In software engineering, containerization is operating-system-level virtualization or application-level virtualization over multiple resources so that software applications can run in isolated user spaces called containers in any cloud or non-cloud environment, regardless of type or vendor. The term "container" has different meanings in different contexts, and it is important to ensure that the intended definition aligns with the audience's understanding. == Usage == Each container is basically a fully functional and portable cloud or non-cloud computing environment surrounding the application and keeping it independent of other environments running in parallel. Individually, each container simulates a different software application and runs isolated processes by bundling related configuration files, libraries and dependencies. But, collectively, multiple containers share a common operating system kernel (OS). In recent times, containerization technology has been widely adopted by cloud computing platforms like Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud Platform, and IBM Cloud. Containerization has also been pursued by the U.S. Department of Defense as a way of more rapidly developing and fielding software updates, with first application in its F-22 air superiority fighter. == History == The concept of containerization in computing originated from early operating system–level isolation mechanisms. One of the earliest implementations was the chroot system call introduced in Version 7 Unix in 1979, which changed the apparent root directory for a process and its children, providing a basic form of filesystem isolation. In the early 2000s, more advanced forms of operating system–level virtualization were developed. FreeBSD introduced "jails" in 2000, which extended isolation by restricting processes to a subset of system resources. Around the same time, Solaris introduced "zones" (also known as Solaris Containers), providing similar capabilities with resource management and isolation features. Linux later incorporated comparable functionality through kernel features such as namespaces and control groups (cgroups), which enabled isolation of process IDs, network stacks, filesystems, and resource allocation. These features formed the foundation for Linux Containers (LXC), which provided a userspace interface for managing containers. The widespread adoption of containerization accelerated with the release of Docker in 2013, which introduced a standardized format for packaging applications and their dependencies, along with tooling for image distribution and container management. == Types of containers == OS containers Application containers == Security issues == Because of the shared OS, security threats can affect the whole containerized system. In containerized environments, security scanners generally protect the OS, but not the application containers, which adds unwanted vulnerability. == Container management, orchestration, clustering == Container orchestration or container management is mostly used in the context of application containers. Implementations providing such orchestration include Kubernetes and Docker swarm. == Container cluster management == Container clusters need to be managed. This includes functionality to create a cluster, to upgrade the software or repair it, balance the load between existing instances, scale by starting or stopping instances to adapt to the number of users, to log activities and monitor produced logs or the application itself by querying sensors. Open-source implementations of such software include OKD and Rancher. Quite a number of companies provide container cluster management as a managed service, like Alibaba, Amazon, Google, and Microsoft.
Intel Threat Detection Technology
Intel Threat Detection Technology (TDT) is a CPU-level technology created by Intel in 2018 to enable host endpoint protections to use a CPU's low-level access to detect threats to a system. TDT consists of multiple components including Accelerated Memory Scanning, which uses the CPU's integrated GPU to scan memory, and Advanced Platform Telemetry, which uses processor-level activity monitoring to detect unusual activity. It is supported on sixth-generation or newer Intel Core CPUs and additional capabilities were added to the 11th generation Core processors. Intel TDT is integrated into several third-party anti-malware solutions including Microsoft Defender, Check Point Harmony Endpoint, CrowdStrike Falcon, and others. == Accelerated Memory Scanning == Accelerated Memory Scanning (also referred to as "Advanced Memory Scanning") uses the CPU's integrated GPU to scan memory for malicious code, instead of using the CPU directly. This improves system responsiveness during anti-malware scanning. and lowers power consumption. Features include pattern matching, using random forest decision trees, string extraction, entropy calculation, and Euclidean clustering. == Advanced Platform Telemetry == Advanced Platform Telemetry collects CPU-level telemetry to detect uncommon activity patterns which might be indicative of malware. The telemetry data is collected from the CPU performance monitoring unit (PMU) and doesn't require a large signature database to detect malware. Instead, it uses machine-learning based correlations to identify indicators of attack For example, Microsoft Defender is able to use TDT's Advanced Platform Telemetry features to detect processor usage patterns indicative of ransomware and cryptojacking with TDT so it can detect them.
Telebirr
Telebirr (Amharic: ቴሌብር) is a mobile payment service developed and was launched by Ethio telecom, the state owned telecommunication and Internet service provider in Ethiopia. It took five months to develop the end-to-end service. It facilitates the delivery of cashless transactions. The platform deployed currently has the capacity of processing up to 100 transactions per second (TPS) and can be scaled up to 1000 TPS. The service is accessible via SMS, USSD, and smartphone applications. Telebirr works in five languages. == Services == Though the service is fully accessible for any customer of Ethio telecom, the users need to register through the mobile application called Telebirr or using an authorized agent or Ethio telecom shop or Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD), 127# nationally. However, Telebirr also provides a “quick registration” by using any information that already exists in Ethio telecom's system.
Language-Theoretic Security
Language-theoretic security, or LangSec, is an approach to software security that focuses on input handling, complexity, and program design as strategies to improve the verifiability of computer programs. It was introduced in 2005 by Robert J. Hansen and Meredith L. Patterson at BlackHat and in 2011 by Len Sassaman and Patterson. It aims to create a formal description of which software is likely to have security vulnerabilities of particular classes, and why. It considers programs to have an inherent parser component, whether or not explicit, composed of that part of the program which operates on external input before that input is fully parsed. A central hypothesis of language-theoretic security is that vulnerabilities in software increase according to the computational power of the notional input-accepting automaton equivalent to this parser, using the definitions of automata theory. The lower bound on this computational power is the input language complexity of the program. The extent to which reducing this complexity is possible is a function of the specification of the communication protocol or file format the program takes as input. == Parsing as a security mechanism == The behaviour of a program is defined with reference to its expected input. Unexpected input being used by a program is a factor in numerous security bugs, including the so-called Android master key vulnerability (CVE-2013-4787), because accepting unexpected input renders the program's specification ambiguous. In that instance, the unexpected ambiguity came in the form of a ZIP file with duplicate filenames. If a program fully parses its input and only acts on input that unambiguously meets the specification, it follows that the program will avoid these types of vulnerabilities. This is an intentional inversion of the Postel principle. Accepting only unambiguous and valid input is a more formal requirement than input validation or sanitization, and narrows the number of possible but unanticipated program states that can be induced in an application via user input. Conversely, failure to do this is associated with security vulnerabilities. Input sanitization in particular is held to be an inadequate approach to avoiding malicious input because it inherently ignores context-sensitive properties of the input; it can therefore result in paradoxical effects, such as sanitization code activating otherwise inert cross-site scripting payloads in browsers. === Parser differentials === If the language of accepted program input is sufficiently simple, it is possible to verify that two implementations parse the same input language consistently. This is advantageous because it shows no parser differential exists between the two implementations. The requisite level of simplicity is theoretically that for which there is a solution to the equivalence problem. If the two parsers involved in CVE-2013-4787 were equivalent - that is, if they rendered the same output state given the same input state - the vulnerability could not have existed. One strategy for doing this is to publish machine-readable specifications of a format or protocol, and then use a parser generator to generate the parser code. An example of a parser generator built for this purpose is DaeDaLus. The combination of Lex with any of GNU Bison, ANTLR, or Yacc also accomplishes this. However, many parser generators allow the mixing of general purpose code with the parsing definitions, which weakens the guarantees provided by parsing. === Analysis of injection attacks === Injection attacks are generally the result of differences between the serializer (or "unparser") and the corresponding parser at a layer boundary in a system; therefore, they are a special case of parser differentials. In a SQL injection attack, for example, an attacker is able to cause the application with which they are interacting to serialize a SQL query that has different semantics than intended. In the simplest case where the payload ends a string and adds new code, the payload has crossed the code-data boundary in SQL. In language-theoretic security, this is treated as a bug in the serializer of the SQL query, which should instead be written in a way that constrains its possible outputs to those within the scope of the intended query. === Parser combinators === If a parser generator is not used, it is still possible to avoid implementation bugs by using parser combinator such as Nom to implement the parser code. This has the drawback of relying on a programmer correctly translating the specification into the language of the parser generator library, though this task is still less error-prone than hand-coding a parser. == Input format complexity == Complexity in computer programs is associated with security vulnerabilities. Within the domain of language-theoretic security, complexity is described with reference to the computational power of the abstract machine necessary to implement the program, or more particularly, to implement the parser for its input language. This complexity describes whether it is possible to show that there is no unintended or undesired functionality in the program which might be exploitable by an attacker. To be bounded in complexity, the program's input must be well-defined both in terms of form and of semantics. === Weird machines === A weird machine is a model of computation in a program that exists in parallel with, but is distinct from, the intended abstract model of computation in that program. Some classes of weird machine arise from the multi-layered nature of computer programs, or the context in which the programs run; others result from the unanticipated functionality a program has due to its complexity or to software bugs. The more complex the computation model of a program, the more likely it is to implement a weird machine. Depending on context, the weird machine may or may not be concretely useful for an attacker. Since the space of weird machines in the context of some program is the universe of all possible states that are not within the program's intended states, many exploited states including remote code execution and injection attacks belong to the domain of weird machines. A reduction in weird machines is therefore a likely correlate with reduced program vulnerability. === SafeDocs project === SafeDocs is a DARPA project undertaken in 2018 to take existing file formats, create safer subsets of them, and develop programming tools to work for the safer formats. The initial test case for this was PDF. The purpose of creating safer subsets in this case is to lower the minimum bound on parser complexity so that it becomes possible to create tools that will generate correct, normative parsers for them. == Relation to programming languages == The analytic framework of language-theoretic security assumes programs to be virtual machines that execute their input. A document that is read by an application is in this sense a form of machine code, in a generalization of the data as code idea, following the automata theory description of parsers. === Type-safe programming languages === Parsing input and serializing output are operations that consume one data type and emit another. A programming language can therefore check that data is correctly parsed and contains the expected structure by checking data types, and correct serializing (or unparsing) can be implemented as operations on the data types that are relevant to the program's output. This approach can be used to show that the recognizer and unparser patterns have been implemented. It is also possible to implement type checking across a distributed system to enforce parsing and unparsing of the expected structures and to verify that the assumptions made in designing the compositional properties of a distributed system have been followed. === Memory-safe programming languages === In the general case, spatial memory correctness is undecidable. If any proof of spatial memory correctness is to be made, it is therefore necessary to bound the complexity of the code. Interpreted languages such as Java and Python effectively accomplish this via runtime bounds checking, and frameworks for runtime bounds checking also exist for C. The effect of these strategies for spatial memory correctness are to create a halt state in place of a spatial memory correctness violation; therefore, it can be shown that the program will not violate spatial memory correctness, but in exchange, it cannot be shown in the general case that programs will not have runtime bounds checking exceptions. Some programming languages, such as Rust, accomplish this using borrow checking. The borrow checker acts to assure spatial memory correctness by compile-time reference counting. Code for which spatial memory correctness cannot be shown to not be violated therefore does not compile, inherently limiting the complexity of the spatial memory correctness of the program to what is decidable. Thi
Soterml
SoTerML (Soil and Terrain Markup Language) is a XML-based markup language for storing and exchanging soil and terrain related data. SoTerML development is being done within The e-SoTer Platform. GEOSS plans a global Earth Observation System and, within this framework, the e-SOTER project addresses the felt need for a global soil and terrain database. The Centre for Geospatial Science (Currently Nottingham Geospatial Institute) at the University of Nottingham has initiated the development since January 2009. Further development and maintenance is currently handled in National Soil Resources Institute (NSRI) at Cranfield University, UK. The role of CGS is within the development of the e-SOTER dissemination platform, which is based on INSPIRE principles. The SoTerML development included: 1. Development of a data dictionary for nomenclatures and various data sources (data and metadata). 2. Development of an exchange format/procedures from the World Reference Base 2006.
Brownout (software engineering)
Brownout in software engineering is a technique that involves disabling certain features of an application. == Description == Brownout is used to increase the robustness of an application to computing capacity shortage. If too many users are simultaneously accessing an application hosted online, the underlying computing infrastructure may become overloaded, rendering the application unresponsive. Users are likely to abandon the application and switch to competing alternatives, hence incurring long-term revenue loss. To better deal with such a situation, the application can be given brownout capabilities: The application will disable certain features – e.g., an online shop will no longer display recommendations of related products – to avoid overload. Although reducing features generally has a negative impact on the short-term revenue of the application owner, long-term revenue loss can be avoided. The technique is inspired by brownouts in power grids, which consists in reducing the power grid's voltage in case electricity demand exceeds production. Some consumers, such as incandescent light bulbs, will dim – hence originating the term – and draw less power, thus helping match demand with production. Similarly, a brownout application helps match its computing capacity requirements to what is available on the target infrastructure. Brownout complements elasticity. The former can help the application withstand short-term capacity shortage, but does so without changing the capacity available to the application. In contrast, elasticity consists of adding (or removing) capacity to the application, preferably in advance, so as to avoid capacity shortage altogether. The two techniques can be combined; e.g., brownout is triggered when the number of users increases unexpectedly until elasticity can be triggered, the latter usually requiring minutes to show an effect. Brownout is relatively non-intrusive for the developer, for example, it can be implemented as an advice in aspect-oriented programming. However, surrounding components, such as load-balancers, need to be made brownout-aware to distinguish between cases where an application is running normally and cases where the application maintains a low response time by triggering brownout. == Usage in phased deprecation == A related use of the brownout concept in software engineering is the deliberate introduction of temporary outages to a system, API or feature that is being phased out. This is sometimes also called a "scream test" when it is used to discover unknown dependents of a system or API. The intention is to allow detection of downstream consumers of an API or service who may otherwise have missed deprecation announcements or to uncover hidden side-effects of the deprecation that may have been overlooked. The intention is that developers of dependent systems will notice their own system failures caused by the upstream brownout. Such brownouts are typically pre-announced scheduled outages or probabilistic in nature (such as artificially failing a percentage of requests). As a brownout is only a temporary or partial outage, it provides downstream consumers of an API or service time to remove any discovered dependencies on the deprecated API before it is fully retired. For consumers that have already prepared for the deprecation, a brownout provides valuable testing that the final removal of the service won't cause any unexpected problems.
Hit-testing
In computer graphics programming, hit-testing (hit detection, picking, or pick correlation) is the process of determining whether a user-controlled cursor (such as a mouse cursor or touch-point on a touch-screen interface) intersects a given graphical object (such as a shape, line, or curve) drawn on the screen. Hit-testing may be performed on the movement or activation of a mouse or other pointing device. Hit-testing is used by GUI environments to respond to user actions, such as selecting a menu item or a target in a game based on its visual location. In web programming languages such as HTML, SVG, and CSS, this is associated with the concept of pointer-events (e.g. user-initiated cursor movement or object selection). Collision detection is a related concept for detecting intersections of two or more different graphical objects, rather than intersection of a cursor with one or more graphical objects. == Algorithm == There are many different algorithms that may be used to perform hit-testing, with different performance or accuracy outcomes. One common hit-test algorithm for axis aligned bounding boxes. A key idea is that the box being tested must be either entirely above, entirely below, entirely to the right or left of the current box. If this is not possible, they are colliding. Example logic is presented in the pseudo-code below: In Python: