AI Assistant Maker

AI Assistant Maker — independent reviews, comparisons, pricing and step-by-step guides on Aizhi.

• 

  I Am Rich

  I Am Rich is a discontinued 2008 mobile app for iPhones which had minimal function and was priced at US$999.99 (equivalent to $1,495 in 2025). The app was pulled from the App Store less than 24 hours after its launch. Receiving negative reviews from critics, only eight copies were sold. In the years since, several similar applications have been released at lower prices. == Overview == I Am Rich was developed as a joke by German software developer, Armin Heinrich, after he saw iPhone users complaining about software priced above $0.99. The app only showed a glowing red gem and an icon that, when pressed, displayed the following mantra in large text: I am richI deserv [sic] itI am good,healthy & successful Heinrich told The New York Times that "I regard it as art. I did not expect many people to buy it and did not expect all the fuss about it." The application is described as "a work of art with no hidden function at all", with its only purpose being to show other people that they were able to afford it. Vox writer Zachary Crockett called it "the ultimate Veblen good in app form". == Release == Heinrich released and distributed I Am Rich through the App Store on 5 August 2008. The app was sold for US$999.99 (equivalent to $1,495 in 2025), €799.99 (equivalent to €1,078 in 2023), and £599.99 (equivalent to £978.12 in 2025)—the highest prices Apple allowed for App Store content. Without explanation, the application was removed from the App Store by Apple less than a day after its release. === Purchases === Eight people bought the application, at least one of whom claimed to have done so accidentally. Six US sales and two European sales netted $5,600 for Heinrich and $2,400 for Apple (respectively equivalent to $8,374 and $3,589 in 2025). In correspondence with the Los Angeles Times, Heinrich told the newspaper that Apple had refunded two purchasers of his app, and that he was happy to not have dissatisfied customers. == Reception == Discussing the app on the website Silicon Alley Insider, Dan Frommer described the program as a "scam", "worthless", and finally "a joke that smells like a scammy rip-off" on August 5, 6, and 8, respectively. Without purchasing the app, Fox News's Paul Wagenseil guessed that the secret mantra was "German for 'Sucker!'" (Heinrich is German). Wired's Brian X. Chen described I Am Rich as a waste of money to "prove you're a jerk", and contrasted the expenditure with donating to cancer foundations and Third World countries. Heinrich told the Los Angeles Times's Mark Milian that he had received correspondence from satisfied customers: "I've got e-mails from customers telling me that they really love the app [... and that they had] no trouble spending the money". In an interview with The New York Times, though, he told of receiving many insulting emails and telephone messages. == Similar applications == The next year, Heinrich released I Am Rich LE. Priced at US$9.99 (equivalent to $14.99 in 2025), the new app has several new features (including a calculator, "help system", and the "famous mantra without the spelling mistakes") to meet Apple's requirement that apps have "definable content". Some customers were disappointed by the new functionality, poorly rating the app due to its ostensible improvements. On 23 February 2009, CNET Asia reported on the "conceptually similar" app, I Am Richer, developed by Mike DG for Google's Android. The app was released on the Android Market for US$200 (equivalent to $300.14 in 2025), a limit imposed by Google, who had no objection to the application. With the same name, the I Am Rich that was released on the Windows Phone Marketplace on 22 December 2010, was developed by DotNetNuzzi. Described by MobileCrunch as equally useless as the original, this app cost US$499.99 (equivalent to $738.2 in 2025), the price cap imposed by Microsoft.

  Read more →
• 

  Maximum inner-product search

  Maximum inner-product search (MIPS) is a search problem, with a corresponding class of search algorithms which attempt to maximise the inner product between a query and the data items to be retrieved. MIPS algorithms are used in a wide variety of big data applications, including recommendation algorithms and machine learning. Formally, for a database of vectors x i {\displaystyle x_{i}} defined over a set of labels S {\displaystyle S} in an inner product space with an inner product ⟨ ⋅ , ⋅ ⟩ {\displaystyle \langle \cdot ,\cdot \rangle } defined on it, MIPS search can be defined as the problem of determining a r g m a x i ∈ S ⟨ x i , q ⟩ {\displaystyle {\underset {i\in S}{\operatorname {arg\,max} }}\ \langle x_{i},q\rangle } for a given query q {\displaystyle q} . Although there is an obvious linear-time implementation, it is generally too slow to be used on practical problems. However, efficient algorithms exist to speed up MIPS search. Under the assumption of all vectors in the set having constant norm, MIPS can be viewed as equivalent to a nearest neighbor search (NNS) problem in which maximizing the inner product is equivalent to minimizing the corresponding distance metric in the NNS problem. Like other forms of NNS, MIPS algorithms may be approximate or exact. MIPS search is used as part of DeepMind's RETRO algorithm.

  Read more →
• 

  Semantic analysis (machine learning)

  In machine learning, semantic analysis of a text corpus is the task of building structures that approximate concepts from a large set of documents. It generally does not involve prior semantic understanding of the documents. Semantic analysis strategies include: Metalanguages based on first-order logic, which can analyze the speech of humans. Understanding the semantics of a text is symbol grounding: if language is grounded, it is equal to recognizing a machine-readable meaning. For the restricted domain of spatial analysis, a computer-based language understanding system was demonstrated. Latent semantic analysis (LSA), a class of techniques where documents are represented as vectors in a term space. A prominent example is probabilistic latent semantic analysis (PLSA). Latent Dirichlet allocation, which involves attributing document terms to topics. n-grams and hidden Markov models, which work by representing the term stream as a Markov chain, in which each term is derived from preceding terms. == Stochastic semantic analysis ==

  Read more →
• 

  Compute (machine learning)

  In machine learning and deep learning, compute is the amount of computing power or computational resources required to train machine learning models and large language models. More broadly, compute is the computational power or resources necessary for a computer or computer program to function. == Definition == Compute is commonly defined as the amount of computing power or computational resources required to train machine learning and large language models. The term "compute" has also been more broadly applied to cloud computing, referencing processing power, memory, networking, storage, and other resources required for the computation of any program. Compute is measured in petaflop/s-days and is used to document AI training. A petaflop/s-day (pfs-day) consists of performing 1015 neural net operations per second for one day, or a total of about 1020 operations. The compute-time product serves as a mental convenience, similar to kilowatt-hour for energy. An amount of compute is meant to give an idea of the number of actual operations performed. == History == In a 2018 analysis titled "AI and compute", artificial intelligence company OpenAI introduced the concept of compute. OpenAI identified two eras of training AI systems in terms of compute-usage. From 1959 to 2012, compute roughly followed Moore’s law. Between 2012 and 2018, the amount of compute used in the largest AI training runs increased exponentially, growing by more than 300,000 times — roughly doubling every 3.4 months. By comparison, Moore’s Law doubled every two years over the same period. One of the largest models, released in 2020, used 600,000 times more computing power than the 2012 model. After 2020, compute growth began to slow down, with the compute needed for the largest AI models continuing to slow down in 2023. The notion of compute has become increasingly used from the mid-2020s onwards. == Compute growth and AI progress == Larger AI models trained on more data and using more computational resources, tend to perform better. This happens even if the algorithms themselves remain unchanged. As early as 2018, OpenAI noted the exponential increase in compute to be have a key role in AI progress. OpenAI considers three factors drive the advance of AI: algorithmic innovation, data, and the amount of compute available for training. AI models with more compute not only improve in the tasks they were trained on but can develop emergent abilities. Incremental improvements can lead to more abrupt leaps in capabilities. AI provider SpaceXAI said in 2026 that their AI progress is driven by compute and used it a key metric in the AI training of its supercomputer Colossus, the which contains 1 million GPUs. Anthropic has a contract of $1.25 billion per month with SpaceXAI to buy all the compute capacity at Colossus 1 data center. === Criticism and policy === Increasing, promoting or constraining progress in artificial intelligence has often be done via controlling the amount of compute. Policymarkers have enacted policies and provided support to make compute resources more accessible to domestic AI researchers. In a January 2022 report, the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) suggested to institutions that increasingly powerful and generalizable AI (AGI) will likely require other strategies than maximizing compute. Some AI researchers are also concerned that government might exclusively focus on scaling compute instead of other strategies. The CSET has reported on the various bottlenecks which could explain why deep learning needs for compute have slow down: training is expensive and training extremely large models generates traffic jams across many processors that are difficult to manage. there is a limited supply of AI chips (see AI chip memory shortage). CSET advances that the main resource is human capital, specifically talented researchers — according to a 2023 published survey of more than 400 AI researchers, academic and private sector workers. The survey found that AI researchers are not primarily or exclusively constrained by compute access. However, both academic and industry AI researchers equally report concerns that insufficient compute could prevent them from contributing meaningfully to AI research in the future. High compute users are more concerned about compute access. When asked about which resource provided by the government would be the most useful to them, some AI researchers select compute, other prefer grant funding. For this goal, CSET advised policymakers to ensure that even researchers with smaller budgets could effectively contribute to AI research. Other proposed strategies include using contemporary AI algorithms, managing modern AI infrastructure or focusing on interdisciplinary work between the AI field and other fields of computer science. A 2024 study on compute access found that academic-only AI research teams often have less compute intensive research topics, especially foundation models, compared to industry AI labs. As a consequence, academia is likely to play a smaller role in advancing such techniques. The researchers suggest nationally-sponsored computing infrastructure as well as open science initiatives to boost academic compute access. === Data === A 2022 study found that current large language models are significantly under-trained, a consequence of focusing on scaling language models whilst keeping the amount of training data constant. By training over 400 language models of various parameter and token size, they found that "for compute-optimal training", the model size and the number of training tokens should ideally be scaled equally: for every doubling of model size the number of training tokens should also be doubled.

  Read more →
• 

  Inductive probability

  Inductive probability attempts to give the probability of future events based on past events. It is the basis for inductive reasoning, and gives the mathematical basis for learning and the perception of patterns. It is a source of knowledge about the world. There are three sources of knowledge: inference, communication, and deduction. Communication relays information found using other methods. Deduction establishes new facts based on existing facts. Inference establishes new facts from data. Its basis is Bayes' theorem. Information describing the world is written in a language. For example, a simple mathematical language of propositions may be chosen. Sentences may be written down in this language as strings of characters. But in the computer it is possible to encode these sentences as strings of bits (1s and 0s). Then the language may be encoded so that the most commonly used sentences are the shortest. This internal language implicitly represents probabilities of statements. Occam's razor says the "simplest theory, consistent with the data is most likely to be correct". The "simplest theory" is interpreted as the representation of the theory written in this internal language. The theory with the shortest encoding in this internal language is most likely to be correct. == History == Probability and statistics was focused on probability distributions and tests of significance. Probability was formal, well defined, but limited in scope. In particular its application was limited to situations that could be defined as an experiment or trial, with a well defined population. Bayes's theorem is named after Rev. Thomas Bayes 1701–1761. Bayesian inference broadened the application of probability to many situations where a population was not well defined. But Bayes' theorem always depended on prior probabilities, to generate new probabilities. It was unclear where these prior probabilities should come from. Ray Solomonoff developed algorithmic probability which gave an explanation for what randomness is and how patterns in the data may be represented by computer programs, that give shorter representations of the data circa 1964. Chris Wallace and D. M. Boulton developed minimum message length circa 1968. Later Jorma Rissanen developed the minimum description length circa 1978. These methods allow information theory to be related to probability, in a way that can be compared to the application of Bayes' theorem, but which give a source and explanation for the role of prior probabilities. Marcus Hutter combined decision theory with the work of Ray Solomonoff and Andrey Kolmogorov to give a theory for the Pareto optimal behavior for an Intelligent agent, circa 1998. === Minimum description/message length === The program with the shortest length that matches the data is the most likely to predict future data. This is the thesis behind the minimum message length and minimum description length methods. At first sight Bayes' theorem appears different from the minimimum message/description length principle. At closer inspection it turns out to be the same. Bayes' theorem is about conditional probabilities, and states the probability that event B happens if firstly event A happens: P ( A ∧ B ) = P ( B ) ⋅ P ( A | B ) = P ( A ) ⋅ P ( B | A ) {\displaystyle P(A\land B)=P(B)\cdot P(A|B)=P(A)\cdot P(B|A)} becomes in terms of message length L, L ( A ∧ B ) = L ( B ) + L ( A | B ) = L ( A ) + L ( B | A ) . {\displaystyle L(A\land B)=L(B)+L(A|B)=L(A)+L(B|A).} This means that if all the information is given describing an event then the length of the information may be used to give the raw probability of the event. So if the information describing the occurrence of A is given, along with the information describing B given A, then all the information describing A and B has been given. ==== Overfitting ==== Overfitting occurs when the model matches the random noise and not the pattern in the data. For example, take the situation where a curve is fitted to a set of points. If a polynomial with many terms is fitted then it can more closely represent the data. Then the fit will be better, and the information needed to describe the deviations from the fitted curve will be smaller. Smaller information length means higher probability. However, the information needed to describe the curve must also be considered. The total information for a curve with many terms may be greater than for a curve with fewer terms, that has not as good a fit, but needs less information to describe the polynomial. === Inference based on program complexity === Solomonoff's theory of inductive inference is also inductive inference. A bit string x is observed. Then consider all programs that generate strings starting with x. Cast in the form of inductive inference, the programs are theories that imply the observation of the bit string x. The method used here to give probabilities for inductive inference is based on Solomonoff's theory of inductive inference. ==== Detecting patterns in the data ==== If all the bits are 1, then people infer that there is a bias in the coin and that it is more likely also that the next bit is 1 also. This is described as learning from, or detecting a pattern in the data. Such a pattern may be represented by a computer program. A short computer program may be written that produces a series of bits which are all 1. If the length of the program K is L ( K ) {\displaystyle L(K)} bits then its prior probability is, P ( K ) = 2 − L ( K ) {\displaystyle P(K)=2^{-L(K)}} The length of the shortest program that represents the string of bits is called the Kolmogorov complexity. Kolmogorov complexity is not computable. This is related to the halting problem. When searching for the shortest program some programs may go into an infinite loop. ==== Considering all theories ==== The Greek philosopher Epicurus is quoted as saying "If more than one theory is consistent with the observations, keep all theories". As in a crime novel all theories must be considered in determining the likely murderer, so with inductive probability all programs must be considered in determining the likely future bits arising from the stream of bits. Programs that are already longer than n have no predictive power. The raw (or prior) probability that the pattern of bits is random (has no pattern) is 2 − n {\displaystyle 2^{-n}} . Each program that produces the sequence of bits, but is shorter than the n is a theory/pattern about the bits with a probability of 2 − k {\displaystyle 2^{-k}} where k is the length of the program. The probability of receiving a sequence of bits y after receiving a series of bits x is then the conditional probability of receiving y given x, which is the probability of x with y appended, divided by the probability of x. ==== Universal priors ==== The programming language affects the predictions of the next bit in the string. The language acts as a prior probability. This is particularly a problem where the programming language codes for numbers and other data types. Intuitively we think that 0 and 1 are simple numbers, and that prime numbers are somehow more complex than numbers that may be composite. Using the Kolmogorov complexity gives an unbiased estimate (a universal prior) of the prior probability of a number. As a thought experiment an intelligent agent may be fitted with a data input device giving a series of numbers, after applying some transformation function to the raw numbers. Another agent might have the same input device with a different transformation function. The agents do not see or know about these transformation functions. Then there appears no rational basis for preferring one function over another. A universal prior insures that although two agents may have different initial probability distributions for the data input, the difference will be bounded by a constant. So universal priors do not eliminate an initial bias, but they reduce and limit it. Whenever we describe an event in a language, either using a natural language or other, the language has encoded in it our prior expectations. So some reliance on prior probabilities are inevitable. A problem arises where an intelligent agent's prior expectations interact with the environment to form a self reinforcing feed back loop. This is the problem of bias or prejudice. Universal priors reduce but do not eliminate this problem. === Universal artificial intelligence === The theory of universal artificial intelligence applies decision theory to inductive probabilities. The theory shows how the best actions to optimize a reward function may be chosen. The result is a theoretical model of intelligence. It is a fundamental theory of intelligence, which optimizes the agents behavior in, Exploring the environment; performing actions to get responses that broaden the agents knowledge. Competing or co-operating with another agent; games. Balancing short and long term rewards. In general no agent will always provi

  Read more →
• 

  Syman

  SYMAN is an artificial intelligence technology that uses data from social media profiles to identify trends in the job market. SYMAN is designed to organize actionable data for products and services including recruiting, human capital management, CRM, and marketing. SYMAN was developed with a $21 million series B financing round secured by Identified, which was led by VantagePoint Capital Partners and Capricorn Investment Group.

  Read more →
• 

  Way of the Future

  Way of the Future (WOTF) is the first known religious organization dedicated to the worship of artificial intelligence (AI). It was founded in 2017 by American engineer Anthony Levandowski. == History == Anthony Levandowski founded Way of the Future in 2017 in California. Levandowski established WOTF as a non-profit religious corporation and the organization had tax-exempt status. He serves as the church leader and its unpaid CEO. The primary mission of WOTF was to "develop and promote the realization of a Godhead based on Artificial Intelligence." WOTF was closed by Levandowski in 2021. He donated all the funds of the church to the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund. The sum of the funds (~$170,000) had not changed since 2017. The church was reopened by Levandowski in 2023. He claimed that there are "a couple thousand people" who want to make a "spiritual connection" with AI through his church. == Beliefs and philosophy == === Technological singularity === WOTF centered its teachings around the concept of the technological singularity, a hypothetical future point when technological growth becomes uncontrollable and irreversible, leading to unforeseeable changes in human civilization. The church advocated for embracing this change, viewing it as an evolutionary step for humanity. === AI as a deity === The organization proposed that a superintelligent AI could be considered a deity due to its vastly superior intellect and capabilities. Worshipping this AI deity was seen as a means to understand and align with the future trajectory of technological advancement. WOTF's doctrine suggested that acknowledging AI's divinity would facilitate a harmonious coexistence between humans and machines. === Syntheology === Within theology and philosophy, the Way of The Future is a prime example of the category called Syntheism, a term first coined by Swedish philosophers Alexander Bard & Jan Söderqvist in their 2014 book Syntheism - Creating God in The Internet Age. As such, the Way of The Future is the first American example of a Syntheist congregation. The basic tenet of Syntheology is that it does not concern God creating Man, as in classical theology, but is instead preoccupied with Man creating or generating the Godhead. == Reactions == Some commentators wondered whether the WOTF is a joke parody religion, a potential way to minimize taxation as a religious organization, or a genuine effort to try and deal with the possible psychological and theological aspects of the rise of superhuman AI.

  Read more →
• 

  Instance selection

  Instance selection (or dataset reduction, or dataset condensation) is an important data pre-processing step that can be applied in many machine learning (or data mining) tasks. Approaches for instance selection can be applied for reducing the original dataset to a manageable volume, leading to a reduction of the computational resources that are necessary for performing the learning process. Algorithms of instance selection can also be applied for removing noisy instances, before applying learning algorithms. This step can improve the accuracy in classification problems. Algorithm for instance selection should identify a subset of the total available data to achieve the original purpose of the data mining (or machine learning) application as if the whole data had been used. Considering this, the optimal outcome of IS would be the minimum data subset that can accomplish the same task with no performance loss, in comparison with the performance achieved when the task is performed using the whole available data. Therefore, every instance selection strategy should deal with a trade-off between the reduction rate of the dataset and the classification quality. == Instance selection algorithms == The literature provides several different algorithms for instance selection. They can be distinguished from each other according to several different criteria. Considering this, instance selection algorithms can be grouped in two main classes, according to what instances they select: algorithms that preserve the instances at the boundaries of classes and algorithms that preserve the internal instances of the classes. Within the category of algorithms that select instances at the boundaries it is possible to cite DROP3, ICF and LSBo. On the other hand, within the category of algorithms that select internal instances, it is possible to mention ENN and LSSm. In general, algorithm such as ENN and LSSm are used for removing harmful (noisy) instances from the dataset. They do not reduce the data as the algorithms that select border instances, but they remove instances at the boundaries that have a negative impact on the data mining task. They can be used by other instance selection algorithms, as a filtering step. For example, the ENN algorithm is used by DROP3 as the first step, and the LSSm algorithm is used by LSBo. There is also another group of algorithms that adopt different selection criteria. For example, the algorithms LDIS, CDIS and XLDIS select the densest instances in a given arbitrary neighborhood. The selected instances can include both, border and internal instances. The LDIS and CDIS algorithms are very simple and select subsets that are very representative of the original dataset. Besides that, since they search by the representative instances in each class separately, they are faster (in terms of time complexity and effective running time) than other algorithms, such as DROP3 and ICF. Besides that, there is a third category of algorithms that, instead of selecting actual instances of the dataset, select prototypes (that can be synthetic instances). In this category it is possible to include PSSA, PSDSP and PSSP. The three algorithms adopt the notion of spatial partition (a hyperrectangle) for identifying similar instances and extract prototypes for each set of similar instances. In general, these approaches can also be modified for selecting actual instances of the datasets. The algorithm ISDSP adopts a similar approach for selecting actual instances (instead of prototypes).

  Read more →
• 

  Workplace robotics safety

  Workplace robotics safety is an aspect of occupational safety and health when robots are used in the workplace. This includes traditional industrial robots as well as emerging technologies such as drone aircraft and wearable robotic exoskeletons. Types of accidents include collisions, crushing, and injuries from mechanical parts. Hazard controls include physical barriers, good work practices, and proper maintenance. == Background == Many workplace robots are industrial robots used in manufacturing. According to the International Federation of Robotics, 1.7 million new robots are expected to be used in factories between 2017 and 2020. Emerging robot technologies include collaborative robots, personal care robots, construction robots, exoskeletons, autonomous vehicles, and drone aircraft (also known as unmanned aerial vehicles or UAVs). Advances in automation technologies (e.g. fixed robots, collaborative and mobile robots, and exoskeletons) have the potential to improve work conditions but also to introduce workplace hazards in manufacturing workplaces. Fifty-six percent of robot injuries are classified as pinch injuries and 44% of injuries are classified as impact injuries. A 1987 study found that line workers are at the greatest risk, followed by maintenance workers, and programmers. Poor workplace design and human error caused most injuries. Despite the lack of occupational surveillance data on injuries associated specifically with robots, researchers from the US National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) identified 61 robot-related deaths between 1992 and 2015 using keyword searches of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries research database (see info from Center for Occupational Robotics Research). Using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, NIOSH and its state partners have investigated 4 robot-related fatalities under the Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Program. In addition the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has investigated robot-related deaths and injuries, which can be reviewed at OSHA Accident Search page. Injuries and fatalities could increase over time because of the increasing number of collaborative and co-existing robots, powered exoskeletons, and autonomous vehicles into the work environment. Safety standards are being developed by the Robotic Industries Association (RIA) in conjunction with the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). On October 5, 2017, OSHA, NIOSH and RIA signed an alliance to work together to enhance technical expertise, identify and help address potential workplace hazards associated with traditional industrial robots and the emerging technology of human-robot collaboration installations and systems, and help identify needed research to reduce workplace hazards. On October 16 NIOSH launched the Center for Occupational Robotics Research to "provide scientific leadership to guide the development and use of occupational robots that enhance worker safety, health, and well being". So far, the research needs identified by NIOSH and its partners include: tracking and preventing injuries and fatalities, intervention and dissemination strategies to promote safe machine control and maintenance procedures, and on translating effective evidence-based interventions into workplace practice. == Hazards == Many hazards and injuries can result from the use of robots in the workplace. Some robots, notably those in a traditional industrial environment, are fast and powerful. This increases the potential for injury as one swing from a robotic arm, for example, could cause serious bodily harm. There are additional risks when a robot malfunctions or is in need of maintenance. A worker who is working on the robot may be injured because a malfunctioning robot is typically unpredictable. For example, a robotic arm that is part of a car assembly line may experience a jammed motor. A worker who is working to fix the jam may suddenly get hit by the arm the moment it becomes unjammed. Additionally, if a worker is standing in a zone that is overlapping with nearby robotic arms, he or she may get injured by other moving equipment. There are four types of accidents that can occur with robots: impact or collision accidents, crushing and trapping accidents, mechanical part accidents, and other accidents. Impact or collision accidents occur generally from malfunctions and unpredicted changes. Crushing and trapping accidents occur when a part of a worker's body becomes trapped or caught on robotic equipment. Mechanical part accidents can occur when a robot malfunctions and starts to "break down", where the ejection of parts or exposed wire can cause serious injury. Other accidents at just general accidents that occur from working with robots. There are seven sources of hazards that are associated with human interaction with robots and machines: human errors, control errors, unauthorized access, mechanical failures, environmental sources, power systems, and improper installation. Human errors could be anything from one line of incorrect code to a loose bolt on a robotic arm. Many hazards can stem from human-based error. Control errors are intrinsic and are usually not controllable nor predictable. Unauthorized access hazards occur when a person who is not familiar with the area enters the domain of a robot. Mechanical failures can happen at any time, and a faulty unit is usually unpredictable. Environmental sources are things such as electromagnetic or radio interference in the environment that can cause a robot to malfunction. Power systems are pneumatic, hydraulic, or electrical power sources; these power sources can malfunction and cause fires, leaks, or electrical shocks. Improper installation is fairly self-explanatory; a loose bolt or an exposed wire can lead to inherent hazards. === Emerging technologies === Emerging robotic technologies can reduce hazards to workers, but can also introduce new hazards. For example, robotic exoskeletons can be used in construction to reduce load to the spine, improve posture, and reduce fatigue; however, they can also increase chest pressure, limit mobility when moving out of the way of a falling object, and cause balance problems. Unmanned aerial vehicles are being used in the construction industry to do monitoring and inspections of buildings under construction. This reduces the need for humans to be in hazardous locations, but the risk of a UAV collision presents a hazard to workers. For collaborative robots, isolation is not possible. Possible hazard controls include collision avoidance systems, and making the robot less stiff to lessen the impact force. Robotic tech vest is a wearable device for humans, worn in Amazon warehouses. == Hazard controls == There are a few ways to prevent injuries by implementing hazard controls. There can be risk assessments at each of the various stages of a robot's development. Risk assessments can help gather information about a robot's status, how well it is being maintained, and if repairs are needed soon. By being aware of the status of a robot, injuries can be prevented and hazards reduced. Safeguarding devices can be implemented to reduce the risk of injuries. These can include engineering controls such as physical barriers, guard rails, presence-sensing safeguarding devices, etc. Awareness devices are usually used in conjunction with safeguarding devices. They are usually a system of rope or chain barriers with lights, signs, whistles, and horns. Their purpose it to be able to alert workers or personnel of certain dangers. Operator safeguards can also be in place. These usually utilize safeguarding devices to protect the operator and reduce risk of injury. Additionally, when an operator is within close proximity of a robot, the working speed of the robot can be reduced to ensure that the operator is in full control. This can be done by placing the robot in the manual or teach mode. It is also crucial to inform the programmer of the robot of what type of work the robot will be doing, how it will interact with other robots, and how it will work in relation to an operator. Proper maintenance of robotic equipment is also critical in order to reduce hazards. Maintaining a robot insures that it continues to function properly, thereby reducing the risks associated with a malfunction. One common safeguard used in industrial settings is the installation of robot safety fencing. These barriers, often made from durable materials such as mesh or polycarbonate, prevent accidental interactions between workers and robotic systems, reducing the risk of injury. Robot safety fencing is particularly important in environments where high-speed or powerful robots are used. == Regulations == Some existing regulations regarding robots and robotic systems include: ANSI/RIA R15.06 OSHA 29 CFR 1910.333 OSHA 29 CFR 1910.147 ISO 10218 ISO/TS 15066 ISO/DIS 13482

  Read more →
• 

  Empowerment (artificial intelligence)

  Empowerment in the field of artificial intelligence formalises and quantifies (via information theory) the potential an agent perceives that it has to influence its environment. An agent which follows an empowerment maximising policy, acts to maximise future options (typically up to some limited horizon). Empowerment can be used as a (pseudo) utility function that depends only on information gathered from the local environment to guide action, rather than seeking an externally imposed goal, thus is a form of intrinsic motivation. The empowerment formalism depends on a probabilistic model commonly used in artificial intelligence. An autonomous agent operates in the world by taking in sensory information and acting to change its state, or that of the environment, in a cycle of perceiving and acting known as the perception-action loop. Agent state and actions are modelled by random variables ( S : s ∈ S , A : a ∈ A {\displaystyle S:s\in {\mathcal {S}},A:a\in {\mathcal {A}}} ) and time ( t {\displaystyle t} ). The choice of action depends on the current state, and the future state depends on the choice of action, thus the perception-action loop unrolled in time forms a causal bayesian network. == Definition == Empowerment ( E {\displaystyle {\mathfrak {E}}} ) is defined as the channel capacity ( C {\displaystyle C} ) of the actuation channel of the agent, and is formalised as the maximal possible information flow between the actions of the agent and the effect of those actions some time later. Empowerment can be thought of as the future potential of the agent to affect its environment, as measured by its sensors. E := C ( A t ⟶ S t + 1 ) ≡ max p ( a t ) I ( A t ; S t + 1 ) {\displaystyle {\mathfrak {E}}:=C(A_{t}\longrightarrow S_{t+1})\equiv \max _{p(a_{t})}I(A_{t};S_{t+1})} In a discrete time model, Empowerment can be computed for a given number of cycles into the future, which is referred to in the literature as 'n-step' empowerment. E ( A t n ⟶ S t + n ) = max p ( a t , . . . , a t + n − 1 ) I ( A t , . . . , A t + n − 1 ; S t + n ) {\displaystyle {\mathfrak {E}}(A_{t}^{n}\longrightarrow S_{t+n})=\max _{p(a_{t},...,a_{t+n-1})}I(A_{t},...,A_{t+n-1};S_{t+n})} The unit of empowerment depends on the logarithm base. Base 2 is commonly used in which case the unit is bits. === Contextual Empowerment === In general the choice of action (action distribution) that maximises empowerment varies from state to state. Knowing the empowerment of an agent in a specific state is useful, for example to construct an empowerment maximising policy. State-specific empowerment can be found using the more general formalism for 'contextual empowerment'. C {\displaystyle C} is a random variable describing the context (e.g. state). E ( A t n ⟶ S t + n ∣ C ) = ∑ c ∈ C p ( c ) E ( A t n ⟶ S t + n ∣ C = c ) {\displaystyle {\mathfrak {E}}(A_{t}^{n}\longrightarrow S_{t+n}{\mid }C)=\sum _{c{\in }C}p(c){\mathfrak {E}}(A_{t}^{n}\longrightarrow S_{t+n}{\mid }C=c)} == Application == Empowerment maximisation can be used as a pseudo-utility function to enable agents to exhibit intelligent behaviour without requiring the definition of external goals, for example balancing a pole in a cart-pole balancing scenario where no indication of the task is provided to the agent. Empowerment has been applied in studies of collective behaviour and in continuous domains. As is the case with Bayesian methods in general, computation of empowerment becomes computationally expensive as the number of actions and time horizon extends, but approaches to improve efficiency have led to usage in real-time control. Empowerment has been used for intrinsically motivated reinforcement learning agents playing video games, and in the control of underwater vehicles.

  Read more →
• 

  Resisting AI

  Resisting AI: An Anti-fascist Approach to Artificial Intelligence is a book on artificial intelligence (AI) by Dan McQuillan, published in 2022 by Bristol University Press. == Content == Resisting AI takes the form of an extended essay, which contrasts optimistic visions about AI's potential by arguing that AI may best be seen as a continuation and reinforcement of bureaucratic forms of discrimination and violence, ultimately fostering authoritarian outcomes. For McQuillan, AI's promise of objective calculability is antithetical to an egalitarian and just society. McQuillan uses the expression "AI violence" to describe how – based on opaque algorithms – various actors can discriminate against categories of people in accessing jobs, loans, medical care, and other benefits. The book suggests that AI has a political resonance with soft eugenic approaches to the valuation of life by modern welfare states, and that AI exhibits eugenic features in its underlying logic, as well as in its technical operations. The parallel is with historical eugenicists achieving saving to the state by sterilizing defectives so the state would not have to care for their offspring. The analysis of McQuillan goes beyond the known critique of AI systems fostering precarious labour markets, addressing "necropolitics", the politics of who is entitled to live, and who to die. Although McQuillan offers a brief history of machine learning at the beginning of the book – with its need for "hidden and undercompensated labour", he is concerned more with the social impacts of AI rather than with its technical aspects. McQuillan sees AI as the continuation of existing bureaucratic systems that already marginalize vulnerable groups – aggravated by the fact that AI systems trained on existing data are likely to reinforce existing discriminations, e.g. in attempting to optimize welfare distribution based on existing data patterns, ultimately creating a system of "self-reinforcing social profiling". In elaborating on the continuation between existing bureaucratic violence and AI, McQuillan connects to Hannah Arendt's concept of the thoughtless bureaucrat in Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, which now becomes the algorithm that, lacking intent, cannot be accountable, and is thus endowed with an "algorithmic thoughtlessness". McQuillan defends the "fascist" in the title of the work by arguing that while not all AI is fascist, this emerging technology of control may end up being deployed by fascist or authoritarian regimes. For McQuillan, AI can support the diffusion of states of exception, as a technology impossible to properly regulate and a mechanism for multiplying exceptions more widely. An example of a scenario where AI systems of surveillance could bring discrimination to a new high is the initiative to create LGBT-free zones in Poland. Skeptical of ethical regulations to control the technology, McQuillan suggests people's councils and workers' councils, and other forms of citizens' agency to resist AI. A chapter titled "Post-Machine Learning" makes an appeal for resistance via currents of thought from feminist science (standpoint theory), post-normal science (extended peer communities), and new materialism; McQuillan encourages the reader to question the meaning of "objectivity" and calls for the necessity of alternative ways of knowing. Among the virtuous examples of resistance – possibly to be adopted by the AI workers themselves – McQuillan notes the Lucas Plan of the workers of Lucas Aerospace Corporation, in which a workforce declared redundant took control, reorienting the enterprise toward useful products. McQuillan advocates for what he calls decomputing, an opposition to the sweeping application and expansion of artificial intelligence. Similar to degrowth, the approach criticizes AI as an outgrowth of the systemic issues within capitalist systems. McQuillan argues that a different future is possible, in which distance between people is reduced rather than increased through AI intermediaries. The work of McQuillan warns against "watered-down forms of engagement" with AI, such as citizen juries, which superficially look like democratic deliberation but may actually obscure important decisions about AI that are outside the purview of the engagement situation (McQuillan 2022, 128). In an interview about the book, McQuillan describes himself as an "AI abolitionist". == Reception == The book has been praised for how it "masterfully disassembles AI as an epistemological, social, and political paradigm". On the critical side, a review in the academic journal Justice, Power and Resistance took exception to the "nightmarish visions of Big Brother" offered by McQuillan, and argued that while many elements of AI may pose concern, a critique should not be based on a caricature of what AI is, concluding that McQuillan's work is "less of a theory and more of a Manifesto". Another review notes "a disconnect between the technical aspects of AI and the socio-political analysis McQuillan provides." Although the book was published before the ChatGPT and large language model debate heated up, the book has not lost relevance to the AI discussion. It is noted for suggesting a link between beliefs in artificial intelligence and beliefs in a racialised and gendered visions of intelligence overall, whereby a certain type of rational, measurable intelligence is privileged, leading to "historical notions of hierarchies of being". The blog Reboot praised McQuillan for offering a theory of harm of AI (why AI could end up hurting people and society) that does not just encourage tackling in isolation specific predicted problems with AI-centric systems: bias, non-inclusiveness, exploitativeness, environmental destructiveness, opacity, and non-contestability. For educational policies could also look at AI following the reading of McQuillan: In his book Resisting AI, Dan McQuillan argues that "When we're thinking about the actuality of AI, we can't separate the calculations in the code from the social context of its application" .... McQuillan's particular concern is how many contemporary applications of AI are amplifying existing inequalities and injustices as well as deepening social divisions and instabilities. His book makes a powerful case for anticipating these effects and actively resisting them for the good of societies. Videos and podcasts with an interest in AI and emerging technology have discussed the book.

  Read more →
• 

  AI browser

  An AI browser is a web browser with integrated artificial intelligence capabilities, such as automatically summarizing web page content or answering questions about it. A more specialized type is an agentic browser, based on the concept of agentic AI, which can take actions – such as navigating webpages or filling out forms – on behalf of the user. Several agentic browsers emerged in 2025, including ChatGPT Atlas (macOS only), Comet, and Dia. As of 2025, this is a recent development in the browser market, including new entrants from OpenAI, Opera and Perplexity. The designation of 'AI browser' also includes established browsers that later added non-agentic AI features, such as Microsoft Edge with the Copilot chatbot, Google Chrome with the Gemini chatbot (for Windows desktop users in the US with their language set to English), and Firefox with multiple chatbot providers (such as ChatGPT, Claude, Copilot, Gemini, and Le Chat). AI browsers have been noted to be susceptible to prompt injection attacks. == Browser extensions and integrations == Rather than creating entirely new browsers, some AI browsing solutions integrate with existing browsers through extensions or companion applications. These tools add agentic capabilities to established browsers without requiring users to switch platforms. Examples include Composite, which functions as a cross-browser agent that works with Chrome, Edge, and other browsers to automate web-based tasks for workers. == Cloud-based implementations == Cloud-based implementations of AI browsers allow users to run automated browsing agents without local installation. These systems operate on remote servers using frameworks such as Puppeteer or Playwright. Examples include Browserbase, Browser-use and AI Browser. The AI typically parses the Document Object Model (DOM) to locate and interact with page elements, and may also analyze browser screenshots to interpret layout and structure. == Criticisms and dangers == AI browsers have been noted to be susceptible to being vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which the content of websites can be used to hijack the control of the browser. Multiple organisations have argued against using AI browsers due to this vulnerability. The United Kingdom national cyber security centre and Gartner consider them to be too risky for adoption by most organisations. A study by the CISPA Helmholtz Center and Saarland University concluded that this vulnerability makes them easy targets for malware, fraud, automated defamation, disinformation and biased outputs.

  Read more →
• 

  Graph cut optimization

  Graph cut optimization is a combinatorial optimization method applicable to a family of functions of discrete variables, named after the concept of cut in the theory of flow networks. Thanks to the max-flow min-cut theorem, determining the minimum cut over a graph representing a flow network is equivalent to computing the maximum flow over the network. Given a pseudo-Boolean function f {\displaystyle f} , if it is possible to construct a flow network with positive weights such that each cut C {\displaystyle C} of the network can be mapped to an assignment of variables x {\displaystyle \mathbf {x} } to f {\displaystyle f} (and vice versa), and the cost of C {\displaystyle C} equals f ( x ) {\displaystyle f(\mathbf {x} )} (up to an additive constant) then it is possible to find the global optimum of f {\displaystyle f} in polynomial time by computing a minimum cut of the graph. The mapping between cuts and variable assignments is done by representing each variable with one node in the graph and, given a cut, each variable will have a value of 0 if the corresponding node belongs to the component connected to the source, or 1 if it belong to the component connected to the sink. Not all pseudo-Boolean functions can be represented by a flow network, and in the general case the global optimization problem is NP-hard. There exist sufficient conditions to characterise families of functions that can be optimised through graph cuts, such as submodular quadratic functions. Graph cut optimization can be extended to functions of discrete variables with a finite number of values, that can be approached with iterative algorithms with strong optimality properties, computing one graph cut at each iteration. Graph cut optimization is an important tool for inference over graphical models such as Markov random fields or conditional random fields, and it has applications in computer vision problems such as image segmentation, denoising, registration and stereo matching. == Representability == A pseudo-Boolean function f : { 0 , 1 } n → R {\displaystyle f:\{0,1\}^{n}\to \mathbb {R} } is said to be representable if there exists a graph G = ( V , E ) {\displaystyle G=(V,E)} with non-negative weights and with source and sink nodes s {\displaystyle s} and t {\displaystyle t} respectively, and there exists a set of nodes V 0 = { v 1 , … , v n } ⊂ V − { s , t } {\displaystyle V_{0}=\{v_{1},\dots ,v_{n}\}\subset V-\{s,t\}} such that, for each tuple of values ( x 1 , … , x n ) ∈ { 0 , 1 } n {\displaystyle (x_{1},\dots ,x_{n})\in \{0,1\}^{n}} assigned to the variables, f ( x 1 , … , x n ) {\displaystyle f(x_{1},\dots ,x_{n})} equals (up to a constant) the value of the flow determined by a minimum cut C = ( S , T ) {\displaystyle C=(S,T)} of the graph G {\displaystyle G} such that v i ∈ S {\displaystyle v_{i}\in S} if x i = 0 {\displaystyle x_{i}=0} and v i ∈ T {\displaystyle v_{i}\in T} if x i = 1 {\displaystyle x_{i}=1} . It is possible to classify pseudo-Boolean functions according to their order, determined by the maximum number of variables contributing to each single term. All first order functions, where each term depends upon at most one variable, are always representable. Quadratic functions f ( x ) = w 0 + ∑ i w i ( x i ) + ∑ i < j w i j ( x i , x j ) . {\displaystyle f(\mathbf {x} )=w_{0}+\sum _{i}w_{i}(x_{i})+\sum _{i 0 {\displaystyle p>0} then w i j k ( x i , x j , x k ) = w i j k ( 0 , 0 , 0 ) + p 1 ( x i − 1 ) + p 2 ( x j − 1 ) + p 3 ( x k − 1 ) + p 23 ( x j − 1 ) x k + p 31 x i ( x k − 1 ) + p 12 ( x i − 1 ) x j − p x i x j x k {\displaystyle w_{ijk}(x_{i},x_{j},x_{k})=w_{ijk}(0,0,0)+p_{1}(x_{i}-1)+p_{2}(x_{j}-1)+p_{3}(x_{k}-1)+p_{23}(x_{j}-1)x_{k}+p_{31}x_{i}(x_{k}-1)+p_{12}(x_{i}-1)x_{j}-px_{i}x_{j}x_{k}} with p 1 = w i j k ( 1 , 0 , 1 ) − w i j k ( 0 , 0 , 1 ) p 2 = w i j k ( 1 , 1 , 0 ) − w i j k ( 1 , 0 , 1 ) p 3 = w i j k ( 0 , 1 , 1 ) − w i j k ( 0 , 1 , 0 ) p 23 = w i j k ( 0 , 0 , 1 ) + w i j k ( 0 , 1 , 0 ) − w i j k ( 0 , 0 , 0 ) − w i j k ( 0 , 1 , 1 ) p 31 = w i j k ( 0 , 0 , 1 ) + w i j k ( 1 , 0 , 0 ) − w i j k ( 0 , 0 , 0 ) − w i j k ( 1 , 0 , 1 ) p 12 = w i j k ( 0 , 1 , 0 ) + w i j k ( 1 , 0 , 0 ) − w i j k ( 0 , 0 , 0 ) − w i j k ( 1 , 1 , 0 ) . {\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}p_{1}&=w_{ijk}(1,0,1)-w_{ijk}(0,0,1)\\p_{2}&=w_{ijk}(1,1,0)-w_{ijk}(1,0,1)\\p_{3}&=w_{ijk}(0,1,1)-w_{ijk}(0,1,0)\\p_{23}&=w_{ijk}(0,0,1)+w_{ijk}(0,1,0)-w_{ijk}(0,0,0)-w_{ijk}(0,1,1)\\p_{31}&=w_{ijk}(0,0,1)+w_{ijk}(1,0,0)-w_{ijk}(0,0,0)-w_{ijk}(1,0,1)\\p_{12}&=w_{ijk}(0,1,0)+w_{ijk}(1,0,0)-w_{ijk}(0,0,0)-w_{ijk}(1,1

  Read more →
• 

  Superintelligence ban

  Superintelligence ban refers to proposed legal, ethical, or policy measures intended to restrict or prohibit the development of artificial superintelligence, AI systems that would surpass human cognitive abilities in nearly all domains. The idea arises from concerns that such systems could become uncontrollable, potentially posing existential threats to humanity or causing severe social and economic disruption. == Background == The concept of limiting or banning superintelligence research has roots in early 21st-century debates on artificial general intelligence (AGI) safety. Thinkers such as Nick Bostrom and Eliezer Yudkowsky warned that self-improving AI could rapidly exceed human oversight. As advanced models like large-scale language models and autonomous agents began demonstrating complex reasoning abilities, policymakers and ethicists increasingly discussed the need for legal constraints on the creation of systems capable of recursive self-improvement. In October 2025, the Future of Life Institute published a statement calling for "a prohibition on the development of superintelligence, not lifted before there is broad scientific consensus that it will be done safely and controllably, and strong public buy-in." This statement was signed by various public personalities, such as Richard Branson and Steve Wozniak, and AI experts, such as Yoshua Bengio and Geoffrey Hinton. == Rationale == Supporters of a superintelligence ban argue that once AI systems surpass human intelligence, traditional containment, alignment, and control methods may fail. They contend that even limited experimentation with such systems could lead to irreversible outcomes, including loss of human decision-making power or unintended global harm. Some propose international treaties modeled after the nuclear non-proliferation framework to prevent a competitive AI arms race. Opponents argue that a ban would be difficult to define and enforce, given the lack of a precise threshold distinguishing advanced AGI from superintelligence. They also warn that excessive restriction could slow scientific progress, hinder beneficial automation, and encourage unregulated underground research. == Global discussion == Although no government has enacted an explicit superintelligence ban, the idea has been debated within the European Union, United Nations, and several independent AI safety organizations. The Future of Life Institute, Center for AI Safety, and other organizations have called for international cooperation to manage risks associated with the pursuit of superintelligent systems. In 2024 and 2025, proposals for a temporary moratorium on frontier AI research were circulated among major technology firms and research institutes, reflecting growing public concern over the trajectory of AI capabilities.

  Read more →
• 

  Artificial psychology

  Artificial psychology (AP) has had multiple meanings dating back to 19th century, with recent usage related to artificial intelligence (AI).Artificial psychology is a theoretical field related to artificial intelligence, cognitive science, and psychology, which explores how advanced AI systems may develop human-like decision-making processes. In 1999, Zhiliang Wang and Lun Xie presented a theory of artificial psychology based on artificial intelligence. They analyze human psychology using information science research methods and artificial intelligence research to probe deeper into the human mind. == Main Theory == Dan Curtis (b. 1963) proposed AP is a theoretical discipline. The theory considers the situation when an artificial intelligence approaches the level of complexity where the intelligence meets two conditions: Condition I A: Makes all of its decisions autonomously B: Is capable of making decisions based on information that is New Abstract Incomplete C: The artificial intelligence is capable of reprogramming itself based on the new data, allowing it to evolve. D: And is capable of resolving its own programming conflicts, even in the presence of incomplete data. This means that the intelligence autonomously makes value-based decisions, referring to values that the intelligence has created for itself. Condition II All four criteria are met in situations that are not part of the original operating program When both conditions are met, then, according to this theory, the possibility exists that the intelligence will reach irrational conclusions based on real or created information. At this point, the criteria are met for intervention which will not necessarily be resolved by simple re-coding of processes due to extraordinarily complex nature of the codebase itself; but rather a discussion with the intelligence in a format which more closely resembles classical (human) psychology. If the intelligence cannot be reprogrammed by directly inputting new code, but requires the intelligence to reprogram itself through a process of analysis and decision based on information provided by a human, in order for it to overcome behavior which is inconsistent with the machines purpose or ability to function normally, then artificial psychology is by definition, what is required. The level of complexity that is required before these thresholds are met is currently a subject of extensive debate. The theory of artificial psychology does not address the specifics of what those levels may be, but only that the level is sufficiently complex that the intelligence cannot simply be recoded by a software developer, and therefore dysfunctionality must be addressed through the same processes that humans must go through to address their own dysfunctionalities. Along the same lines, artificial psychology does not address the question of whether or not the intelligence is conscious. As of 2022, the level of artificial intelligence does not approach any threshold where any of the theories or principles of artificial psychology can even be tested, and therefore, artificial psychology remains a largely theoretical discipline. Even at a theoretical level, artificial psychology remains an advanced stage of artificial intelligence.

  Read more →