Software requirements for a system are the description of what the system should do, the service or services that it provides and the constraints on its operation. The IEEE Standard Glossary of Software Engineering Terminology defines a requirement as: A condition or capability needed by a user to solve a problem or achieve an objective A condition or capability that must be met or possessed by a system or system component to satisfy a contract, standard, specification, or other formally imposed document A documented representation of a condition or capability as in 1 or 2 The activities related to working with software requirements can broadly be broken down into elicitation, analysis, specification, and management. Note that the wording Software requirements is additionally used in software release notes to explain, which depending on software packages are required for a certain software to be built/installed/used. == Elicitation == Elicitation is the gathering and discovery of requirements from stakeholders and other sources. A variety of techniques can be used such as joint application design (JAD) sessions, interviews, document analysis, focus groups, etc. Elicitation is the first step of requirements development. == Analysis == Analysis is the logical breakdown that proceeds from elicitation. Analysis involves reaching a richer and more precise understanding of each requirement and representing sets of requirements in multiple, complementary ways. Requirements Triage or prioritization of requirements is another activity which often follows analysis. This relates to Agile software development in the planning phase, e.g. by Planning poker, however it might not be the same depending on the context and nature of the project and requirements or product/service that is being built. == Specification == Specification involves representing and storing the collected requirements knowledge in a persistent and well-organized fashion that facilitates effective communication and change management. Use cases, user stories, functional requirements, and visual analysis models are popular choices for requirements specification. == Validation == Validation involves techniques to confirm that the correct set of requirements has been specified to build a solution that satisfies the project's business objectives, and to detect and correct errors in the requirements before implementation. == Management == Requirements change during projects and there are often many of them. Management of this change becomes paramount to ensuring that the correct software is built for the stakeholders. == Tool support for Requirements Engineering == === Tools for Requirements Elicitation, Analysis and Validation === Taking into account that these activities may involve some artifacts such as observation reports (user observation), questionnaires (interviews, surveys and polls), use cases, user stories; activities such as requirement workshops (charrettes), brainstorming, mind mapping, role-playing; and even, prototyping; software products providing some or all of these capabilities can be used to help achieve these tasks. There is at least one author who advocates, explicitly, for mind mapping tools such as FreeMind; and, alternatively, for the use of specification by example tools such as Concordion. Additionally, the ideas and statements resulting from these activities may be gathered and organized with wikis and other collaboration tools such as Trello. The features actually implemented and standards compliance vary from product to product. === Tools for Requirements Specification === A Software requirements specification (SRS) document might be created using general-purpose software like a word processor or one of several specialized tools. Some of these tools can import, edit, export and publish SRS documents. It may help to make SRS documents while following a standardised structure and methodology, such as ISO/IEC/IEEE 29148:2018. Likewise, software may or not use some standard to import or export requirements (such as ReqIF) or not allow these exchanges at all. === Tools for Requirements Document Verification === Tools of this kind verify if there are any errors in a requirements document according to some expected structure or standard. === Tools for Requirements Comparison === Tools of this kind compare two requirement sets according to some expected document structure and standard. === Tools for Requirements Merge and Update === Tools of this kind allow the merging and update of requirement documents. === Tools for Requirements Traceability === Tools of this kind allow tracing requirements to other artifacts such as models and source code (forward traceability) or, to previous ones such as business rules and constraints (backwards traceability). === Tools for Model-Based Software or Systems Requirement Engineering === Model-based systems engineering (MBSE) is the formalised application of modelling to support system requirements, design, analysis, verification and validation activities beginning in the conceptual design phase and continuing throughout development and later lifecycle phases. It is also possible to take a model-based approach for some stages of the requirements engineering and, a more traditional one, for others. Very many combinations might be possible. The level of formality and complexity depends on the underlying methodology involved (for instance, i is much more formal than SysML and, even more formal than UML) === Tools for general Requirements Engineering === Tools in this category may provide some mix of the capabilities mentioned previously and others such as requirement configuration management and collaboration. The features actually implemented and standards compliance vary from product to product. There are even more capable or general tools that support other stages and activities. They are classified as ALM tools.
Description logic
Description logics (DL) are a family of formal knowledge representation languages. Many DLs are more expressive than propositional logic but less expressive than first-order logic. In contrast to the latter, the core reasoning problems for DLs are (usually) decidable, and efficient decision procedures have been designed and implemented for these problems. There are general, spatial, temporal, spatiotemporal, and fuzzy description logics, and each description logic features a different balance between expressive power and reasoning complexity by supporting different sets of mathematical constructors. DLs are used in artificial intelligence to describe and reason about the relevant concepts of an application domain (known as terminological knowledge). It is of particular importance in providing a logical formalism for ontologies and the Semantic Web: the Web Ontology Language (OWL) and its profiles are based on DLs. A major area of application of DLs and OWL is in biomedical informatics, where they assist in the codification of biomedical knowledge. DLs and OWL are also applied in other domains, including defense, climate modeling, and large-scale industrial knowledge graphs. == Introduction == A DL models concepts, roles and individuals, and their relationships. The fundamental modeling concept of a DL is the axiom—a logical statement relating roles and/or concepts. This is a key difference from the frames paradigm where a frame specification declares and completely defines a class. == Nomenclature == === Terminology compared to FOL and OWL === The description logic community uses different terminology than the first-order logic (FOL) community for operationally equivalent notions; some examples are given below. The Web Ontology Language (OWL) uses again a different terminology, also given in the table below. === Naming convention === There are many varieties of description logics and there is an informal naming convention, roughly describing the operators allowed. The expressivity is encoded in the label for a logic starting with one of the following basic logics: Followed by any of the following extensions: ==== Exceptions ==== Some canonical DLs that do not exactly fit this convention are: ==== Examples ==== As an example, A L C {\displaystyle {\mathcal {ALC}}} is a centrally important description logic from which comparisons with other varieties can be made. A L C {\displaystyle {\mathcal {ALC}}} is simply A L {\displaystyle {\mathcal {AL}}} with complement of any concept allowed, not just atomic concepts. A L C {\displaystyle {\mathcal {ALC}}} is used instead of the equivalent A L U E {\displaystyle {\mathcal {ALUE}}} . A further example, the description logic S H I Q {\displaystyle {\mathcal {SHIQ}}} is the logic A L C {\displaystyle {\mathcal {ALC}}} plus extended cardinality restrictions, and transitive and inverse roles. The naming conventions aren't purely systematic so that the logic A L C O I N {\displaystyle {\mathcal {ALCOIN}}} might be referred to as A L C N I O {\displaystyle {\mathcal {ALCNIO}}} and other abbreviations are also made where possible. The Protégé ontology editor supports S H O I N ( D ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {SHOIN}}^{\mathcal {(D)}}} . Three major biomedical informatics terminology bases, SNOMED CT, GALEN, and GO, are expressible in E L {\displaystyle {\mathcal {EL}}} (with additional role properties). OWL 2 provides the expressiveness of S R O I Q ( D ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {SROIQ}}^{\mathcal {(D)}}} , OWL-DL is based on S H O I N ( D ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {SHOIN}}^{\mathcal {(D)}}} , and for OWL-Lite it is S H I F ( D ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {SHIF}}^{\mathcal {(D)}}} . == History == Description logic was given its current name in the 1980s. Previous to this it was called (chronologically): terminological systems, and concept languages. === Knowledge representation === Frames and semantic networks lack formal (logic-based) semantics. DL was first introduced into knowledge representation (KR) systems to overcome this deficiency. The first DL-based KR system was KL-ONE (by Ronald J. Brachman and Schmolze, 1985). During the '80s other DL-based systems using structural subsumption algorithms were developed including KRYPTON (1983), LOOM (1987), BACK (1988), K-REP (1991) and CLASSIC (1991). This approach featured DL with limited expressiveness but relatively efficient (polynomial time) reasoning. In the early '90s, the introduction of a new tableau based algorithm paradigm allowed efficient reasoning on more expressive DL. DL-based systems using these algorithms — such as KRIS (1991) — show acceptable reasoning performance on typical inference problems even though the worst case complexity is no longer polynomial. From the mid '90s, reasoners were created with good practical performance on very expressive DL with high worst case complexity. Examples from this period include FaCT, RACER (2001), CEL (2005), and KAON 2 (2005). DL reasoners, such as FaCT, FaCT++, RACER, DLP and Pellet, implement the method of analytic tableaux. KAON2 is implemented by algorithms which reduce a SHIQ(D) knowledge base to a disjunctive datalog program. === Semantic web === The DARPA Agent Markup Language (DAML) and Ontology Inference Layer (OIL) ontology languages for the Semantic Web can be viewed as syntactic variants of DL. In particular, the formal semantics and reasoning in OIL use the S H I Q {\displaystyle {\mathcal {SHIQ}}} DL. The DAML+OIL DL was developed as a submission to—and formed the starting point of—the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) Web Ontology Working Group. In 2004, the Web Ontology Working Group completed its work by issuing the OWL recommendation. The design of OWL is based on the S H {\displaystyle {\mathcal {SH}}} family of DL with OWL DL and OWL Lite based on S H O I N ( D ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {SHOIN}}^{\mathcal {(D)}}} and S H I F ( D ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {SHIF}}^{\mathcal {(D)}}} respectively. The W3C OWL Working Group began work in 2007 on a refinement of - and extension to - OWL. In 2009, this was completed by the issuance of the OWL2 recommendation. OWL2 is based on the description logic S R O I Q ( D ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {SROIQ}}^{\mathcal {(D)}}} . Practical experience demonstrated that OWL DL lacked several key features necessary to model complex domains. == Modeling == === TBox vs Abox === In DL, a distinction is drawn between the so-called TBox (terminological box) and the ABox (assertional box). In general, the TBox contains sentences describing concept hierarchies (i.e., relations between concepts) while the ABox contains ground sentences stating where in the hierarchy, individuals belong (i.e., relations between individuals and concepts). For example, the statement: belongs in the TBox, while the statement: belongs in the ABox. Note that the TBox/ABox distinction is not significant, in the same sense that the two "kinds" of sentences are not treated differently in first-order logic (which subsumes most DL). When translated into first-order logic, a subsumption axiom like (1) is simply a conditional restriction to unary predicates (concepts) with only variables appearing in it. Clearly, a sentence of this form is not privileged or special over sentences in which only constants ("grounded" values) appear like (2). === Motivation for having Tbox and Abox === So why was the distinction introduced? The primary reason is that the separation can be useful when describing and formulating decision-procedures for various DL. For example, a reasoner might process the TBox and ABox separately, in part because certain key inference problems are tied to one but not the other one ('classification' is related to the TBox, 'instance checking' to the ABox). Another example is that the complexity of the TBox can greatly affect the performance of a given decision-procedure for a certain DL, independently of the ABox. Thus, it is useful to have a way to talk about that specific part of the knowledge base. The secondary reason is that the distinction can make sense from the knowledge base modeler's perspective. It is plausible to distinguish between our conception of terms/concepts in the world (class axioms in the TBox) and particular manifestations of those terms/concepts (instance assertions in the ABox). In the above example: when the hierarchy within a company is the same in every branch but the assignment to employees is different in every department (because there are other people working there), it makes sense to reuse the TBox for different branches that do not use the same ABox. There are two features of description logic that are not shared by most other data description formalisms: DL does not make the unique name assumption (UNA) or the closed-world assumption (CWA). Not having UNA means that two concepts with different names may be allowed by some inference to be shown to be equivalent. Not having CWA, or rather having the open world assumption (OWA) means that
Adversarial machine learning
Adversarial machine learning is the study of the attacks on machine learning algorithms, and of the defenses against such attacks. Machine learning techniques are mostly designed to work on specific problem sets, under the assumption that the training and test data are generated from the same statistical distribution (IID). However, this assumption is often violated in practical high-stake applications, where users may intentionally supply fabricated data that violates the statistical assumption. Most common attacks in adversarial machine learning include evasion attacks, data poisoning attacks, Byzantine attacks and model extraction. == History == At the MIT Spam Conference in January 2004, John Graham-Cumming showed that a machine-learning spam filter could be used to defeat another machine-learning spam filter by automatically learning which words to add to a spam email to get the email classified as not spam. In 2004, Nilesh Dalvi and others noted that linear classifiers used in spam filters could be defeated by simple "evasion attacks" as spammers inserted "good words" into their spam emails. (Around 2007, some spammers added random noise to fuzz words within "image spam" in order to defeat OCR-based filters.) In 2006, Marco Barreno and others published "Can Machine Learning Be Secure?", outlining a broad taxonomy of attacks. As late as 2013 many researchers continued to hope that non-linear classifiers (such as support vector machines and neural networks) might be robust to adversaries, until Battista Biggio and others demonstrated the first gradient-based attacks on such machine-learning models (2012–2013). In 2012, deep neural networks began to dominate computer vision problems; starting in 2014, Christian Szegedy and others demonstrated that deep neural networks could be fooled by adversaries, again using a gradient-based attack to craft adversarial perturbations. Further work would show that adversarial attacks are harder to produce in uncontrolled environments, due to the different environmental constraints that cancel out the effect of noise. For example, any small rotation or slight illumination on an adversarial image can destroy the adversariality. In addition, researchers such as Google Brain's Nick Frosst point out that it is much easier to make self-driving cars miss stop signs by physically removing the sign itself, rather than creating adversarial examples. Frosst also believes that the adversarial machine learning community incorrectly assumes models trained on a certain data distribution will also perform well on a completely different data distribution. He suggests that a new approach to machine learning should be explored, and is currently working on a unique neural network that has characteristics more similar to human perception than state-of-the-art approaches. While adversarial machine learning continues to be heavily rooted in academia, large tech companies such as Google, Microsoft, and IBM have begun curating documentation and open source code bases to allow others to concretely assess the robustness of machine learning models and minimize the risk of adversarial attacks. === Examples === Examples include attacks in spam filtering, where spam messages are obfuscated through the misspelling of "bad" words or the insertion of "good" words; attacks in computer security, such as obfuscating malware code within network packets or modifying the characteristics of a network flow to mislead intrusion detection; attacks in biometric recognition where fake biometric traits may be exploited to impersonate a legitimate user; or to compromise users' template galleries that adapt to updated traits over time. Researchers showed that by changing only one-pixel it was possible to fool deep learning algorithms. Others 3-D printed a toy turtle with a texture engineered to make Google's object detection AI classify it as a rifle regardless of the angle from which the turtle was viewed. Creating the turtle required only low-cost commercially available 3-D printing technology. A machine-tweaked image of a dog was shown to look like a cat to both computers and humans. A 2019 study reported that humans can guess how machines will classify adversarial images. Researchers discovered methods for perturbing the appearance of a stop sign such that an autonomous vehicle classified it as a merge or speed limit sign. A data poisoning filter called Nightshade was released in 2023 by researchers at the University of Chicago. It was created for use by visual artists to put on their artwork to corrupt the data set of text-to-image models, which usually scrape their data from the internet without the consent of the image creator. McAfee attacked Tesla's former Mobileye system, fooling it into driving 50 mph over the speed limit, simply by adding a two-inch strip of black tape to a speed limit sign. Adversarial patterns on glasses or clothing designed to deceive facial-recognition systems or license-plate readers, have led to a niche industry of "stealth streetwear". An adversarial attack on a neural network can allow an attacker to inject algorithms into the target system. Researchers can also create adversarial audio inputs to disguise commands to intelligent assistants in benign-seeming audio; a parallel literature explores human perception of such stimuli. Clustering algorithms are used in security applications. Malware and computer virus analysis aims to identify malware families, and to generate specific detection signatures. In the context of malware detection, researchers have proposed methods for adversarial malware generation that automatically craft binaries to evade learning-based detectors while preserving malicious functionality. Optimization-based attacks such as GAMMA use genetic algorithms to inject benign content (for example, padding or new PE sections) into Windows executables, framing evasion as a constrained optimization problem that balances misclassification success with the size of the injected payload and showing transferability to commercial antivirus products. Complementary work uses generative adversarial networks (GANs) to learn feature-space perturbations that cause malware to be classified as benign; Mal-LSGAN, for instance, replaces the standard GAN loss with a least-squares objective and modified activation functions to improve training stability and produce adversarial malware examples that substantially reduce true positive rates across multiple detectors. == Challenges in applying machine learning to security == Researchers have observed that the constraints under which machine-learning techniques function in the security domain are different from those of common benchmark domains. Security data may change over time, include mislabeled samples, or reflect adversarial behavior, which complicates evaluation and reproducibility. === Data collection issues === Security datasets vary across formats, including binaries, network traces, and log files. Studies have reported that the process of converting these sources into features can introduce bias or inconsistencies. In addition, time-based leakage can occur when related malware samples are not properly separated across training and testing splits, which may lead to overly optimistic results. === Labeling and ground truth challenges === Malware labels are often unstable because different antivirus engines may classify the same sample in conflicting ways. Ceschin et al. note that families may be renamed or reorganized over time, causing further discrepancies in ground truth and reducing the reliability of benchmarks. === Concept drift === Because malware creators continuously adapt their techniques, the statistical properties of malicious samples also change. This form of concept drift has been widely documented and may reduce model performance unless systems are updated regularly or incorporate mechanisms for incremental learning. === Feature robustness === Researchers differentiate between features that can be easily manipulated and those that are more resistant to modification. For example, simple static attributes, such as header fields, may be altered by attackers, while structural features, such as control-flow graphs, are generally more stable but computationally expensive to extract. === Class imbalance === In realistic deployment environments, the proportion of malicious samples can be extremely low, ranging from 0.01% to 2% of total data. This unbalanced distribution causes models to develop a bias towards the majority class, achieving high accuracy but failing to identify malicious samples. Prior approaches to this problem have included both data-level solutions and sequence-specific models. Methods like n-gram and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) networks can model sequential data, but their performance has been shown to decline significantly when malware samples are realistically proportioned in the training set, demonstrating the limitations in
Neurocomputing (journal)
Neurocomputing is a peer-reviewed scientific journal covering research on artificial intelligence, machine learning, and neural computation. It was established in 1989 and is published by Elsevier. The editor-in-chief is Zidong Wang (Brunel University London). Independent scientometric studies noted that despite being one of the most productive journals in the field, it has kept its reputation across the years intact and plays an important role in leading the research in the area. The journal is abstracted and indexed in Scopus and Science Citation Index Expanded. According to the Journal Citation Reports, its 2023 impact factor is 5.5.
Pedagogical agent
A pedagogical agent is a concept borrowed from computer science and artificial intelligence and applied to education, usually as part of an intelligent tutoring system (ITS). It is a simulated human-like interface between the learner and the content, in an educational environment. A pedagogical agent is designed to model the type of interactions between a student and another person. Mabanza and de Wet define it as "a character enacted by a computer that interacts with the user in a socially engaging manner". A pedagogical agent can be assigned different roles in the learning environment, such as tutor or co-learner, depending on the desired purpose of the agent. "A tutor agent plays the role of a teacher, while a co-learner agent plays the role of a learning companion". == History == The history of Pedagogical Agents is closely aligned with the history of computer animation. As computer animation progressed, it was adopted by educators to enhance computerized learning by including a lifelike interface between the program and the learner. The first versions of a pedagogical agent were more cartoon than person, like Microsoft's Clippy which helped users of Microsoft Office load and use the program's features in 1997. However, with developments in computer animation, pedagogical agents can now look lifelike. By 2006 there was a call to develop modular, reusable agents to decrease the time and expertise required to create a pedagogical agent. There was also a call in 2009 to enact agent standards. The standardization and re-usability of pedagogical agents is less of an issue since the decrease in cost and widespread availability of animation tools. Individualized pedagogical agents can be found across disciplines including medicine, math, law, language learning, automotive, and armed forces. They are used in applications directed to every age, from preschool to adult. == Learning theories related to pedagogical agent design == === Distributed cognition theory === Distributed cognition theory is the method in which cognition progresses in the context of collaboration with others. Pedagogical agents can be designed to assist the cognitive transfer to the learner, operating as artifacts or partners with collaborative role in learning. To support the performance of an action by the user, the pedagogical agent can act as a cognitive tool as long as the agent is equipped with the knowledge that the user lacks. The interactions between the user and the pedagogical agent can facilitate a social relationship. The pedagogical agent may fulfill the role of a working partner. === Socio-cultural learning theory === Socio-cultural learning theory is how the user develops when they are involved in learning activities in which there is interaction with other agents. A pedagogical agent can: intervene when the user requests, provide support for tasks that the user cannot address, and potentially extend the learners cognitive reach. Interaction with the pedagogical agent may elicit a variety of emotions from the learner. The learner may become excited, confused, frustrated, and/or discouraged. These emotions affect the learners' motivation. === Extraneous Cognitive Load === Extraneous cognitive load is the extra effort being exerted by an individual's working memory due to the way information is being presented. A pedagogical agent can increase the user's cognitive load by distracting them and becoming the focus of their attention, causing split attention between the instructional material and the agent. Agents can reduce the perceived cognitive load by providing narration and personalization that can also promote a user's interest and motivation. While research on the reduction of cognitive load from pedagogical agents is minimal, more studies have shown that agents do not increase it. == Effectiveness == It has been suggested by researchers that pedagogical agents may take on different roles in the learning environment. Examples of these roles are: supplanting, scaffolding, coaching, testing, or demonstrating or modelling a procedure. A pedagogical agent as a tutor has not been demonstrated to add any benefit to an educational strategy in equivalent lessons with and without a pedagogical agent. According to Richard Mayer, there is some support in research for pedagogical agent increasing learning, but only as a presenter of social cues. A co-learner pedagogical agent is believed to increase the student's self-efficacy. By pointing out important features of instructional content, a pedagogical agent can fulfill the signaling function, which research on multimedia learning has shown to enhance learning. Research has demonstrated that human-human interaction may not be completely replaced by pedagogical agents, but learners may prefer the agents to non-agent multimedia systems. This finding is supported by social agency theory. Much like the varying effectiveness of the pedagogical agent roles in the learning environment, agents that take into account the user's affect have had mixed results. Research has shown pedagogical agents that make use of the users’ affect have been found to increase user knowledge retention, motivation, and perceived self-efficacy. However, with such a broad range of modalities in affective expressions, it is often difficult to utilize them. Additionally, having agents detect a user's affective state with precision remains challenging, as displays of affect are different across individuals. == Design == === Attractiveness === The appearance of a pedagogical agent can be manipulated to meet the learning requirements. The attractiveness of a pedagogical agent can enhance student's learning when the users were the opposite gender of the pedagogical agent. Male students prefer a sexy appearance of a female pedagogical agents and dislike the sexy appearance of male agents. Female students were not attracted by the sexy appearance of either male or female pedagogical agents. === Affective Response === Pedagogical agents have reached a point where they can convey and elicit emotion, but also reason about and respond to it. These agents are often designed to elicit and respond to affective actions from users through various modalities such as speech, facial expressions, and body gestures. They respond to the affective state of the given user, and make use of these modalities using a wide array of sensors incorporated into the design of the agent. Specifically in education and training applications, pedagogical agents are often designed to increasingly recognize when users or learners exhibit frustration, boredom, confusion, and states of flow. The added recognition in these agents is a step toward making them more emotionally intelligent, comforting and motivating the users as they interact. === Digital Representation === The design of a pedagogical agent often begins with its digital representation, whether it will be 2D or 3D and static or animated. Several studies have developed pedagogical agents that were both static and animated, then evaluated the relative benefits. Similar to other design considerations, the improved learning from static or animated agents remains questionable. One study showed that the appearance of an agent portrayed using a static image can impact a user's recall, based on the visual appearance. Other research found results that suggest static agent images improve learning outcomes. However, several other studies found user's learned more when the pedagogical agent was animated rather than static. Recently a meta-analysis of such research found a negligible improvement in learning via pedagogical agents, suggesting more work needs to be done in the area to support any claims.
Army Chief Information Officer/G-6
In September 2020, the Army realigned the previously consolidated CIO/G-6 function into two separate roles, Office of the Chief Information Officer and Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6, that report to the secretary of the Army and chief of staff of the Army, respectively. The realignment came after several months of planning and coordination. Lt. Gen. John Morrison was nominated to the Senate for promotion and assignment as the G-6 and confirmed, assuming that position in August 2020. Subsequently, the Secretary of the Army, Ryan McCarthy appointed Dr. Raj G. Iyer as the first civilian Chief Information Officer, a career Senior Executive Service position in November 2020. == G-6 == Advise chief of staff of the Army and the Chief Information Officer on planning, fielding, and execution of C4IT worldwide Army operations Develop and execute the plan for the Unified Network Implement Army information assurance Supervise C4IT, Signal support, Information security, Force structure and equipping activities in support of warfighting operations Oversee management of the Signal forces == Planned realignment == On June 11, 2020, the Army announced that the two roles of CIO and Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6 (DCS, G-6) would be realigned no later than August 31, 2020, with separate individuals responsible for each position. With the realignment: CIO core functions will be policy, governance, and oversight. Focus areas include: Information Environment, Cybersecurity, Enterprise Architecture, and Data Policy/Oversight/Governance, Enterprise Architecture, Enterprise Cloud Management and IT Spend/Category Management. DCS, G-6 core functions will be planning, strategy, and implementation. Focus areas include: Information Environment/Network, Planning and Integration, Theater Synchronization, Architecture Integration, Enterprise Information Environment (EIE) Mission Area Portfolio Management and Mission Decision Packet Management. In order to support multi-domain operations, the Army will have to connect Enterprise networks and tactical networks. —LTG Morrison, DCS, G-6 DCS G-6 released the Army Unified Network Plan under the Army Digital Transformation Strategy, to help the Army to establish a Multi-Domain Operations capable force by 2028. The Unified Network will enable Army formations, as part of the Joint Force, to operate in highly contested and congested operational environments with the speed and global range to achieve decision dominance and maintain overmatch. The plan shapes, synchronizes, integrates and governs Unified Network efforts and aligns the personnel, organizational structure and capabilities required to enable MDO at all echelons. == Chief signal officers and their successors == Chief signal officers (1860–1964) Maj. Albert J. Myer 1860–1863 Lt. Col. William J. L. Nicodemus 1863–1864 Col. Benjamin F. Fisher 1864–1866 Col. Albert J. Myer 1866–1880 (promoted to brigadier general 16 June 1880) Brig. Gen. William B. Hazen 1880–1887 Brig. Gen. Adolphus W. Greely 1887–1906 Brig. Gen. James Allen 1906–1913 Brig. Gen. George P. Scriven 1913–1917 Brig. Gen. George O. Squier 1917–1923 (promoted to major general 6 October 1917) Maj. Gen. Charles McK. Saltzman 1924–1928 Maj. Gen. George Sabin Gibbs 1928–1931 Maj. Gen. Irving J. Carr 1931–1934 Maj. Gen. James B. Allison 1935–1937 Maj. Gen. Joseph O. Mauborgne 1937–1941 Maj. Gen. Dawson Olmstead 1941–1943 Maj. Gen. Harry C. Ingles 1943–1947 Maj. Gen. Spencer B. Akin 1947–1951 Maj. Gen. George I. Back 1951–1955 Lt. Gen. James D. O’Connell 1955–1959 Maj. Gen. Ralph T. Nelson 1959–1962 Maj. Gen. Earle F. Cook 1962–1963 Maj. Gen. David Parker Gibbs 1963–1964 Chiefs of communications-electronics (1964–1967) Maj. Gen. David Parker Gibbs 1964–1966 Maj. Gen. Walter E. Lotz, Jr. 1966–1967 Assistant chiefs of staff for communications-electronics (1967–1974) Maj. Gen. Walter E. Lotz, Jr. 1967–1968 Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett 1968–1972 Lt. Gen. Thomas Rienzi 1972–1974 Directors of telecommunications and command and control (1974–1978) (a directorate of ODCSOPS) Lt. Gen. Thomas Rienzi 1974–1977 Lt. Gen. Charles R. Myer 1977–1978 Assistant chiefs of staff for automation and communications (1978–1981) Lt. Gen. Charles R. Myer 1978–1979 Maj. Gen. Clay T. Buckingham 1979–1981 Assistant deputy chiefs of staff for operations and plans (command, control, communications, and computers) (1981–1984) Maj. Gen. Clay T. Buckingham 1981–1982 Maj. Gen. James M. Rockwell 1982–1984 Assistant chiefs of staff for information management (1984–1987) Lt. Gen. David K. Doyle 1984–1986 Lt. Gen. Thurman D. Rodgers 1986–1987 Directors of information systems for command, control, communications, and computers Lt. Gen. Thurman D. Rodgers 1987–1988 Lt. Gen. Bruce R. Harris 1988–1990 Lt. Gen. Jerome B. Hilmes 1990–1992 Lt. Gen. Peter A. Kind 1992–1994 Lt. Gen. Otto J. Guenther 1995–1997 Lt. Gen. William H. Campbell Chief Information Officer, Military Deputy to the Army Acquisition Executive, and Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications and Computers Lt. Gen. William H. Campbell 1997–2000
Rule induction
Rule induction is an area of machine learning in which formal rules are extracted from a set of observations. The rules extracted may represent a full scientific model of the data, or merely represent local patterns in the data. Data mining in general and rule induction in detail are trying to create algorithms without human programming but with analyzing existing data structures. In the easiest case, a rule is expressed with “if-then statements” and was created with the ID3 algorithm for decision tree learning. Rule learning algorithm are taking training data as input and creating rules by partitioning the table with cluster analysis. A possible alternative over the ID3 algorithm is genetic programming which evolves a program until it fits to the data. Creating different algorithm and testing them with input data can be realized in the WEKA software. Additional tools are machine learning libraries for Python, like scikit-learn. == Paradigms == Some major rule induction paradigms are: Association rule learning algorithms (e.g., Agrawal) Decision rule algorithms (e.g., Quinlan 1987) Hypothesis testing algorithms (e.g., RULEX) Horn clause induction Version spaces Rough set rules Inductive Logic Programming Boolean decomposition (Feldman) == Algorithms == Some rule induction algorithms are: Charade Rulex Progol CN2