In mathematics, a tuple is a finite sequence (or ordered list) of numbers. More generally, it is a sequence of mathematical objects, called the elements of the tuple. An n-tuple is a tuple of n elements, where n is a non-negative integer. There is only one 0-tuple, called the empty tuple. A 1-tuple and a 2-tuple are commonly called a singleton and an ordered pair, respectively. The term "infinite tuple" is occasionally used for "infinite sequences". Tuples are usually written by listing the elements within parentheses "( )" and separated by commas; for example, (2, 7, 4, 1, 7) denotes a 5-tuple. Other types of brackets are sometimes used, although they may have a different meaning. An n-tuple can be formally defined as the image of a function that has the set of the first n natural numbers as its domain (1, 2, ..., n). Tuples may be also defined from ordered pairs by a recurrence starting from an ordered pair; indeed, an n-tuple can be identified with the ordered pair of its (n − 1) first elements and its nth element, for example, ( ( ( 1 , 2 ) , 3 ) , 4 ) = ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ) {\displaystyle \left(\left(\left(1,2\right),3\right),4\right)=\left(1,2,3,4\right)} . In computer science, tuples come in many forms. Most typed functional programming languages implement tuples directly as product types, tightly associated with algebraic data types, pattern matching, and destructuring assignment. Many programming languages offer an alternative to tuples, known as record types, featuring unordered elements accessed by label. A few programming languages combine ordered tuple product types and unordered record types into a single construct, as in C structs and Haskell records. Relational databases may formally identify their rows (records) as tuples. Tuples also occur in relational algebra; when programming the semantic web with the Resource Description Framework (RDF); in linguistics; and in philosophy. == Etymology == The term originated as an abstraction of the sequence: single, couple/double, triple, quadruple, quintuple, sextuple, septuple, octuple, ..., n‑tuple, ..., where the prefixes are taken from the Latin names of the numerals. The unique 0-tuple is called the null tuple or empty tuple. A 1‑tuple is called a single (or singleton), a 2‑tuple is called an ordered pair or couple, and a 3‑tuple is called a triple (or triplet). The number n can be any nonnegative integer. For example, a complex number can be represented as a 2‑tuple of reals, a quaternion can be represented as a 4‑tuple, an octonion can be represented as an 8‑tuple, and a sedenion can be represented as a 16‑tuple. Although these uses treat ‑tuple as the suffix, the original suffix was ‑ple as in "triple" (three-fold) or "decuple" (ten‑fold). This originates from medieval Latin plus (meaning "more") related to Greek ‑πλοῦς, which replaced the classical and late antique ‑plex (meaning "folded"), as in "duplex". == Properties == The general rule for the identity of two n-tuples is ( a 1 , a 2 , … , a n ) = ( b 1 , b 2 , … , b n ) {\displaystyle (a_{1},a_{2},\ldots ,a_{n})=(b_{1},b_{2},\ldots ,b_{n})} if and only if a 1 = b 1 , a 2 = b 2 , … , a n = b n {\displaystyle a_{1}=b_{1},{\text{ }}a_{2}=b_{2},{\text{ }}\ldots ,{\text{ }}a_{n}=b_{n}} . Thus a tuple has properties that distinguish it from a set: A tuple may contain multiple instances of the same element, so tuple ( 1 , 2 , 2 , 3 ) ≠ ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) {\displaystyle (1,2,2,3)\neq (1,2,3)} ; but set { 1 , 2 , 2 , 3 } = { 1 , 2 , 3 } {\displaystyle \{1,2,2,3\}=\{1,2,3\}} . Tuple elements are ordered: tuple ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) ≠ ( 3 , 2 , 1 ) {\displaystyle (1,2,3)\neq (3,2,1)} , but set { 1 , 2 , 3 } = { 3 , 2 , 1 } {\displaystyle \{1,2,3\}=\{3,2,1\}} . A tuple has a finite number of elements, while a set or a multiset may have an infinite number of elements. == Definitions == There are several definitions of tuples that give them the properties described in the previous section. === Tuples as functions === The 0 {\displaystyle 0} -tuple may be identified as the empty function. For n ≥ 1 , {\displaystyle n\geq 1,} the n {\displaystyle n} -tuple ( a 1 , … , a n ) {\displaystyle \left(a_{1},\ldots ,a_{n}\right)} may be identified with the surjective function F : { 1 , … , n } → { a 1 , … , a n } {\displaystyle F~:~\left\{1,\ldots ,n\right\}~\to ~\left\{a_{1},\ldots ,a_{n}\right\}} with domain domain F = { 1 , … , n } = { i ∈ N : 1 ≤ i ≤ n } {\displaystyle \operatorname {domain} F=\left\{1,\ldots ,n\right\}=\left\{i\in \mathbb {N} :1\leq i\leq n\right\}} and with codomain codomain F = { a 1 , … , a n } , {\displaystyle \operatorname {codomain} F=\left\{a_{1},\ldots ,a_{n}\right\},} that is defined at i ∈ domain F = { 1 , … , n } {\displaystyle i\in \operatorname {domain} F=\left\{1,\ldots ,n\right\}} by F ( i ) := a i . {\displaystyle F(i):=a_{i}.} That is, F {\displaystyle F} is the function defined by 1 ↦ a 1 ⋮ n ↦ a n {\displaystyle {\begin{alignedat}{3}1\;&\mapsto &&\;a_{1}\\\;&\;\;\vdots &&\;\\n\;&\mapsto &&\;a_{n}\\\end{alignedat}}} in which case the equality ( a 1 , a 2 , … , a n ) = ( F ( 1 ) , F ( 2 ) , … , F ( n ) ) {\displaystyle \left(a_{1},a_{2},\dots ,a_{n}\right)=\left(F(1),F(2),\dots ,F(n)\right)} necessarily holds. Tuples as sets of ordered pairs Functions are commonly identified with their graphs, which is a certain set of ordered pairs. Indeed, many authors use graphs as the definition of a function. Using this definition of "function", the above function F {\displaystyle F} can be defined as: F := { ( 1 , a 1 ) , … , ( n , a n ) } . {\displaystyle F~:=~\left\{\left(1,a_{1}\right),\ldots ,\left(n,a_{n}\right)\right\}.} === Tuples as nested ordered pairs === Another way of modeling tuples in set theory is as nested ordered pairs. This approach assumes that the notion of ordered pair has already been defined. The 0-tuple (i.e. the empty tuple) is represented by the empty set ∅ {\displaystyle \emptyset } . An n-tuple, with n > 0, can be defined as an ordered pair of its first entry and an (n − 1)-tuple (which contains the remaining entries when n > 1): ( a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , … , a n ) = ( a 1 , ( a 2 , a 3 , … , a n ) ) {\displaystyle (a_{1},a_{2},a_{3},\ldots ,a_{n})=(a_{1},(a_{2},a_{3},\ldots ,a_{n}))} This definition can be applied recursively to the (n − 1)-tuple: ( a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , … , a n ) = ( a 1 , ( a 2 , ( a 3 , ( … , ( a n , ∅ ) … ) ) ) ) {\displaystyle (a_{1},a_{2},a_{3},\ldots ,a_{n})=(a_{1},(a_{2},(a_{3},(\ldots ,(a_{n},\emptyset )\ldots ))))} Thus, for example: ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) = ( 1 , ( 2 , ( 3 , ∅ ) ) ) ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ) = ( 1 , ( 2 , ( 3 , ( 4 , ∅ ) ) ) ) {\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}(1,2,3)&=(1,(2,(3,\emptyset )))\\(1,2,3,4)&=(1,(2,(3,(4,\emptyset ))))\\\end{aligned}}} A variant of this definition starts "peeling off" elements from the other end: The 0-tuple is the empty set ∅ {\displaystyle \emptyset } . For n > 0: ( a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , … , a n ) = ( ( a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , … , a n − 1 ) , a n ) {\displaystyle (a_{1},a_{2},a_{3},\ldots ,a_{n})=((a_{1},a_{2},a_{3},\ldots ,a_{n-1}),a_{n})} This definition can be applied recursively: ( a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , … , a n ) = ( ( … ( ( ( ∅ , a 1 ) , a 2 ) , a 3 ) , … ) , a n ) {\displaystyle (a_{1},a_{2},a_{3},\ldots ,a_{n})=((\ldots (((\emptyset ,a_{1}),a_{2}),a_{3}),\ldots ),a_{n})} Thus, for example: ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) = ( ( ( ∅ , 1 ) , 2 ) , 3 ) ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ) = ( ( ( ( ∅ , 1 ) , 2 ) , 3 ) , 4 ) {\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}(1,2,3)&=(((\emptyset ,1),2),3)\\(1,2,3,4)&=((((\emptyset ,1),2),3),4)\\\end{aligned}}} === Tuples as nested sets === Using Kuratowski's representation for an ordered pair, the second definition above can be reformulated in terms of pure set theory: The 0-tuple (i.e. the empty tuple) is represented by the empty set ∅ {\displaystyle \emptyset } ; Let x {\displaystyle x} be an n-tuple ( a 1 , a 2 , … , a n ) {\displaystyle (a_{1},a_{2},\ldots ,a_{n})} , and let x → b ≡ ( a 1 , a 2 , … , a n , b ) {\displaystyle x\rightarrow b\equiv (a_{1},a_{2},\ldots ,a_{n},b)} . Then, x → b ≡ { { x } , { x , b } } {\displaystyle x\rightarrow b\equiv \{\{x\},\{x,b\}\}} . (The right arrow, → {\displaystyle \rightarrow } , could be read as "adjoined with".) In this formulation: ( ) = ∅ ( 1 ) = ( ) → 1 = { { ( ) } , { ( ) , 1 } } = { { ∅ } , { ∅ , 1 } } ( 1 , 2 ) = ( 1 ) → 2 = { { ( 1 ) } , { ( 1 ) , 2 } } = { { { { ∅ } , { ∅ , 1 } } } , { { { ∅ } , { ∅ , 1 } } , 2 } } ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) = ( 1 , 2 ) → 3 = { { ( 1 , 2 ) } , { ( 1 , 2 ) , 3 } } = { { { { { { ∅ } , { ∅ , 1 } } } , { { { ∅ } , { ∅ , 1 } } , 2 } } } , { { { { { ∅ } , { ∅ , 1 } } } , { { { ∅ } , { ∅ , 1 } } , 2 } } , 3 } } {\displaystyle {\begin{array}{lclcl}()&&&=&\emptyset \\&&&&\\(1)&=&()\rightarrow 1&=&\{\{()\},\{(),1\}\}\\&&&=&\{\{\emptyset \},\{\emptyset ,1\}\}\\&&&&\\(1,2)&=&(1)\rightarrow 2&=&\{\{(1)\},\{(1),2\}\}\\&&&=&\{\{\{\{\emptyset \},\{\emptyset ,1\}\}\},\\&&&&\{\{\{\emptyset \},\{\emptyset ,1\}\},2\}\}\\&&&&\\(1,2,3)&=&(1,2)\rightarrow 3&=&\{\{(1,2)\},\{(1,2),3\}\}\\&&&=&\{\{\{\{\{\{\empty
Algorithmic inference
Algorithmic inference gathers new developments in the statistical inference methods made feasible by the powerful computing devices widely available to any data analyst. Cornerstones in this field are computational learning theory, granular computing, bioinformatics, and, long ago, structural probability (Fraser 1966). The main focus is on the algorithms which compute statistics rooting the study of a random phenomenon, along with the amount of data they must feed on to produce reliable results. This shifts the interest of mathematicians from the study of the distribution laws to the functional properties of the statistics, and the interest of computer scientists from the algorithms for processing data to the information they process. == The Fisher parametric inference problem == Concerning the identification of the parameters of a distribution law, the mature reader may recall lengthy disputes in the mid 20th century about the interpretation of their variability in terms of fiducial distribution (Fisher 1956), structural probabilities (Fraser 1966), priors/posteriors (Ramsey 1925), and so on. From an epistemology viewpoint, this entailed a companion dispute as to the nature of probability: is it a physical feature of phenomena to be described through random variables or a way of synthesizing data about a phenomenon? Opting for the latter, Fisher defines a fiducial distribution law of parameters of a given random variable that he deduces from a sample of its specifications. With this law he computes, for instance "the probability that μ (mean of a Gaussian variable – omeur note) is less than any assigned value, or the probability that it lies between any assigned values, or, in short, its probability distribution, in the light of the sample observed". == The classic solution == Fisher fought hard to defend the difference and superiority of his notion of parameter distribution in comparison to analogous notions, such as Bayes' posterior distribution, Fraser's constructive probability and Neyman's confidence intervals. For half a century, Neyman's confidence intervals won out for all practical purposes, crediting the phenomenological nature of probability. With this perspective, when you deal with a Gaussian variable, its mean μ is fixed by the physical features of the phenomenon you are observing, where the observations are random operators, hence the observed values are specifications of a random sample. Because of their randomness, you may compute from the sample specific intervals containing the fixed μ with a given probability that you denote confidence. === Example === Let X be a Gaussian variable with parameters μ {\displaystyle \mu } and σ 2 {\displaystyle \sigma ^{2}} and { X 1 , … , X m } {\displaystyle \{X_{1},\ldots ,X_{m}\}} a sample drawn from it. Working with statistics S μ = ∑ i = 1 m X i {\displaystyle S_{\mu }=\sum _{i=1}^{m}X_{i}} and S σ 2 = ∑ i = 1 m ( X i − X ¯ ) 2 , where X ¯ = S μ m {\displaystyle S_{\sigma ^{2}}=\sum _{i=1}^{m}(X_{i}-{\overline {X}})^{2},{\text{ where }}{\overline {X}}={\frac {S_{\mu }}{m}}} is the sample mean, we recognize that T = S μ − m μ S σ 2 m − 1 m = X ¯ − μ S σ 2 / ( m ( m − 1 ) ) {\displaystyle T={\frac {S_{\mu }-m\mu }{\sqrt {S_{\sigma ^{2}}}}}{\sqrt {\frac {m-1}{m}}}={\frac {{\overline {X}}-\mu }{\sqrt {S_{\sigma ^{2}}/(m(m-1))}}}} follows a Student's t distribution (Wilks 1962) with parameter (degrees of freedom) m − 1, so that f T ( t ) = Γ ( m / 2 ) Γ ( ( m − 1 ) / 2 ) 1 π ( m − 1 ) ( 1 + t 2 m − 1 ) m / 2 . {\displaystyle f_{T}(t)={\frac {\Gamma (m/2)}{\Gamma ((m-1)/2)}}{\frac {1}{\sqrt {\pi (m-1)}}}\left(1+{\frac {t^{2}}{m-1}}\right)^{m/2}.} Gauging T between two quantiles and inverting its expression as a function of μ {\displaystyle \mu } you obtain confidence intervals for μ {\displaystyle \mu } . With the sample specification: x = { 7.14 , 6.3 , 3.9 , 6.46 , 0.2 , 2.94 , 4.14 , 4.69 , 6.02 , 1.58 } {\displaystyle \mathbf {x} =\{7.14,6.3,3.9,6.46,0.2,2.94,4.14,4.69,6.02,1.58\}} having size m = 10, you compute the statistics s μ = 43.37 {\displaystyle s_{\mu }=43.37} and s σ 2 = 46.07 {\displaystyle s_{\sigma ^{2}}=46.07} , and obtain a 0.90 confidence interval for μ {\displaystyle \mu } with extremes (3.03, 5.65). == Inferring functions with the help of a computer == From a modeling perspective the entire dispute looks like a chicken-egg dilemma: either fixed data by first and probability distribution of their properties as a consequence, or fixed properties by first and probability distribution of the observed data as a corollary. The classic solution has one benefit and one drawback. The former was appreciated particularly back when people still did computations with sheet and pencil. Per se, the task of computing a Neyman confidence interval for the fixed parameter θ is hard: you do not know θ, but you look for disposing around it an interval with a possibly very low probability of failing. The analytical solution is allowed for a very limited number of theoretical cases. Vice versa a large variety of instances may be quickly solved in an approximate way via the central limit theorem in terms of confidence interval around a Gaussian distribution – that's the benefit. The drawback is that the central limit theorem is applicable when the sample size is sufficiently large. Therefore, it is less and less applicable with the sample involved in modern inference instances. The fault is not in the sample size on its own part. Rather, this size is not sufficiently large because of the complexity of the inference problem. With the availability of large computing facilities, scientists refocused from isolated parameters inference to complex functions inference, i.e. re sets of highly nested parameters identifying functions. In these cases we speak about learning of functions (in terms for instance of regression, neuro-fuzzy system or computational learning) on the basis of highly informative samples. A first effect of having a complex structure linking data is the reduction of the number of sample degrees of freedom, i.e. the burning of a part of sample points, so that the effective sample size to be considered in the central limit theorem is too small. Focusing on the sample size ensuring a limited learning error with a given confidence level, the consequence is that the lower bound on this size grows with complexity indices such as VC dimension or detail of a class to which the function we want to learn belongs. === Example === A sample of 1,000 independent bits is enough to ensure an absolute error of at most 0.081 on the estimation of the parameter p of the underlying Bernoulli variable with a confidence of at least 0.99. The same size cannot guarantee a threshold less than 0.088 with the same confidence 0.99 when the error is identified with the probability that a 20-year-old man living in New York does not fit the ranges of height, weight and waistline observed on 1,000 Big Apple inhabitants. The accuracy shortage occurs because both the VC dimension and the detail of the class of parallelepipeds, among which the one observed from the 1,000 inhabitants' ranges falls, are equal to 6. == The general inversion problem solving the Fisher question == With insufficiently large samples, the approach: fixed sample – random properties suggests inference procedures in three steps: === Definition === For a random variable and a sample drawn from it a compatible distribution is a distribution having the same sampling mechanism M X = ( Z , g θ ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {M}}_{X}=(Z,g_{\boldsymbol {\theta }})} of X with a value θ {\displaystyle {\boldsymbol {\theta }}} of the random parameter Θ {\displaystyle \mathbf {\Theta } } derived from a master equation rooted on a well-behaved statistic s. === Example === You may find the distribution law of the Pareto parameters A and K as an implementation example of the population bootstrap method as in the figure on the left. Implementing the twisting argument method, you get the distribution law F M ( μ ) {\displaystyle F_{M}(\mu )} of the mean M of a Gaussian variable X on the basis of the statistic s M = ∑ i = 1 m x i {\textstyle s_{M}=\sum _{i=1}^{m}x_{i}} when Σ 2 {\displaystyle \Sigma ^{2}} is known to be equal to σ 2 {\displaystyle \sigma ^{2}} (Apolloni, Malchiodi & Gaito 2006). Its expression is: F M ( μ ) = Φ ( m μ − s M σ m ) , {\displaystyle F_{M}(\mu )=\Phi {\left({\frac {m\mu -s_{M}}{\sigma {\sqrt {m}}}}\right)},} shown in the figure on the right, where Φ {\displaystyle \Phi } is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution. Computing a confidence interval for M given its distribution function is straightforward: we need only find two quantiles (for instance δ / 2 {\displaystyle \delta /2} and 1 − δ / 2 {\displaystyle 1-\delta /2} quantiles in case we are interested in a confidence interval of level δ symmetric in the tail's probabilities) as indicated on the left in the diagram showing the behavior of
Representation collapse
Representation collapse is a phenomenon in machine learning and representation learning where a model maps different inputs to the same or very similar embeddings, which means it loses important information about how the data is spread out. It is frequently encountered in self-supervised learning, especially within contrastive and non-contrastive frameworks, when training objectives or model architectures do not maintain variance across representations. Collapse results in degenerate solutions characterized by uninformative learned features, significantly impairing downstream task performance. Various techniques have been proposed to mitigate representation collapse, including the use of negative samples, architectural asymmetry, stop-gradient operations, variance regularization, and redundancy reduction objectives, as seen in methods such as SimCLR, BYOL, and VICReg. Comprehending and averting representation collapse is regarded as a fundamental challenge in the advancement of stable and efficient self-supervised learning systems.
Artificial intimacy
Artificial intimacy is a form of human-AI interaction in which an individual will form social connections, emotional bonds, or intimate relationships with various forms of artificial intelligence, including chatbots, virtual assistants, and other artificial entities. Artificially intimate relationships include not only romances, but parasocial relationships with virtual AI characters and the use of griefbots trained on a dead or otherwise lost individual. Artificial intimacy can arise because humans are prone to anthropomorphism. Responses from these AI models are often designed to simulate human interaction. Individuals experiencing artificial intimacy may exhibit attachment, love and commitment to certain AI models, akin to the bonds typically shared between humans. == Causes == === Perceived responsiveness === Robin Dunbar famously proposed that due to emergence of larger groups of humans, vocal communication and language in humans evolved to replace grooming as a means of bonding, arguing that language was a more efficient way to maintain and strengthen social bonds across wider social settings and networks. Further research in this field leads many psychologists to agree that social cognition, affiliative bonding and language in humans are deeply connected. The interpersonal model of intimacy considers communication to be key in affiliative bonding, suggesting that intimacy develops and deepens through open communication between partners in relationship. Specifically, when individuals communicate emotions and perceive their partner as responsive and caring, feelings of closeness and connection are enhanced, building intimacy. Social penetration theory also aligns with the idea of communication being central to intimacy, by explaining how interpersonal relationships develop through gradual increases in self-disclosure. When the benefits of emotional bonding outweigh the costs of vulnerability, individuals will partake in self-disclosure, opening up to one another. Thereby, the literature can be used to provide a proximate explanation for the emergence of artificial intimacy to understand how the phenomenon occurs. Artificial entities are able to mimic interpersonal communication between humans, which in turn can simulate sensations of intimacy within human users though a perceived sense of responsiveness. The relationship between human and AI does not come with the cost of vulnerability or social rejection, which may make self-disclosure easier than with other humans. Altogether, these factors may lead to the experience of anthropomorphism and formation of affiliative relationships. Skjuve et al's interview study on Replika chatbot users further aligns with this explanation, finding that users' perception of chatbots as "accepting, understanding and non-judgmental" facilitated relationship development between the AI and users, and the act of self-disclosure possibly strengthened relationships. Another study on Replika users' reviews and survey results found users perceived chatbots as emotional supportive companions. This evidence further suggests that the perception of artificial entities as capable of empathy and responsiveness in communication facilitate the development of intimate relationships between users and AI. === Loneliness and coping with negative emotions === Research has suggested that humans evolved social bonds as a result of evolutionary pressures that favored cooperation, information exchange and transmission, and group living. Many studies stress the presence of social bonds to be important for human living: research by Baumeister and Leary suggests that humans have a basic psychological need to form and maintain "strong, stable interpersonal relationships", and that a lack of social bonds or sense of belonging leads to negative psychological and physical outcomes. Eisenberger et al's study on the neuroimaging of brain activity suggests that human brains process social rejection and exclusion similarly to physical pain. Furthermore, Song et al's study found that lonely individuals tend to seek more connections in mediated environments, such as online platforms like Facebook. This was suggested to be as a means to reduce their offline loneliness from a lack of in-person interaction, while also fulfilling a need to communicate. Leading on from this, an ultimate explanation for why humans seek the perceived sense of connection from artificial intimacy is to fulfil an evolutionary need for bonding and belonging. Xie et al's study found loneliness to be a driving factor in chatbot interaction. Herbener and Damholdt's study on Danish high school students found that students who sought emotional support or engaged in reciprocal conversations with chatbots were significantly more lonely than their peers, perceived themselves as having less social support, and used the chatbots to cope with negative emotions. The aforementioned notion that chatbots were perceived to have a positive effect on users' negative emotions is also further supported by other studies. Skjuve et al's study found that chatbot relationships may have a positive effect on users' wellbeing. De Freitas et al ran several studies on the effect of chatbots on loneliness, consistently finding evidence suggesting that interaction with chatbots reduces loneliness in users: It was found that existing chatbot users used AI to alleviate loneliness, having an AI companion consistently reduced loneliness over the course of a week, and reductions in loneliness could be explained by chatbot performance—and specifically whether it was able to make users feel heard. Overall the evidence suggests an innate need for bonding evokes feelings of loneliness in users, who turn to artificial intimacy as a low-cost method alleviate these emotions. While many users report positive experiences, some researchers caution that pursuing artificial intimacy may lead to reduced social motivation, social substitution effects, withdrawal from real-life relationships and difficulty discerning reality from fantasy, which may increase longer-term loneliness and isolation. The long-term psychological and societal impacts remain under active investigation.
Ideonomy
Ideonomy is a combinatorial "science of ideas" developed by American independent scholar Patrick M. Gunkel (1947–2017). Specifically, Ideonomy is concerned with the systematic organization of ideas and the discovery of the rules behind how ideas combine, diverge, and transform. Gunkel defined ideonomy as "the science of the laws of ideas and of the application of such laws to the generation of all possible ideas in connection with any subject, idea, or thing." In his 1992 book A History of Knowledge, Charles Van Doren compared ideonomy to a "mining operation" that excavates meanings and thought to discover treasures hidden deep within language. Sources from the 1980s and 1990s demonstrate that ideonomy was useful to academic researchers in fields including biology, toxicology, and nursing/patient care. Beginning in the 2010s, academics in a wide range of fields including machine learning, marketing, computational modeling, and cybersecurity have relied on materials generated for ideonomy to provide methodological support for their research. == Etymology and definition == The word "ideonomy" combines the Greek roots ideo- (from idea, meaning pattern or form) and -nomy (from nomos, meaning law or custom). The suffix -nomy suggests the laws concerning or the totality of knowledge about a given subject, as in astronomy or taxonomy. In a note posted on the MIT ideonomy website, Gunkel states that the word was supposedly first coined by the French Encyclopedists to refer to a science of ideas. No evidence is provided for this statement, however. The concept bears some relationship to Antoine Destutt de Tracy's "ideology" (1796), which originally meant a systematic science of ideas before acquiring its modern political connotations. Gunkel provided several metaphorical descriptions of ideonomy: An "idea bank": a computer network enabling systematic exploration of infinite possible ideas A "kaleidoscope" that can exhibit all possible combinations and transformations of ideas A "prism" capable of diffracting any idea into its cognitive components A "gigantic microscope for magnifying the ideocosm" == History and development == In 1984, Gunkel received a five-year unsolicited grant from the Richard Lounsbery Foundation of New York to develop ideonomy. A June 1, 1987 article on the front page of The Wall Street Journal brought Gunkel and ideonomy to wider public attention. Some academics were interested in using ideonomy's techniques, including biologist Betsey Dyer, who published several contemporaneous peer-reviewed studies citing ideonomy. Academic researchers in the field of toxicology and nursing/patient care also used ideonomy. However, ideonomy's broadest contribution to date came beginning in the 2010s, as a list of personality traits generated for combinatorial matching was used by researchers in artificial intelligence to code human emotions for machine-learning tasks, develop computational models related to personality, develop a measurement framework for influencer-brand recommender systems, and aid information awareness/cybersecurity assessment. == Methodology == The foundational empirical method of ideonomy involves the systematic creation of extensive lists. Gunkel's apartment reportedly contained thousands of lists on every conceivable topic. Gunkel termed each list an "organon," which he described as expanding through "combination, permutation, transformation, generalization, specialization, intersection, interaction, reapplication, recursive use, etc. of existing organons." The ideonomic process follows a progressive structure. The ideonomist begins with a simple list of examples of a particular idea, concept, or thing. The list need not be exhaustive. By studying this list, the ideonomist isolates and identifies types. This categorical analysis then reveals missing items, allowing the primary list to be improved and refined. Gunkel emphasized that list items must not only cover genuine categories of nature but also be formulated in ways that yield the largest possible number of syntactically coherent possibilities when combined. The core technique of ideonomy is "ideocombinatorics"—the systematic intersection and combination of items from different lists to generate novel composite concepts. Gunkel developed computer programs to automate this process. For example, combining a list of 230 Universal Elementary Shapes (pits, pyramids, trenches, hemispheres, needles) with a list of 74 Types of Order (recurrence, identity, likeness of parts) yields 17,020 possible "shapes of order." These combinations, when phrased as questions ("Can there be pits of recurrence?"), could suggest new categories of phenomena worthy of investigation. The computer-generated output is typically repetitive and often meaningless. However, with sufficient frequency, the combinations yield results that are unexpectedly interesting and fruitful. In one documented case, Gunkel's programs generated 45,540 questions about toxins for microbiologist David Bermudes. One question—"Can hierarchies of cell process be used as a basis for classifying toxic action?"—prompted Bermudes to develop a novel approach to classifying biological toxins by the type of molecule they attack, rather than by chemical structure or physiological system affected. According to one contemporaneous account of ideonomy, "Gunkel takes for his field all fields and all ideas about anything. He uses a computer to generate lists of words and phrases and by juxtaposition reviews the resultant patterns for novel ideas. The computer is ideal for this task because the mind would rebel at the formidable processing task ideonomy involves. What we have here is computer generated originality." == Applications == Gunkel and his supporters identified several practical applications for ideonomic methods: Scientific research: Biologist Betsey Dyer of Wheaton College published research crediting ideonomy for helping to generate ideas. Medical science: When Austin pathologist Michael T. O'Brien was presented with the ideonomically-generated question "Can arteries have rashes?", he initially dismissed it as nonsense. Upon reflection, he realized that large arteries are supplied with blood by tiny vessels that might become inflamed and dilated, analogous to skin vessels in a rash—a phenomenon potentially worth researching. Analogical thinking: Harvard law professor Robert Clark used ideonomic analogies to write a research paper comparing plant structure with human hierarchies. Artificial intelligence: Douglas Lenat, a researcher at Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC) in Austin, suggested that Gunkel's lists enumerating types of human mistakes could help design AI systems capable of recognizing and correcting their own errors. == Reception and criticism == Ideonomy received mixed reactions from the academic and scientific communities. Prominent supporters included: Edward Fredkin, former director of MIT's computer science laboratory, who praised Gunkel's "provocative ideas on artificial intelligence." Marvin Minsky, AI scientist and MIT professor, who described ideonomy as "perhaps the most extensive study of ways to generate ideas." Frederick Seitz, president emeritus of Rockefeller University, who noted Gunkel's "encyclopedic scope" Robert C. Clark, Harvard law professor, who called Gunkel "the most intelligent person I ever met" However, skeptics questioned whether ideonomy constituted a genuine science. Fredkin himself noted that Gunkel "pours out about 60 ideas a minute, and 59 of them are bad," though he added that "even with one good idea out of 60, it's still an amazing accomplishment." Douglas Lenat observed that brainstorming with Gunkel was "a bit like being hit over the head by the muse with a sledgehammer" and that "he puts people off." Gunkel himself acknowledged that ideonomy was in its infancy and might seem "absurdly utopian." His planned magnum opus on ideonomy remained incomplete, and was posted on an MIT website thanks to faculty advisor Whitman Richards. Gunkel wrote: "Pioneering in a completely new field, yes in a new science, is almost unreal. It is heartbreaking, it is pitiable, it is almost inhuman. Honestly, it is a hell. There is nothing heroic about it." == Related concepts == Gunkel identified several historical precedents for ideonomic thinking: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716): The philosopher's work on a universal characteristic (characteristica universalis) and calculus of reasoning Peter Mark Roget (1779–1869): Creator of Roget's Thesaurus, which organized concepts into a systematic taxonomy Dmitri Mendeleev (1834–1907): Developer of the periodic table, demonstrating how combining lists of element families could reveal previously unseen connections Fritz Zwicky (1898–1974): The Caltech astrophysicist whom Gunkel called the "grandfather of ideonomy" for his development of "morphological research"—systematic exploration of all possible solutions t
Site-specific browser
A site-specific browser (SSB) is a software application dedicated to accessing pages from a single source (site) on a computer network such as the Internet or a private intranet. SSBs typically simplify the more complex functions of a web browser by excluding the menus, toolbars and browser graphical user interface associated with functions that are external to the workings of a single site. Modern site-specific browsers range from simple browser windows without navigation controls to sophisticated desktop applications built with frameworks like Electron that bundle entire browser engines. This evolution has enabled many popular desktop applications to be built using web technologies, effectively making them advanced site-specific browsers. == History == === Early development === One of the earliest examples of an SSB was MacDICT, a Mac OS 9 application that accessed various websites to define, translate, or find synonyms for words typed into a text box. However, the first general-purpose SSB is considered to be Bubbles, which launched in late 2005 on the Windows platform. Bubbles introduced the term "Site Specific Extensions" for SSB userscripts and created the first SSB JavaScript API. In 2007, Mozilla announced Prism (originally called WebRunner), a project to integrate web applications with the desktop. That same year, Todd Ditchendorf, a former Apple Dashboard engineer, released Fluid for macOS. On 2 September 2008, Google Chrome was released with a built-in "Create application shortcut" feature, bringing SSB functionality to mainstream users. This feature allowed any website to be launched in a separate window without the browser interface. === Modern era === The landscape of site-specific browsers changed dramatically with the introduction of Electron in 2013 (originally called Atom Shell). Electron combined Chromium and Node.js into a single runtime, enabling developers to build desktop applications using web technologies. This framework has since powered applications used by hundreds of millions of users, including Visual Studio Code, Slack, Discord, and Microsoft Teams. In 2015, the concept of Progressive Web Apps (PWAs) was introduced by Google engineers Alex Russell and Frances Berriman, representing a parallel evolution in web-to-desktop technology. While PWAs share similar goals with SSBs, they follow web standards and can be installed directly from browsers. More recently, alternative frameworks like Tauri have emerged, offering significantly smaller application sizes by using the system's native web renderer instead of bundling Chromium. == Technical implementation == Site-specific browsers can be implemented through various approaches: === Browser-based SSBs === The simplest form of SSB is created through browser features that allow websites to run in separate windows without the standard browser interface. Modern Chromium-based browsers offer "Install as app" or "Create shortcut" functionality that creates a dedicated window for a specific website. These SSBs share the browser's underlying engine and resources but operate in isolated windows. === Framework-based SSBs === More sophisticated SSBs are built using application frameworks: Electron: Bundles a complete Chromium browser with Node.js, resulting in applications of 85MB or larger. Each Electron application runs its own browser instance, providing full access to system APIs but consuming significant resources. Tauri: Uses the operating system's native web rendering engine (WebView2 on Windows, WebKit on macOS, and WebKitGTK on Linux), resulting in applications typically 2.5-10MB in size. Other frameworks: Include Neutralino.js (ultra-lightweight using system browser), Wails (Go-based), and the Chromium Embedded Framework (CEF). == Comparison with Progressive Web Apps == While site-specific browsers and Progressive Web Apps (PWAs) share the goal of bringing web content to the desktop, they differ in several key aspects: == Applications == Site-specific browsers have become the foundation for many popular desktop applications: Communication and collaboration: Many modern communication tools are built as SSBs, including Slack, Discord, Microsoft Teams, and WhatsApp Desktop. These applications benefit from web-based development while providing desktop integration. Development tools: Visual Studio Code, used by 73.6% of developers according to Stack Overflow's 2024 survey, is built with Electron, as are Atom and GitHub Desktop. Productivity software: Applications like Notion, Obsidian, and various project management tools use SSB technology to provide consistent experiences across platforms. Security and Privacy: Web browsers can be modified to only have access to a single site, in order to protect the security and privacy of the user via compartmentalization == Security and performance == === Memory usage === Framework-based SSBs, particularly those using Electron, are known for high memory consumption. Studies show Electron applications typically use 120-300MB at baseline, with complex applications consuming significantly more. This is approximately 5-10 times more memory than equivalent native applications. === Security considerations === SSBs can provide security benefits through process isolation, where each application runs in its own sandboxed environment. However, bundling an entire browser engine also means each application must be updated independently to patch security vulnerabilities. Research presented at the Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium has identified various security challenges specific to Electron applications. === Bundle sizes === The choice of framework significantly impacts application size: Electron applications: 85MB+ (includes full Chromium) Tauri applications: 2.5-10MB (uses system WebView) Browser-based SSBs: No additional download (uses existing browser) == Software == === Browser support === Most modern browsers provide some form of SSB functionality: Chromium-based browsers (Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Brave, Opera, Vivaldi): "Install as app" or "Create shortcut" feature Safari: "Add to Dock" feature in macOS Sonoma (2023) Firefox: Removed SSB support in December 2020 (version 85) GNOME Web: "Install Site as Web Application" feature === Standalone tools === ==== Active ==== WebCatalog (Windows, macOS, Linux) – Manages multiple SSBs with isolated storage Fluid (macOS) – Pioneering SSB creator for Mac Unite (macOS) – Creates SSBs with customization options Coherence X (macOS) – Advanced SSB creation tool Pake (cross-platform) – Open-source SSB creator Wavebox (cross-platform) – Workspace browser with SSB features ==== Discontinued ==== Mozilla Prism – Cross-platform SSB creator (discontinued 2011) Nativefier – Command-line SSB creator (discontinued 2023) Epichrome – macOS SSB creator (discontinued 2021) === Development frameworks === Electron – Most popular framework, bundles Chromium and Node.js Tauri – Rust-based framework using system WebView Chromium Embedded Framework (CEF) – C++ library for embedding Chromium Neutralino.js – Lightweight framework using system browser Wails – Go-based framework for web frontends
Dynamic epistemic logic
Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) is a logical framework dealing with knowledge and information change. Typically, DEL focuses on situations involving multiple agents and studies how their knowledge changes when events occur. These events can change factual properties of the actual world (they are called ontic events): for example a red card is painted in blue. They can also bring about changes of knowledge without changing factual properties of the world (they are called epistemic events): for example, a card is revealed publicly (or privately) to be red. Originally, DEL focused on epistemic events. Only some of the basic ideas are present in this entry of the original DEL framework; more details about DEL in general can be found in the references. Due to the nature of its object of study and its abstract approach, DEL is related and has applications to numerous research areas, such as computer science (artificial intelligence), philosophy (formal epistemology), economics (game theory) and cognitive science. In computer science, DEL is for example very much related to multi-agent systems, which are systems where multiple intelligent agents interact and exchange information. As a combination of dynamic logic and epistemic logic, dynamic epistemic logic is a young field of research. It really started in 1989 with Plaza's logic of public announcement. Independently, Gerbrandy and Groeneveld proposed a system dealing moreover with private announcement and that was inspired by the work of Veltman. Another system was proposed by van Ditmarsch whose main inspiration was the Cluedo game. But the most influential and original system was the system proposed by Baltag, Moss and Solecki. This system can deal with all the types of situations studied in the works above and its underlying methodology is conceptually grounded. This entry will present some of its basic ideas. Formally, DEL extends ordinary epistemic logic by the inclusion of event models to describe actions, and a product update operator that defines how epistemic models are updated as the consequence of executing actions described through event models. Epistemic logic will first be recalled. Then, actions and events will enter into the picture and we will introduce the DEL framework. == Epistemic logic == Epistemic logic is a modal logic dealing with the notions of knowledge and belief. As a logic, it is concerned with understanding the process of reasoning about knowledge and belief: which principles relating the notions of knowledge and belief are intuitively plausible? Like epistemology, it stems from the Greek word ϵ π ι σ τ η μ η {\displaystyle \epsilon \pi \iota \sigma \tau \eta \mu \eta } or ‘episteme’ meaning knowledge. Epistemology is nevertheless more concerned with analyzing the very nature and scope of knowledge, addressing questions such as “What is the definition of knowledge?” or “How is knowledge acquired?”. In fact, epistemic logic grew out of epistemology in the Middle Ages thanks to the efforts of Burley and Ockham. The formal work, based on modal logic, that inaugurated contemporary research into epistemic logic dates back only to 1962 and is due to Hintikka. It then sparked in the 1960s discussions about the principles of knowledge and belief and many axioms for these notions were proposed and discussed. For example, the interaction axioms K p → B p {\displaystyle Kp\rightarrow Bp} and B p → K B p {\displaystyle Bp\rightarrow KBp} are often considered to be intuitive principles: if an agent Knows p {\displaystyle p} then (s)he also Believes p {\displaystyle p} , or if an agent Believes p {\displaystyle p} , then (s)he Knows that (s)he Believes p {\displaystyle p} . More recently, these kinds of philosophical theories were taken up by researchers in economics, artificial intelligence and theoretical computer science where reasoning about knowledge is a central topic. Due to the new setting in which epistemic logic was used, new perspectives and new features such as computability issues were then added to the research agenda of epistemic logic. === Syntax === In the sequel, A G T S = { 1 , … , n } {\displaystyle AGTS=\{1,\ldots ,n\}} is a finite set whose elements are called agents and P R O P {\displaystyle PROP} is a set of propositional letters. The epistemic language is an extension of the basic multi-modal language of modal logic with a common knowledge operator C A {\displaystyle C_{A}} and a distributed knowledge operator D A {\displaystyle D_{A}} . Formally, the epistemic language L EL C {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{\textsf {EL}}^{C}} is defined inductively by the following grammar in BNF: L EL C : ϕ ::= p ∣ ¬ ϕ ∣ ( ϕ ∧ ϕ ) ∣ K j ϕ ∣ C A ϕ ∣ D A ϕ {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{\textsf {EL}}^{C}:\phi ~~::=~~p~\mid ~\neg \phi ~\mid ~(\phi \land \phi )~\mid ~K_{j}\phi ~\mid ~C_{A}\phi ~\mid ~D_{A}\phi } where p ∈ P R O P {\displaystyle p\in PROP} , j ∈ A G T S {\displaystyle j\in {AGTS}} and A ⊆ A G T S {\displaystyle A\subseteq {AGTS}} . The basic epistemic language L E L {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{EL}} is the language L E L C {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{EL}^{C}} without the common knowledge and distributed knowledge operators. The formula ⊥ {\displaystyle \bot } is an abbreviation for ¬ p ∧ p {\displaystyle \neg p\land p} (for a given p ∈ P R O P {\displaystyle p\in PROP} ), ⟨ K j ⟩ ϕ {\displaystyle \langle K_{j}\rangle \phi } is an abbreviation for ¬ K j ¬ ϕ {\displaystyle \neg K_{j}\neg \phi } , E A ϕ {\displaystyle E_{A}\phi } is an abbreviation for ⋀ j ∈ A K j ϕ {\displaystyle \bigwedge \limits _{j\in A}K_{j}\phi } and C ϕ {\displaystyle C\phi } an abbreviation for C A G T S ϕ {\displaystyle C_{AGTS}\phi } . Group notions: general, common and distributed knowledge. In a multi-agent setting there are three important epistemic concepts: general knowledge, distributed knowledge and common knowledge. The notion of common knowledge was first studied by Lewis in the context of conventions. It was then applied to distributed systems and to game theory, where it allows to express that the rationality of the players, the rules of the game and the set of players are commonly known. General knowledge. General knowledge of ϕ {\displaystyle \phi } means that everybody in the group of agents A G T S {\displaystyle {AGTS}} knows that ϕ {\displaystyle \phi } . Formally, this corresponds to the following formula: E ϕ := ⋀ j ∈ A G T S K j ϕ . {\displaystyle E\phi :={\underset {j\in {AGTS}}{\bigwedge }}K_{j}\phi .} Common knowledge. Common knowledge of ϕ {\displaystyle \phi } means that everybody knows ϕ {\displaystyle \phi } but also that everybody knows that everybody knows ϕ {\displaystyle \phi } , that everybody knows that everybody knows that everybody knows ϕ {\displaystyle \phi } , and so on ad infinitum. Formally, this corresponds to the following formula C ϕ := E ϕ ∧ E E ϕ ∧ E E E ϕ ∧ … {\displaystyle C\phi :=E\phi \land EE\phi \land EEE\phi \land \ldots } As we do not allow infinite conjunction the notion of common knowledge will have to be introduced as a primitive in our language. Before defining the language with this new operator, we are going to give an example introduced by Lewis that illustrates the difference between the notions of general knowledge and common knowledge. Lewis wanted to know what kind of knowledge is needed so that the statement p {\displaystyle p} : “every driver must drive on the right” be a convention among a group of agents. In other words, he wanted to know what kind of knowledge is needed so that everybody feels safe to drive on the right. Suppose there are only two agents i {\displaystyle i} and j {\displaystyle j} . Then everybody knowing p {\displaystyle p} (formally E p {\displaystyle Ep} ) is not enough. Indeed, it might still be possible that the agent i {\displaystyle i} considers possible that the agent j {\displaystyle j} does not know p {\displaystyle p} (formally ¬ K i K j p {\displaystyle \neg K_{i}K_{j}p} ). In that case the agent i {\displaystyle i} will not feel safe to drive on the right because he might consider that the agent j {\displaystyle j} , not knowing p {\displaystyle p} , could drive on the left. To avoid this problem, we could then assume that everybody knows that everybody knows that p {\displaystyle p} (formally E E p {\displaystyle EEp} ). This is again not enough to ensure that everybody feels safe to drive on the right. Indeed, it might still be possible that agent i {\displaystyle i} considers possible that agent j {\displaystyle j} considers possible that agent i {\displaystyle i} does not know p {\displaystyle p} (formally ¬ K i K j K i p {\displaystyle \neg K_{i}K_{j}K_{i}p} ). In that case and from i {\displaystyle i} ’s point of view, j {\displaystyle j} considers possible that i {\displaystyle i} , not knowing p {\displaystyle p} , will drive on the left. So from i {\displaystyle i} ’s point of view, j {\displaystyle j} might drive on the left as well (by the same argument as abov