Data remanence is the residual representation of digital data that remains even after attempts have been made to remove or erase the data. This residue may result from data being left intact by a nominal file deletion operation, by reformatting of storage media that does not remove data previously written to the media, or through physical properties of the storage media that allow previously written data to be recovered. Data remanence may make inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information possible should the storage media be released into an uncontrolled environment (e.g., thrown in refuse containers or lost). Various techniques have been developed to counter data remanence. These techniques are classified as clearing, purging/sanitizing, or destruction. Specific methods include overwriting, degaussing, encryption, and media destruction. Effective application of countermeasures can be complicated by several factors, including media that are inaccessible, media that cannot effectively be erased, advanced storage systems that maintain histories of data throughout the data's life cycle, and persistence of data in memory that is typically considered volatile. Several standards exist for the secure removal of data and the elimination of data remanence. == Causes == Many operating systems, file managers, and other software provide a facility where a file is not immediately deleted when the user requests that action. Instead, the file is moved to a holding area (i.e. the "trash"), making it easy for the user to undo a mistake. Similarly, many software products automatically create backup copies of files that are being edited, to allow the user to restore the original version, or to recover from a possible crash (autosave feature). Even when an explicit deleted file retention facility is not provided or when the user does not use it, operating systems do not actually remove the contents of a file when it is deleted unless they are aware that explicit erasure commands are required, like on a solid-state drive. (In such cases, the operating system will issue the Serial ATA TRIM command or the SCSI UNMAP command to let the drive know to no longer maintain the deleted data.) Instead, they simply remove the file's entry from the file system directory because this requires less work and is therefore faster, and the contents of the file—the actual data—remain on the storage medium. The data will remain there until the operating system reuses the space for new data. In some systems, enough filesystem metadata are also left behind to enable easy undeletion by commonly available utility software. Even when undelete has become impossible, the data, until it has been overwritten, can be read by software that reads disk sectors directly. Computer forensics often employs such software. Likewise, reformatting, repartitioning, or reimaging a system is unlikely to write to every area of the disk, though all will cause the disk to appear empty or, in the case of reimaging, empty except for the files present in the image, to most software. Finally, even when the storage media is overwritten, physical properties of the media may permit recovery of the previous contents. In most cases however, this recovery is not possible by just reading from the storage device in the usual way, but requires using laboratory techniques such as disassembling the device and directly accessing/reading from its components. § Complications below gives further explanations for causes of data remanence. == Countermeasures == There are three levels commonly recognized for eliminating remnant data: === Clearing === Clearing is the removal of sensitive data from storage devices in such a way that there is assurance that the data may not be reconstructed using normal system functions or software file/data recovery utilities. The data may still be recoverable, but not without special laboratory techniques. Clearing is typically an administrative protection against accidental disclosure within an organization. For example, before a hard drive is re-used within an organization, its contents may be cleared to prevent their accidental disclosure to the next user. === Purging === Purging or sanitizing is the physical rewrite of sensitive data from a system or storage device done with the specific intent of rendering the data unrecoverable at a later time. Purging, proportional to the sensitivity of the data, is generally done before releasing media beyond control, such as before discarding old media, or moving media to a computer with different security requirements. === Destruction === The storage media is made unusable for conventional equipment. Effectiveness of destroying the media varies by medium and method. Depending on recording density of the media, and/or the destruction technique, this may leave data recoverable by laboratory methods. Conversely, destruction using appropriate techniques is the most secure method of preventing retrieval. == Specific methods == === Overwriting === A common method used to counter data remanence is to overwrite the storage media with new data. This is often called wiping or shredding a disk or file, by analogy to common methods of destroying print media, although the mechanism bears no similarity to these. Because such a method can often be implemented in software alone, and may be able to selectively target only part of the media, it is a popular, low-cost option for some applications. Overwriting is generally an acceptable method of clearing, as long as the media is writable and not damaged. The simplest overwrite technique writes the same data everywhere—often just a pattern of all zeros. At a minimum, this will prevent the data from being retrieved simply by reading from the media again using standard system functions. The UEFI in modern machines may offer an ATA class disk erase function as well. The ATA-6 standard governs secure erases specifications. Bitlocker is whole disk encryption and illegible without the key. Writing a fresh GPT allows a new file system to be established. Blocks will set empty but LBA read is illegible. New data will be unaffected and work fine. In an attempt to counter more advanced data recovery techniques, specific overwrite patterns and multiple passes have often been prescribed. These may be generic patterns intended to eradicate any trace signatures; an example is the seven-pass pattern 0xF6, 0x00, 0xFF, , 0x00, 0xFF, , sometimes erroneously attributed to US standard DOD 5220.22-M. One challenge with overwriting is that some areas of the disk may be inaccessible, due to media degradation or other errors. Software overwrite may also be problematic in high-security environments, which require stronger controls on data commingling than can be provided by the software in use. The use of advanced storage technologies may also make file-based overwrite ineffective (see the related discussion below under § Complications). There are specialized machines and software that are capable of doing overwriting. The software can sometimes be a standalone operating system specifically designed for data destruction. There are also machines specifically designed to wipe hard drives to the department of defense specifications DOD 5220.22-M. Writing zero to each block on hard disks and SSDs has the advantage of affording the firmware to deploy spare blocks when bad blocks are identified. Bitlocker has the advantage that data is illegible without the key. Seatools and other tools can erase disks with zero which is typical to revive old consumer class disks but they can wipe server disks albeit slowly. Modern 28TB and larger disks have an enormous number of LBA48 blocks. 40TB and 60TB disks will take proportionately longer times to wipe. ==== Feasibility of recovering overwritten data ==== Peter Gutmann investigated data recovery from nominally overwritten media in the mid-1990s. He suggested magnetic force microscopy may be able to recover such data, and developed specific patterns, for specific drive technologies, designed to counter such. These patterns have come to be known as the Gutmann method. Gutmann's belief in the possibility of data recovery is based on many questionable assumptions and factual errors that indicate a low level of understanding of how hard drives work. Daniel Feenberg, an economist at the private National Bureau of Economic Research, claims that the chances of overwritten data being recovered from a modern hard drive amount to "urban legend". He also points to the "18+1⁄2-minute gap" Rose Mary Woods created on a tape of Richard Nixon discussing the Watergate break-in. Erased information in the gap has not been recovered, and Feenberg claims doing so would be an easy task compared to recovery of a modern high density digital signal. As of November 2007, the United States Department of Defense considers overwriting acceptable for clearing magnetic media within the same security area/
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