Kuaishou Technology is a Chinese publicly traded partly state-owned holding company based in Haidian District, Beijing, that was founded in 2011 by Hua Su (Chinese: 宿华) and Cheng Yixiao (Chinese: 程一笑). The company, listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, is known for developing a mobile app for sharing users' short videos, a social network, and video special effects editor. The app is known as Kwai in many countries outside of China. It is also known as Snack Video in India, Pakistan and Indonesia. == Ownership and governance == Kuaishou's overseas team is led by the former CEO of the application 99, and staff from Google, Facebook, Netflix, and TikTok were recruited to lead the company's international expansion. The China Internet Investment Fund, a state-owned enterprise controlled by the Cyberspace Administration of China, holds a golden share ownership stake in Kuaishou. == History == Kuaishou is China's first short video platform that was developed in 2011 by engineer Hua Su and Cheng Yixiao. Prior to co-founding Kuaishou, Su Hua had worked for both Google and Baidu as a software engineer. The company is headquartered in Haidian District, Beijing. Kuaishou's predecessor "GIF Kuaishou" was founded in March 2011. GIF Kuaishou was a mobile app with which users could make and share GIF pictures. In 2013, Kuaishou became a short-video social platform. By 2013, the app had reached 100 million daily users. By 2019, it had exceeded 200 million active daily users. In March 2017, Kuaishou closed a US$350 million investment round that was led by Tencent. In January 2018, Forbes estimated the company's valuation to be US$18 billion. In April 2018, Kuaishou's app was briefly banned from Chinese app stores after China Central Television (CCTV) reported on the platform popularizing videos of teenage mothers. In 2019, the company announced a partnership with the People's Daily, an official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, to help it experiment with the use of artificial intelligence in news. In June 2020, following the start of the 2020–2021 China–India skirmishes, the Government of India banned Kwai along with 58 other apps, citing "data and privacy issues". In January 2021, Kuaishou announced it was planning an initial public offering (IPO) to raise approximately US$5 billion. Kuaishou's stock completed its first day of trading at $300 Hong Kong dollars (HKD) (US$38.70), more than doubling its initial offer price, and causing its market value to rise to over $1 trillion HKD (US$159 billion). In February 2021, Kuaishou made a debut on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, with its shares soaring by 194% at the opening. The company subsequently encountered major setbacks as a result of heightened regulatory restrictions on Chinese internet firms, which contributed to its share price falling by nearly 80% from its post-IPO peak. By December 2021, Kuaishou announced a major reorganization, including the layoff of 30% of its staff, primarily targeting mid-level employees earning an annual salary of $157,000 or more. This restructuring aimed to cut costs and mitigate financial losses. In October 2022, state-owned Beijing Radio and Television Station took a minority ownership stake in Kuaishou. In April 2024, a Financial Times article citing current and former Kuaishou employees stated that the company has been running an ageist redundancy programme known internally as "Limestone", culling workers in their mid-30s. In June 2024, Kuaishou and the Sichuan international communication center launched a branch center in São Paulo, Brazil. In June 2024, Kuaishou released its diffusion transformer text-to-video model, Kling, which they claimed could generate two minutes of video at 30 frames per second and in 1080p resolution. The model has been compared to that of OpenAI's Sora text-to-video model. It is accessible to the public on Kuaishou's video editing app KwaiCut via signing up for a waitlist with a Chinese phone number. In December 2025, Kuaishou came under a cyberattack which led to a temporary influx of violent and pornographic content. == Popularity == As of 2019, it had a worldwide user base of over 200 million, leading the "Most Downloaded" lists of the Google Play and Apple App Store in eight countries, such as Brazil, where it was introduced in 2019. Its main short-video platform competitor was Douyin, which is known as TikTok outside China. Compared to Douyin, Kuaishou is more popular with older users living outside China's Tier 1 cities. Its initial popularity came from videos of Chinese rural life. The app is particularly well known for its "rustic" aesthetic and is popular among rural people. Kuaishou also relied more on e-commerce revenue than on advertising revenue compared to its main competitor. == Reception == Kwai (as the app is called outside of China) was banned in India in 2020 along with other short video apps like TikTok. Kuaishou then released the clone SnackVideo, which was subsequently also banned. The app is one of the most popular social media platforms in Brazil, where Kuaishou partnered with creators to make telenovela style content, and appeals to football fans by working with football teams CR Flamengo and Santos FC and sponsoring the tournament Copa América. Kwai was notable in Brazil for spreading information (and misinformation) about the COVID-19 vaccine and political misinformation. === Manjiao Wenhua === "Manjiao wenhua" (慢脚文化) is a sarcasm term on Chinese internet on the unethical or illegal contents on Kuaishou. State broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) reported that many contents are about child pregnancy. "Dating, pregnancy, bearing a child...these are strictly prohibited in the real time by a minor, but these contents can easily shown to audiences here." In addition, many students from primary or secondary schools make a pose of smoking. Wang Zhenhui (王贞会) from CUPSL stated that these kinds of bad values will give negative effects to the minors.
E-on Vue
Vue is a software tool for world generation by Bentley Systems, with support for many visual effects, animations, and various other features. The tool has been used in several feature-length films. In 2024, Bentley Systems announced that Vue would be discontinued, and be freely available to those that still wish to use it. == Versions == == Features == This is a list of features as of the 2023 release of Vue: === Terrains === Heightfield terrains Procedural terrains Infinite terrains Planetary terrains Real-world terrains 3D terrain sculpting Terrain export === EcoSystem Instancing Technology === Material-based EcoSystems Global EcoSystems Dynamic EcoSystems 360° EcoSystem Population Paint EcoSystem instances EcoParticles Export EcoSystem populations === Vegetation === Built-in Plant editor Compatible with PlantFactory Vegetation assets === Atmosphere, Skies and Clouds === Standard atmospheric model Spectral atmospheric model Photometric atmospheric model Atmosphere presets Procedural Volumetric 3D cloud layers Standalone 3D Metaclouds Convert meshes to Clouds Cloud morphing Import OpenVDB Export standalone and cloud layer zones to OpenVDB Export skies as HDRI === Modeling === Primitive and Feature modeling 3D Text edition tool Metablobbing Hyperblobs Export baked hyperblobs Splines Built in Road Construction toolkit Random rock generator Export rocks === Texturing and UVs === Material presets PBR Substance support Node-based procedural materials Volumetric materials and Hypertextures Stacked UVs Unwrapped UVs Ptex === Interoperability, Integration And Export === Export single assets to generic 3D formats Full scene export Integration plugins Import and Export Camera data as FBX and Nuke.chan Python API ZBrush GoZ bridge === Animation === Animate objects, materials, atmospheres, clouds, waves... Automatic wind and breeze Localized wind effects per plant / per EcoSystem population Omni and directional ventilators for local modifications of plants Time spline editor Automatic keyframe creation Automatic synchronization of cameras and lights Animation export as AfterEffects Import motion tracking information === Lighting === Global illumination, Global Radiosity, Ambient occlusion Subsurface Scattering HDRI image based lighting Point light, Quadratic point light, Spotlight, Quadratic spotlight, Directional light Use IES distribution profiles on photometric lights Area lights, light panels, light portals Physically accurate caustics computation === Rendering === Render with Ray Tracer Render with Path Tracer Stereoscopic rendering 360/180 VR Panorama Render Option Spherical panoramic rendering Tone mapping options Multipass & G-Buffer Network rendering with HyperVue / RenderCows Network rendering with RenderNodes == Users == Blue Sky Studios Digital Domain DreamWorks Animation: Kung Fu Panda Industrial Light & Magic: Indiana Jones and the Kingdom of the Crystal Skull, Pirates of the Caribbean: Dead Man's Chest Sony Pictures Imageworks Warner Bros. Interactive Entertainment Weta Digital
Language-Theoretic Security
Language-theoretic security, or LangSec, is an approach to software security that focuses on input handling, complexity, and program design as strategies to improve the verifiability of computer programs. It was introduced in 2005 by Robert J. Hansen and Meredith L. Patterson at BlackHat and in 2011 by Len Sassaman and Patterson. It aims to create a formal description of which software is likely to have security vulnerabilities of particular classes, and why. It considers programs to have an inherent parser component, whether or not explicit, composed of that part of the program which operates on external input before that input is fully parsed. A central hypothesis of language-theoretic security is that vulnerabilities in software increase according to the computational power of the notional input-accepting automaton equivalent to this parser, using the definitions of automata theory. The lower bound on this computational power is the input language complexity of the program. The extent to which reducing this complexity is possible is a function of the specification of the communication protocol or file format the program takes as input. == Parsing as a security mechanism == The behaviour of a program is defined with reference to its expected input. Unexpected input being used by a program is a factor in numerous security bugs, including the so-called Android master key vulnerability (CVE-2013-4787), because accepting unexpected input renders the program's specification ambiguous. In that instance, the unexpected ambiguity came in the form of a ZIP file with duplicate filenames. If a program fully parses its input and only acts on input that unambiguously meets the specification, it follows that the program will avoid these types of vulnerabilities. This is an intentional inversion of the Postel principle. Accepting only unambiguous and valid input is a more formal requirement than input validation or sanitization, and narrows the number of possible but unanticipated program states that can be induced in an application via user input. Conversely, failure to do this is associated with security vulnerabilities. Input sanitization in particular is held to be an inadequate approach to avoiding malicious input because it inherently ignores context-sensitive properties of the input; it can therefore result in paradoxical effects, such as sanitization code activating otherwise inert cross-site scripting payloads in browsers. === Parser differentials === If the language of accepted program input is sufficiently simple, it is possible to verify that two implementations parse the same input language consistently. This is advantageous because it shows no parser differential exists between the two implementations. The requisite level of simplicity is theoretically that for which there is a solution to the equivalence problem. If the two parsers involved in CVE-2013-4787 were equivalent - that is, if they rendered the same output state given the same input state - the vulnerability could not have existed. One strategy for doing this is to publish machine-readable specifications of a format or protocol, and then use a parser generator to generate the parser code. An example of a parser generator built for this purpose is DaeDaLus. The combination of Lex with any of GNU Bison, ANTLR, or Yacc also accomplishes this. However, many parser generators allow the mixing of general purpose code with the parsing definitions, which weakens the guarantees provided by parsing. === Analysis of injection attacks === Injection attacks are generally the result of differences between the serializer (or "unparser") and the corresponding parser at a layer boundary in a system; therefore, they are a special case of parser differentials. In a SQL injection attack, for example, an attacker is able to cause the application with which they are interacting to serialize a SQL query that has different semantics than intended. In the simplest case where the payload ends a string and adds new code, the payload has crossed the code-data boundary in SQL. In language-theoretic security, this is treated as a bug in the serializer of the SQL query, which should instead be written in a way that constrains its possible outputs to those within the scope of the intended query. === Parser combinators === If a parser generator is not used, it is still possible to avoid implementation bugs by using parser combinator such as Nom to implement the parser code. This has the drawback of relying on a programmer correctly translating the specification into the language of the parser generator library, though this task is still less error-prone than hand-coding a parser. == Input format complexity == Complexity in computer programs is associated with security vulnerabilities. Within the domain of language-theoretic security, complexity is described with reference to the computational power of the abstract machine necessary to implement the program, or more particularly, to implement the parser for its input language. This complexity describes whether it is possible to show that there is no unintended or undesired functionality in the program which might be exploitable by an attacker. To be bounded in complexity, the program's input must be well-defined both in terms of form and of semantics. === Weird machines === A weird machine is a model of computation in a program that exists in parallel with, but is distinct from, the intended abstract model of computation in that program. Some classes of weird machine arise from the multi-layered nature of computer programs, or the context in which the programs run; others result from the unanticipated functionality a program has due to its complexity or to software bugs. The more complex the computation model of a program, the more likely it is to implement a weird machine. Depending on context, the weird machine may or may not be concretely useful for an attacker. Since the space of weird machines in the context of some program is the universe of all possible states that are not within the program's intended states, many exploited states including remote code execution and injection attacks belong to the domain of weird machines. A reduction in weird machines is therefore a likely correlate with reduced program vulnerability. === SafeDocs project === SafeDocs is a DARPA project undertaken in 2018 to take existing file formats, create safer subsets of them, and develop programming tools to work for the safer formats. The initial test case for this was PDF. The purpose of creating safer subsets in this case is to lower the minimum bound on parser complexity so that it becomes possible to create tools that will generate correct, normative parsers for them. == Relation to programming languages == The analytic framework of language-theoretic security assumes programs to be virtual machines that execute their input. A document that is read by an application is in this sense a form of machine code, in a generalization of the data as code idea, following the automata theory description of parsers. === Type-safe programming languages === Parsing input and serializing output are operations that consume one data type and emit another. A programming language can therefore check that data is correctly parsed and contains the expected structure by checking data types, and correct serializing (or unparsing) can be implemented as operations on the data types that are relevant to the program's output. This approach can be used to show that the recognizer and unparser patterns have been implemented. It is also possible to implement type checking across a distributed system to enforce parsing and unparsing of the expected structures and to verify that the assumptions made in designing the compositional properties of a distributed system have been followed. === Memory-safe programming languages === In the general case, spatial memory correctness is undecidable. If any proof of spatial memory correctness is to be made, it is therefore necessary to bound the complexity of the code. Interpreted languages such as Java and Python effectively accomplish this via runtime bounds checking, and frameworks for runtime bounds checking also exist for C. The effect of these strategies for spatial memory correctness are to create a halt state in place of a spatial memory correctness violation; therefore, it can be shown that the program will not violate spatial memory correctness, but in exchange, it cannot be shown in the general case that programs will not have runtime bounds checking exceptions. Some programming languages, such as Rust, accomplish this using borrow checking. The borrow checker acts to assure spatial memory correctness by compile-time reference counting. Code for which spatial memory correctness cannot be shown to not be violated therefore does not compile, inherently limiting the complexity of the spatial memory correctness of the program to what is decidable. Thi
Central Equipment Identity Register
A Central Equipment Identity Register (CEIR) is a database of mobile equipment identifiers (IMEI – for networks of GSM standard, MEID – for networks of CDMA standard). Such an identifier is assigned to each SIM slot of the mobile device. Different kinds of IMEIs could be, White, for devices that are allowed to register in the cellular network; Black, for devices that are prohibited to register in the cellular network; and Grey, for devices in intermediate status (when it is not yet defined in which of the lists - black or white - the device should be placed). Depending on the rules of mobile equipment registration in a country the CEIR database may contain other lists or fields beside IMEI. For example, the subscriber number (MSISDN), which is bound to the IMEI, the ID of the individual (passport data, National ID, etc.) who registered IMEI in the database, details of the importer who brought the device into the country, etc. == History == Originally abbreviation CEIR stood for IMEI Database, created and provided by GSM Association. It was proposed to blacklist the IMEIs of stolen or lost phones. It was assumed that any MNO would be able to receive this list to block the registration of such devices on their network. Thus, it turns out that a stolen phone, once blacklisted by the GSMA CEIR, cannot be used on a large number of cellular networks, which means that the theft of mobile devices will become meaningless. However, it soon became clear that the MNOs on their initiative were not going to do this because if many phones stopped working in their networks, but works in another, it puts them at a disadvantage and can lead to an outflow of subscribers. It became clear that the blocking of stolen devices should be introduced simultaneously in all mobile networks of the country by legislative measures at the initiative of the communications regulator. In this case, as a rule, a national IMEI database is created, which contains general lists of blocked IMEIs. Since the registration in the cellular operator's network is directly blocked by a network node called EIR (Equipment Identity Register), the system that contains the national IMEI base became known as Central EIR (CEIR). To avoid confusion the database of GSM Association was renamed to IMEI Database - IMEI DB (it was in 2003-2008, see “Document History” at IMEI Database File Format Specification). Also sometimes a common IMEI database for several EIRs is called SEIR (Shared EIR). In each country, the CEIR can interact with IMEI DB differently. National CEIR may not communicate with IMEI DB at all. Firstly, it is separately decided whether CEIR will send information about its blacklist to IMEI DB (which IMEIs are placed in it or removed from there). Secondly, upon receipt of the blacklist from IMEI DB, the regulator decides from which countries it will receive it (IMEI DB stores the information exactly who blacklisted the IMEI). For example, you can get a list from neighboring countries, from countries in your region, from around the world. In addition to the blacklist, the GSMA is developing a list of IMEIs allocated to manufacturers for use in their devices. The manufacturer for each new device model gets at least one TAC (Type Allocation Code) allocated by GSMA, consisting of 8 digits, to which he can add a 6-digit serial number to obtain the IMEI. Thus, with one TAC, a manufacturer can release up to 1 million devices with a unique IMEI. Usually, CEIR receives a list of allocated TACs from the GSMA, since if the first 8 digits of the IMEI of a device are not in this list, this is a sign that it is counterfeit. If the central database of identifiers does not work with GSM networks, but with CDMA, then for the same purposes it is necessary to interact with another worldwide database that contains MEIDs – MEID Database. A system that directly blocks the registration of a mobile device on a cellular network – EIR. Each MNO must have at least one EIR, to which IMEI check requests (CheckIMEI) are sent when registering a device on the network. A typical EIR and CERI interaction scheme: The CEIR accumulates black, white, and grey lists using various data sources and verification methods. These lists are periodically transmitted to all EIRs. EIR uses them when processing every CheckIMEI request to determine whether to allow the device on the network or not. EIR can transmit some data to the CEIR database too. Usually, changes in a grey list – new IMEIs on the network that are not in any list – are transmitted from EIR to CEIR. In addition to synchronizing lists across multiple networks, the main function of CEIR is to implement the scenarios of changes at these lists. This usually requires interaction with various IT systems (databases) of other organizations and/or with subscribers. Еxamples of such scenarios: Whitelisting the IMEI of devices imported by the legal entity Whitelisting the IMEI of devices manufactured domestically Whitelisting the IMEI of devices imported by individual Blacklisting the IMEI of stolen/lost devices Binding IMEI to the subscriber's number and, vice versa, unbinding IMEI from the subscriber == System implementation results == The goals and results of CEIR implementation in a country are usually: Reducing mobile phone theft Reducing the import of devices stolen in other countries Reducing the presence of counterfeit devices on the market (null IMEI, incorrect IMEI, changed IMEI) Reducing illegal imports of mobile devices (increase in the collection of customs duties) Additionally, CEIR most often contributes to the solution of such problems: Combating various mobile fraud schemes Obtaining more accurate statistics on the state of the mobile communications market for the regulator Fight against terrorism (the ability to block the device at once in all mobile networks of the country). Known results achieved in some countries: Great Britain – reducing mobile phone theft. Turkey – reducing mobile phone theft, decreasing the current account deficit of Turkey and maximizing tax revenues. Uzbekistan – preventing black import of mobile devices by 98%, increase in revenues from the import of mobile devices by 700%. Kenya – disposing the market of counterfeit mobile equipment. Azerbaijan – disposing the market of counterfeit mobile equipment. Ukraine – increasing of legally imported mobile devices by 95%, increase in revenues from the import of mobile devices. == CEIR and EIR manufacturers == Some countries have used local developers to implement CEIR for their country (Great Britain, Turkey, India, and Azerbaijan). EIR is a system that is standardized in a 2G-5G networks. Such system may be established at mobile network even it doesn’t use black list and there are no CEIR in a country. Some developers of MNO’s signal core include EIR in a complex solution. However, its standard capabilities are usually lacking for specific requirements when implementing CEIR.
IT8
IT8 is a set of American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards for color communications and control specifications. Formerly governed by the IT8 Committee, IT8 activities were merged with those of the Committee for Graphics Arts Technologies Standards (CGATS Archived November 9, 2018, at the Wayback Machine) in 1994. == Standards list == The following is a list of the IT8 standards, according to the NPES Standards Blue Book Archived July 19, 2011, at the Wayback Machine: === IT8.6 - 2002 - Graphic technology - Prepress digital data exchange - Diecutting data (DDES3) === This standard establishes a data exchange format to enable transfer of numerical control information between diecutting systems and electronic prepress systems. The information will typically consist of numerical control information used in the manufacture of dies. 37 pp. === IT8.7/1 - 1993 (R2003) - Graphic technology - Color transmission target for input scanner calibration === This standard defines an input test target that will allow any color input scanner to be calibrated with any film dye set used to create the target. It is intended to address the color transparency products that are generally used for input to the preparatory process for printing and publishing. This standard defines the layout and colorimetric values of a target that can be manufactured on any positive color transparency film and that is intended for use in the calibration of a photographic film/scanner combination. 32 pp. === IT8.7/2 - 1993 (R2003) Graphic technology - Color reflection target for input scanner calibration === This standard defines an input test target that will allow any color input scanner to be calibrated with any film dye set used to create the target. It is intended to address the color photographic paper products that are generally used for input to the preparatory process for printing and publishing. It defines the layout and colorimetric values of the target that can be manufactured on any color photographic paper and is intended for use in the calibration of a photographic paper/scanner combination. 29 pp. === IT8.7/3 - 1993 (R2003) Graphic technology - Input data for characterization of 4-color process printing === The purpose of this standard is to specify an input data file, a measurement procedure and an output data format to characterize any four-color printing process. The output data (characterization) file should be transferred with any four-color (cyan, magenta, yellow and black) halftone image files to enable a color transformation to be undertaken when required. 29 pp. == Targets == Calibrating all devices involved in the process chain (original, scanner/digital camera, monitor/printer) is required for an authentic color reproduction, because their actual color spaces differ device-specifically from the reference color spaces. An IT8 calibration is done with what are called IT8 targets, which are defined by the IT8 standards. Example Special targets, implementing the IT8.7/1 (transparent target) or IT8.7/2 (reflective target) standards, are needed for calibrating scanners. These targets consists of 24 grey fields and 264 color fields in 22 columns: Column 01 to 12: HCL color model, which differ in Hue, Chroma, and Lightness Column 13 to 16: CMYK-Colors Cyan, Magenta, Yellow, and Key (black) in different steps of brightness Column 17 to 19: RGB-Colors Red, Green, and Blue in different steps of brightness Column 20 to 22: undefined, producers' choice After scanning such a target, an ICC profile gets calculated on the basis of reference values. This profile is used for all subsequent scans and assures color fidelity.
Render layers
When creating computer-generated imagery, final scenes appearing in movies and television productions are usually produced by rendering more than one "layer" or "pass," which are multiple images designed to be put together through digital compositing to form a completed frame. Rendering in passes is based on a traditions in motion control photography which predate CGI. As an example, for a visual effects shot, a camera could be programmed to move past a physical model of a spaceship in one pass to film the fully lit beauty pass of the ship, and then to repeat exactly the same camera move passing the ship again to photograph additional elements such as the illuminated windows in the ship or its thrusters. Once all of the passes were filmed, they could then be optically printed together to form a completed shot. The terms render layers and render passes are sometimes used interchangeably. However, rendering in layers refers specifically to separating different objects into separate images, such as a layer each for foreground characters, sets, distant landscape, and sky. On the other hand, rendering in passes refers to separating out different aspects of the scene, such as shadows, highlights, or reflections, into separate images.
Physical access
Physical access is a term in computer security that refers to the ability of people to physically gain access to a computer system. According to Gregory White, "Given physical access to an office, the knowledgeable attacker will quickly be able to find the information needed to gain access to the organization's computer systems and network." == Attacks and countermeasures == === Attacks === Physical access opens up a variety of avenues for hacking. Michael Meyers notes that "the best network software security measures can be rendered useless if you fail to physically protect your systems," since an intruder could simply walk off with a server and crack the password at his leisure. Physical access also allows hardware keyloggers to be installed. An intruder may be able to boot from a CD or other external media and then read unencrypted data on the hard drive. They may also exploit a lack of access control in the boot loader; for instance, pressing F8 while certain versions of Microsoft Windows are booting, specifying 'init=/bin/sh' as a boot parameter to Linux (usually done by editing the command line in GRUB), etc. One could also use a rogue device to access a poorly secured wireless network; if the signal were sufficiently strong, one might not even need to breach the perimeter. === Countermeasures === IT security standards in the United States typically call for physical access to be limited by locked server rooms, sign-in sheets, etc. Physical access systems and IT security systems have historically been administered by separate departments of organizations, but are increasingly being seen as having interdependent functions needing a single, converged security policy. An IT department could, for instance, check security log entries for suspicious logons occurring after business hours, and then use keycard swipe records from a building access control system to narrow down the list of suspects to those who were in the building at that time. Surveillance cameras might also be used to deter or detect unauthorized access.