AI Headshot Magisk Module

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  Computational heuristic intelligence

  Computational heuristic intelligence (CHI) refers to specialized programming techniques in computational intelligence (also called artificial intelligence, or AI). These techniques have the express goal of avoiding complexity issues, also called NP-hard problems, by using human-like techniques. They are best summarized as the use of exemplar-based methods (heuristics), rather than rule-based methods (algorithms). Hence the term is distinct from the more conventional computational algorithmic intelligence, or symbolic AI. An example of a CHI technique is the encoding specificity principle of Tulving and Thompson. In general, CHI principles are problem solving techniques used by people, rather than programmed into machines. It is by drawing attention to this key distinction that the use of this term is justified in a field already replete with confusing neologisms. Note that the legal systems of all modern human societies employ both heuristics (generalisations of cases) from individual trial records as well as legislated statutes (rules) as regulatory guides. Another recent approach to the avoidance of complexity issues is to employ feedback control rather than feedforward modeling as a problem-solving paradigm. This approach has been called computational cybernetics, because (a) the term 'computational' is associated with conventional computer programming techniques which represent a strategic, compiled, or feedforward model of the problem, and (b) the term 'cybernetic' is associated with conventional system operation techniques which represent a tactical, interpreted, or feedback model of the problem. Of course, real programs and real problems both contain both feedforward and feedback components. A real example which illustrates this point is that of human cognition, which clearly involves both perceptual (bottom-up, feedback, sensor-oriented) and conceptual (top-down, feedforward, motor-oriented) information flows and hierarchies. The AI engineer must choose between mathematical and cybernetic problem solution and machine design paradigms. This is not a coding (program language) issue, but relates to understanding the relationship between the declarative and procedural programming paradigms. The vast majority of STEM professionals never get the opportunity to design or implement pure cybernetic solutions. When pushed, most responders will dismiss the importance of any difference by saying that all code can be reduced to a mathematical model anyway. Unfortunately, not only is this belief false, it fails most spectacularly in many AI scenarios. Mathematical models are not time agnostic, but by their very nature are pre-computed, i.e. feedforward. Dyer [2012] and Feldman [2004] have independently investigated the simplest of all somatic governance paradigms, namely control of a simple jointed limb by a single flexor muscle. They found that it is impossible to determine forces from limb positions- therefore, the problem cannot have a pre-computed (feedforward) mathematical solution. Instead, a top-down command bias signal changes the threshold feedback level in the sensorimotor loop, e.g. the loop formed by the afferent and efferent nerves, thus changing the so-called ‘equilibrium point’ of the flexor muscle/ elbow joint system. An overview of the arrangement reveals that global postures and limb position are commanded in feedforward terms, using global displacements (common coding), with the forces needed being computed locally by feedback loops. This method of sensorimotor unit governance, which is based upon what Anatol Feldman calls the ‘equilibrium Point’ theory, is formally equivalent to a servomechanism such as a car's ‘cruise control’.

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  Critical data studies

  Critical data studies is the exploration of and engagement with social, cultural, and ethical challenges that arise when working with big data. It is through various unique perspectives and taking a critical approach that this form of study can be practiced. As its name implies, critical data studies draws heavily on the influence of critical theory, which has a strong focus on addressing the organization of power structures. This idea is then applied to the study of data. Interest in this unique field of critical data studies began in 2011 with scholars danah boyd and Kate Crawford posing various questions for the critical study of big data and recognizing its potential threatening impacts on society and culture. It was not until 2014, and more exploration and conversations, that critical data studies was officially coined by scholars Craig Dalton and Jim Thatcher. They put a large emphasis on understanding the context of big data in order to approach it more critically. Researchers such as David Ribes, Robert Soden, Seyram Avle, Sarah E. Fox, and Phoebe Sengers focus on understanding data as a historical artifact and taking an interdisciplinary approach towards critical data studies. Other key scholars in this discipline include Rob Kitchin and Tracey P. Lauriault who focus on reevaluating data through different spheres. Various critical frameworks that can be applied to analyze big data include Feminist, Anti-Racist, Queer, Indigenous, Decolonial, Anti-Ableist, as well as Symbolic and Synthetic data science. These frameworks help to make sense of the data by addressing power, biases, privacy, consent, and underrepresentation or misrepresentation concerns that exist in data as well as how to approach and analyze this data with a more equitable mindset. == Motivation == In their article in which they coin the term 'critical data studies,' Dalton and Thatcher also provide several justifications as to why data studies is a discipline worthy of a critical approach. First, 'big data' is an important aspect of twenty-first century society, and the analysis of 'big data' allows for a deeper understanding of what is happening and for what reasons. Big data is important to critical data studies because it is the type of data used within this field. Big data does not necessarily refer to a large data set, it can have a data set with millions of rows, but also a data set that just has a wide variety and expansive scope of data with a smaller type of dataset. As well as having whole populations in the data set and not just sample sizes. Furthermore, big data as a technological tool and the information that it yields are not neutral, according to Dalton and Thatcher, making it worthy of critical analysis in order to identify and address its biases. Building off this idea, another justification for a critical approach is that the relationship between big data and society is an important one, and therefore worthy of study. Ribes et. al. argue there is a need for an interdisciplinary understanding of data as a historical artifact as a motivating aspect of critical data studies.The overarching consensus in the Computer-Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) field, is that people should speak for the data, and not let the data speak for itself. The sources of big data and it’s relationship to varied metadata can be a complicated one, which leads to data disorder and a need for an ethical analysis. Additionally, Iliadis and Russo (2016) have called for studying data assemblages. This is to say, data has innate technological, political, social, and economic histories that should be taken into consideration. Kitchin argues data is almost never raw, and it is almost always cooked, meaning that it is always spoken for by the data scientists utilizing it. Thus, Big Data should be open to a variety of perspectives, especially those of cultural and philosophical nature. Further, data contains hidden histories, ideologies, and philosophies. Big data technology can cause significant changes in society's structure and in the everyday lives of people, and, being a product of society, big data technology is worthy of sociological investigation. Moreover, data sets are almost never completely without any influence. Rather, data are shaped by the vision or goals of those gathering the data, and during the data collection process, certain things are quantified, stored, sorted and even discarded by the research team. A critical approach is thus necessary in order to understand and reveal the intent behind the information being presented.One of these critical approaches has been through feminist data studies. This method applies feminist principles to critical studies and data collecting and analysis. The goal of this is to address the power imbalance in data science and society. According to Catherine D’Ignazio and Lauren F. Klein, a power analysis can be performed by examining power, challenging power, evaluating emotion and embodiment, rethinking binaries and hierarchies, embracing pluralism, considering context, and making labor visible. Feminist data studies is part of the movement towards making data to benefit everyone and not to increase existing inequalities. Moreover, data alone cannot speak for themselves; in order to possess any concrete meaning, data must be accompanied by theoretical insight or alternative quantitative or qualitative research measures. Based on different social topics such as anti-racist data studies, critical data studies give a focus on those social issues concerning data. Specifically in anti-racist data studies they use a classification approach to get representation for those within that community. Desmond Upton Patton and others used their own classification system in the communities of Chicago to help target and reduce violence with young teens on twitter. They had students in those communities help them to decipher the terminology and emojis of these teens to target the language used in tweets that followed with violence outside of the computer screens. This is just one real world example of critical data studies and its application. Dalton and Thatcher argue that if one were to only think of data in terms of its exploitative power, there is no possibility of using data for revolutionary, liberatory purposes. Finally, Dalton and Thatcher propose that a critical approach in studying data allows for 'big data' to be combined with older, 'small data,' and thus create more thorough research, opening up more opportunities, questions and topics to be explored. == Issues and concerns for critical data scholars == Data plays a pivotal role in the emerging knowledge economy, driving productivity, competitiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and capital accumulation. The ethical, political, and economic dimensions of data dynamically evolve across space and time, influenced by changing regimes, technologies, and priorities. Technically, the focus lies on handling, storing, and analyzing vast data sets, utilizing machine learning-based data mining and analytics. This technological advancement raises concerns about data quality, encompassing validity, reliability, authenticity, usability, and lineage. The use of data in modern society brings about new ways of understanding and measuring the world, but also brings with it certain concerns or issues. Data scholars attempt to bring some of these issues to light in their quest to be critical of data. Technical and organizational issues could include the scope of the data set, meaning there is too little or too much data to work with, leading to inaccurate results. It becomes crucial for critical data scholars to carefully consider the adequacy of data volume for their analyses. The quality of the data itself is another facet of concern. The data itself could be of poor quality, such as an incomplete or messy data set with missing or inaccurate data values. This would lead researchers to have to make edits and assumptions about the data itself. Addressing these issues often requires scholars to make edits and assumptions about the data to ensure its reliability and relevance. Data scientists could have improper access to the actual data set, limiting their abilities to analyze it. Linnet Taylor explains how gaps in data can arise when people of varying levels of power have certain rights to their data sources. These people in power can control what data is collected, how it is displayed and how it is analyzed. The capabilities of the research team also play a crucial role in the quality of data analytics. The research team may have inadequate skills or organizational capabilities which leads to the actual analytics performed on the dataset to be biased. This can also lead to ecological fallacies, meaning an assumption is made about an individual based on data or results from a larger group of people. These technical and organizational challenges highlight the complexity of working with data and

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  Honey encryption

  Honey encryption is a type of data encryption that "produces a ciphertext, which, when decrypted with an incorrect key as guessed by the attacker, presents a plausible-looking yet incorrect plaintext." == Creators == Ari Juels and Thomas Ristenpart of the University of Wisconsin, the developers of the encryption system, presented a paper on honey encryption at the 2014 Eurocrypt cryptography conference. == Method of protection == A brute-force attack involves repeated decryption with random keys; this is equivalent to picking random plaintexts from the space of all possible plaintexts with a uniform distribution. This is effective because even though the attacker is equally likely to see any given plaintext, most plaintexts are extremely unlikely to be legitimate i.e. the distribution of legitimate plaintexts is non-uniform. Honey encryption defeats such attacks by first transforming the plaintext into a space such that the distribution of legitimate plaintexts is uniform. Thus an attacker guessing keys will see legitimate-looking plaintexts frequently and random-looking plaintexts infrequently. This makes it difficult to determine when the correct key has been guessed. In effect, honey encryption "[serves] up fake data in response to every incorrect guess of the password or encryption key." The security of honey encryption relies on the fact that the probability of an attacker judging a plaintext to be legitimate can be calculated (by the encrypting party) at the time of encryption. This makes honey encryption difficult to apply in certain applications e.g. where the space of plaintexts is very large or the distribution of plaintexts is unknown. It also means that honey encryption can be vulnerable to brute-force attacks if this probability is miscalculated. For example, it is vulnerable to known-plaintext attacks: if the attacker has a crib that a plaintext must match to be legitimate, they will be able to brute-force even Honey Encrypted data if the encryption did not take the crib into account. == Example == An encrypted credit card number is susceptible to brute-force attacks because not every string of digits is equally likely. The number of digits can range from 13 to 19, though 16 is the most common. Additionally, it must have a valid IIN and the last digit must match the checksum. An attacker can also take into account the popularity of various services: an IIN from MasterCard is probably more likely than an IIN from Diners Club Carte Blanche. Honey encryption can protect against these attacks by first mapping credit card numbers to a larger space where they match their likelihood of legitimacy. Numbers with invalid IINs and checksums are not mapped at all (i.e. have probability 0 of legitimacy). Numbers from large brands like MasterCard and Visa map to large regions of this space, while less popular brands map to smaller regions, etc. An attacker brute-forcing such an encryption scheme would only see legitimate-looking credit card numbers when they brute-force, and the numbers would appear with the frequency the attacker would expect from the real world. == Application == Juels and Ristenpart aim to use honey encryption to protect data stored on password manager services. Juels stated that "password managers are a tasty target for criminals," and worries that "if criminals get a hold of a large collection of encrypted password vaults they could probably unlock many of them without too much trouble." Hristo Bojinov, CEO and founder of Anfacto, noted that "Honey Encryption could help reduce their vulnerability. But he notes that not every type of data will be easy to protect this way. … Not all authentication or encryption system yield themselves to being honeyed."

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  WYSIWYS

  In cryptography, What You See Is What You Sign (WYSIWYS) is a property of digital signature systems that ensures the semantic content of signed messages can not be changed, either by accident or intent. == Mechanism of WYSIWYS == When digitally signing a document, the integrity of the signature relies not just on the soundness of the digital signature algorithms that are used, but also on the security of the computing platform used to sign the document. The WYSIWYS property of digital signature systems aims to tackle this problem by defining a desirable property that the visual representation of a digital document should be consistent across computing systems, particularly at the points of digital signature and digital signature verification. It is relatively easy to change the interpretation of a digital document by implementing changes on the computer system where the document is being processed, and the greater the semantic distance, the easier it gets. From a semantic perspective this creates uncertainty about what exactly has been signed. WYSIWYS is a property of a digital signature system that ensures that the semantic interpretation of a digitally signed message cannot be changed, either by accident or by intent. This property also ensures that a digital document to be signed can not contain hidden semantic content that can be revealed after the signature has been applied. Though a WYSIWYS implementation is only as secure as the computing platform it is running on, various methods have been proposed to make WYSIWYS more robust. The term WYSIWYS was coined by Peter Landrock and Torben Pedersen to describe some of the principles in delivering secure and legally binding digital signatures for Pan-European projects.

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  Database virtualization

  Database virtualization is the decoupling of the database layer, which lies between the storage and application layers within the application stack. Virtualization of the database layer enables a shift away from the physical, toward the logical or virtual. Virtualization enables compute and storage resources to be pooled and allocated on demand. This enables both the sharing of single server resources for multi-tenancy, as well as the pooling of server resources into a single logical database or cluster. In both cases, database virtualization provides increased flexibility, more granular and efficient allocation of pooled resources, and more scalable computing. == Virtual data partitioning == The act of partitioning data stores as a database grows has been in use for several decades. There are two primary ways that data has been partitioned inside legacy data management systems: Shared-data databases: an architecture that assumes all database cluster nodes share a single partition. Inter-node communications are used to synchronize update activities performed by different nodes on the cluster. Shared-data data management systems are limited to single-digit node clusters. Shared-nothing databases: an architecture in which all data is segregated to internally managed partitions with clear, well-defined data location boundaries. Shared-nothing databases require manual partition management. In virtual partitioning, logical data is abstracted from physical data by autonomously creating and managing large numbers of data partitions (100s to 1000s). Because they are autonomously maintained, the resources required to manage the partitions are minimal. This kind of massive partitioning results in: Partitions that are small, efficiently managed, and load-balanced. Systems that do not require re-partitioning events to define additional partitions, even when the hardware is changed. “Shared-data” and “shared-nothing” architectures allow scalability through multiple data partitions and cross-partition querying and transaction processing without full partition scanning. == Horizontal data partitioning == Partitioning database sources from consumers is a fundamental concept. With greater numbers of database sources, inserting a horizontal data virtualization layer between the sources and consumers helps address this complexity. Rick van der Lans, the author of multiple books on SQL and relational databases, has defined data virtualization as "the process of offering data consumers a data access interface that hides the technical aspects of stored data, such as location, storage structure, API, access language, and storage technology." == Advantages == Added flexibility and agility for existing computing infrastructure. Enhanced database performance. Pooling and sharing computing resources, either splitting them (multi-tenancy) or combining them (clustering). Simplification of administration and management. Increased fault tolerance.

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  Social media newsroom

  A social media newsroom is a company resource, set up to increase the functionality and usability of the traditional online newsroom. Social media newsrooms (SMNs) are intended to encourage dialogue and information sharing. Unlike online newsrooms, content is accessible to more than just journalists, but to all those with whom the company engages such as bloggers, their prospects, customers, business partners and investors. It gives these stakeholders access to news, public relations announcements, images, audio, video and other multimedia files. In addition to posting press releases and corporate news, companies can integrate other social content from sites such as YouTube, Flickr and Slideshow as well as streams from corporate Twitter accounts. Traditional tools for journalists such as corporate fast facts, leadership information, a multimedia library, financial information, awards and other recent media coverage are also included in an SMN. Examples of companies effectively using social media newsrooms include Opel Group, Pressat, First Direct, MyNewsdesk, Scania and Newport Beach.

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  Forking lemma

  The forking lemma is any of a number of related lemmas in cryptography research. The lemma states that if an adversary (typically a probabilistic Turing machine), on inputs drawn from some distribution, produces an output that has some property with non-negligible probability, then with non-negligible probability, if the adversary is re-run on new inputs but with the same random tape, its second output will also have the property. This concept was first used by David Pointcheval and Jacques Stern in "Security proofs for signature schemes," published in the proceedings of Eurocrypt 1996. In their paper, the forking lemma is specified in terms of an adversary that attacks a digital signature scheme instantiated in the random oracle model. They show that if an adversary can forge a signature with non-negligible probability, then there is a non-negligible probability that the same adversary with the same random tape can create a second forgery in an attack with a different random oracle. The forking lemma was later generalized by Mihir Bellare and Gregory Neven. The forking lemma has been used and further generalized to prove the security of a variety of digital signature schemes and other random-oracle based cryptographic constructions. == Statement of the lemma == The generalized version of the lemma is stated as follows. Let A be a probabilistic algorithm, with inputs (x, h1, ..., hq; r) that outputs a pair (J, y), where r refers to the random tape of A (that is, the random choices A will make). Suppose further that IG is a probability distribution from which x is drawn, and that H is a set of size h from which each of the hi values are drawn according to the uniform distribution. Let acc be the probability that on inputs distributed as described, the J output by A is greater than or equal to 1. We can then define a "forking algorithm" FA that proceeds as follows, on input x: Pick a random tape r for A. Pick h1, ..., hq uniformly from H. Run A on input (x, h1, ..., hq; r) to produce (J, y). If J = 0, then return (0, 0, 0). Pick h'J, ..., h'q uniformly from H. Run A on input (x, h1, ..., hJ−1, h'J, ..., h'q; r) to produce (J', y'). If J' = J and hJ ≠ h'J then return (1, y, y'), otherwise, return (0, 0, 0). Let frk be the probability that FA outputs a triple starting with 1, given an input x chosen randomly from IG. Then frk ≥ acc ⋅ ( acc q − 1 h ) . {\displaystyle {\text{frk}}\geq {\text{acc}}\cdot \left({\frac {\text{acc}}{q}}-{\frac {1}{h}}\right).} === Intuition === The idea here is to think of A as running two times in related executions, where the process "forks" at a certain point, when some but not all of the input has been examined. In the alternate version, the remaining inputs are re-generated but are generated in the normal way. The point at which the process forks may be something we only want to decide later, possibly based on the behavior of A the first time around: this is why the lemma statement chooses the branching point (J) based on the output of A. The requirement that hJ ≠ h'J is a technical one required by many uses of the lemma. (Note that since both hJ and h'J are chosen randomly from H, then if h is large, as is usually the case, the probability of the two values not being distinct is extremely small.) === Example === For example, let A be an algorithm for breaking a digital signature scheme in the random oracle model. Then x would be the public parameters (including the public key) A is attacking, and hi would be the output of the random oracle on its ith distinct input. The forking lemma is of use when it would be possible, given two different random signatures of the same message, to solve some underlying hard problem. An adversary that forges once, however, gives rise to one that forges twice on the same message with non-negligible probability through the forking lemma. When A attempts to forge on a message m, we consider the output of A to be (J, y) where y is the forgery, and J is such that m was the Jth unique query to the random oracle (it may be assumed that A will query m at some point, if A is to be successful with non-negligible probability). (If A outputs an incorrect forgery, we consider the output to be (0, y).) By the forking lemma, the probability (frk) of obtaining two good forgeries y and y' on the same message but with different random oracle outputs (that is, with hJ ≠ h'J) is non-negligible when acc is also non-negligible. This allows us to prove that if the underlying hard problem is indeed hard, then no adversary can forge signatures. This is the essence of the proof given by Pointcheval and Stern for a modified ElGamal signature scheme against an adaptive adversary. == Known issues with application of forking lemma == The reduction provided by the forking lemma is not tight. Pointcheval and Stern proposed security arguments for Digital Signatures and Blind Signature using Forking Lemma. Claus P. Schnorr provided an attack on blind Schnorr signatures schemes, with more than p o l y l o g ( n ) {\displaystyle polylog(n)} concurrent executions (the case studied and proven secure by Pointcheval and Stern). A polynomial-time attack, for Ω ( n ) {\displaystyle \Omega (n)} concurrent executions, was shown in 2020 by Benhamouda, Lepoint, Raykova, and Orrù. Schnorr also suggested enhancements for securing blind signatures schemes based on discrete logarithm problem.

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  Application delivery network

  An application delivery network (ADN) is a suite of technologies that, when deployed together, provide availability, security, visibility, and acceleration for Internet applications such as websites. ADN components provide supporting functionality that enables website content to be delivered to visitors and other users of that website, in a fast, secure, and reliable way. Gartner defines application delivery networking as the combination of WAN optimization controllers (WOCs) and application delivery controllers (ADCs). At the data center end of an ADN is the ADC, an advanced traffic management device that is often also referred to as a web switch, content switch, or multilayer switch, the purpose of which is to distribute traffic among a number of servers or geographically dislocated sites based on application specific criteria. In the branch office portion of an ADN is the WAN optimization controller, which works to reduce the number of bits that flow over the network using caching and compression, and shapes TCP traffic using prioritization and other optimization techniques. Some WOC components are installed on PCs or mobile clients, and there is typically a portion of the WOC installed in the data center. Application delivery networks are also offered by some CDN vendors. The ADC, one component of an ADN, evolved from layer 4-7 switches in the late 1990s when it became apparent that traditional load balancing techniques were not robust enough to handle the increasingly complex mix of application traffic being delivered over a wider variety of network connectivity options. == Application delivery techniques == The Internet was designed according to the end-to-end principle. This principle keeps the core network relatively simple and moves the intelligence as much as possible to the network end-points: the hosts and clients. An Application Delivery Network (ADN) enhances the delivery of applications across the Internet by employing a number of optimization techniques. Many of these techniques are based on established best-practices employed to efficiently route traffic at the network layer including redundancy and load balancing In theory, an Application Delivery Network (ADN) is closely related to a content delivery network. The difference between the two delivery networks lies in the intelligence of the ADN to understand and optimize applications, usually referred to as application fluency. Application Fluent Network (AFN) is based on the concept of Application Fluency to refer to WAN optimization techniques applied at Layer Four to Layer Seven of the OSI model for networks. Application Fluency implies that the network is fluent or intelligent in understanding and being able to optimize delivery of each application. Application Fluent Network is an addition of SDN capabilities. The acronym 'AFN' is used by Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise to refer to an Application Fluent Network. Application delivery uses one or more layer 4–7 switches, also known as a web switch, content switch, or multilayer switch to intelligently distribute traffic to a pool, also known as a cluster or farm, of servers. The application delivery controller (ADC) is assigned a single virtual IP address (VIP) that represents the pool of servers. Traffic arriving at the ADC is then directed to one of the servers in the pool (cluster, farm) based on a number of factors including application specific data values, application transport protocol, availability of servers, current performance metrics, and client-specific parameters. An ADN provides the advantages of load distribution, increase in capacity of servers, improved scalability, security, and increased reliability through application specific health checks. Increasingly the ADN comprises a redundant pair of ADC on which is integrated a number of different feature sets designed to provide security, availability, reliability, and acceleration functions. In some cases these devices are still separate entities, deployed together as a network of devices through which application traffic is delivered, each providing specific functionality that enhances the delivery of the application. == ADN optimization techniques == === TCP multiplexing === TCP Multiplexing is loosely based on established connection pooling techniques utilized by application server platforms to optimize the execution of database queries from within applications. An ADC establishes a number of connections to the servers in its pool and keeps the connections open. When a request is received by the ADC from the client, the request is evaluated and then directed to a server over an existing connection. This has the effect of reducing the overhead imposed by establishing and tearing down the TCP connection with the server, improving the responsiveness of the application. Some ADN implementations take this technique one step further and also multiplex HTTP and application requests. This has the benefit of executing requests in parallel, which enhances the performance of the application. === TCP optimization === There are a number of Request for Comments (RFCs) which describe mechanisms for improving the performance of TCP. Many ADN implement these RFCs in order to provide enhanced delivery of applications through more efficient use of TCP. The RFCs most commonly implemented are: Delayed Acknowledgements Nagle Algorithm Selective Acknowledgements Explicit Congestion Notification ECN Limited and Fast Retransmits Adaptive Initial Congestion Windows === Data compression and caching === ADNs also provide optimization of application data through caching and compression techniques. There are two types of compression used by ADNs today: industry standard HTTP compression and proprietary data reduction algorithms. It is important to note that the cost in CPU cycles to compress data when traversing a LAN can result in a negative performance impact and therefore best practices are to only utilize compression when delivering applications via a WAN or particularly congested high-speed data link. HTTP compression is asymmetric and transparent to the client. Support for HTTP compression is built into web servers and web browsers. All commercial ADN products currently support HTTP compression. A second compression technique is achieved through data reduction algorithms. Because these algorithms are proprietary and modify the application traffic, they are symmetric and require a device to reassemble the application traffic before the client can receive it. A separate class of devices known as WAN Optimization Controllers (WOC) provide this functionality, but the technology has been slowly added to the ADN portfolio over the past few years as this class of device continues to become more application aware, providing additional features for specific applications such as CIFS and SMB. == ADN reliability and availability techniques == === Advanced health checking === Advanced health checking is the ability of an ADN to determine not only the state of the server on which an application is hosted, but the status of the application it is delivering. Advanced health checking techniques allow the ADC to intelligently determine whether or not the content being returned by the server is correct and should be delivered to the client. This feature enables other reliability features in the ADN, such as resending a request to a different server if the content returned by the original server is found to be erroneous. === Load balancing algorithms === The load balancing algorithms found in today's ADN are far more advanced than the simplistic round-robin and least connections algorithms used in the early 1990s. These algorithms were originally loosely based on operating systems' scheduling algorithms, but have since evolved to factor in conditions peculiar to networking and application environments. It is more accurate to describe today's "load balancing" algorithms as application routing algorithms, as most ADN employ application awareness to determine whether an application is available to respond to a request. This includes the ability of the ADN to determine not only whether the application is available, but whether or not the application can respond to the request within specified parameters, often referred to as a service level agreement. Typical industry standard load balancing algorithms available today include: Round Robin Least Connections Fastest Response Time Weighted Round Robin Weighted Least Connections Custom values assigned to individual servers in a pool based on SNMP or other communication mechanism === Fault tolerance === The ADN provides fault tolerance at the server level, within pools or farms. This is accomplished by designating specific servers as a 'backup' that is activated automatically by the ADN in the event that the primary server(s) in the pool fail. The ADN also ensures application availability and reliability through its ability to seamlessly "failover"

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  Hidden layer

  In artificial neural networks, a hidden layer is a layer of artificial neurons that is neither an input layer nor an output layer. The simplest examples appear in multilayer perceptrons (MLP), as illustrated in the diagram. An MLP without any hidden layer is essentially just a linear model. With hidden layers and activation functions, however, nonlinearity is introduced into the model. In typical machine learning practice, the weights and biases are initialized, then iteratively updated during training via backpropagation.

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  MDS matrix

  An MDS matrix (maximum distance separable) is a matrix representing a function with certain diffusion properties that have useful applications in cryptography. Technically, an m × n {\displaystyle m\times n} matrix A {\displaystyle A} over a finite field K {\displaystyle K} is an MDS matrix if it is the transformation matrix of a linear transformation f ( x ) = A x {\displaystyle f(x)=Ax} from K n {\displaystyle K^{n}} to K m {\displaystyle K^{m}} such that no two different ( m + n ) {\displaystyle (m+n)} -tuples of the form ( x , f ( x ) ) {\displaystyle (x,f(x))} coincide in n {\displaystyle n} or more components. Equivalently, the set of all ( m + n ) {\displaystyle (m+n)} -tuples ( x , f ( x ) ) {\displaystyle (x,f(x))} is an MDS code, i.e., a linear code that reaches the Singleton bound. Let A ~ = ( I n A ) {\displaystyle {\tilde {A}}={\begin{pmatrix}\mathrm {I} _{n}\\\hline \mathrm {A} \end{pmatrix}}} be the matrix obtained by joining the identity matrix I n {\displaystyle \mathrm {I} _{n}} to A {\displaystyle A} . Then a necessary and sufficient condition for a matrix A {\displaystyle A} to be MDS is that every possible n × n {\displaystyle n\times n} submatrix obtained by removing m {\displaystyle m} rows from A ~ {\displaystyle {\tilde {A}}} is non-singular. This is also equivalent to the following: all the sub-determinants of the matrix A {\displaystyle A} are non-zero. Then a binary matrix A {\displaystyle A} (namely over the field with two elements) is never MDS unless it has only one row or only one column with all components 1 {\displaystyle 1} . Reed–Solomon codes have the MDS property and are frequently used to obtain the MDS matrices used in cryptographic algorithms. Serge Vaudenay suggested using MDS matrices in cryptographic primitives to produce what he called multipermutations, not-necessarily linear functions with this same property. These functions have what he called perfect diffusion: changing t {\displaystyle t} of the inputs changes at least m − t + 1 {\displaystyle m-t+1} of the outputs. He showed how to exploit imperfect diffusion to cryptanalyze functions that are not multipermutations. MDS matrices are used for diffusion in such block ciphers as AES, SHARK, Square, Twofish, Anubis, KHAZAD, Manta, Hierocrypt, Kalyna, Camellia and HADESMiMC, and in the stream cipher MUGI and the cryptographic hash function Whirlpool, Poseidon.

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  Strong cryptography

  Strong cryptography or cryptographically strong are general terms used to designate the cryptographic algorithms that, when used correctly, provide a very high (usually insurmountable) level of protection against any eavesdropper, including the government agencies. There is no precise definition of the boundary line between the strong cryptography and (breakable) weak cryptography, as this border constantly shifts due to improvements in hardware and cryptanalysis techniques. These improvements eventually place the capabilities once available only to the NSA within the reach of a skilled individual, so in practice there are only two levels of cryptographic security, "cryptography that will stop your kid sister from reading your files, and cryptography that will stop major governments from reading your files" (Bruce Schneier). The strong cryptography algorithms have high security strength, for practical purposes usually defined as a number of bits in the key. For example, the United States government, when dealing with export control of encryption, considered as of 1999 any implementation of the symmetric encryption algorithm with the key length above 56 bits or its public key equivalent to be strong and thus potentially a subject to the export licensing. To be strong, an algorithm needs to have a sufficiently long key and be free of known mathematical weaknesses, as exploitation of these effectively reduces the key size. At the beginning of the 21st century, the typical security strength of the strong symmetrical encryption algorithms is 128 bits (slightly lower values still can be strong, but usually there is little technical gain in using smaller key sizes). Demonstrating the resistance of any cryptographic scheme to attack is a complex matter, requiring extensive testing and reviews, preferably in a public forum. Good algorithms and protocols are required (similarly, good materials are required to construct a strong building), but good system design and implementation is needed as well: "it is possible to build a cryptographically weak system using strong algorithms and protocols" (just like the use of good materials in construction does not guarantee a solid structure). Many real-life systems turn out to be weak when the strong cryptography is not used properly, for example, random nonces are reused A successful attack might not even involve algorithm at all, for example, if the key is generated from a password, guessing a weak password is easy and does not depend on the strength of the cryptographic primitives. A user can become the weakest link in the overall picture, for example, by sharing passwords and hardware tokens with the colleagues. == Background == The level of expense required for strong cryptography originally restricted its use to the government and military agencies, until the middle of the 20th century the process of encryption required a lot of human labor and errors (preventing the decryption) were very common, so only a small share of written information could have been encrypted. US government, in particular, was able to keep a monopoly on the development and use of cryptography in the US into the 1960s. In the 1970, the increased availability of powerful computers and unclassified research breakthroughs (Data Encryption Standard, the Diffie-Hellman and RSA algorithms) made strong cryptography available for civilian use. Mid-1990s saw the worldwide proliferation of knowledge and tools for strong cryptography. By the 21st century the technical limitations were gone, although the majority of the communication were still unencrypted. At the same the cost of building and running systems with strong cryptography became roughly the same as the one for the weak cryptography. The use of computers changed the process of cryptanalysis, famously with Bletchley Park's Colossus. But just as the development of digital computers and electronics helped in cryptanalysis, it also made possible much more complex ciphers. It is typically the case that use of a quality cipher is very efficient, while breaking it requires an effort many orders of magnitude larger - making cryptanalysis so inefficient and impractical as to be effectively impossible. == Cryptographically strong algorithms == This term "cryptographically strong" is often used to describe an encryption algorithm, and implies, in comparison to some other algorithm (which is thus cryptographically weak), greater resistance to attack. But it can also be used to describe hashing and unique identifier and filename creation algorithms. See for example the description of the Microsoft .NET runtime library function Path.GetRandomFileName. In this usage, the term means "difficult to guess". An encryption algorithm is intended to be unbreakable (in which case it is as strong as it can ever be), but might be breakable (in which case it is as weak as it can ever be) so there is not, in principle, a continuum of strength as the idiom would seem to imply: Algorithm A is stronger than Algorithm B which is stronger than Algorithm C, and so on. The situation is made more complex, and less subsumable into a single strength metric, by the fact that there are many types of cryptanalytic attack and that any given algorithm is likely to force the attacker to do more work to break it when using one attack than another. There is only one known unbreakable cryptographic system, the one-time pad, which is not generally possible to use because of the difficulties involved in exchanging one-time pads without them being compromised. So any encryption algorithm can be compared to the perfect algorithm, the one-time pad. The usual sense in which this term is (loosely) used, is in reference to a particular attack, brute force key search — especially in explanations for newcomers to the field. Indeed, with this attack (always assuming keys to have been randomly chosen), there is a continuum of resistance depending on the length of the key used. But even so there are two major problems: many algorithms allow use of different length keys at different times, and any algorithm can forgo use of the full key length possible. Thus, Blowfish and RC5 are block cipher algorithms whose design specifically allowed for several key lengths, and who cannot therefore be said to have any particular strength with respect to brute force key search. Furthermore, US export regulations restrict key length for exportable cryptographic products and in several cases in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g., famously in the case of Lotus Notes' export approval) only partial keys were used, decreasing 'strength' against brute force attack for those (export) versions. More or less the same thing happened outside the US as well, as for example in the case of more than one of the cryptographic algorithms in the GSM cellular telephone standard. The term is commonly used to convey that some algorithm is suitable for some task in cryptography or information security, but also resists cryptanalysis and has no, or fewer, security weaknesses. Tasks are varied, and might include: generating randomness encrypting data providing a method to ensure data integrity Cryptographically strong would seem to mean that the described method has some kind of maturity, perhaps even approved for use against different kinds of systematic attacks in theory and/or practice. Indeed, that the method may resist those attacks long enough to protect the information carried (and what stands behind the information) for a useful length of time. But due to the complexity and subtlety of the field, neither is almost ever the case. Since such assurances are not actually available in real practice, sleight of hand in language which implies that they are will generally be misleading. There will always be uncertainty as advances (e.g., in cryptanalytic theory or merely affordable computer capacity) may reduce the effort needed to successfully use some attack method against an algorithm. In addition, actual use of cryptographic algorithms requires their encapsulation in a cryptosystem, and doing so often introduces vulnerabilities which are not due to faults in an algorithm. For example, essentially all algorithms require random choice of keys, and any cryptosystem which does not provide such keys will be subject to attack regardless of any attack resistant qualities of the encryption algorithm(s) used. == Legal issues == Widespread use of encryption increases the costs of surveillance, so the government policies aim to regulate the use of the strong cryptography. In the 2000s, the effect of encryption on the surveillance capabilities was limited by the ever-increasing share of communications going through the global social media platforms, that did not use the strong encryption and provided governments with the requested data. Murphy talks about a legislative balance that needs to be struck between the power of the government that are broad enough to be able to follow the qui

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  Philco computers

  Philco was one of the pioneers of transistorized computers, also known as second-generation computers. After the company developed the surface-barrier transistor, which was much faster than previous point-contact types, it was awarded contracts for military and government computers. Commercialized derivatives of some of these designs became successful business and scientific computers. The TRANSAC (Transistor Automatic Computer) Model S-1000 was released as a scientific computer. The TRANSAC S-2000 mainframe computer system was first produced in 1958, and a family of compatible machines, with increasing performance, was released over the next several years. However, the mainframe computer market was dominated by IBM. Other companies could not deploy resources for development, customer support and marketing on the scale that IBM could afford, making competition in this segment difficult after the introduction of the IBM 360 family. Philco went bankrupt and was purchased in 1961 by Ford Motor Company, but the computer division carried on until the Philco division of Ford exited the computer business in 1963. The Ford company maintained one Philco mainframe in use until 1981. == The surface-barrier transistor == The surface-barrier transistor developed by Philco in 1953 had a much higher frequency response than the original point-contact transistors. The transistor was made of a thin crystal of germanium, which was electrolytically etched with pits on either side forming a very thin base region, on the order of 5 micrometers. Philco's process for etching was United States patent number 2,885,571. Philco surface-barrier transistors were used in TX-0, and in early models of what would become the DEC PDP product line. Although relatively fast, the small size of the devices limited their power to circuits operating at a few tens of milliwatts. == Military and government == Between 1955 and 1957, Philco built transistor computers for use in aircraft, models C-1000, C-1100, and C-1102, intended for airborne real-time applications. By 1957, the C-1102 had been used by a civilian sector customer. The BASICPAC AN/TYK 6V (first delivery in 1961), COMPAC AN/TYK 4V (not completed), and LOGICPAC systems were built for the US Army as transportable computer systems for use with their Fieldata concept of integrated information management. BASICPAC was a transistorized computer with up to 28,672 words of 38-bit core memory (including sign and parity), available in several configurations from a minimum system, to a truck-borne mobile version, to a fully expanded system. Basic clock periods was 1 microsecond (which gives a clock rate of 1 MHz), with 12 microsecond memory access and a fixed-point multiplication taking 242 microseconds. Input/output was by paper tape reader and punch, or through a teletypewriter. With additional hardware, magnetic tape storage was also available, with up to seven I/O devices. The instruction set had 31 basic operation codes and nine opcodes for I/O === CXPQ === Philco was contracted by the US Navy to build the CXPQ computer. One model was completed and installed at the David Taylor Model Basin. This design was later adapted to become the commercial TRANSAC S-2000. Only one CXPQ was built. The CXPQ is a 48-bit transistorized computer. === SOLO === In 1955, the National Security Agency through the US Navy contracted with Philco to produce a computer suitable for use as a workstation, with an architecture based on the vacuum-tube computer system called Atlas II already in use at the NSA, and similar to the commercial UNIVAC 1103. At the time, Philco was the largest producer of surface barrier transistors, which were the only type available with the speed and quantities required for a computer. The SOLO prototype was delivered in 1958, but required extensive debugging at NSA. Difficulties were encountered with core memory and power supplies. SOLO used paper tape and teleprinter machines for input and output. SOLO cost about $1 million US, and contained 8,000 transistors. While the system was extensively used for training, testing, research and development, no additional units were ordered. SOLO was removed from active service in 1963. The design of the SOLO became commercialized as Philco's TRANSAC Model S-1000. == Commercial == === S-1000 === The TRANSAC S-1000 was a scientific computer with a 36-bit word length and 4096 words of core memory. It was packaged in a container about the size of a large office desk, and used only 1.2 kilowatts, much less than vacuum-tube-based computers of similar capacity. In a 1961 survey, about 15 S-1000 computer installations had been identified. It weighed about 1,650 pounds (750 kg). === S-2000 === The TRANSAC S-2000 was a large mainframe system intended for both business and scientific work. It had a 48-bit word length and supported calculations in fixed point, floating point and binary-coded decimal formats. The original S-2000 "TRANSAC" (Transistor Automatic Computer) released in 1958 was later designated Model 210; it was used internally at Philco. Similar to the Control Data Corporation Model 1604, it was a 48-bit fully transistorized computer. Three succeeding models were released in the series, all compatible with the software of the original model. The Model 211 was introduced in 1960, using micro-alloy diffused field-effect transistors, requiring significant redesign of circuits compared to the original. The TRANSAC S-2000/Philco 210/211 weighed about 2,000 pounds (910 kg). By 1964, eighteen Model 210, eighteen Model 211 and seven Model 212 systems had been sold. After Philco was purchased by Ford Motor Company, the Model 212 was introduced in 1962 and released in 1963. It had 65,535 words of 48-bit memory. Initially made with 6-microsecond core memory, it had better performance than the IBM 7094 transistor computer. It was later upgraded in 1964 to 2-microsecond core memory, which gave the machine floating-point performance greater than the IBM 7030 Stretch computer. A Model 213 was announced in 1964 but never built. By that time competition from IBM had made the Philco computer operations no longer profitable for Ford, and the division was closed down. The Model 212 could carry out a floating-point multiplication in 22 microseconds. Each word contained two 24-bit instructions with 16 bits of address information and eight bits for the opcode. There were 225 different valid opcodes in the Model 212; invalid opcodes were detected and halted the machine. The CPU had an accumulator register of 48 bits, three general-purpose registers of 24 bits, and 32 index registers of 15 bits. Main memory size ranged from 4K words to 64K words. Only the first model had a magnetic drum memory; later editions used tape drives. The Model 212 weighed about 6,500 pounds (3.3 short tons; 2.9 t). Software for the S-2000 initially consisted of TAC (Translator-Assembler-Compiler), and ALTAC, a FORTRAN II-like language with some differences from the IBM 704 FORTRAN implementation. A COBOL compiler was also available, targeted at business applications. The Philco 2400 was the input/output system for the S-2000. Operations such as reading cards or printing were carried out through magnetic tapes, thereby offloading the S-2000 from relatively slow input/output processing. The 2400 had a 24-bit word length and could be supplied with 4K to 32K characters (1K to 8K words) of core memory, rated at 3-microsecond cycle time. The instruction set was aimed at character I/O use. The idea of base registers, implemented in Philco computers, influenced the design of IBM/360. The last Philco TRANSAC S-2000 Model 212 was taken out of service in December 1981, after 19 years of service at Ford.

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  Image moment

  In image processing, computer vision and related fields, an image moment is a certain particular weighted average (moment) of the image pixels' intensities, or a function of such moments, usually chosen to have some attractive property or interpretation. Image moments are useful to describe objects after segmentation. Simple properties of the image which are found via image moments include area (or total intensity), its centroid, and information about its orientation. == Raw moments == For a 2D continuous function f(x,y) the moment (sometimes called "raw moment") of order (p + q) is defined as M p q = ∫ − ∞ ∞ ∫ − ∞ ∞ x p y q f ( x , y ) d x d y {\displaystyle M_{pq}=\int \limits _{-\infty }^{\infty }\int \limits _{-\infty }^{\infty }x^{p}y^{q}f(x,y)\,dx\,dy} for p,q = 0,1,2,... Adapting this to scalar (grayscale) image with pixel intensities I(x,y), raw image moments Mij are calculated by M i j = ∑ x ∑ y x i y j I ( x , y ) {\displaystyle M_{ij}=\sum _{x}\sum _{y}x^{i}y^{j}I(x,y)\,\!} In some cases, this may be calculated by considering the image as a probability density function, i.e., by dividing the above by ∑ x ∑ y I ( x , y ) {\displaystyle \sum _{x}\sum _{y}I(x,y)\,\!} A uniqueness theorem states that if f(x,y) is piecewise continuous and has nonzero values only in a finite part of the xy plane, moments of all orders exist, and the moment sequence (Mpq) is uniquely determined by f(x,y). Conversely, (Mpq) uniquely determines f(x,y). In practice, the image is summarized with functions of a few lower order moments. === Examples === Simple image properties derived via raw moments include: Area (for binary images) or sum of grey level (for greytone images): M 00 {\displaystyle M_{00}} Centroid: { x ¯ , y ¯ } = { M 10 M 00 , M 01 M 00 } {\displaystyle \{{\bar {x}},\ {\bar {y}}\}=\left\{{\frac {M_{10}}{M_{00}}},{\frac {M_{01}}{M_{00}}}\right\}} == Central moments == Central moments are defined as μ p q = ∫ − ∞ ∞ ∫ − ∞ ∞ ( x − x ¯ ) p ( y − y ¯ ) q f ( x , y ) d x d y {\displaystyle \mu _{pq}=\int \limits _{-\infty }^{\infty }\int \limits _{-\infty }^{\infty }(x-{\bar {x}})^{p}(y-{\bar {y}})^{q}f(x,y)\,dx\,dy} where x ¯ = M 10 M 00 {\displaystyle {\bar {x}}={\frac {M_{10}}{M_{00}}}} and y ¯ = M 01 M 00 {\displaystyle {\bar {y}}={\frac {M_{01}}{M_{00}}}} are the components of the centroid. If ƒ(x, y) is a digital image, then the previous equation becomes μ p q = ∑ x ∑ y ( x − x ¯ ) p ( y − y ¯ ) q f ( x , y ) {\displaystyle \mu _{pq}=\sum _{x}\sum _{y}(x-{\bar {x}})^{p}(y-{\bar {y}})^{q}f(x,y)} The central moments of order up to 3 are: μ 00 = M 00 , μ 01 = 0 , μ 10 = 0 , μ 11 = M 11 − x ¯ M 01 = M 11 − y ¯ M 10 , μ 20 = M 20 − x ¯ M 10 , μ 02 = M 02 − y ¯ M 01 , μ 21 = M 21 − 2 x ¯ M 11 − y ¯ M 20 + 2 x ¯ 2 M 01 , μ 12 = M 12 − 2 y ¯ M 11 − x ¯ M 02 + 2 y ¯ 2 M 10 , μ 30 = M 30 − 3 x ¯ M 20 + 2 x ¯ 2 M 10 , μ 03 = M 03 − 3 y ¯ M 02 + 2 y ¯ 2 M 01 . {\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}\mu _{00}&=M_{00},&\mu _{01}&=0,\\\mu _{10}&=0,&\mu _{11}&=M_{11}-{\bar {x}}M_{01}=M_{11}-{\bar {y}}M_{10},\\\mu _{20}&=M_{20}-{\bar {x}}M_{10},&\mu _{02}&=M_{02}-{\bar {y}}M_{01},\\\mu _{21}&=M_{21}-2{\bar {x}}M_{11}-{\bar {y}}M_{20}+2{\bar {x}}^{2}M_{01},&\mu _{12}&=M_{12}-2{\bar {y}}M_{11}-{\bar {x}}M_{02}+2{\bar {y}}^{2}M_{10},\\\mu _{30}&=M_{30}-3{\bar {x}}M_{20}+2{\bar {x}}^{2}M_{10},&\mu _{03}&=M_{03}-3{\bar {y}}M_{02}+2{\bar {y}}^{2}M_{01}.\end{aligned}}} It can be shown that: μ p q = ∑ m p ∑ n q ( p m ) ( q n ) ( − x ¯ ) ( p − m ) ( − y ¯ ) ( q − n ) M m n {\displaystyle \mu _{pq}=\sum _{m}^{p}\sum _{n}^{q}{p \choose m}{q \choose n}(-{\bar {x}})^{(p-m)}(-{\bar {y}})^{(q-n)}M_{mn}} Central moments are translational invariant. === Examples === Information about image orientation can be derived by first using the second order central moments to construct a covariance matrix. μ 20 ′ = μ 20 / μ 00 = M 20 / M 00 − x ¯ 2 μ 02 ′ = μ 02 / μ 00 = M 02 / M 00 − y ¯ 2 μ 11 ′ = μ 11 / μ 00 = M 11 / M 00 − x ¯ y ¯ {\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}\mu '_{20}&=\mu _{20}/\mu _{00}=M_{20}/M_{00}-{\bar {x}}^{2}\\\mu '_{02}&=\mu _{02}/\mu _{00}=M_{02}/M_{00}-{\bar {y}}^{2}\\\mu '_{11}&=\mu _{11}/\mu _{00}=M_{11}/M_{00}-{\bar {x}}{\bar {y}}\end{aligned}}} The covariance matrix of the image I ( x , y ) {\displaystyle I(x,y)} is now cov ⁡ [ I ( x , y ) ] = [ μ 20 ′ μ 11 ′ μ 11 ′ μ 02 ′ ] . {\displaystyle \operatorname {cov} [I(x,y)]={\begin{bmatrix}\mu '_{20}&\mu '_{11}\\\mu '_{11}&\mu '_{02}\end{bmatrix}}.} The eigenvectors of this matrix correspond to the major and minor axes of the image intensity, so the orientation can thus be extracted from the angle of the eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue towards the axis closest to this eigenvector. It can be shown that this angle Θ is given by the following formula: Θ = 1 2 arctan ⁡ ( 2 μ 11 ′ μ 20 ′ − μ 02 ′ ) {\displaystyle \Theta ={\frac {1}{2}}\arctan \left({\frac {2\mu '_{11}}{\mu '_{20}-\mu '_{02}}}\right)} The above formula holds as long as: μ 20 ′ − μ 02 ′ ≠ 0 {\displaystyle \mu '_{20}-\mu '_{02}\neq 0} The eigenvalues of the covariance matrix can easily be shown to be λ i = μ 20 ′ + μ 02 ′ 2 ± 4 μ ′ 11 2 + ( μ ′ 20 − μ ′ 02 ) 2 2 , {\displaystyle \lambda _{i}={\frac {\mu '_{20}+\mu '_{02}}{2}}\pm {\frac {\sqrt {4{\mu '}_{11}^{2}+({\mu '}_{20}-{\mu '}_{02})^{2}}}{2}},} and are proportional to the squared length of the eigenvector axes. The relative difference in magnitude of the eigenvalues are thus an indication of the eccentricity of the image, or how elongated it is. The eccentricity is 1 − λ 2 λ 1 . {\displaystyle {\sqrt {1-{\frac {\lambda _{2}}{\lambda _{1}}}}}.} == Moment invariants == Moments are well-known for their application in image analysis, since they can be used to derive invariants with respect to specific transformation classes. The term invariant moments is often abused in this context. However, while moment invariants are invariants that are formed from moments, the only moments that are invariants themselves are the central moments. Note that the invariants detailed below are exactly invariant only in the continuous domain. In a discrete domain, neither scaling nor rotation are well defined: a discrete image transformed in such a way is generally an approximation, and the transformation is not reversible. These invariants therefore are only approximately invariant when describing a shape in a discrete image. === Translation invariants === The central moments μi j of any order are, by construction, invariant with respect to translations. === Scale invariants === Invariants ηi j with respect to both translation and scale can be constructed from central moments by dividing through a properly scaled zero-th central moment: η i j = μ i j μ 00 ( 1 + i + j 2 ) {\displaystyle \eta _{ij}={\frac {\mu _{ij}}{\mu _{00}^{\left(1+{\frac {i+j}{2}}\right)}}}\,\!} where i + j ≥ 2. Note that translational invariance directly follows by only using central moments. === Rotation invariants === As shown in the work of Hu, invariants with respect to translation, scale, and rotation can be constructed: I 1 = η 20 + η 02 {\displaystyle I_{1}=\eta _{20}+\eta _{02}} I 2 = ( η 20 − η 02 ) 2 + 4 η 11 2 {\displaystyle I_{2}=(\eta _{20}-\eta _{02})^{2}+4\eta _{11}^{2}} I 3 = ( η 30 − 3 η 12 ) 2 + ( 3 η 21 − η 03 ) 2 {\displaystyle I_{3}=(\eta _{30}-3\eta _{12})^{2}+(3\eta _{21}-\eta _{03})^{2}} I 4 = ( η 30 + η 12 ) 2 + ( η 21 + η 03 ) 2 {\displaystyle I_{4}=(\eta _{30}+\eta _{12})^{2}+(\eta _{21}+\eta _{03})^{2}} I 5 = ( η 30 − 3 η 12 ) ( η 30 + η 12 ) [ ( η 30 + η 12 ) 2 − 3 ( η 21 + η 03 ) 2 ] + ( 3 η 21 − η 03 ) ( η 21 + η 03 ) [ 3 ( η 30 + η 12 ) 2 − ( η 21 + η 03 ) 2 ] {\displaystyle I_{5}=(\eta _{30}-3\eta _{12})(\eta _{30}+\eta _{12})[(\eta _{30}+\eta _{12})^{2}-3(\eta _{21}+\eta _{03})^{2}]+(3\eta _{21}-\eta _{03})(\eta _{21}+\eta _{03})[3(\eta _{30}+\eta _{12})^{2}-(\eta _{21}+\eta _{03})^{2}]} I 6 = ( η 20 − η 02 ) [ ( η 30 + η 12 ) 2 − ( η 21 + η 03 ) 2 ] + 4 η 11 ( η 30 + η 12 ) ( η 21 + η 03 ) {\displaystyle I_{6}=(\eta _{20}-\eta _{02})[(\eta _{30}+\eta _{12})^{2}-(\eta _{21}+\eta _{03})^{2}]+4\eta _{11}(\eta _{30}+\eta _{12})(\eta _{21}+\eta _{03})} I 7 = ( 3 η 21 − η 03 ) ( η 30 + η 12 ) [ ( η 30 + η 12 ) 2 − 3 ( η 21 + η 03 ) 2 ] − ( η 30 − 3 η 12 ) ( η 21 + η 03 ) [ 3 ( η 30 + η 12 ) 2 − ( η 21 + η 03 ) 2 ] . {\displaystyle I_{7}=(3\eta _{21}-\eta _{03})(\eta _{30}+\eta _{12})[(\eta _{30}+\eta _{12})^{2}-3(\eta _{21}+\eta _{03})^{2}]-(\eta _{30}-3\eta _{12})(\eta _{21}+\eta _{03})[3(\eta _{30}+\eta _{12})^{2}-(\eta _{21}+\eta _{03})^{2}].} These are well-known as Hu moment invariants. The first one, I1, is analogous to the moment of inertia around the image's centroid, where the pixels' intensities are analogous to physical density. The first six, I1 ... I6, are reflection symmetric, i.e. they are unchanged if the image is changed to a mirror image. The last one, I7, is reflection antisymmetric (changes sign under reflection), which enables it to distinguish mirror images of otherwise identical im

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  Back-Up Interceptor Control

  Backup Interceptor Control (BUIC, ) was the Electronic Systems Division 416M System to backup the SAGE 416L System in the United States and Canada. BUIC deployed Cold War command, control, and coordination systems to SAGE radar stations to create dispersed NORAD Control Centers. == Background == Prior to the SAGE Direction Centers becoming operational, the USAF deployed data link systems at NORAD Control Centers with ground computers for controlling crewed interceptors. After SAGE IBM AN/FSQ-7 Combat Direction Centrals became operational and the Super Combat Centers with improved (digital) computers were cancelled, a backup to SAGE was planned in the event the above-ground SAGE Air Defense Direction Center failed. == General Electric AN/GPA-37 Course Directing Group == BUIC began with deployment of General Electric AN/GPA-37 Course Directing Groups to several Long Range Radar stations. Units designated included the "U.S. Air Force 858th Air Defense Group (BUIC) [which became] a permanent operating facility" at Naval Air Station Fallon in Nevada. == BUIC II == BUIC II was used to command and control sites using the Burroughs AN/GSA-51 Radar Course Directing Group. North Truro AFS became the first ADC installation configured for BUIC II. == BUIC III == The AN/GYK-19 (initially AN/GSA-51A) was an upgraded version of the BUIC II system designated AN/GSA-51A and required a larger building than the AN/GSA-51. The first BUIC III site was Fort Fisher AFS, and Air Defense Command's was first installed at Fort Fisher Air Force Station, North Carolina. Although more advanced systems were contemplated, the final design of the BUIC III system was an upgraded version of the BUIC II with around twice the performance. == Closure and upgrade == In 1972, the USAF decided to shut down most of the BUIC sites; most of the sites mothballed by 1974, except for the BUIC III site at Tyndall Air Force Base. In Canada the BUIC site at Senneterre was shut down, but St Margarets remained open. The remaining sites were closed between 1983-1984 when SAGE was replaced by the Joint Surveillance System. The AN/FYQ-47 Common Digitizer for the Joint Surveillance System, and the Radar Video Data Processor (RVDP) was a combined system for the Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), it replaced the SAGE Burroughs AN/FST-2 Coordinate Data Transmitting Sets.

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  Hybrid cryptosystem

  In cryptography, a hybrid cryptosystem is one which combines the convenience of a public-key cryptosystem with the efficiency of a symmetric-key cryptosystem. Public-key cryptosystems are convenient in that they do not require the sender and receiver to share a common secret in order to communicate securely. However, they often rely on complicated mathematical computations and are thus generally much more inefficient than comparable symmetric-key cryptosystems. In many applications, the high cost of encrypting long messages in a public-key cryptosystem can be prohibitive. This is addressed by hybrid systems by using a combination of both. A hybrid cryptosystem can be constructed using any two separate cryptosystems: a key encapsulation mechanism, which is a public-key cryptosystem a data encapsulation scheme, which is a symmetric-key cryptosystem The hybrid cryptosystem is itself a public-key system, whose public and private keys are the same as in the key encapsulation scheme. Note that for very long messages the bulk of the work in encryption/decryption is done by the more efficient symmetric-key scheme, while the inefficient public-key scheme is used only to encrypt/decrypt a short key value. == Implementations and standards == All practical implementations of public key cryptography today employ a hybrid system. Examples include the TLS protocol and the SSH protocol, that use a public-key mechanism for key exchange (such as Diffie-Hellman) and a symmetric-key mechanism for data encapsulation (such as AES). The OpenPGP file format and the PKCS#7 file format are other examples. Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE, published as RFC 9180) is a modern standard for generic hybrid encryption. HPKE is used within multiple IETF protocols, including Messaging Layer Security (MLS), Oblivious DNS over HTTPS, Oblivious HTTP, Privacy Preserving Measurement, and TLS Encrypted Client Hello. Envelope encryption is an example of a usage of hybrid cryptosystems in cloud computing. In a cloud context, hybrid cryptosystems also enable centralized key management. == Example == To encrypt a message addressed to Alice in a hybrid cryptosystem, Bob does the following: Obtains Alice's public key. Generates a fresh symmetric key for the data encapsulation scheme. Encrypts the message under the data encapsulation scheme, using the symmetric key just generated. Encrypts the symmetric key under the key encapsulation scheme, using Alice's public key. Sends both of these ciphertexts to Alice. To decrypt this hybrid ciphertext, Alice does the following: Uses her private key to decrypt the symmetric key contained in the key encapsulation segment. Uses this symmetric key to decrypt the message contained in the data encapsulation segment. == Security == If both the key encapsulation and data encapsulation schemes in a hybrid cryptosystem are secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks, then the hybrid scheme inherits that property as well. However, it is possible to construct a hybrid scheme secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks even if the key encapsulation has a slightly weakened security definition (though the security of the data encapsulation must be slightly stronger). == Envelope encryption == Envelope encryption is term used for encrypting with a hybrid cryptosystem used by all major cloud service providers, often as part of a centralized key management system in cloud computing. Envelope encryption gives names to the keys used in hybrid encryption: Data Encryption Keys (abbreviated DEK, and used to encrypt data) and Key Encryption Keys (abbreviated KEK, and used to encrypt the DEKs). In a cloud environment, encryption with envelope encryption involves generating a DEK locally, encrypting one's data using the DEK, and then issuing a request to wrap (encrypt) the DEK with a KEK stored in a potentially more secure service. Then, this wrapped DEK and encrypted message constitute a ciphertext for the scheme. To decrypt a ciphertext, the wrapped DEK is unwrapped (decrypted) via a call to a service, and then the unwrapped DEK is used to decrypt the encrypted message. In addition to the normal advantages of a hybrid cryptosystem, using asymmetric encryption for the KEK in a cloud context provides easier key management and separation of roles, but can be slower. In cloud systems, such as Google Cloud Platform and Amazon Web Services, a key management system (KMS) can be available as a service. In some cases, the key management system will store keys in hardware security modules, which are hardware systems that protect keys with hardware features like intrusion resistance. This means that KEKs can also be more secure because they are stored on secure specialized hardware. Envelope encryption makes centralized key management easier because a centralized key management system only needs to store KEKs, which occupy less space, and requests to the KMS only involve sending wrapped and unwrapped DEKs, which use less bandwidth than transmitting entire messages. Since one KEK can be used to encrypt many DEKs, this also allows for less storage space to be used in the KMS. This also allows for centralized auditing and access control at one point of access.

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