CycloneDX 1.6. === Data model and interchange (example) === CycloneDX provides machine‑readable encodings (JSON/XML) for CBOM content. The example below (subset) shows an application depending on a crypto library that provides the AES‑256‑GCM algorithm, and the application also depends on a leaf X.509 certificate. See the CycloneDX CBOM guide, JSON reference, and the “Implementation details” use‑case for the semantics of `dependsOn` and `provides`. == Relationship to cybersecurity supply chain initiatives == CBOMs complement SBOM‑focused supply‑chain transparency introduced by U.S. Executive Order 14028 and NTIA/NIST SBOM work. SBOMs document software components; CBOMs add detail on embedded cryptography to support risk management, policy compliance (e.g., disallowing deprecated algorithms), and PQC transition planning.

GNU social

GNU social (and its predecessor StatusNet) is a largely defunct free and open-source microblogging social networking service that implements the OStatus and ActivityPub standards for interoperability between installations. While offering similar functionality to social networks such as Twitter, GNU social seeks to provide the ability for open and federated communication between different microblogging communities, known as 'instances'. Both enterprises and individuals can install and control their own instances and user data. At its peak in popularity, GNU social had been deployed on hundreds of interconnected instances, however has since fallen into disuse as competing software like Mastodon and Pleroma have taken its position as the dominant federated microblogging services. Later on in its lifespan, the project split into two separate branches, with "v2" being a continuation of the original codebase for maintenance of existing instances, with "v3" being a complete redesign of the project meant to integrate further ActivityPub support and modernization of the user experience and its technological back-end. As of August 15, 2022, there had been no new commits to the v2 branch, with the v3 branch also no longer being actively developed not long after by November 25, 2022, with the project essentially abandoned. Despite its modern obsolescence and dated design compared to modern platforms, GNU social and StatusNet is regarded to be the origin of the Fediverse network and has had a major influence on the design of more modern decentralized social networks that succeeded it. == History == While being the main project within its lineage, GNU social originally began as a fork of StatusNet. The software was first developed for a service called identi.ca from Evan Prodromou, which offered free microblogging accounts to the public. The software quickly became one of the first popular examples of a decentralized social network, as identi.ca allowed any other server that was running the software to communicate with it, something which had not previously been attempted before in social media at such a large scale. === StatusNet === Originally, StatusNet (named Laconica at the time) was launched with a communication protocol designed specifically for the project called OpenMicroBlogging (OMB). With version 0.8.1, the name of the software was changed to StatusNet. Version 0.9.0 was released soon after in March 3, 2010, with the developers implementing a newly designed protocol dubbed OStatus, with support for OMB being dropped not long after. Compared to OpenMicroBlogging, OStatus could handle and federate more events and actions than the basic plaintext communication that OMB provided and was based on a variety of other web technologies, allowing for easier adoption of new implementations of the protocol for servers and clients compared to the fully custom architecture of OMB. With the StatusNet name change, the company developing both the software and OStatus as well as managing identi.ca rebranded from Control Yourself to StatusNet Inc. In August 2010, the company raised a new round of venture capital funds to establish a hosting service under the status.net domain from sources such as First Mark Capital, BOLDstart Ventures, iNovia Capital and Montreal Start Up, raising over $2.3 million in funding up to that point. The hosting service allowed anyone to establish their own StatusNet instance without maintaining a server, similar to WordPress.com and other blogging platforms. New registrations on identi.ca along with the ability to create new status.net instances was disabled in December 2012, in preparation for a migration to pump.io that has since been named by users of StatusNet and OStatus as "the Pumpocalypse". pump.io was a brand new software package like StatusNet, but with a new protocol designed for general purpose activity streams outside of microblogging and ease-of-use for developers building on the technology, much like the transition from OMB to OStatus. The announcement was seen as unexpected among identi.ca users, who were concerned about the possibility of their statuses being deleted with the transition. At the same time, server administrators running third-party instances and their users who were left behind on StatusNet were also worried, as it was unclear at the time whether future development of the software would be picked up by a new maintainer. The transition for identi.ca users to pump.io was completed on 12 July 2013. ==== Previous names ==== The original name of StatusNet was Laconica, a reference to the Laconic phrase; a particularly brief statement commonly attributed to the leaders of Sparta (Laconia being the Greek region containing Sparta). In microblogging, all messages are designed to be very short due to the traditional 140-character limit on message size, a limitation imported from SMS. Beginning with version 0.8.1, the name was changed to StatusNet. The developers said that the new name "simply reflects what our software does: send status updates into your social network." === GNU social === GNU social originally began as a side project of GNU FM (Libre.fm) maintainer Matt Lee, with the goal of being able to federate messages between Last.fm and other instances of GNU FM using StatusNet plugins. Around the same time, a developer named Mikael Nordfeldth forked StatusNet with the intention of maintaining it as a personal project, dubbing it "Free Social". However, following identi.ca's transition to pump.io and its developers' sudden abandonment of StatusNet, the projects received more attention from server administrators and other users looking for an actively updated alternative. Shortly after LibrePlanet 2012, a plan was formed to merge all three projects into a single service. On June 8, 2013, it was announced that along with Free Social, StatusNet would be merged into the GNU social project and stewarded by the Free Software Foundation, with the project since becoming the dominant variant of StatusNet. During GNU social's lifespan, a popular theme for the user interface named Quitter was used, which was similar to an earlier Twitter interface. Many instances were made specifically using the name Quitter such as Quitter.se, an instance created by the developer of the theme. Before the establishment of Mastodon's popularity and dominance within the network, Quitter was noted as a frequent location for users of Twitter to migrate to when users disagreed with moderation policies or feature updates, such as when an algorithmic feed was added to Twitter. A fork of GNU social was made called postActiv, which planned to rewrite the backend and user interface of GNU social, as well as to add compatibility for Diaspora's protocol. == Features == A basic GNU social instance takes the form of a microblogging service with a reverse chronological timeline that features status updates and small messages from followed accounts, similar to other services such as Twitter or Weibo. While users could see their own customized timeline, they could access another timeline that showcased every message that the instance knows of, including from other instances that were connected to each other if someone on the instance followed an account from it. Users could also create and join groups, which allows for discussion and collaboration on specific topics. Administrators can also customize their server via the plugin system, which allows developers to create new features or modify existing plugins to suit the needs of the instance via PHP. A notable plugin built for GNU social was Quitter, a revamp of the user interface that resembles an earlier version of Twitter's user interface.

Initialization vector

In cryptography, an initialization vector (IV) or starting variable is an input to a cryptographic primitive being used to provide the initial state. The IV is typically required to be random or pseudorandom, but sometimes an IV only needs to be unpredictable or unique. Randomization is crucial for some encryption schemes to achieve semantic security, a property whereby repeated usage of the scheme under the same key does not allow an attacker to infer relationships between (potentially similar) segments of the encrypted message. For block ciphers, the use of an IV is described by the modes of operation. Some cryptographic primitives require the IV only to be non-repeating, and the required randomness is derived internally. In this case, the IV is commonly called a nonce (a number used only once), and the primitives (e.g. CBC) are considered stateful rather than randomized. This is because an IV need not be explicitly forwarded to a recipient but may be derived from a common state updated at both sender and receiver side. (In practice, a short nonce is still transmitted along with the message to consider message loss.) An example of stateful encryption schemes is the counter mode of operation, which has a sequence number for a nonce. The IV size depends on the cryptographic primitive used; for block ciphers it is generally the cipher's block-size. In encryption schemes, the unpredictable part of the IV has at best the same size as the key to compensate for time/memory/data tradeoff attacks. When the IV is chosen at random, the probability of collisions due to the birthday problem must be taken into account. Traditional stream ciphers such as RC4 do not support an explicit IV as input, and a custom solution for incorporating an IV into the cipher's key or internal state is needed. Some designs realized in practice are known to be insecure; the WEP protocol is a notable example, and is prone to related-IV attacks. == Motivation == A block cipher is one of the most basic primitives in cryptography, and frequently used for data encryption. However, by itself, it can only be used to encode a data block of a predefined size, called the block size. For example, a single invocation of the AES algorithm transforms a 128-bit plaintext block into a ciphertext block of 128 bits in size. The key, which is given as one input to the cipher, defines the mapping between plaintext and ciphertext. If data of arbitrary length is to be encrypted, a simple strategy is to split the data into blocks each matching the cipher's block size, and encrypt each block separately using the same key. This method is not secure as equal plaintext blocks get transformed into equal ciphertexts, and a third party observing the encrypted data may easily determine its content even when not knowing the encryption key. To hide patterns in encrypted data while avoiding the re-issuing of a new key after each block cipher invocation, a method is needed to randomize the input data. In 1980, the NIST published a national standard document designated Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) PUB 81, which specified four so-called block cipher modes of operation, each describing a different solution for encrypting a set of input blocks. The first mode implements the simple strategy described above, and was specified as the electronic codebook (ECB) mode. In contrast, each of the other modes describe a process where ciphertext from one block encryption step gets intermixed with the data from the next encryption step. To initiate this process, an additional input value is required to be mixed with the first block, and which is referred to as an initialization vector. For example, the cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode requires an unpredictable value, of size equal to the cipher's block size, as additional input. This unpredictable value is added to the first plaintext block before subsequent encryption. In turn, the ciphertext produced in the first encryption step is added to the second plaintext block, and so on. The ultimate goal for encryption schemes is to provide semantic security: by this property, it is practically impossible for an attacker to draw any knowledge from observed ciphertext. It can be shown that each of the three additional modes specified by the NIST are semantically secure under so-called chosen-plaintext attacks. == Properties == Properties of an IV depend on the cryptographic scheme used. A basic requirement is uniqueness, which means that no IV may be reused under the same key. For block ciphers, repeated IV values devolve the encryption scheme into electronic codebook mode: equal IV and equal plaintext result in equal ciphertext. In stream cipher encryption uniqueness is crucially important as plaintext may be trivially recovered otherwise. Example: Stream ciphers encrypt plaintext P to ciphertext C by deriving a key stream K from a given key and IV and computing C as C = P xor K. Assume that an attacker has observed two messages C1 and C2 both encrypted with the same key and IV. Then knowledge of either P1 or P2 reveals the other plaintext since C1 xor C2 = (P1 xor K) xor (P2 xor K) = P1 xor P2. Many schemes require the IV to be unpredictable by an adversary. This is effected by selecting the IV at random or pseudo-randomly. In such schemes, the chance of a duplicate IV is negligible, but the effect of the birthday problem must be considered. As for the uniqueness requirement, a predictable IV may allow recovery of (partial) plaintext. Example: Consider a scenario where a legitimate party called Alice encrypts messages using the cipher-block chaining mode. Consider further that there is an adversary called Eve that can observe these encryptions and is able to forward plaintext messages to Alice for encryption (in other words, Eve is capable of a chosen-plaintext attack). Now assume that Alice has sent a message consisting of an initialization vector IV1 and starting with a ciphertext block CAlice. Let further PAlice denote the first plaintext block of Alice's message, let E denote encryption, and let PEve be Eve's guess for the first plaintext block. Now, if Eve can determine the initialization vector IV2 of the next message she will be able to test her guess by forwarding a plaintext message to Alice starting with (IV2 xor IV1 xor PEve); if her guess was correct this plaintext block will get encrypted to CAlice by Alice. This is because of the following simple observation: CAlice = E(IV1 xor PAlice) = E(IV2 xor (IV2 xor IV1 xor PAlice)). Depending on whether the IV for a cryptographic scheme must be random or only unique the scheme is either called randomized or stateful. While randomized schemes always require the IV chosen by a sender to be forwarded to receivers, stateful schemes allow sender and receiver to share a common IV state, which is updated in a predefined way at both sides. == Block ciphers == Block cipher processing of data is usually described as a mode of operation. Modes are primarily defined for encryption as well as authentication, though newer designs exist that combine both security solutions in so-called authenticated encryption modes. While encryption and authenticated encryption modes usually take an IV matching the cipher's block size, authentication modes are commonly realized as deterministic algorithms, and the IV is set to zero or some other fixed value. == Stream ciphers == In stream ciphers, IVs are loaded into the keyed internal secret state of the cipher, after which a number of cipher rounds are executed prior to releasing the first bit of output. For performance reasons, designers of stream ciphers try to keep that number of rounds as small as possible, but because determining the minimal secure number of rounds for stream ciphers is not a trivial task, and considering other issues such as entropy loss, unique to each cipher construction, related-IVs and other IV-related attacks are a known security issue for stream ciphers, which makes IV loading in stream ciphers a serious concern and a subject of ongoing research. == WEP IV == The 802.11 encryption algorithm called WEP (short for Wired Equivalent Privacy) used a short, 24-bit IV, leading to reused IVs with the same key, which led to it being easily cracked. Packet injection allowed for WEP to be cracked in times as short as several seconds. This ultimately led to the deprecation of WEP. == SSL 2.0 IV == In cipher-block chaining mode (CBC mode), the IV need not be secret, but must be unpredictable (In particular, for any given plaintext, it must not be possible to predict the IV that will be associated to the plaintext in advance of the generation of the IV.) at encryption time. Additionally for the output feedback mode (OFB mode), the IV must be unique. In particular, the (previously) common practice of re-using the last ciphertext block of a message as the IV for the next message is insecure (for example, this method was used by SSL 2.0). If an attacker knows