The interaction of artificial intelligence and copyright law has become one of the most contentious tech policy debates in the United Kingdom, centering on whether AI developers should be permitted to train their models on copyrighted material without explicit consent or remuneration. This debate has exposed a deep fracture between the creative industries, which seek to protect their intellectual property from unauthorised commercial exploitation, and tech companies. The academic and library sectors are also impacted, and argue that overly restrictive copyright laws hinder scientific research and the UK's sovereign AI capabilities. In 2024, the UK government proposed a broad text and data mining (TDM) exception to copyright that would have allowed AI companies to use publicly available copyrighted material for training, offering creators only an "opt-out" mechanism, similar to the exception introduced in Europe. This proposal faced intense opposition from across the creative sector. Trade unions representing writers, musicians, performers, and journalists argued that such an exception would effectively expropriate their members' work for the commercial benefit of tech giants. A report from the House of Lords Communications and Digital Committee, warned that generative AI posed a "clear and present danger" to the £124 billion creative economy. The government abandoned the opt-out model in March 2026, opting instead to build a stronger evidence base before pursuing any copyright reform. Conversely, the academic and library sectors have raised significant concerns that the UK's current TDM exception, which is strictly limited to non-commercial research, is too narrow. Universities and research libraries occupy a dual role as both creators of vast datasets and beneficiaries of TDM exceptions. They argue that the current legal framework restricts their ability to computationally analyse the very research they produce, thereby hobbling the UK's "AI for Science" strategy. Advocacy groups have highlighted a "triple payment" problem, wherein publicly funded research is handed over to publishers, who then charge universities substantial subscription fees and demand additional payments for specific TDM licences. This tension is further complicated by the commercial practices of major academic publishers. While publishers often restrict universities from using subscribed databases for AI training, they have simultaneously entered into lucrative, multi-million-dollar licensing agreements to sell access to this academic content to commercial AI developers. Furthermore, academics have accused publishers of actively steering authors away from permissive open-access licences towards more restrictive variants. By doing so, publishers retain the exclusive commercial rights necessary to strike these AI training deals, often without consulting the original authors or offering them any additional remuneration. This dynamic has not only reopened debates within the Open Access movement but has also created complex legal scenarios where publishers, rather than authors, control the terms of copyright litigation against major tech companies. == Training on copyrighted material == The question of whether AI developers should be permitted to train their models on copyrighted material without payment or consent has been one of the most contentious policy debates in the UK AI landscape. In 2024, the then-Conservative government proposed a broad text and data mining (TDM) exception that would have allowed AI companies to use any publicly available copyrighted material for training purposes, with creators able only to "opt out" of having their work used. This proposal provoked intense opposition from writers, musicians, visual artists, publishers, and broadcasters, who argued it would effectively expropriate their intellectual property for the commercial benefit of AI companies. The debate over text and data mining exceptions extends significantly beyond generative AI and the creative industries, implicating a wide range of scientific, industrial, and academic research applications. TDM is a foundational process for analysing large datasets to identify patterns, trends, and correlations, which is heavily utilised in fields such as medical research, climate modelling, and financial services. In the scientific and academic sectors, researchers rely on TDM to process vast amounts of published literature. For example, in biomedical research, TDM is used to accelerate drug discovery, identify new uses for existing medicines, and extract insights from clinical notes and genomic datasets. However, the application of traditional copyright frameworks to scientific literature has been criticised by academics. Researchers argue that scientific writing is intended to convey factual, verifiable information rather than creative originality, and that copyright restrictions on TDM hinder reproducibility, validation, and the advancement of science. The current UK copyright exception for TDM (Section 29A of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988) is limited strictly to non-commercial research, which creates barriers for public-private research partnerships and commercial scientific development. Beyond academia, non-generative AI and TDM are critical to various industrial and commercial operations. In the financial services sector, TDM is employed to monitor transactions, detect fraud, and analyse market feeds. Other non-generative applications include search engine indexing, plagiarism detection software, and media monitoring. A 2026 report by Public First estimated that 19% of UK businesses use specialised TDM tools, and that a restrictive copyright regime requiring licenses for all copyrighted content could cost the UK economy £220 billion in lost AI-driven GDP growth by 2035 compared to a broad commercial TDM exemption. Industry advocates argue that the lack of a commercial TDM exception in the UK creates legal uncertainty that stifles innovation across these broader, non-generative applications of data analysis. === Tech and AI industry positions === The technology and artificial intelligence industries lobbied for a broad text and data mining (TDM) exception to UK copyright law, arguing that such an exception is essential for the UK to remain globally competitive in AI development. Industry bodies such as techUK have argued that without a TDM exception, the UK risks becoming an "AI taker rather than an AI maker," as developers will relocate training operations to jurisdictions with more permissive copyright regimes, such as the United States, Japan, Singapore, and the European Union. During the UK government's 2024–2025 consultation on copyright and AI, major AI developers and trade associations strongly supported "Option 2" (a broad TDM exception) or "Option 3" (a TDM exception with an opt-out mechanism). OpenAI stated in its consultation response that a broad TDM exception is "necessary to drive AI innovation and investment in the UK," arguing that developers should be permitted to train models on lawfully accessed copies without further distribution. The Computer and Communications Industry Association (CCIA) similarly argued that restricting TDM to non-commercial development would undermine the government's ambitions for the UK tech sector and frustrate partnerships between commercial entities and research institutions. Tech industry advocates have also highlighted the economic implications of copyright policy. According to analysis by the think tank UK Day One, adopting an overly restrictive licensing-only approach could result in the UK economy losing up to £182 billion over 20 years, whereas a broad TDM exception could generate a positive impact of £131.61 billion over the same period. Following the government's March 2026 decision to drop plans for a TDM exception in favour of a market-led licensing approach, techUK's Deputy CEO Antony Walker criticised the move, stating that "copyright material cannot be used for AI development and training without permission" under the current framework, which he argued would push AI model training to the US. === Creative sector and political opposition to text and data mining === In March 2026, the House of Lords Communications and Digital Committee published a report, AI, Copyright and the Creative Industries, which concluded that the creative industries face "a clear and present danger from generative AI" and that it would be "a very poor bet" for the government to weaken copyright protections to attract AI investment. The Committee noted that the creative industries contributed £124 billion to the UK economy in 2023 and employed 2.4 million people, compared to the AI sector's £12 billion GVA and 86,000 employees in 2024. The Committee called on the government to develop a "licensing-first" regime underpinned by mandatory transparency requirements, and to rule out any new commercial TDM exception with an opt-out model. Tra
Availability zone
In cloud computing, an availability region is a group of data centres that are located in the same geographical region. Availability regions comprise multiple availability zones, which are groups of data centres that are located far enough from each other to prevent large-scale outages in the event of failure of a single zone, whilst still being close enough to each other to enable low-latency connections. Distributed systems spanning multiple availability zones allow for high availability, even in the event of catastrophic failure, such as natural disasters. Services offering distinct availability zones include Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud.
Wargame (hacking)
In hacking, a wargame (or war game) is a cyber-security challenge and mind sport in which the competitors must exploit or defend a vulnerability in a system or application, and/or gain or prevent access to a computer system. A wargame usually involves a capture the flag logic, based on pentesting, semantic URL attacks, knowledge-based authentication, password cracking, reverse engineering of software (often JavaScript, C and assembly language), code injection, SQL injections, cross-site scripting, exploits, IP address spoofing, forensics, and other hacking techniques. == Wargames for preparedness == Wargames are also used as a method of cyberwarfare preparedness. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) organizes an annual event, Locked Shields, which is an international live-fire cyber exercise. The exercise challenges cyber security experts through real-time attacks in fictional scenarios and is used to develop skills in national IT defense strategies. == Additional applications == Wargames can be used to teach the basics of web attacks and web security, giving participants a better understanding of how attackers exploit security vulnerabilities. Wargames are also used as a way to "stress test" an organization's response plan and serve as a drill to identify gaps in cyber disaster preparedness.
Glyph (data visualization)
In the context of data visualization, a glyph is any marker, such as an arrow or similar marking, used to specify part of a visualization. This is a representation to visualize data where the data set is presented as a collection of visual objects. These visual objects are collectively called a glyph. It helps visualizing data relation in data analysis, statistics, etc. by using any custom notation. In the context of data visualization, a glyph is the visual representation of a piece of data where the attributes of a graphical entity are dictated by one or more attributes of a data record. == Constructing glyphs == Glyph construction can be a complex process when there are many dimensions to be represented in the visualization. Maguire et al proposed a taxonomy based approach to glyph-design that uses a tree to guide the visual encodings used to representation various data items. Duffy et al created perhaps one of the most complex glyph representations with their representation of sperm movement.
North Atlantic Population Project
The North Atlantic Population Project (NAPP) is a collaboration of historical demographers in Britain, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden to produce a massive census microdata collection for the North Atlantic Region in the late-nineteenth century. The database includes complete individual-level census enumerations for each country, and provides information on over 110 million people. This large scale allows detailed analysis of small geographic areas and population subgroups. The NAPP database is designed to be compatible with the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), and is disseminated through the IPUMS data-access system at the Minnesota Population Center, University of Minnesota. Major collaborators on the project include Lisa Dillon, University of Montreal; Chad Gaffield, University of Ottawa; Ólöf Garðarsdóttir, Statistics Iceland; Marianne Jarnes Erikstad, University of Tromsø; Jan Oldervall University of Bergen; Evan Roberts, University of Minnesota; Steven Ruggles, University of Minnesota; Kevin Schürer, UK Data Archive; Gunnar Thorvaldsen, University of Tromsø; and Matthew Woollard, UK Data Archive. The project is also coordinated by the Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota.
Dynamic Graphics Project
The Dynamic Graphics Project (commonly referred to as DGP) is an interdisciplinary research laboratory at the University of Toronto devoted to projects involving computer graphics, computer vision, human computer interaction, and visualization. The lab began as the computer graphics research group of Department of Computer Science Professor Leslie Mezei in 1967. Mezei invited Bill Buxton, a pioneer of human–computer interaction (HCI) to join. In 1972, Ronald Baecker, another HCI pioneer joined, establishing DGP as the first Canadian university group focused on computer graphics and human-computer interaction. According to csrankings.org, the DGP is the top research institution in the world for the combined subfields of computer graphics, HCI, and visualization. Since then, DGP has hosted many well known faculty and students in computer graphics, computer vision and HCI (e.g., Alain Fournier, Bill Reeves, Jos Stam, Demetri Terzopoulos, Marilyn Tremaine). DGP also occasionally hosts artists in residence (e.g., Oscar-winner Chris Landreth). Many past and current researchers at Autodesk (and before that Alias Wavefront) graduated after working at DGP. DGP is located in the St. George campus of University of Toronto in the Bahen Centre for Information Technology. DGP researchers regularly publish at ACM SIGGRAPH, ACM SIGCHI and ICCV. DGP hosts the Toronto User Experience (TUX) Speaker Series and the Sanders Series Lectures. == Notable alumni == Bill Buxton (MS 1978) James McCrae (PhD 2013) Dimitris Metaxas (PhD 1992) Bill Reeves (MS 1976, Ph.D. 1980) Jos Stam (MS 1991, Ph.D. 1995)
Security type system
In computer science, a type system can be described as a syntactic framework which contains a set of rules that are used to assign a type property (int, boolean, char etc.) to various components of a computer program, such as variables or functions. A security type system works in a similar way, only with a main focus on the security of the computer program, through information flow control. Thus, the various components of the program are assigned security types, or labels. The aim of a such system is to ultimately be able to verify that a given program conforms to the type system rules and satisfies non-interference. Security type systems is one of many security techniques used in the field of language-based security, and is tightly connected to information flow and information flow policies. In simple terms, a security type system can be used to detect if there exists any kind of violation of confidentiality or integrity in a program, i.e. the programmer wants to detect if the program is in line with the information flow policy or not. == A simple information flow policy == Suppose there are two users, A and B. In a program, the following security classes (SC) are introduced: SC = {∅, {A}, {B}, {A,B}}, where ∅ is the empty set. The information flow policy should define the direction that information is allowed to flow, which is dependent on whether the policy allows read or write operations. This example considers read operations (confidentiality). The following flows are allowed: → = {({A}, {A}), ({B}, {B}), ({A,B}, {A,B}), ({A,B}, {A}), ({A,B}, {B}), ({A}, ∅), ({B}, ∅), ({A,B}, ∅)} This can also be described as a superset (⊇). In words: information is allowed to flow towards stricter levels of confidentiality. The combination operator (⊕) can express how security classes can perform read operations with respect to other security classes. For example: {A} ⊕ {A,B} = {A} — the only security class that can read from both {A} and {A,B} is {A}. {A} ⊕ {B} = ∅ — neither {A} nor {B} are allowed to read from both {A} and {B}. This can also be described as an intersection (∩) between security classes. An information flow policy can be illustrated as a Hasse diagram. The policy should also be a lattice, that is, it has a greatest lower-bound and least upper-bound (there always exists a combination between security classes). In the case of integrity, information will flow in the opposite direction, thus the policy will be inverted. == Information flow policy in security type systems == Once the policy is in place, the software developer can apply the security classes to the program components. Use of a security type system is usually combined with a compiler that can perform the verification of the information flow according to the type system rules. For the sake of simplicity, a very simple computer program, together with the information flow policy as described in the previous section, can be used as a demonstration. The simple program is given in the following pseudocode: if y{A} = 1 then x{A,B} := 0 else x{A,B} := 1 Here, an equality check is made on a variable y that is assigned the security class {A}. A variable x with a lower security class ({A,B}) is influenced by this check. This means that information is leaking from class {A} to class {A,B}, which is a violation of the confidentiality policy. This leak should be detected by the security type system. === Example === Designing a security type system requires a function (also known as a security environment) that creates a mapping from variables to security types, or classes. This function can be called Γ, such that Γ(x) = τ, where x is a variable and τ is the security class, or type. Security classes are assigned (also called "judgement") to program components, using the following notation: Types are assigned to read operations by: Γ ⊢ e : τ. Types are assigned to write operations by: Γ ⊢ S : τ cmd. Constants can be assigned any type. The following bottom-up notation can be used to decompose the program: assumption1 ... assumptionn/conclusion. Once the program is decomposed into trivial judgements, by which the type can easily be determined, the types for the less trivial parts of the program can be derived. Each "numerator" is considered in isolation, looking at the type of each statement to see if an allowed type can be derived for the "denominator", based on the defined type system "rules". ==== Rules ==== The main part of the security type system is the rules. They say how the program should be decomposed and how type verification should be performed. This toy program consists of a conditional test and two possible variable assignments. Rules for these two events are defined as follows: Applying this to the simple program introduced above yields: The type system detects the policy violation in line 2, where a read operation of security class {A} is performed, followed by two write operations of a less strict security class {A,B}. In more formalized terms, {A} ⋢ {A,B}, {A,B} (from the rule of the conditional test). Thus, the program is classified as "not typeable". === Soundness === The soundness of a security type system can be informally defined as: If program P is well typed, P satisfies non-interference. Volpano, Smith and Irvine were the first to prove soundness of a security type system for a deterministic imperative programming language with a standard (non-instrumented) semantics using the notion of non-interference.