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  • Threat actor

    Threat actor

    In cybersecurity and risk assessment, a threat actor (or threat agents, attackers, or adversaries) is a person, group, organisation, state, or other entity with the ability to cause, carry, transmit, support, or exploit a threat. Threat actors are commonly analysed according to their motivations, resources, technical capability, access to systems, relationship to a target, and degree of connection to state authority. They may exploit vulnerabilities, conduct social engineering, steal or monetise data, disrupt operations, or support other actors who carry out such activity. Because the term covers a wide range of actors, researchers and security organisations use taxonomies that distinguish between groups such as cybercriminals, state-linked actors, ideologically motivated actors, thrill seekers or trolls, insiders, and competitors. Threat actor classifications are used in risk management, cyber threat intelligence, and incident response to connect observed behaviour with possible objectives and likely future activity. The categories are not always mutually exclusive: the same actor may combine criminal, ideological, commercial, or state-linked motivations, and different organisations may use different names for similar actors. == Risk assessment and security management == In risk assessment, threat actor analysis is used to identify who or what may create, carry, transmit, support, or exploit a threat, and how that actor relates to the system being assessed. Rausand and Haugen classify threat actors by their relationship to the system, distinguishing between internal and external actors, and by intent, distinguishing between intentional and unintentional actors. Threat actor classification may also support incident investigation. Rogers argued that actor categories could be inferred from observable case points, such as tools used, messages left, data targeted, forensic knowledge, and the degree of damage, allowing investigators to assess likely motivation and skill level. Later work similarly linked actor classification to operational analysis. Chng, Lu, Kumar and Yau proposed a framework connecting hacker types, motivations and typical strategies, arguing that observed behaviour before or during an attack can help analysts infer the likely type of actor involved. At the strategic level, actor analysis may consider an actor's resources, capabilities, degree of state involvement, motivations and objectives. == Landscape == The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research has described the contemporary cyberthreat landscape as involving an increasingly diverse and interconnected set of actors, including state-led operations, cybercriminal syndicates, ideological hacktivists, commercial cyber mercenaries, private companies and civilian volunteers. Its 2026 report argued that these actors vary in resources, technical sophistication and relationships with states, making it traditional distinctions between state, civilian combatant roles, and legitimate and illegitimate conduct harder to apply. == Academic taxonomies == Early taxonomies classified hackers by activity, skill, motivation, or criminal profile. Landreth proposed six categories based on activity: novice, student, tourist, crasher, and thief. Hollinger classified computer misuse into pirates, browsers, and crackers, describing a progression from less-skilled activity to more technically serious offences. Chantler used attributes including activity, skill, knowledge, motivation, and duration of involvement to distinguish between an elite group, neophytes, and "losers and lamers". Parker proposed seven profiles of cybercriminals: pranksters, hacksters, malicious hackers, personal problem solvers, career criminals, extreme advocates, and malcontents, addicts, and irrational or incompetent people. In 2000, Marc Rogers proposed a taxonomy of hackers with seven, non-mutually-exclusive categories: newbie/tool kit users, cyber-punks, internals, coders, old guard hackers, professional criminals, and cyber-terrorists. Rausand and Haugen distinguish between internal and external threat actors, and between intentional and unintentional threat actors. Internal actors have some relationship with, access to, or position inside the system or organisation, while external actors operate from outside it. Intentional actors seek to create, exploit, or support a threat event, whereas unintentional actors may cause or enable a threat event through error, negligence, accident, or lack of awareness. Rogers later revised his hacker taxonomy into Novices, Cyber-punks, Internals, Petty Thieves, Virus Writers, Old Guard hackers, Professional Criminals, Information Warriors, and, more tentatively, Political Activists. In the model, motivation is grouped into four broad domains: curiosity, notoriety, revenge, and financial gain. A 2022 review by Chng, Lu, Kumar and Yau examined 11 hacker typologies published over three decades and proposed a unified framework linking hacker types, motivations, and strategies. The framework identified 13 hacker types and seven motivations, and argued that observed strategies during an attack can help analysts infer the likely type of actor involved. == Government taxonomies == Taxonomies of threat actors by governments are much more likely to include state-level threat actors. In the United States the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) uses the term threat source in its risk-assessment guidance: organisations are directed to identify and characterise threat sources of concern, including capability, intent and targeting for adversarial threat sources, and the range of effects for non-adversarial threat sources. NIST treats threat-source identification as part of the risk-assessment process, alongside identifying threat events, vulnerabilities, likelihood and impact. In the EU, European Union Agency for Cybersecurity publishes the annual ENISA Threat Landscape, which analyses cyber incidents and adversary behaviour affecting the European Union. The 2025 report analysed selected incidents from the previous year and grouped activity around cybercrime, state-aligned activity, foreign information manipulation and interference, and hacktivism. In ENISA's 2025 analysis, hacktivist activity dominated reporting, representing almost 80% of recorded incidents and consisting mainly of low-level distributed denial-of-service operations. ENISA also reported increasing convergence between hacktivism, cybercrime and state-nexus activity, including state-aligned use of hacktivist personas, hacktivist adoption of ransomware, and false-flag or impersonation activity. At the UN level, A 2026 report by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research described the cyberthreat landscape as involving state-led operations, cybercriminal syndicates, ideological hacktivists, commercial cyber mercenaries, and civilian volunteers, with actors varying in resources, technical sophistication, and links to states. Canada defines threat actors as states, groups, or individuals who aim to cause harm by exploiting a vulnerability with malicious intent. A threat actor must be trying to gain access to information systems to access or alter data, devices, systems, or networks. The Japanese government's National Centre of Incident Readiness and Strategy (NISC) was established in 2015 to create a "free, fair and secure cyberspace" in Japan. The NICS created a cybersecurity strategy in 2018 that outlines nation-states and cybercrime to be some of the most key threats. It also indicates that terrorist usage of the cyberspace needs to be monitored and understood. The Security Council of the Russian Federation published the cyber security strategy doctrine in 2016. This strategy highlights the following threat actors as a risk to cyber security measures: nation-state actors, cyber criminals, and terrorists. == Techniques == Threat actors use techniques like Social engineering (security), and Phishing, alongside technical exploits like Cross-site scripting, SQL injection, and denial-of-service attacks. == Limitations == In practice, actor categories may overlap (Edward Snowden for example), and the same activity may combine features associated with hacktivism, cybercrime and state-linked operations. The lines between hacktivism, cybercrime and state-nexus activity had continued to blur, with shared toolsets, overlapping methods, fake personas, hacktivist adoption of ransomware, and cybercriminal or state-linked actors masquerading as other groups. Threat actor analysis also has limits as a risk-management method. NIST notes that risk assessments depend on their purpose, scope, assumptions, constraints, information sources, risk model and analytic approach, and that assessments are tied to particular time frames and organisational contexts. NIST also warns that simple threat-vulnerability pairing may be undesirable or problematic where there are many threats and vulnerabilities, and recom

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  • Nortel Speech Server

    Nortel Speech Server

    The Nortel Speech Server (formerly known as Periphonics Speech Processing Platform) in telecommunications is a speech processing system that was originally developed by Nortel. Following the bankruptcy of Nortel, it is now sold by Avaya. The system is primarily used for large vocabulary speech recognition, natural language understanding, text-to-speech, and speaker verification. The Nortel Speech Server was based on the Periphonics OSCAR platform. The original OSCAR Platform was based upon Solaris servers. The current range of Speech Servers is Windows based. Nortel Speech Server is a component of the MPS 500, MPS 1000, and ICP platforms. On MPS systems, it may be used to stream prerecorded audio.

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  • Dr.Fill

    Dr.Fill

    Dr.Fill is a computer program that solves American-style crossword puzzles. It was developed by Matt Ginsberg and described by Ginsberg in an article in the Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research. Ginsberg claims in that article that Dr.Fill is among the top fifty crossword solvers in the world. == History == Dr.Fill participated in the 2012 American Crossword Puzzle Tournament, finishing 141st of approximately 650 entrants with a total score of just over 10,000 points. The appearance led to a variety of descriptions of Dr.Fill in the popular press, including The Economist, the San Francisco Chronicle and Gizmodo. A description of Dr.Fill appeared on the front page of the March 17, 2012 New York Times. Dr.Fill's score in 2013 improved to 10,550, which would have earned it 92nd place. Videos of the program solving the problems from the tournament are available on YouTube. The score in 2014 improved further to 10,790, which would have tied for 67th place. A video of the program solving the first six puzzles from that tournament, together with a talk given by Ginsberg describing its performance, can be found on YouTube. Dr.Fill has largely continued to improve since the 2014 event. In 2015, it scored 10,920 points and finished in 55th place. In 2016, it scored 11,205 points and finished in 41st place. In 2017, it scored 11,795 and finished in 11th place. In 2018, it scored 10,740 points, dropping to 78th place. Dr.Fill returned to "form" in 2019, once again scoring 11,795 and finishing in 14th place. The 2020 ACPT was cancelled due to COVID-19, and Dr.Fill participated as a non-competitor in the Boswords tournament instead. The program outperformed the humans, scoring 11,218 points (fast solves with a total of one mistake) while the best scoring human scored 10,994 points (slower solves but no mistakes). The 2021 ACPT was virtual, again due to COVID-19. The Dr.Fill effort was joined by the Berkeley NLP Group, creating a hybrid system named Berkeley Crossword Solver, and Dr.Fill won the main event, scoring 12,825 points with Erik Agard, the highest scoring human, scoring 12,810 points. The tournament was won by Tyler Hinman (12,760 points), who completed the championship puzzle perfectly in three minutes. Dr.Fill also completed that puzzle perfectly, but in 49 seconds. After winning the tournament, Ginsberg announced on August 8, 2021, that both he and Dr.Fill would be retiring from crosswords. == Algorithm == As described by Ginsberg, Dr.Fill works by converting a crossword to a weighted constraint satisfaction problem and then attempting to maximize the probability that the fill is correct. Probabilities for individual words or phrases in the puzzle are computed using relatively simple statistical techniques based on features such as previous appearances of the clue, number of Google hits for the fill, and so on. In doing this, Dr.Fill is attempting to solve a problem similar to that tackled by the Jeopardy!-playing program Watson; Dr.Fill runs on a laptop instead of a supercomputer and Ginsberg remarks that Watson is far more effective than Dr.Fill at solving this portion of the problem. Instead of computational horsepower, Dr.Fill relies on the constraints provided by crossing words to refine its answers. A variety of techniques from artificial intelligence are applied to attempt to find the most likely fill. These include a small amount of lookahead, limited discrepancy search, and postprocessing. Ginsberg remarks that postprocessing was chosen over branch and bound because the two techniques are mutually incompatible and postprocessing was found to be more effective in this domain.

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  • Leela Chess Zero

    Leela Chess Zero

    Leela Chess Zero (abbreviated as LCZero, lc0) is a free, open-source chess engine and volunteer computing project based on Google's AlphaZero engine. It was spearheaded by Gary Linscott, a developer for the Stockfish chess engine, and adapted from the Leela Zero Go engine. Like Leela Zero and AlphaGo Zero, early iterations of Leela Chess Zero started with no intrinsic chess-specific knowledge other than the basic rules of the game. It learned how to play chess through reinforcement learning from repeated self-play, using a distributed computing network coordinated at the Leela Chess Zero website. However, as of November 2024 most models used by the engine are trained through supervised learning on data generated by previous reinforcement learning runs. As of June 2025, Leela Chess Zero has played over 2.5 billion games against itself, playing around 1 million games every day, and is capable of play at a level that is comparable with Stockfish, the leading conventional chess program. == History == The Leela Chess Zero project was first announced on TalkChess.com on January 9, 2018, as an open-source, self-learning chess engine attempting to recreate the success of AlphaZero. Within the first few months of training, Leela Chess Zero had already reached the Grandmaster level, surpassing the strength of early releases of Rybka, Stockfish, and Komodo, despite evaluating orders of magnitude fewer positions due to the size of the deep neural network it uses as its evaluation function. In December 2018, the AlphaZero team published a paper in Science magazine revealing previously undisclosed details of the architecture and training parameters used for AlphaZero. These changes were soon incorporated into Leela Chess Zero and increased both its strength and training efficiency. Work on Leela Chess Zero has informed the AobaZero project for shogi. The engine has been rewritten and carefully iterated upon since its inception, and since 2019 has run on multiple backends, allowing it to run on both CPU and GPU. The engine can be configured to use different weights, including even different architectures. This same mechanism of substitutable weights can also be used for alternative chess rules, such as for the Fischer Random Chess variant, which was done in 2019. == Neural network == Like AlphaZero, Leela Chess Zero employs neural networks which output both a policy vector, a distribution over subsequent moves used to guide search, and a position evaluation. These neural networks are designed to run on GPU, unlike traditional engines. It originally used residual neural networks, but in 2022 switched to using a transformer-based architecture designed by Daniel Monroe and Philip Chalmers. These models represent a chessboard as a sequence of 64 tokens and apply a trunk consisting of a stack of Post-LN encoder layers, outputting a sequence of 64 encoded tokens which is used to generate a position evaluation and a distribution over subsequent moves. They use a custom domain-specific position encoding called smolgen to improve the self-attention layer. As of November 2024, the models used by the engine are significantly larger and more efficient than the residual network used by AlphaZero, reportedly achieving grandmaster-level strength at one position evaluation per move. These models are able to detect and exploit positional features like trapped pieces and fortresses to outmaneuver traditional engines, giving Leela a unique playstyle. There is also evidence that they are able to perform look-ahead. == Program and use == Like AlphaZero, Leela Chess Zero learns through reinforcement learning, continually training on data generated through self-play. However, unlike AlphaZero, Leela Chess Zero decentralizes its data generation through distributed computing, with volunteers generating self-play data on local hardware which is fed to the reinforcement algorithm. In order to contribute training games, volunteers must download the latest non-release candidate (non-rc) version of the engine and the client. The client connects to the Leela Chess Zero server and iteratively receives the latest neural network version and produces self-play games which are sent back to the server and use to train the network. In order to run the Leela Chess Zero engine, two components are needed: the engine binary used to perform search, and a network used to evaluate positions. The client, which is used to contribute training data to the project, is not needed for this purpose. Older networks can also be downloaded and used by placing those networks in the folder with the Lc0 binary. == Spinoffs == In season 15 of the Top Chess Engine Championship, the engine AllieStein competed alongside Leela. AllieStein is a combination of two different spinoffs from Leela: Allie, which uses the same neural network as Leela, but has a unique search algorithm for exploring different lines of play, and Stein, a network which was trained using supervised learning on existing game data from games between other engines. While neither of these projects were admitted to TCEC separately due to their similarity to Leela, the combination of Allie's search algorithm with the Stein network, called AllieStein, was deemed unique enough to warrant its inclusion in the competition. In early 2021, the LcZero blog announced Ceres, a transliteration of the engine to C# which introduced several algorithmic improvements. The engine has performed competitively in tournaments, achieving third place in the TCEC Swiss 7 and fourth place in the TCEC Cup 14. In 2024, the CeresTrain framework was announced to support training deep neural networks for chess in PyTorch. == Competition results == In April 2018, Leela Chess Zero became the first engine using a deep neural network to enter the Top Chess Engine Championship (TCEC), during Season 12 in the lowest division, Division 4. Out of 28 games, it won one, drew two, and lost the remainder; its sole victory came from a position in which its opponent, Scorpio 2.82, crashed in three moves. However, it improved quickly. In July 2018, Leela placed seventh out of eight competitors at the 2018 World Computer Chess Championship. In August 2018, it won division 4 of TCEC season 13 with a record of 14 wins, 12 draws, and 2 losses. In Division 3, Leela scored 16/28 points, finishing third behind Ethereal, which scored 22.5/28 points, and Arasan on tiebreak. By September 2018, Leela had become competitive with the strongest engines in the world. In the 2018 Chess.com Computer Chess Championship (CCCC), Leela placed fifth out of 24 entrants. The top eight engines advanced to round 2, where Leela placed fourth. Leela then won the 30-game match against Komodo to secure third place in the tournament. Leela participated in the "TCEC Cup", an event in which engines from different TCEC divisions can play matches against one another. Leela defeated higher-division engines Laser, Ethereal and Fire before finally being eliminated by Stockfish in the semi-finals. In December 2018, Leela participated in Season 14 of the Top Chess Engine Championship. Leela dominated divisions 3, 2, and 1, easily finishing first in all of them. In the premier division, Stockfish dominated while Houdini, Komodo and Leela competed for second place. It came down to a final-round game where Leela needed to hold Stockfish to a draw with black to finish second ahead of Komodo. Leela managed this and therefore met Stockfish in the superfinal. In a back and forth match, first Stockfish and then Leela took three game leads before Stockfish won by the narrow margin of 50.5–49.5. In February 2019, Leela scored its first major tournament win when it defeated Houdini in the final of the second TCEC cup. Leela did not lose a game the entire tournament. In April 2019, Leela won the Chess.com Computer Chess Championship 7: Blitz Bonanza, becoming the first neural-network project to take the title. In the season 15 of the Top Chess Engine Championship (May 2019), Leela defended its TCEC Cup title, this time defeating Stockfish with a score of 5.5–4.5 (+2 =7 −1) in the final after Stockfish blundered a seven-man tablebase draw. Leela also won the Superfinal for the first time, scoring 53.5–46.5 (+14 −7 =79) versus Stockfish, including winning as both white and black in the same predetermined opening in games 61 and 62. Season 16 of TCEC saw Leela finish in third place in premier division, missing qualification for the Superfinal to Stockfish and the new deep neural network engine AllieStein. Leela was the only engine not to suffer any losses in the Premier division, and defeated Stockfish in one of the six games they played. However, Leela only managed to score nine wins, while AllieStein and Stockfish both scored 14 wins. This inability to defeat weaker engines led to Leela finishing third, half a point behind AllieStein and a point behind Stockfish. In the fourth TCEC Cup, Leela was seeded first as the defending champion,

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  • Circular thresholding

    Circular thresholding

    Circular thresholding is an algorithm for automatic image threshold selection in image processing. Most threshold selection algorithms assume that the values (e.g. intensities) lie on a linear scale. However, some quantities such as hue and orientation are a circular quantity, and therefore require circular thresholding algorithms. The example shows that the standard linear version of Otsu's method when applied to the hue channel of an image of blood cells fails to correctly segment the large white blood cells (leukocytes). In contrast the white blood cells are correctly segmented by the circular version of Otsu's method. == Methods == There are a relatively small number of circular image threshold selection algorithms. The following examples are all based on Otsu's method for linear histograms: (Tseng, Li and Tung 1995) smooth the circular histogram, and apply Otsu's method. The histogram is cyclically rotated so that the selected threshold is shifted to zero. Otsu's method and histogram rotation are applied iteratively until several heuristics involving class size, threshold location, and class variance are satisfied. (Wu et al. 2006) smooth the circular histogram until it contains only two peaks. The histogram is cyclically rotated so that the midpoint between the peaks is shifted to zero. Otsu's method and histogram rotation are applied iteratively until convergence of the threshold. (Lai and Rosin 2014) applied Otsu's method to the circular histogram. For the two class circular thresholding task they showed that, for a histogram with an even number of bins, the optimal solution for Otsu's criterion of within-class variance is obtained when the histogram is split into two halves. Therefore the optimal solution can be efficiently obtained in linear rather than quadratic time. == References and further reading == D.-C. Tseng, Y.-F. Li, and C.-T. Tung, Circular histogram thresholding for color image segmentation in Proc. Int. Conf. Document Anal. Recognit., 1995, pp. 673–676. J. Wu, P. Zeng, Y. Zhou, and C. Olivier, A novel color image segmentation method and its application to white blood cell image analysis in Proc. Int. Conf. Signal Process., vol. 2. 2006, pp. 16–20. Y.K. Lai, P.L. Rosin, Efficient Circular Thresholding, IEEE Trans. on Image Processing 23(3), 992–1001 (2014). doi:10.1109/TIP.2013.2297014

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  • Turing test

    Turing test

    The Turing test, originally called the imitation game by Alan Turing in 1949, is a test of a machine's ability to exhibit intelligent behaviour equivalent to that of a human. In the test, a human evaluator judges a text transcript of a natural-language conversation between a human and a machine. The evaluator tries to identify the machine, and the machine passes if the evaluator cannot reliably tell them apart. The results would not depend on the machine's ability to answer questions correctly, only on how closely its answers resembled those of a human. Since the Turing test is a test of indistinguishability in performance capacity, the verbal version generalizes naturally to all of human performance capacity, verbal as well as nonverbal (robotic). The test was introduced by Turing in his 1950 paper "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" while working at the University of Manchester. It opens with the words: "I propose to consider the question, 'Can machines think?'." Because "thinking" is difficult to define, Turing chooses to "replace the question by another, which is closely related to it and is expressed in relatively unambiguous words". Turing describes the new form of the problem in terms of a three-person party game called the "imitation game", in which an interrogator asks questions of a man and a woman in another room in order to determine the correct sex of the two players. Turing's new question is: "Are there imaginable digital computers which would do well in the imitation game?" This question, Turing believed, was one that could actually be answered. In the remainder of the paper, he argued against the major objections to the proposition that "machines can think". Since Turing introduced his test, it has been highly influential in the philosophy of artificial intelligence, resulting in substantial discussion and controversy, as well as criticism from philosophers like John Searle, who argue against the test's ability to detect consciousness. == History == === Philosophical background === The question of whether it is possible for machines to think has a long history, which is firmly entrenched in the distinction between dualist and materialist views of the mind. René Descartes prefigures aspects of the Turing test in his 1637 Discourse on the Method when he writes: [H]ow many different automata or moving machines could be made by the industry of man ... For we can easily understand a machine's being constituted so that it can utter words, and even emit some responses to action on it of a corporeal kind, which brings about a change in its organs; for instance, if touched in a particular part it may ask what we wish to say to it; if in another part it may exclaim that it is being hurt, and so on. But it never happens that it arranges its speech in various ways, in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. Here Descartes notes that automata are capable of responding to human interactions but argues that such automata cannot respond appropriately to things said in their presence in the way that any human can. Descartes therefore prefigures the Turing test by defining the insufficiency of appropriate linguistic response as that which separates the human from the automaton. Descartes fails to consider the possibility that future automata might be able to overcome such insufficiency, and so does not propose the Turing test as such, even if he prefigures its conceptual framework and criterion. Denis Diderot formulates in his 1746 book Pensées philosophiques a Turing-test criterion, though with the important implicit limiting assumption maintained, of the participants being natural living beings, rather than considering created artifacts: If they find a parrot who could answer to everything, I would claim it to be an intelligent being without hesitation. This does not mean he agrees with this, but that it was already a common argument of materialists at that time. According to dualism, the mind is non-physical (or, at the very least, has non-physical properties) and, therefore, cannot be explained in purely physical terms. According to materialism, the mind can be explained physically, which leaves open the possibility of minds that are produced artificially. In 1936, philosopher Alfred Ayer considered the standard philosophical question of other minds: how do we know that other people have the same conscious experiences that we do? In his book, Language, Truth and Logic, Ayer suggested a protocol to distinguish between a conscious man and an unconscious machine: "The only ground I can have for asserting that an object which appears to be conscious is not really a conscious being, but only a dummy or a machine, is that it fails to satisfy one of the empirical tests by which the presence or absence of consciousness is determined". (This suggestion is very similar to the Turing test, but it is not certain that Ayer's popular philosophical classic was familiar to Turing.) In other words, a thing is not conscious if it fails the consciousness test. === Cultural background === A rudimentary idea of the Turing test appears in the 1726 novel Gulliver's Travels by Jonathan Swift. When Gulliver is brought before the king of Brobdingnag, the king thinks at first that Gulliver might be a "a piece of clock-work (which is in that country arrived to a very great perfection) contrived by some ingenious artist". Even when he hears Gulliver speaking, the king still doubts whether Gulliver was taught "a set of words" to make him "sell at a better price". Gulliver tells that only after "he put several other questions to me, and still received rational answers" the king became satisfied that Gulliver was not a machine. Tests where a human judges whether a computer or an alien is intelligent were an established convention in science fiction by the 1940s, and it is likely that Turing would have been aware of these. Stanley G. Weinbaum's "A Martian Odyssey" (1934) provides an example of how nuanced such tests could be. Earlier examples of machines or automatons attempting to pass as human include the Ancient Greek myth of Pygmalion who creates a sculpture of a woman that is animated by Aphrodite, Carlo Collodi's novel The Adventures of Pinocchio, about a puppet who wants to become a real boy, and E. T. A. Hoffmann's 1816 story "The Sandman," where the protagonist falls in love with an automaton. In all these examples, people are fooled by artificial beings that—up to a point—pass as human. === Alan Turing and the imitation game === Researchers in the United Kingdom had been exploring "machine intelligence" for up to ten years prior to the founding of the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research in 1956. It was a common topic among the members of the Ratio Club, an informal group of British cybernetics and electronics researchers that included Alan Turing. Turing, in particular, had been running the notion of machine intelligence since at least 1941 and one of the earliest-known mentions of "computer intelligence" was made by him in 1947. In Turing's report, "Intelligent Machinery," he investigated "the question of whether or not it is possible for machinery to show intelligent behaviour" and, as part of that investigation, proposed what may be considered the forerunner to his later tests: It is not difficult to devise a paper machine which will play a not very bad game of chess. Now get three men A, B and C as subjects for the experiment. A and C are to be rather poor chess players, B is the operator who works the paper machine. ... Two rooms are used with some arrangement for communicating moves, and a game is played between C and either A or the paper machine. C may find it quite difficult to tell which he is playing. "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" (1950) was the first published paper by Turing to focus exclusively on machine intelligence. Turing begins the 1950 paper with the claim, "I propose to consider the question 'Can machines think?'" As he highlights, the traditional approach to such a question is to start with definitions, defining both the terms "machine" and "think". Turing chooses not to do so; instead, he replaces the question with a new one, "which is closely related to it and is expressed in relatively unambiguous words". In essence he proposes to change the question from "Can machines think?" to "Can machines do what we (as thinking entities) can do?" The advantage of the new question, Turing argues, is that it draws "a fairly sharp line between the physical and intellectual capacities of a man". To demonstrate this approach Turing proposes a test inspired by a party game, known as the "imitation game", in which a man and a woman go into separate rooms and guests try to tell them apart by writing a series of questions and reading the typewritten answers sent back. In this game, both the man and the woman aim to convince the guests that they ar

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  • Turing test

    Turing test

    The Turing test, originally called the imitation game by Alan Turing in 1949, is a test of a machine's ability to exhibit intelligent behaviour equivalent to that of a human. In the test, a human evaluator judges a text transcript of a natural-language conversation between a human and a machine. The evaluator tries to identify the machine, and the machine passes if the evaluator cannot reliably tell them apart. The results would not depend on the machine's ability to answer questions correctly, only on how closely its answers resembled those of a human. Since the Turing test is a test of indistinguishability in performance capacity, the verbal version generalizes naturally to all of human performance capacity, verbal as well as nonverbal (robotic). The test was introduced by Turing in his 1950 paper "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" while working at the University of Manchester. It opens with the words: "I propose to consider the question, 'Can machines think?'." Because "thinking" is difficult to define, Turing chooses to "replace the question by another, which is closely related to it and is expressed in relatively unambiguous words". Turing describes the new form of the problem in terms of a three-person party game called the "imitation game", in which an interrogator asks questions of a man and a woman in another room in order to determine the correct sex of the two players. Turing's new question is: "Are there imaginable digital computers which would do well in the imitation game?" This question, Turing believed, was one that could actually be answered. In the remainder of the paper, he argued against the major objections to the proposition that "machines can think". Since Turing introduced his test, it has been highly influential in the philosophy of artificial intelligence, resulting in substantial discussion and controversy, as well as criticism from philosophers like John Searle, who argue against the test's ability to detect consciousness. == History == === Philosophical background === The question of whether it is possible for machines to think has a long history, which is firmly entrenched in the distinction between dualist and materialist views of the mind. René Descartes prefigures aspects of the Turing test in his 1637 Discourse on the Method when he writes: [H]ow many different automata or moving machines could be made by the industry of man ... For we can easily understand a machine's being constituted so that it can utter words, and even emit some responses to action on it of a corporeal kind, which brings about a change in its organs; for instance, if touched in a particular part it may ask what we wish to say to it; if in another part it may exclaim that it is being hurt, and so on. But it never happens that it arranges its speech in various ways, in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. Here Descartes notes that automata are capable of responding to human interactions but argues that such automata cannot respond appropriately to things said in their presence in the way that any human can. Descartes therefore prefigures the Turing test by defining the insufficiency of appropriate linguistic response as that which separates the human from the automaton. Descartes fails to consider the possibility that future automata might be able to overcome such insufficiency, and so does not propose the Turing test as such, even if he prefigures its conceptual framework and criterion. Denis Diderot formulates in his 1746 book Pensées philosophiques a Turing-test criterion, though with the important implicit limiting assumption maintained, of the participants being natural living beings, rather than considering created artifacts: If they find a parrot who could answer to everything, I would claim it to be an intelligent being without hesitation. This does not mean he agrees with this, but that it was already a common argument of materialists at that time. According to dualism, the mind is non-physical (or, at the very least, has non-physical properties) and, therefore, cannot be explained in purely physical terms. According to materialism, the mind can be explained physically, which leaves open the possibility of minds that are produced artificially. In 1936, philosopher Alfred Ayer considered the standard philosophical question of other minds: how do we know that other people have the same conscious experiences that we do? In his book, Language, Truth and Logic, Ayer suggested a protocol to distinguish between a conscious man and an unconscious machine: "The only ground I can have for asserting that an object which appears to be conscious is not really a conscious being, but only a dummy or a machine, is that it fails to satisfy one of the empirical tests by which the presence or absence of consciousness is determined". (This suggestion is very similar to the Turing test, but it is not certain that Ayer's popular philosophical classic was familiar to Turing.) In other words, a thing is not conscious if it fails the consciousness test. === Cultural background === A rudimentary idea of the Turing test appears in the 1726 novel Gulliver's Travels by Jonathan Swift. When Gulliver is brought before the king of Brobdingnag, the king thinks at first that Gulliver might be a "a piece of clock-work (which is in that country arrived to a very great perfection) contrived by some ingenious artist". Even when he hears Gulliver speaking, the king still doubts whether Gulliver was taught "a set of words" to make him "sell at a better price". Gulliver tells that only after "he put several other questions to me, and still received rational answers" the king became satisfied that Gulliver was not a machine. Tests where a human judges whether a computer or an alien is intelligent were an established convention in science fiction by the 1940s, and it is likely that Turing would have been aware of these. Stanley G. Weinbaum's "A Martian Odyssey" (1934) provides an example of how nuanced such tests could be. Earlier examples of machines or automatons attempting to pass as human include the Ancient Greek myth of Pygmalion who creates a sculpture of a woman that is animated by Aphrodite, Carlo Collodi's novel The Adventures of Pinocchio, about a puppet who wants to become a real boy, and E. T. A. Hoffmann's 1816 story "The Sandman," where the protagonist falls in love with an automaton. In all these examples, people are fooled by artificial beings that—up to a point—pass as human. === Alan Turing and the imitation game === Researchers in the United Kingdom had been exploring "machine intelligence" for up to ten years prior to the founding of the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research in 1956. It was a common topic among the members of the Ratio Club, an informal group of British cybernetics and electronics researchers that included Alan Turing. Turing, in particular, had been running the notion of machine intelligence since at least 1941 and one of the earliest-known mentions of "computer intelligence" was made by him in 1947. In Turing's report, "Intelligent Machinery," he investigated "the question of whether or not it is possible for machinery to show intelligent behaviour" and, as part of that investigation, proposed what may be considered the forerunner to his later tests: It is not difficult to devise a paper machine which will play a not very bad game of chess. Now get three men A, B and C as subjects for the experiment. A and C are to be rather poor chess players, B is the operator who works the paper machine. ... Two rooms are used with some arrangement for communicating moves, and a game is played between C and either A or the paper machine. C may find it quite difficult to tell which he is playing. "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" (1950) was the first published paper by Turing to focus exclusively on machine intelligence. Turing begins the 1950 paper with the claim, "I propose to consider the question 'Can machines think?'" As he highlights, the traditional approach to such a question is to start with definitions, defining both the terms "machine" and "think". Turing chooses not to do so; instead, he replaces the question with a new one, "which is closely related to it and is expressed in relatively unambiguous words". In essence he proposes to change the question from "Can machines think?" to "Can machines do what we (as thinking entities) can do?" The advantage of the new question, Turing argues, is that it draws "a fairly sharp line between the physical and intellectual capacities of a man". To demonstrate this approach Turing proposes a test inspired by a party game, known as the "imitation game", in which a man and a woman go into separate rooms and guests try to tell them apart by writing a series of questions and reading the typewritten answers sent back. In this game, both the man and the woman aim to convince the guests that they ar

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  • Model

    Model

    A model is an informative representation of an object, person, or system. The term originally denoted the plans of a building in 16th-century English, and derived via French and Italian ultimately from Latin modulus, 'a measure'. Models can be divided into physical models (e.g. a ship model) and abstract models (e.g. a set of mathematical equations describing the workings of the atmosphere for the purpose of weather forecasting). Abstract or conceptual models are central to philosophy of science. In scholarly research and applied science, a model should not be confused with a theory: while a model seeks only to represent reality with the purpose of better understanding or predicting the world, a theory is more ambitious in that it claims to be an explanation of reality. == Types of model == === Model in specific contexts === As a noun, model has specific meanings in certain fields, derived from its original meaning of "structural design or layout": Model (art), a person posing for an artist, e.g. a 15th-century criminal representing the biblical Judas in Leonardo da Vinci's painting The Last Supper Model (person), a person who serves as a template for others to copy, as in a role model, often in the context of advertising commercial products; e.g. the first fashion model, Marie Vernet Worth in 1853, wife of designer Charles Frederick Worth. Model (product), a particular design of a product as displayed in a catalogue or show room (e.g. Ford Model T, an early car model) Model (organism) a non-human species that is studied to understand biological phenomena in other organisms, e.g. a guinea pig starved of vitamin C to study scurvy, an experiment that would be immoral to conduct on a person Model (mimicry), a species that is mimicked by another species Model (logic), a structure (a set of items, such as natural numbers 1, 2, 3,..., along with mathematical operations such as addition and multiplication, and relations, such as < {\displaystyle <} ) that satisfies a given system of axioms (basic truisms), i.e. that satisfies the statements of a given theory Model (CGI), a mathematical representation of any surface of an object in three dimensions via specialized software Model (MVC), the information-representing internal component of a software, as distinct from its user interface === Physical model === A physical model (most commonly referred to simply as a model but in this context distinguished from a conceptual model) is a smaller or larger physical representation of an object, person or system. The object being modelled may be small (e.g., an atom) or large (e.g., the Solar System) or life-size (e.g., a fashion model displaying clothes for similarly-built potential customers). The geometry of the model and the object it represents are often similar in the sense that one is a rescaling of the other. However, in many cases the similarity is only approximate or even intentionally distorted. Sometimes the distortion is systematic, e.g., a fixed scale horizontally and a larger fixed scale vertically when modelling topography to enhance a region's mountains. An architectural model permits visualization of internal relationships within the structure or external relationships of the structure to the environment. Another use is as a toy. Instrumented physical models are an effective way of investigating fluid flows for engineering design. Physical models are often coupled with computational fluid dynamics models to optimize the design of equipment and processes. This includes external flow such as around buildings, vehicles, people, or hydraulic structures. Wind tunnel and water tunnel testing is often used for these design efforts. Instrumented physical models can also examine internal flows, for the design of ductwork systems, pollution control equipment, food processing machines, and mixing vessels. Transparent flow models are used in this case to observe the detailed flow phenomenon. These models are scaled in terms of both geometry and important forces, for example, using Froude number or Reynolds number scaling (see Similitude). In the pre-computer era, the UK economy was modelled with the hydraulic model MONIAC, to predict for example the effect of tax rises on employment. === Conceptual model === A conceptual model is a theoretical representation of a system, e.g. a set of mathematical equations attempting to describe the workings of the atmosphere for the purpose of weather forecasting. It consists of concepts used to help understand or simulate a subject the model represents. Abstract or conceptual models are central to philosophy of science, as almost every scientific theory effectively embeds some kind of model of the physical or human sphere. In some sense, a physical model "is always the reification of some conceptual model; the conceptual model is conceived ahead as the blueprint of the physical one", which is then constructed as conceived. Thus, the term refers to models that are formed after a conceptualization or generalization process. === Examples === Conceptual model (computer science), an agreed representation of entities and their relationships, to assist in developing software Economic model, a theoretical construct representing economic processes Language model, a probabilistic model of a natural language, used for speech recognition, language generation, and information retrieval Large language models are artificial neural networks used for generative artificial intelligence (AI), e.g. ChatGPT Mathematical model, a description of a system using mathematical concepts and language Statistical model, a mathematical model that usually specifies the relationship between one or more random variables and other non-random variables Model (CGI), a mathematical representation of any surface of an object in three dimensions via specialized software Medical model, a proposed "set of procedures in which all doctors are trained" Mental model, in psychology, an internal representation of external reality Model (logic), a set along with a collection of finitary operations, and relations that are defined on it, satisfying a given collection of axioms Model (MVC), information-representing component of a software, distinct from the user interface (the "view"), both linked by the "controller" component, in the context of the model–view–controller software design Model act, a law drafted centrally to be disseminated and proposed for enactment in multiple independent legislatures Standard model (disambiguation) == Properties of models, according to general model theory == According to Herbert Stachowiak, a model is characterized by at least three properties: 1. Mapping A model always is a model of something—it is an image or representation of some natural or artificial, existing or imagined original, where this original itself could be a model. 2. Reduction In general, a model will not include all attributes that describe the original but only those that appear relevant to the model's creator or user. 3. Pragmatism A model does not relate unambiguously to its original. It is intended to work as a replacement for the original a) for certain subjects (for whom?) b) within a certain time range (when?) c) restricted to certain conceptual or physical actions (what for?). For example, a street map is a model of the actual streets in a city (mapping), showing the course of the streets while leaving out, say, traffic signs and road markings (reduction), made for pedestrians and vehicle drivers for the purpose of finding one's way in the city (pragmatism). Additional properties have been proposed, like extension and distortion as well as validity. The American philosopher Michael Weisberg differentiates between concrete and mathematical models and proposes computer simulations (computational models) as their own class of models. == Uses of models == According to Bruce Edmonds, there are at least 5 general uses for models: Prediction: reliably anticipating unknown data, including data within the domain of the training data (interpolation), and outside the domain (extrapolation) Explanation: establishing plausible chains of causality by proposing mechanisms that can explain patterns seen in data Theoretical exposition: discovering or proposing new hypotheses, or refuting existing hypotheses about the behaviour of the system being modelled Description: representing important aspects of the system being modelled Illustration: communicating an idea or explanation

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  • Hardware for artificial intelligence

    Hardware for artificial intelligence

    Specialized computer hardware is often used to execute artificial intelligence (AI) programs faster, and with less energy, such as Lisp machines, neuromorphic engineering, event cameras, and physical neural networks. Since 2017, several consumer grade CPUs and SoCs have on-die NPUs. As of 2023, the market for AI hardware is dominated by GPUs. As of the 2020s, AI computation is dominated by graphics processing units (GPUs) and newer domain-specific accelerators such as Google's Tensor Processing Units (TPUs), AMD's Instinct MI300 series, and various on-device neural-processing units (NPUs) found in consumer hardware. == Scope == For the purposes of this article, AI hardware refers to computing components and systems specifically designed or optimized to accelerate artificial-intelligence workloads such as machine-learning training or inference. This includes general-purpose accelerators used for AI (for example, GPUs) and domain-specific accelerators (for example, TPUs, NPUs, and other AI ASICs). Event-based cameras are sometimes discussed in the context of neuromorphic computing, but they are input sensors rather than AI compute devices. Conversely, components such as memristors are basic circuit elements rather than specialized AI hardware when considered alone. == Lisp machines == Lisp machines were developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s to make artificial intelligence programs written in the programming language Lisp run faster. == Dataflow architecture == Dataflow architecture processors used for AI serve various purposes with varied implementations like the polymorphic dataflow Convolution Engine by Kinara (formerly Deep Vision), structure-driven dataflow by Hailo, and dataflow scheduling by Cerebras. == Component hardware == === AI accelerators === Since the 2010s, advances in computer hardware have led to more efficient methods for training deep neural networks that contain many layers of non-linear hidden units and a very large output layer. By 2019, graphics processing units (GPUs), often with AI-specific enhancements, had displaced central processing units (CPUs) as the dominant means to train large-scale commercial cloud AI. OpenAI estimated the hardware compute used in the largest deep learning projects from Alex Net (2012) to Alpha Zero (2017), and found a 300,000-fold increase in the amount of compute needed, with a doubling-time trend of 3.4 months. === General-purpose GPUs for AI === Since the 2010s, graphics processing units (GPUs) have been widely used to train and deploy deep learning models because of their highly parallel architecture and high memory bandwidth. Modern data-center GPUs include dedicated tensor or matrix-math units that accelerate neural-network operations. In 2022, NVIDIA introduced the Hopper-generation H100 GPU, adding FP8 precision support and faster interconnects for large-scale model training. AMD and other vendors have also developed GPUs and accelerators aimed at AI and high-performance computing workloads. === Domain-specific accelerators (ASICs / NPUs) === Beyond general-purpose GPUs, several companies have developed application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) and neural processing units (NPUs) tailored for AI workloads. Google introduced the Tensor Processing Unit (TPU) in 2016 for deep-learning inference, with later generations supporting large-scale training through dense systolic-array designs and optical interconnects. Other vendors have released similar devices—such as Apple's Neural Engine and various on-device NPUs—that emphasize energy-efficient inference in mobile or edge computing environments. === Memory and interconnects === AI accelerators rely on fast memory and inter-chip links to manage the large data volumes of training and inference. High-bandwidth memory (HBM) stacks, standardized as HBM3 in 2022, provide terabytes-per-second throughput on modern GPUs and ASICs. These accelerators are often connected through dedicated fabrics such as NVIDIA's NVLink and NVSwitch or optical interconnects used in TPU systems to scale performance across thousands of chips.

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  • Lethal autonomous weapon

    Lethal autonomous weapon

    A lethal autonomous weapon (LAW), also known as a lethal autonomous weapon system (LAWS), autonomous weapon system (AWS), robotic weapon, or killer robot, is a type of military drone or military robot, which is autonomous in that it can independently search for and engage targets based on programmed constraints and descriptions. As of 2025, most military drones (including unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned combat aerial vehicles) and military robots are not truly autonomous. LAWs may engage in drone warfare in the air, on land, on water, underwater, or in space. == Definitions == In weapons development, the term "autonomous" is somewhat ambiguous and can vary hugely between different scholars, nations and organizations. There is no definition of lethal autonomous weapon systems that is generally agreed upon among different countries. The official United States Department of Defense Policy on Autonomy in Weapon Systems (Department of Defense Directive 3000.09) defines an Autonomous Weapon System as one that "...once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator." Heather Roff, a writer for Case Western Reserve University School of Law, describes autonomous weapon systems as "... capable of learning and adapting their 'functioning in response to changing circumstances in the environment in which [they are] deployed,' as well as capable of making firing decisions on their own." The British Ministry of Defence states "Whilst definitions can vary, the key difference is that an automated system is capable of carrying out complicated tasks but is incapable of complex decision-making, whereas an autonomous system is capable of deciding a course of action without depending on human oversight and control." Scholars such as Peter Asaro and Mark Gubrud believe that any weapon system that is capable of releasing a lethal force without the operation, decision, or confirmation of a human supervisor can be deemed autonomous. == Automatic defensive systems == Some definitions of autonomous weapon systems are broad enough to include land mines and naval mines, simple automatically-triggered lethal weapons that have been in use for centuries. Some current examples of LAWs are automated "hardkill" active protection systems, such as a radar-guided close-in weapon systems (CIWS) used to defend ships that have been in use since the 1970s (e.g., the US Phalanx CIWS). Such systems can autonomously identify and attack oncoming missiles, rockets, artillery fire, aircraft, and surface vessels according to criteria set by the human operator. Similar systems exist for tanks, such as the Russian Arena, the Israeli Trophy, and the German AMAP-ADS. Several types of stationary sentry guns, which can fire at humans and vehicles, are used in South Korea and Israel. Many missile defence systems, such as Iron Dome, also have autonomous targeting capabilities. The main reason for not having a "human in the loop" in these systems is the need for rapid response. They have generally been used to protect personnel and installations against incoming projectiles. == Autonomous offensive systems == According to The Economist in 2018, as technology advances, applications of uncrewed undersea vehicles could include mine clearance, mine-laying, anti-submarine sensor networking in contested waters, patrolling with active sonar, resupplying manned submarines, and becoming low-cost missile platforms. In 2017 the Russian Federation was developing artificially intelligent missiles, drones, unmanned vehicles, military robots and medic robots. In 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review alleged that Russia was developing a "new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous torpedo" named "Status 6". Israeli Minister Ayoob Kara stated in 2017 that Israel is developing military robots, including ones as small as flies. In October 2018, Zeng Yi, a senior executive at the Chinese defense firm Norinco, gave a speech in which he said that "In future battlegrounds, there will be no people fighting", and that the use of lethal autonomous weapons in warfare is "inevitable". In 2019, US Defense Secretary Mark Esper lashed out at China for selling drones capable of taking life with no human oversight. As of 2020, DARPA was working on making swarms of 250 autonomous lethal drones available to the American military. The US Navy is developing unmanned surface vehicles, also called sea drones, including Ghost Fleet Overlord, with plans to equip them with weapons and with the potential to use them semi-autonomously. In 2020 a Kargu 2 drone hunted down and attacked a human target in Libya, according to a report from the UN Security Council's Panel of Experts on Libya, published in March 2021. This may have been the first time an autonomous killer robot armed with lethal weaponry attacked human beings. In May 2021 Israel conducted an AI-guided combat drone swarm attack in Gaza. In the Russo-Ukrainian war, Ukraine has developed advanced drones with integrated artificial intelligence for a range of drone warfare purposes, including to attack infrastructure in Russia, although as of May 2026, Al Jazeera reported that humans remain in control of operation. == Ethical and legal issues == === Degree of human control === Three classifications of the degree of human control of autonomous weapon systems were laid out by Bonnie Docherty in a 2012 Human Rights Watch report. human-in-the-loop: a human must instigate the action of the weapon (in other words not fully autonomous). human-on-the-loop: a human may abort an action. human-out-of-the-loop: no human action is involved. === Standard used in US policy === Department of Defense Directive 3000.09 states that "Autonomous … weapons systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force." However, as noted in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the policy requires that autonomous weapon systems that kill people or use kinetic force, selecting and engaging targets without further human intervention, be certified as compliant with "appropriate levels" and other standards, not that such weapon systems cannot meet these standards and are therefore forbidden. "Semi-autonomous" hunter-killers that autonomously identify and attack targets do not even require certification. Deputy Defense Secretary Robert O. Work said in 2016 that the Defense Department would "not delegate lethal authority to a machine to make a decision", but might need to reconsider this since "authoritarian regimes" may do so. In October 2016 President Barack Obama stated that early in his career he was wary of a future in which a US president making use of drone warfare could "carry on perpetual wars all over the world, and a lot of them covert, without any accountability or democratic debate". In the US, security-related AI has fallen under the purview of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence since 2018. On October 31, 2019, the United States Department of Defense's Defense Innovation Board published the draft of a report outlining five principles for weaponized AI and making 12 recommendations for the ethical use of artificial intelligence by the Department of Defense that would ensure a human operator would always be able to look into the 'black box' and understand the kill-chain process. A major concern is how the report will be implemented. === Possible violations of ethics and international acts === Stuart Russell, professor of computer science from University of California, Berkeley stated the concern he has with LAWs is that his view is that it is unethical and inhumane. The main issue with this system is it is hard to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. There is concern by some economists and legal scholars about whether LAWs would violate International Humanitarian Law, especially the principle of distinction, which requires the ability to discriminate combatants from non-combatants, and the principle of proportionality, which requires that damage to civilians be proportional to the military aim. This concern is often invoked as a reason to ban "killer robots" altogether - but it is doubtful that this concern can be an argument against LAWs that do not violate International Humanitarian Law. A 2021 report by the American Congressional Research Service states that "there are no domestic or international legal prohibitions on the development of use of LAWs," although it acknowledges ongoing talks at the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). LAWs are said by some to blur the boundaries of who is responsible for a particular killing. Philosopher Robert Sparrow argues that autonomous weapons are causally but not morally responsible, similar to child soldiers. In each case, he argues there is a risk of atrocities occurring without an appropriate subject to hold responsible, which violates jus in bell

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  • Sentential decision diagram

    Sentential decision diagram

    In artificial intelligence, a sentential decision diagram (SDD) is a type of knowledge representation used in knowledge compilation to represent Boolean functions. SDDs can be viewed as a generalization of the influential ordered binary decision diagram (OBDD) representation, by allowing decisions on multiple variables at once. Like OBDDs, SDDs allow for tractable Boolean operations, while being exponentially more succinct. For this reason, they have become an important representation in knowledge compilation. == Properties == SDDs are defined with respect to a generalization of variable ordering known as a variable tree (vtree). Provided that they satisfy additional properties known as compression and trimming (which are analogous to ROBDDs), SDDs are a canonical representation of Boolean functions; that is, they are unique given a vtree. Like OBDDs, they allow for operations such as conjunction, disjunction and negation to be computed directly on the representation in polynomial time, while being potentially more compact. They also allow for polynomial-time model counting. SDDs are known to be exponentially more succinct than OBDDs. == Applications == SDDs are used as a compilation target for probabilistic logic programs by the ProbLog 2 system since they support tractable (weighted) model counting as well as tractable negation, conjunction and disjunction while being more succinct than BDDs. SDDs have also been extended to model probability distributions, in which context they are known as probabilistic sentential decision diagrams (PSDD).

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  • Hubert Dreyfus's views on artificial intelligence

    Hubert Dreyfus's views on artificial intelligence

    Hubert Dreyfus was a critic of artificial intelligence research. In a series of papers and books, including Alchemy and AI (1965), What Computers Can't Do (1972; 1979; 1992) and Mind over Machine (1986), he presented a skeptical and cautious assessment of AI's progress and a critique of the philosophical foundations of the field. Dreyfus' objections are discussed in most introductions to the philosophy of artificial intelligence, including Russell & Norvig (2021), a standard AI textbook, and in Fearn (2007), a survey of contemporary philosophy. Dreyfus argued that human intelligence and expertise depend primarily on yet-to-be understood informal and unconscious processes rather than symbolic manipulation and that these essentially human skills cannot be fully captured in formal rules. His critique was based on the insights of modern continental philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, and was directed at the first wave of AI research which tried to reduce intelligence to high level formal symbols. When Dreyfus' ideas were first introduced in the mid-1960s, they were met in the AI community with ridicule and outright hostility. By the 1980s, however, some of his perspectives were rediscovered by researchers working in robotics and the new field of connectionism—approaches that were called "sub-symbolic" at the time because they eschewed early AI research's emphasis on high level symbols. In the 21st century, "sub-symbolic" artificial neural networks and other statistics-based approaches to machine learning were highly successful. Historian and AI researcher Daniel Crevier wrote: "time has proven the accuracy and perceptiveness of some of Dreyfus's comments." Dreyfus said in 2007, "I figure I won and it's over—they've given up." == Dreyfus' critique == === The grandiose promises of artificial intelligence === In Alchemy and AI (1965) and What Computers Can't Do (1972), Dreyfus summarized the history of artificial intelligence and ridiculed the unbridled optimism that permeated the field. For example, Herbert A. Simon, following the success of his program General Problem Solver (1957), predicted that by 1967: A computer would be world champion in chess. A computer would discover and prove an important new mathematical theorem. Most theories in psychology will take the form of computer programs. The press dutifully reported these predictions of the imminent arrival of machine intelligence. Dreyfus felt that this optimism was unwarranted and, in 1965, argued forcefully that predictions like these would not come true. He would eventually be proven right. Pamela McCorduck explains Dreyfus' position: A great misunderstanding accounts for public confusion about thinking machines, a misunderstanding perpetrated by the unrealistic claims researchers in AI have been making, claims that thinking machines are already here, or at any rate, just around the corner. These predictions were based on the success of the cognitive revolution, which promoted an "information processing" model of the mind. It was articulated by Newell and Simon in their physical symbol systems hypothesis, and later expanded into a philosophical position known as computationalism by philosophers such as Jerry Fodor and Hilary Putnam. In AI, the approach is now called symbolic AI or "GOFAI". Dreyfus argued that "symbolic AI" was the latest version of the ancient program of rationalism in philosophy. Rationalism had come under heavy criticism in the 20th century from philosophers like Martin Heidegger and Edmund Husserl. The mind, according to modern continental philosophy, is not "rationalist" and is nothing like a digital computer. Cognitivism led early AI researchers to believe that they had successfully simulated the essential process of human thought, thus it seemed a short step to producing fully intelligent machines. Dreyfus' last paper detailed the ongoing history of the "first step fallacy", where AI researchers tend to wildly extrapolate initial success as promising, perhaps even guaranteeing, wild future successes. === Dreyfus' four assumptions of artificial intelligence research === In Alchemy and AI and What Computers Can't Do, Dreyfus identified four philosophical assumptions, at least one of which he deems necessary for AI to succeed. "In each case," Dreyfus writes, "the assumption is taken by workers in AI as an axiom, guaranteeing results, whereas it is, in fact, one hypothesis among others, to be tested by the success of such work." Dreyfus argues that AI would be impossible without accepting at least one of these four assumptions: The biological assumption The brain processes information in discrete operations by way of some biological equivalent of on/off switches. In the early days of research into neurology, scientists found that neurons fire in all-or-nothing pulses. Several researchers, such as Walter Pitts and Warren McCulloch, speculated with great confidence that neurons functioned similarly to the way Boolean logic gates operate, and so could be imitated by electronic circuitry at the level of the neuron. When digital computers became widely used in the early 50s, this argument was extended to suggest that the brain was a vast physical symbol system, manipulating the binary symbols of zero and one. Dreyfus was able to refute the biological assumption by citing research in neurology that suggested that the action and timing of neuron firing had analog components. But Daniel Crevier observes that "few still held that belief in the early 1970s, and nobody argued against Dreyfus" about the biological assumption. The psychological assumption The mind can be viewed as a device operating on bits of information according to formal rules. He refuted this assumption by showing that much of what we know about the world consists of complex attitudes or tendencies that make us lean towards one interpretation over another. He argued that, even when we use explicit symbols, we are using them against an unconscious and informal background including commonsense knowledge and that without this background our symbols cease to mean anything. This background, in Dreyfus' view, was not implemented in individual brains as explicit individual symbols with explicit individual meanings. The epistemological assumption All knowledge can be formalized. This concerns the philosophical issue of epistemology, or the study of knowledge. Even if we agree that the psychological assumption is false, AI researchers could still argue (as AI founder John McCarthy has) that it is possible for a symbol processing machine to represent all knowledge, regardless of whether human beings represent knowledge the same way. Dreyfus argued that there is no justification for this assumption, since so much of human knowledge is not symbolic or even expressible using formal constructs. The ontological assumption The world consists of independent facts that can be represented by independent symbols AI researchers (and futurists and science fiction writers) often assume that there is no limit to formal, scientific knowledge, because they assume that any phenomenon in the universe can be described by symbols or scientific theories. This assumes that everything that exists can be understood as objects, properties of objects, classes of objects, relations of objects, and so on: precisely those things that can be described by logic, language and mathematics. The study of being or existence is called ontology, and so Dreyfus calls this the ontological assumption. If this is false, then it raises doubts about what we can ultimately know and what intelligent machines will ultimately be able to help us to do. === Knowing-how vs. knowing-that: the primacy of intuition === In Mind Over Machine (1986), written (with his brother) during the heyday of expert systems, Dreyfus analyzed the difference between human expertise and the programs that claimed to capture it. This expanded on ideas from What Computers Can't Do, where he had made a similar argument criticizing the "cognitive simulation" school of AI research practiced by Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon in the 1960s. Dreyfus argued that human problem solving and expertise depend on our background sense of the context, of what is important and interesting given the situation, rather than on the process of searching through combinations of possibilities to find what we need. Dreyfus would describe it in 1986 as the difference between "knowing-that" and "knowing-how", based on Heidegger's distinction of present-at-hand and ready-to-hand. Knowing-that is our conscious, step-by-step problem solving abilities. We use these skills when we encounter a difficult problem that requires us to stop, step back and search through ideas one at time. At moments like this, the ideas become very precise and simple: they become context free symbols, which we manipulate using logic and language. These are the skills that Newell and Simon had demonstrated with both psy

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  • Comparison of raster graphics editors

    Comparison of raster graphics editors

    Raster graphics editors can be compared by many variables, including availability. == List == == General information == Basic general information about the editor: creator, company, license, etc. == Operating system support == The operating systems on which the editors can run natively, that is, without emulation, virtual machines or compatibility layers. In other words, the software must be specifically coded for the operation system; for example, Adobe Photoshop for Windows running on Linux with Wine does not fit. == Features == == Color spaces == == File support ==

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  • Suggested Upper Merged Ontology

    Suggested Upper Merged Ontology

    The Suggested Upper Merged Ontology (SUMO) is an upper ontology intended as a foundation ontology for a variety of computer information processing systems. SUMO defines a hierarchy of classes and related rules and relationships. These are expressed in a version of the language SUO-KIF, a higher-order logic that has a LISP-like syntax, as well as the TPTP family of languages. A mapping from WordNet synsets to SUMO has been defined. Initially, SUMO was focused on meta-level concepts (general entities that do not belong to a specific problem domain), and thereby would lead naturally to a categorization scheme for encyclopedias. It has now been considerably expanded to include a mid-level ontology and dozens of domain ontologies. SUMO is organized for interoperability of automated reasoning engines. To maximize compatibility, schema designers can try to assure that their naming conventions use the same meanings as SUMO for identical words (for example, "agent" or "process"). SUMO has an associated open source Sigma knowledge engineering environment. Initially, Sumo was developed by the Teknowledge Corporation and now is maintained by Articulate Software. SUMO is open source. The first release was in December 2000.

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  • Lukas Biewald

    Lukas Biewald

    Lukas Biewald (born 1981) is an American entrepreneur and a prominent figure in artificial intelligence. He is recognized for his contributions to machine learning and as the CEO and co-founder of Weights & Biases, a company that builds developer tools for AI, that sold to CoreWeave in 2025 for $1.7B. He previously founded and was CEO of Figure Eight, a human-in-the-loop machine learning platform. He has co-authored 26 AI research papers from 2004 through 2018. == Early life and education == Biewald was born in Boston, Massachusetts in 1981. He attended Cambridge Rindge and Latin School and later earned both a Bachelor's and Master's degree in Computer science from Stanford University. == Early Career and Founding Figure Eight == After graduation, Biewald joined Yahoo! as an engineer, working on machine translations to improve search results, and eventually led the Search Relevance Team for Yahoo! Japan. He later joined Powerset, a natural language search technology company, as their Senior Scientist, which was acquired by Microsoft in 2008 for an estimated $100M. In 2007, Biewald co-founded Figure Eight (formerly CrowdFlower), a data labeling and crowdsourcing company that created datasets for training machine learning models. Figure Eight was acquired by Appen in 2019 for $300 million. == Weights and Biases == In 2017, Biewald co-founded Weights & Biases with Chris Van Pelt and Shawn Lewis. The company provides tools for tracking machine learning experiments, model management, and collaborative AI and LLM app development. The platform has been adopted by organizations such as OpenAI, Salesforce, and Microsoft. In March 2025 Coreweave acquired Weights and Biases at $1.7 billion, with the transaction closing on May 5, 2025. == Gradient Dissent == Biewald hosts the bi-weekly podcast Gradient Dissent. Guest have included: Anthony Goldbloom – Co-founder & CEO of Kaggle. “How to Win Kaggle Competitions” (podcast, Sep. 9, 2020). Shared tips on data-science competitions from the founder of the largest ML community. Richard Socher – Founder & CEO of You.com; former Chief Scientist at Salesforce. “The Challenges of Making ML Work in the Real World” (podcast, September 28, 2020). A leading NLP researcher, he spoke on multimodal search engines powered by large language models. Jensen Huang – Founder & CEO of NVIDIA. “NVIDIA’s CEO on the Next Generation of AI and MLOps” (podcast, March 3, 2022). Huang’s GPUs power modern ML research and production. Emad Mostaque – Co-founder & CEO of Stability AI. “Stable Diffusion, Stability AI, and What’s Next” (podcast, Nov. 15, 2022). Leads the company behind Stable Diffusion, which helped spark the generative-AI imaging boom. Drago Anguelov – Head of Research at Waymo. “Robustness, Safety, and Scalability at Waymo” (podcast, July 14, 2022). Covered Waymo’s self-driving AI advances and deployment challenges. Jeremy Howard – Co-founder of fast.ai. “The Simple but Profound Insight Behind Diffusion” (podcast, Jan. 5, 2023). Known for democratizing deep-learning education; discussed diffusion models and accessible AI tooling. Aidan Gomez – Co-founder & CEO of Cohere. “Scaling LLMs and Accelerating Adoption” (podcast, April 20, 2023). Co-author of “Attention Is All You Need,” he shared how Cohere delivers large-scale NLP models as a service. Chelsea Finn – Stanford Assistant Professor (AI & Robotics). “Shaping the World of Robotics with Chelsea Finn” (podcast, February 15, 2024). A pioneer in meta-learning and robotics, she detailed robots learning complex tasks like cooking. Andrew Feldman – Co-founder & CEO of Cerebras Systems. "Launching the Fastest AI Inference Solution" (podcast, August 27, 2024). Described wafer-scale AI chips achieving new training performance records. Thomas Dohmke – CEO of GitHub. “GitHub CEO on Copilot and the Future of Software Development” (podcast, June 10, 2025). Discussed building Copilot and the future of AI-assisted coding. Martin Shkreli – Founder of Godel Terminal. “From Pharma to AGI Hype, and Developing AI in Finance: Martin Shkreli’s Journey” (podcast, May 20, 2025). Shkreli reflects on his pharma controversies, prison experience, and his new AI-driven trading platform. Jarek Kutylowski – Founder & CEO of DeepL. “How DeepL Built a Translation Powerhouse with AI” (podcast, July 8, 2025). Shared how DeepL’s neural-MT rivals Google Translate through model and infrastructure innovation. == Awards and recognition == In 2010, Lukas Biewald won the Netexplorateur Award for creating the GiveWork iPhone app, which allows users to perform small tasks that assist refugees and people in developing countries. In 2010, Inc Magazine included Biewald and Van Pelt on its list of the Top 30 Entrepreneurs Under 30. == Publications == Ensuring quality in crowdsourced search relevance evaluation: The effects of training question distribution by John Le, Andy Edmonds, Vaughn Hester, Lukas Biewald. SIGIR 2010 Workshop on Crowdsourcing for Search Evaluation, July 2010. Superficial Data Analysis: Exploring Millions of Social Stereotypes by Lukas Biewald, Brendan O’Connor. O’Reilly July 2009 Biewald has co-authored 26 AI research papers from 2004 through 2018.

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