Description logics (DL) are a family of formal knowledge representation languages. Many DLs are more expressive than propositional logic but less expressive than first-order logic. In contrast to the latter, the core reasoning problems for DLs are (usually) decidable, and efficient decision procedures have been designed and implemented for these problems. There are general, spatial, temporal, spatiotemporal, and fuzzy description logics, and each description logic features a different balance between expressive power and reasoning complexity by supporting different sets of mathematical constructors. DLs are used in artificial intelligence to describe and reason about the relevant concepts of an application domain (known as terminological knowledge). It is of particular importance in providing a logical formalism for ontologies and the Semantic Web: the Web Ontology Language (OWL) and its profiles are based on DLs. A major area of application of DLs and OWL is in biomedical informatics, where they assist in the codification of biomedical knowledge. DLs and OWL are also applied in other domains, including defense, climate modeling, and large-scale industrial knowledge graphs. == Introduction == A DL models concepts, roles and individuals, and their relationships. The fundamental modeling concept of a DL is the axiom—a logical statement relating roles and/or concepts. This is a key difference from the frames paradigm where a frame specification declares and completely defines a class. == Nomenclature == === Terminology compared to FOL and OWL === The description logic community uses different terminology than the first-order logic (FOL) community for operationally equivalent notions; some examples are given below. The Web Ontology Language (OWL) uses again a different terminology, also given in the table below. === Naming convention === There are many varieties of description logics and there is an informal naming convention, roughly describing the operators allowed. The expressivity is encoded in the label for a logic starting with one of the following basic logics: Followed by any of the following extensions: ==== Exceptions ==== Some canonical DLs that do not exactly fit this convention are: ==== Examples ==== As an example, A L C {\displaystyle {\mathcal {ALC}}} is a centrally important description logic from which comparisons with other varieties can be made. A L C {\displaystyle {\mathcal {ALC}}} is simply A L {\displaystyle {\mathcal {AL}}} with complement of any concept allowed, not just atomic concepts. A L C {\displaystyle {\mathcal {ALC}}} is used instead of the equivalent A L U E {\displaystyle {\mathcal {ALUE}}} . A further example, the description logic S H I Q {\displaystyle {\mathcal {SHIQ}}} is the logic A L C {\displaystyle {\mathcal {ALC}}} plus extended cardinality restrictions, and transitive and inverse roles. The naming conventions aren't purely systematic so that the logic A L C O I N {\displaystyle {\mathcal {ALCOIN}}} might be referred to as A L C N I O {\displaystyle {\mathcal {ALCNIO}}} and other abbreviations are also made where possible. The Protégé ontology editor supports S H O I N ( D ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {SHOIN}}^{\mathcal {(D)}}} . Three major biomedical informatics terminology bases, SNOMED CT, GALEN, and GO, are expressible in E L {\displaystyle {\mathcal {EL}}} (with additional role properties). OWL 2 provides the expressiveness of S R O I Q ( D ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {SROIQ}}^{\mathcal {(D)}}} , OWL-DL is based on S H O I N ( D ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {SHOIN}}^{\mathcal {(D)}}} , and for OWL-Lite it is S H I F ( D ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {SHIF}}^{\mathcal {(D)}}} . == History == Description logic was given its current name in the 1980s. Previous to this it was called (chronologically): terminological systems, and concept languages. === Knowledge representation === Frames and semantic networks lack formal (logic-based) semantics. DL was first introduced into knowledge representation (KR) systems to overcome this deficiency. The first DL-based KR system was KL-ONE (by Ronald J. Brachman and Schmolze, 1985). During the '80s other DL-based systems using structural subsumption algorithms were developed including KRYPTON (1983), LOOM (1987), BACK (1988), K-REP (1991) and CLASSIC (1991). This approach featured DL with limited expressiveness but relatively efficient (polynomial time) reasoning. In the early '90s, the introduction of a new tableau based algorithm paradigm allowed efficient reasoning on more expressive DL. DL-based systems using these algorithms — such as KRIS (1991) — show acceptable reasoning performance on typical inference problems even though the worst case complexity is no longer polynomial. From the mid '90s, reasoners were created with good practical performance on very expressive DL with high worst case complexity. Examples from this period include FaCT, RACER (2001), CEL (2005), and KAON 2 (2005). DL reasoners, such as FaCT, FaCT++, RACER, DLP and Pellet, implement the method of analytic tableaux. KAON2 is implemented by algorithms which reduce a SHIQ(D) knowledge base to a disjunctive datalog program. === Semantic web === The DARPA Agent Markup Language (DAML) and Ontology Inference Layer (OIL) ontology languages for the Semantic Web can be viewed as syntactic variants of DL. In particular, the formal semantics and reasoning in OIL use the S H I Q {\displaystyle {\mathcal {SHIQ}}} DL. The DAML+OIL DL was developed as a submission to—and formed the starting point of—the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) Web Ontology Working Group. In 2004, the Web Ontology Working Group completed its work by issuing the OWL recommendation. The design of OWL is based on the S H {\displaystyle {\mathcal {SH}}} family of DL with OWL DL and OWL Lite based on S H O I N ( D ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {SHOIN}}^{\mathcal {(D)}}} and S H I F ( D ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {SHIF}}^{\mathcal {(D)}}} respectively. The W3C OWL Working Group began work in 2007 on a refinement of - and extension to - OWL. In 2009, this was completed by the issuance of the OWL2 recommendation. OWL2 is based on the description logic S R O I Q ( D ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {SROIQ}}^{\mathcal {(D)}}} . Practical experience demonstrated that OWL DL lacked several key features necessary to model complex domains. == Modeling == === TBox vs Abox === In DL, a distinction is drawn between the so-called TBox (terminological box) and the ABox (assertional box). In general, the TBox contains sentences describing concept hierarchies (i.e., relations between concepts) while the ABox contains ground sentences stating where in the hierarchy, individuals belong (i.e., relations between individuals and concepts). For example, the statement: belongs in the TBox, while the statement: belongs in the ABox. Note that the TBox/ABox distinction is not significant, in the same sense that the two "kinds" of sentences are not treated differently in first-order logic (which subsumes most DL). When translated into first-order logic, a subsumption axiom like (1) is simply a conditional restriction to unary predicates (concepts) with only variables appearing in it. Clearly, a sentence of this form is not privileged or special over sentences in which only constants ("grounded" values) appear like (2). === Motivation for having Tbox and Abox === So why was the distinction introduced? The primary reason is that the separation can be useful when describing and formulating decision-procedures for various DL. For example, a reasoner might process the TBox and ABox separately, in part because certain key inference problems are tied to one but not the other one ('classification' is related to the TBox, 'instance checking' to the ABox). Another example is that the complexity of the TBox can greatly affect the performance of a given decision-procedure for a certain DL, independently of the ABox. Thus, it is useful to have a way to talk about that specific part of the knowledge base. The secondary reason is that the distinction can make sense from the knowledge base modeler's perspective. It is plausible to distinguish between our conception of terms/concepts in the world (class axioms in the TBox) and particular manifestations of those terms/concepts (instance assertions in the ABox). In the above example: when the hierarchy within a company is the same in every branch but the assignment to employees is different in every department (because there are other people working there), it makes sense to reuse the TBox for different branches that do not use the same ABox. There are two features of description logic that are not shared by most other data description formalisms: DL does not make the unique name assumption (UNA) or the closed-world assumption (CWA). Not having UNA means that two concepts with different names may be allowed by some inference to be shown to be equivalent. Not having CWA, or rather having the open world assumption (OWA) means that
Referring expression generation
Referring expression generation (REG) is the subtask of natural language generation (NLG) that received most scholarly attention. While NLG is concerned with the conversion of non-linguistic information into natural language, REG focuses only on the creation of referring expressions (noun phrases) that identify specific entities called targets. This task can be split into two sections. The content selection part determines which set of properties distinguish the intended target and the linguistic realization part defines how these properties are translated into natural language. A variety of algorithms have been developed in the NLG community to generate different types of referring expressions. == Types of referring expressions == A referring expression (RE), in linguistics, is any noun phrase, or surrogate for a noun phrase, whose function in discourse is to identify some individual object (thing, being, event...) The technical terminology for identify differs a great deal from one school of linguistics to another. The most widespread term is probably refer, and a thing identified is a referent, as for example in the work of John Lyons. In linguistics, the study of reference relations belongs to pragmatics, the study of language use, though it is also a matter of great interest to philosophers, especially those wishing to understand the nature of knowledge, perception and cognition more generally. Various devices can be used for reference: determiners, pronouns, proper names... Reference relations can be of different kinds; referents can be in a "real" or imaginary world, in discourse itself, and they may be singular, plural, or collective. === Pronouns === The simplest type of referring expressions are pronoun such as he and it. The linguistics and natural language processing communities have developed various models for predicting anaphor referents, such as centering theory, and ideally referring-expression generation would be based on such models. However most NLG systems use much simpler algorithms, for example using a pronoun if the referent was mentioned in the previous sentence (or sentential clause), and no other entity of the same gender was mentioned in this sentence. === Definite noun phrases === There has been a considerable amount of research on generating definite noun phrases, such as the big red book. Much of this builds on the model proposed by Dale and Reiter. This has been extended in various ways, for example Krahmer et al. present a graph-theoretic model of definite NP generation with many nice properties. In recent years a shared-task event has compared different algorithms for definite NP generation, using the TUNA corpus. === Spatial and temporal reference === Recently there has been more research on generating referring expressions for time and space. Such references tend to be imprecise (what is the exact meaning of tonight?), and also to be interpreted in different ways by different people. Hence it may be necessary to explicitly reason about false positive vs false negative tradeoffs, and even calculate the utility of different possible referring expressions in a particular task context. === Criteria for good expressions === Ideally, a good referring expression should satisfy a number of criteria: Referential success: It should unambiguously identify the referent to the reader. Ease of comprehension: The reader should be able to quickly read and understand it. Computational complexity: The generation algorithm should be fast No false inferences: The expression should not confuse or mislead the reader by suggesting false implicatures or other pragmatic inferences. For example, a reader may be confused if he is told Sit by the brown wooden table in a context where there is only one table. == History == === Pre-2000 era === REG goes back to the early days of NLG. One of the first approaches was done by Winograd in 1972 who developed an "incremental" REG algorithm for his SHRDLU program. Afterwards researchers started to model the human abilities to create referring expressions in the 1980s. This new approach to the topic was influenced by the researchers Appelt and Kronfeld who created the programs KAMP and BERTRAND and considered referring expressions as parts of bigger speech acts. Some of their most interesting findings were the fact that referring expressions can be used to add information beyond the identification of the referent as well as the influence of communicative context and the Gricean maxims on referring expressions. Furthermore, its skepticism concerning the naturalness of minimal descriptions made Appelt and Kronfeld's research a foundation of later work on REG. The search for simple, well-defined problems changed the direction of research in the early 1990s. This new approach was led by Dale and Reiter who stressed the identification of the referent as the central goal. Like Appelt they discuss the connection between the Gricean maxims and referring expressions in their culminant paper in which they also propose a formal problem definition. Furthermore, Reiter and Dale discuss the Full Brevity and Greedy Heuristics algorithms as well as their Incremental Algorithm(IA) which became one of the most important algorithms in REG. === Later developments === After 2000 the research began to lift some of the simplifying assumptions, that had been made in early REG research in order to create more simple algorithms. Different research groups concentrated on different limitations creating several expanded algorithms. Often these extend the IA in a single perspective for example in relation to: Reference to Sets like "the t-shirt wearers" or "the green apples and the banana on the left" Relational Descriptions like "the cup on the table" or "the woman who has three children" Context Dependency, Vagueness and Gradeability include statements like "the older man" or "the car on the left" which are often unclear without a context Salience and Generation of Pronouns are highly discourse dependent making for example "she" a reference to "the (most salient) female person" Many simplifying assumptions are still in place or have just begun to be worked on. Also a combination of the different extensions has yet to be done and is called a "non-trivial enterprise" by Krahmer and van Deemter. Another important change after 2000 was the increasing use of empirical studies in order to evaluate algorithms. This development took place due to the emergence of transparent corpora. Although there are still discussions about what the best evaluation metrics are, the use of experimental evaluation has already led to a better comparability of algorithms, a discussion about the goals of REG and more task-oriented research. Furthermore, research has extended its range to related topics such as the choice of Knowledge Representation(KR) Frameworks. In this area the main question, which KR framework is most suitable for the use in REG remains open. The answer to this question depends on how well descriptions can be expressed or found. A lot of the potential of KR frameworks has been left unused so far. Some of the different approaches are the usage of: Graph search which treats relations between targets in the same way as properties. Constraint Satisfaction which allows for a separation between problem specification and the implementation. Modern Knowledge Representation which offers logical inference in for example Description Logic or Conceptual Graphs. == Problem definition == Dale and Reiter (1995) think about referring expressions as distinguishing descriptions. They define: The referent as the entity that should be described The context set as set of salient entities The contrast set or potential distractors as all elements of the context set except the referent A property as a reference to a single attribute–value pair Each entity in the domain can be characterised as a set of attribute–value pairs for example ⟨ {\displaystyle \langle } type, dog ⟩ {\displaystyle \rangle } , ⟨ {\displaystyle \langle } gender, female ⟩ {\displaystyle \rangle } or ⟨ {\displaystyle \langle } age, 10 years ⟩ {\displaystyle \rangle } . The problem then is defined as follows: Let r {\displaystyle r} be the intended referent, and C {\displaystyle C} be the contrast set. Then, a set L {\displaystyle L} of attribute–value pairs will represent a distinguishing description if the following two conditions hold: Every attribute–value pair in L {\displaystyle L} applies to r {\displaystyle r} : that is, every element of L {\displaystyle L} specifies an attribute–value that r {\displaystyle r} possesses. For every member c {\displaystyle c} of C {\displaystyle C} , there is at least one element l {\displaystyle l} of L {\displaystyle L} that does not apply to c {\displaystyle c} : that is, there is an l {\displaystyle l} in L {\displaystyle L} that specifies an attribute–value that c {\displaystyle c} does not possess. l {\displaystyle l} is said
Honey encryption
Honey encryption is a type of data encryption that "produces a ciphertext, which, when decrypted with an incorrect key as guessed by the attacker, presents a plausible-looking yet incorrect plaintext." == Creators == Ari Juels and Thomas Ristenpart of the University of Wisconsin, the developers of the encryption system, presented a paper on honey encryption at the 2014 Eurocrypt cryptography conference. == Method of protection == A brute-force attack involves repeated decryption with random keys; this is equivalent to picking random plaintexts from the space of all possible plaintexts with a uniform distribution. This is effective because even though the attacker is equally likely to see any given plaintext, most plaintexts are extremely unlikely to be legitimate i.e. the distribution of legitimate plaintexts is non-uniform. Honey encryption defeats such attacks by first transforming the plaintext into a space such that the distribution of legitimate plaintexts is uniform. Thus an attacker guessing keys will see legitimate-looking plaintexts frequently and random-looking plaintexts infrequently. This makes it difficult to determine when the correct key has been guessed. In effect, honey encryption "[serves] up fake data in response to every incorrect guess of the password or encryption key." The security of honey encryption relies on the fact that the probability of an attacker judging a plaintext to be legitimate can be calculated (by the encrypting party) at the time of encryption. This makes honey encryption difficult to apply in certain applications e.g. where the space of plaintexts is very large or the distribution of plaintexts is unknown. It also means that honey encryption can be vulnerable to brute-force attacks if this probability is miscalculated. For example, it is vulnerable to known-plaintext attacks: if the attacker has a crib that a plaintext must match to be legitimate, they will be able to brute-force even Honey Encrypted data if the encryption did not take the crib into account. == Example == An encrypted credit card number is susceptible to brute-force attacks because not every string of digits is equally likely. The number of digits can range from 13 to 19, though 16 is the most common. Additionally, it must have a valid IIN and the last digit must match the checksum. An attacker can also take into account the popularity of various services: an IIN from MasterCard is probably more likely than an IIN from Diners Club Carte Blanche. Honey encryption can protect against these attacks by first mapping credit card numbers to a larger space where they match their likelihood of legitimacy. Numbers with invalid IINs and checksums are not mapped at all (i.e. have probability 0 of legitimacy). Numbers from large brands like MasterCard and Visa map to large regions of this space, while less popular brands map to smaller regions, etc. An attacker brute-forcing such an encryption scheme would only see legitimate-looking credit card numbers when they brute-force, and the numbers would appear with the frequency the attacker would expect from the real world. == Application == Juels and Ristenpart aim to use honey encryption to protect data stored on password manager services. Juels stated that "password managers are a tasty target for criminals," and worries that "if criminals get a hold of a large collection of encrypted password vaults they could probably unlock many of them without too much trouble." Hristo Bojinov, CEO and founder of Anfacto, noted that "Honey Encryption could help reduce their vulnerability. But he notes that not every type of data will be easy to protect this way. … Not all authentication or encryption system yield themselves to being honeyed."
Bus encryption
Bus encryption is the use of encrypted program instructions on a data bus in a computer that includes a secure cryptoprocessor for executing the encrypted instructions. Bus encryption is used primarily in electronic systems that require high security, such as automated teller machines, TV set-top boxes, and secure data communication devices such as two-way digital radios. Bus encryption can also mean encrypted data transmission on a data bus from one processor to another processor. For example, from the CPU to a GPU which does not require input of encrypted instructions. Such bus encryption is used by Windows Vista and newer Microsoft operating systems to protect certificates, BIOS, passwords, and program authenticity. PVP-UAB (Protected Video Path) provides bus encryption of premium video content in PCs as it passes over the PCIe bus to graphics cards to enforce digital rights management. The need for bus encryption arises when multiple people have access to the internal circuitry of an electronic system, either because they service and repair such systems, stock spare components for the systems, own the system, steal the system, or find a lost or abandoned system. Bus encryption is necessary not only to prevent tampering of encrypted instructions that may be easily discovered on a data bus or during data transmission, but also to prevent discovery of decrypted instructions that may reveal security weaknesses that an intruder can exploit. In TV set-top boxes, it is necessary to download program instructions periodically to customer's units to provide new features and to fix bugs. These new instructions are encrypted before transmission, but must also remain secure on data buses and during execution to prevent the manufacture of unauthorized cable TV boxes. This can be accomplished by secure crypto-processors that read encrypted instructions on the data bus from external data memory, decrypt the instructions in the cryptoprocessor, and execute the instructions in the same cryptoprocessor.
Plaintext
In cryptography, plaintext usually means unencrypted information pending input into cryptographic algorithms, usually encryption algorithms. This usually refers to data that is transmitted or stored unencrypted. == Overview == With the advent of computing, the term plaintext expanded beyond human-readable documents to mean any data, including binary files, in a form that can be viewed or used without requiring a key or other decryption device. Information—a message, document, file, etc.—if to be communicated or stored in an unencrypted form is referred to as plaintext. Plaintext is used as input to an encryption algorithm; the output is usually termed ciphertext, particularly when the algorithm is a cipher. Codetext is less often used, and almost always only when the algorithm involved is actually a code. Some systems use multiple layers of encryption, with the output of one encryption algorithm becoming "plaintext" input for the next. == Secure handling == Insecure handling of plaintext can introduce weaknesses into a cryptosystem by letting an attacker bypass the cryptography altogether. Plaintext is vulnerable in use and in storage, whether in electronic or paper format. Physical security means the securing of information and its storage media from physical, attack—for instance by someone entering a building to access papers, storage media, or computers. Discarded material, if not disposed of securely, may be a security risk. Even shredded documents and erased magnetic media might be reconstructed with sufficient effort. If plaintext is stored in a computer file, the storage media, the computer and its components, and all backups must be secure. Sensitive data is sometimes processed on computers whose mass storage is removable, in which case physical security of the removed disk is vital. In the case of securing a computer, useful (as opposed to handwaving) security must be physical (e.g., against burglary, brazen removal under cover of supposed repair, installation of covert monitoring devices, etc.), as well as virtual (e.g., operating system modification, illicit network access, Trojan programs). Wide availability of keydrives, which can plug into most modern computers and store large quantities of data, poses another severe security headache. A spy (perhaps posing as a cleaning person) could easily conceal one, and even swallow it if necessary. Discarded computers, disk drives and media are also a potential source of plaintexts. Most operating systems do not actually erase anything— they simply mark the disk space occupied by a deleted file as 'available for use', and remove its entry from the file system directory. The information in a file deleted in this way remains fully present until overwritten at some later time when the operating system reuses the disk space. With even low-end computers commonly sold with many gigabytes of disk space and rising monthly, this 'later time' may be months later, or never. Even overwriting the portion of a disk surface occupied by a deleted file is insufficient in many cases. Peter Gutmann of the University of Auckland wrote a celebrated 1996 paper on the recovery of overwritten information from magnetic disks; areal storage densities have gotten much higher since then, so this sort of recovery is likely to be more difficult than it was when Gutmann wrote. Modern hard drives automatically remap failing sectors, moving data to good sectors. This process makes information on those failing, excluded sectors invisible to the file system and normal applications. Special software, however, can still extract information from them. Some government agencies (e.g., US NSA) require that personnel physically pulverize discarded disk drives and, in some cases, treat them with chemical corrosives. This practice is not widespread outside government, however. Garfinkel and Shelat (2003) analyzed 158 second-hand hard drives they acquired at garage sales and the like, and found that less than 10% had been sufficiently sanitized. The others contained a wide variety of readable personal and confidential information. See data remanence. Physical loss is a serious problem. The US State Department, Department of Defense, and the British Secret Service have all had laptops with secret information, including in plaintext, lost or stolen. Appropriate disk encryption techniques can safeguard data on misappropriated computers or media. On occasion, even when data on host systems is encrypted, media that personnel use to transfer data between systems is plaintext because of poorly designed data policy. For example, in October 2007, HM Revenue and Customs lost CDs that contained the unencrypted records of 25 million child benefit recipients in the United Kingdom. Modern cryptographic systems resist known plaintext or even chosen plaintext attacks, and so may not be entirely compromised when plaintext is lost or stolen. Older systems resisted the effects of plaintext data loss on security with less effective techniques—such as padding and Russian copulation to obscure information in plaintext that could be easily guessed.
Pocketbook (application)
Pocketbook was a Sydney-based free budget planner and personal finance app launched in 2012. The app helped users setup and manage budgets, track spending and manage bills. As of 2016 Pocketbook claimed to support over 250,000 Australians, in January 2018 that number was 435,000. After being acquired by Zip Co Ltd in 2016, it was announced in 2022 that the app was to be shut down and all user accounts deleted. == History == Pocketbook was founded by Alvin Singh and Bosco Tan in 2012. It was conceived in 2011 in a Wolli Creek apartment as a tool for Alvin and Bosco to take control of their money. In 2013, Pocketbook raised $500,000 from technology fund Tank Stream Ventures, and a group of investors including TV personality David Koch, Geoff Levy, David Shein and Peter Cooper. In September 2016 Digital retail finance and payment industry player zipMoney (now trading as Zip Co Limited) acquired Pocketbook in a $7.5m deal == Features == The app synced with the bank account of users and would organize spending into different categories. Users could also be reminded of bill payments, analyse spending and set spending limits. They can also be alerted of fraudulent transactions and deductions. The app employs security measures like end to end encryption, CloudFlare protection, fraud detection, identity protection etc. Pocketbook was available via web and mobile version. == Awards == Personal Finance Innovator of the Year by Fintech Business Awards 2017 Innovator of the Year by OPTUS MyBusiness Awards 2017 Best Finance App of 2016 by Australian Fintech Best Personal Finance App: Pocketbook won the 2016 Finder Innovation Awards, presented at a gala dinner hosted by media personality and The New Inventors presenter James O'Loghlin. Best Mobile App of the Year Winner: StartCon hosted the first annual Australasian Startup Awards. Over 200 nominations in 14 categories and an overall winner were reviewed, and winners were determined by public voting, with over 63,000 votes in total. Best New Startup 2014 by StartupSmart. Finalist in the SWIFT Innotribe startup competition in Dubai in 2013.
Secret London
Secret London is a Facebook group started by 21-year-old Bristol University graduate, Tiffany Philippou, on 19 January 2010 in response to a Saatchi & Saatchi competition. The group grew rapidly (180,000 members as of 8 February 2010) and is composed mostly of Londoners who use the site to share suggestions and photos of London. After the group's early success, the founder announced her intention to launch a website of the same name by crowdsourcing the design and development. The website was launched on 16 February 2010. == Other secret cities == Following the initial success of Secret London, a number of other secret groups were independently started around the world, some of which already have over 100,000 users. As of 19 February 2010, the list of other groups includes: Secret Frankfurt, Secret Tel Aviv, Secret Paris, Secret New York, Secret Tokyo, Secret Toronto, Secret Los Angeles, Secret Exeter, Secret Boston, Secret Norwich, Secret Singapore, Secret Brighton, Secret Minneapolis, Secret Sydney, Secret Canberra, Secret Brisbane, Secret Wellington, Secret Christchurch, Secret Madeira, Secret Funchal, Secret Bristol and Secret Cardiff. == Controversy == Some commentators have questioned whether it possible to share secrets without compromising them, and whether sharing tips publicly will lead to over-exposure of the businesses who are recommended.