A wide-column store (or extensible record store) is a type of NoSQL database. It uses tables, rows, and columns, but unlike a relational database, the names and format of the columns can vary from row to row in the same table. A wide-column store can be interpreted as a two-dimensional key–value store. Google's Bigtable is one of the prototypical examples of a wide-column store. == Wide-column stores versus columnar databases == Wide-column stores such as Bigtable and Apache Cassandra are not column stores in the original sense of the term, since their two-level structures do not use a columnar data layout. In genuine column stores, a columnar data layout is adopted such that each column is stored separately on disk. Wide-column stores do often support the notion of column families that are stored separately. However, each such column family typically contains multiple columns that are used together, similar to traditional relational database tables. Within a given column family, all data is stored in a row-by-row fashion, such that the columns for a given row are stored together, rather than each column being stored separately. Wide-column stores that support column families are also known as column family databases. == Notable examples == Notable wide-column stores include: Apache Accumulo Apache Cassandra Apache HBase Bigtable DataStax Enterprise (uses Apache Cassandra) DataStax Astra DB (uses Apache Cassandra) Hypertable Azure Tables ScyllaDB
Chatbot
A chatbot (originally chatterbot) is a software application or web interface designed to converse through text or speech. Modern chatbots are typically online and use generative artificial intelligence systems that are capable of maintaining a conversation with a user in natural language and simulating the way a human would behave as a conversational partner. Such chatbots often use deep learning and natural language processing. Simpler chatbots have existed for decades. Chatbots have gained popularity during the AI boom of the 2020s, with the releases of generative AI chatbots such as ChatGPT, Gemini, Claude, and Grok. These chatbots typically use fine-tuned large language models to generate text. A major area where chatbots have long been used is customer service and support, with various sorts of virtual assistants. == History == === Turing test === In 1950, Alan Turing published an article entitled "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" in which he proposed what is now called the Turing test as a criterion of intelligence. This criterion depends on the ability of a computer program to impersonate a human in a real-time written conversation with a human judge, to the extent that the judge is incapable of reliably distinguishing, on the basis of the conversational content alone, between the program and a real human. === Early chatbots === Joseph Weizenbaum's program ELIZA was first published in 1966. Weizenbaum did not claim that ELIZA was genuinely intelligent, and the introduction to his paper presented it more as a debunking exercise:In artificial intelligence, machines are made to behave in wondrous ways, often sufficient to dazzle even the most experienced observer. But once a particular program is unmasked, once its inner workings are explained, its magic crumbles away; it stands revealed as a mere collection of procedures. The observer says to himself "I could have written that". With that thought, he moves the program in question from the shelf marked "intelligent", to that reserved for curios. The object of this paper is to cause just such a re-evaluation of the program about to be "explained". Few programs ever needed it more. ELIZA's key method of operation involves the recognition of clue words or phrases in the input, and the output of the corresponding pre-prepared or pre-programmed responses that can move the conversation forward in an apparently meaningful way (e.g. by responding to any input that contains the word 'MOTHER' with 'TELL ME MORE ABOUT YOUR FAMILY'). Thus an illusion of understanding is generated, even though the processing involved has been merely superficial. ELIZA showed that such an illusion is surprisingly easy to generate because human judges are ready to give the benefit of the doubt when conversational responses are capable of being interpreted as "intelligent". Following ELIZA, psychiatrist Kenneth Colby developed PARRY in 1972. From 1978 to some time after 1983, the CYRUS project led by Janet Kolodner constructed a chatbot simulating Cyrus Vance (57th United States Secretary of State). It used case-based reasoning, and updated its database daily by parsing wire news from United Press International. The program was unable to process the news items subsequent to the surprise resignation of Cyrus Vance in April 1980, and the team constructed another chatbot simulating his successor, Edmund Muskie. In 1984, an interactive version of the program Racter was released which acted as a chatbot. A.L.I.C.E. was released in 1995. This uses a markup language called AIML, which is specific to its function as a conversational agent, and has since been adopted by various other developers of, so-called, Alicebots. A.L.I.C.E. is a weak AI without any reasoning capabilities. It is based on a similar pattern matching technique as ELIZA in 1966. This is not strong AI, which would require sapience and logical reasoning abilities. Jabberwacky, released in 1997, learns new responses and context based on real-time user interactions, rather than being driven from a static database. Chatbot competitions focus on the Turing test or more specific goals. Two such annual contests are the Loebner Prize and The Chatterbox Challenge (the latter has been offline since 2015, however, materials can still be found from web archives). Pre-dating the current generation of large language models, Gavagai, a Swedish language technology startup, created a Twitter-based bot in 2015 and DBpedia created a chatbot during the 2017 Google Summer of Code that communicated through Facebook Messenger. === Modern chatbots based on large language models === Modern chatbots like ChatGPT are often based on foundational large language models called generative pre-trained transformers (GPT). They are based on a deep learning architecture called the transformer, which contains artificial neural networks. They generate text after being trained on a large text corpus, and have emergent abilities that they are not specifically trained for. Chatbots integrated into apps and websites can call image-generation models or search the web. Some platforms also enable users to interact with conversational interfaces directly through web-based chat environments, allowing real-time assistance, content generation, and task automation without requiring software installation. == Application == === Messaging apps === Many companies' chatbots run on messaging apps or simply via SMS. They are used for B2C customer service, sales and marketing. In 2016, Facebook Messenger allowed developers to place chatbots on their platform. There were 30,000 bots created for Messenger in the first six months, rising to 100,000 by September 2017. Since September 2017, this has also been as part of a pilot program on WhatsApp. Airlines KLM and Aeroméxico both announced their participation in the testing; both airlines had previously launched customer services on the Facebook Messenger platform. The bots usually appear as one of the user's contacts, but can sometimes act as participants in a group chat. Many banks, insurers, media companies, e-commerce companies, airlines, hotel chains, retailers, health care providers, government entities, and restaurant chains have used chatbots to answer simple questions, increase customer engagement, for promotion, and to offer additional ways to order from them. Chatbots are also used in market research to collect short survey responses. A 2017 study showed 4% of companies used chatbots. In a 2016 study, 80% of businesses said they intended to have one by 2020. ==== As part of company apps and websites ==== Previous generations of chatbots were present on company websites, e.g. Ask Jenn from Alaska Airlines which debuted in 2008 or Expedia's virtual customer service agent which launched in 2011. The newer generation of chatbots includes IBM Watson-powered "Rocky", introduced in February 2017 by the New York City-based e-commerce company Rare Carat to provide information to prospective diamond buyers. ==== Chatbot sequences ==== Used by marketers to script sequences of messages, very similar to an autoresponder sequence. Such sequences can be triggered by user opt-in or the use of keywords within user interactions. After a trigger occurs a sequence of messages is delivered until the next anticipated user response. Each user response is used in the decision tree to help the chatbot navigate the response sequences to deliver the correct response message. === Company internal platforms === Companies have used chatbots for customer support, human resources, or in Internet-of-Things (IoT) projects. Overstock.com, for one, has reportedly launched a chatbot named Mila to attempt to automate certain processes when customer service employees request sick leave. Other large companies such as Lloyds Banking Group, Royal Bank of Scotland, Renault and Citroën are now using chatbots instead of call centres with humans to provide a first point of contact. In large companies, like in hospitals and aviation organizations, chatbots are also used to share information within organizations, and to assist and replace service desks. === Customer service === Chatbots have been proposed as a replacement for customer service departments. In 2026, The Financial Times reported on agentic chatbots that could do shopping for customers once given instructions. In 2016, Russia-based Tochka Bank launched a chatbot on Facebook for a range of financial services, including a possibility of making payments. In July 2016, Barclays Africa also launched a Facebook chatbot. === Healthcare === Chatbots are also appearing in the healthcare industry. A study suggested that physicians in the United States believed that chatbots would be most beneficial for scheduling doctor appointments, locating health clinics, or providing medication information. A 2025 review found that participants often rated chatbot responses as more empathic than those from clinicians. In 2020, WhatsApp worked with th
A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity
"A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity" is a 1943 paper written by Warren Sturgis McCulloch and Walter Pitts, published in the journal The Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics. The paper proposed a mathematical model of the nervous system as a network of simple logical elements, later known as artificial neurons, or McCulloch–Pitts neurons. These neurons receive inputs, perform a weighted sum, and fire an output signal based on a threshold function. By connecting these units in various configurations, McCulloch and Pitts demonstrated that their model could perform all logical functions. It is a seminal work in cognitive science, computational neuroscience, computer science, and artificial intelligence. It was a foundational result in automata theory. John von Neumann cited it as a significant result. == Mathematics == The artificial neuron used in the original paper is slightly different from the modern version. They considered neural networks that operate in discrete steps of time t = 0 , 1 , … {\displaystyle t=0,1,\dots } . The neural network contains a number of neurons. Let the state of a neuron i {\displaystyle i} at time t {\displaystyle t} be N i ( t ) {\displaystyle N_{i}(t)} . The state of a neuron can either be 0 or 1, standing for "not firing" and "firing". Each neuron also has a firing threshold θ {\displaystyle \theta } , such that it fires if the total input exceeds the threshold. Each neuron can connect to any other neuron (including itself) with positive synapses (excitatory) or negative synapses (inhibitory). That is, each neuron can connect to another neuron with a weight w {\displaystyle w} taking an integer value. A peripheral afferent is a neuron with no incoming synapses. We can regard each neural network as a directed graph, with the nodes being the neurons, and the directed edges being the synapses. A neural network has a circle or a circuit if there exists a directed circle in the graph. Let w i j ( t ) {\displaystyle w_{ij}(t)} be the connection weight from neuron j {\displaystyle j} to neuron i {\displaystyle i} at time t {\displaystyle t} , then its next state is N i ( t + 1 ) = H ( ∑ j = 1 n w i j ( t ) N j ( t ) − θ i ( t ) ) , {\displaystyle N_{i}(t+1)=H\left(\sum _{j=1}^{n}w_{ij}(t)N_{j}(t)-\theta _{i}(t)\right),} where H {\displaystyle H} is the Heaviside step function (outputting 1 if the input is greater than or equal to 0, and 0 otherwise). === Symbolic logic === The paper used, as a logical language for describing neural networks, "Language II" from The Logical Syntax of Language by Rudolf Carnap with some notations taken from Principia Mathematica by Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell. Language II covers substantial parts of classical mathematics, including real analysis and portions of set theory. To describe a neural network with peripheral afferents N 1 , N 2 , … , N p {\displaystyle N_{1},N_{2},\dots ,N_{p}} and non-peripheral afferents N p + 1 , N p + 2 , … , N n {\displaystyle N_{p+1},N_{p+2},\dots ,N_{n}} they considered logical predicate of form P r ( N 1 , N 2 , … , N p , t ) {\displaystyle Pr(N_{1},N_{2},\dots ,N_{p},t)} where P r {\displaystyle Pr} is a first-order logic predicate function (a function that outputs a boolean), N 1 , … , N p {\displaystyle N_{1},\dots ,N_{p}} are predicates that take t {\displaystyle t} as an argument, and t {\displaystyle t} is the only free variable in the predicate. Intuitively speaking, N 1 , … , N p {\displaystyle N_{1},\dots ,N_{p}} specifies the binary input patterns going into the neural network over all time, and P r ( N 1 , N 2 , … , N n , t ) {\displaystyle Pr(N_{1},N_{2},\dots ,N_{n},t)} is a function that takes some binary input patterns, and constructs an output binary pattern P r ( N 1 , N 2 , … , N n , 0 ) , P r ( N 1 , N 2 , … , N n , 1 ) , … {\displaystyle Pr(N_{1},N_{2},\dots ,N_{n},0),Pr(N_{1},N_{2},\dots ,N_{n},1),\dots } . A logical sentence P r ( N 1 , N 2 , … , N n , t ) {\displaystyle Pr(N_{1},N_{2},\dots ,N_{n},t)} is realized by a neural network iff there exists a time-delay T ≥ 0 {\displaystyle T\geq 0} , a neuron i {\displaystyle i} in the network, and an initial state for the non-peripheral neurons N p + 1 ( 0 ) , … , N n ( 0 ) {\displaystyle N_{p+1}(0),\dots ,N_{n}(0)} , such that for any time t {\displaystyle t} , the truth-value of the logical sentence is equal to the state of the neuron i {\displaystyle i} at time t + T {\displaystyle t+T} . That is, ∀ t = 0 , 1 , 2 , … , P r ( N 1 , N 2 , … , N p , t ) = N i ( t + T ) {\displaystyle \forall t=0,1,2,\dots ,\quad Pr(N_{1},N_{2},\dots ,N_{p},t)=N_{i}(t+T)} === Equivalence === In the paper, they considered some alternative definitions of artificial neural networks, and have shown them to be equivalent, that is, neural networks under one definition realizes precisely the same logical sentences as neural networks under another definition. They considered three forms of inhibition: relative inhibition, absolute inhibition, and extinction. The definition above is relative inhibition. By "absolute inhibition" they meant that if any negative synapse fires, then the neuron will not fire. By "extinction" they meant that if at time t {\displaystyle t} , any inhibitory synapse fires on a neuron i {\displaystyle i} , then θ i ( t + j ) = θ i ( 0 ) + b j {\displaystyle \theta _{i}(t+j)=\theta _{i}(0)+b_{j}} for j = 1 , 2 , 3 , … {\displaystyle j=1,2,3,\dots } , until the next time an inhibitory synapse fires on i {\displaystyle i} . It is required that b j = 0 {\displaystyle b_{j}=0} for all large j {\displaystyle j} . Theorem 4 and 5 state that these are equivalent. They considered three forms of excitation: spatial summation, temporal summation, and facilitation. The definition above is spatial summation (which they pictured as having multiple synapses placed close together, so that the effect of their firing sums up). By "temporal summation" they meant that the total incoming signal is ∑ τ = 0 T ∑ j = 1 n w i j ( t ) N j ( t − τ ) {\displaystyle \sum _{\tau =0}^{T}\sum _{j=1}^{n}w_{ij}(t)N_{j}(t-\tau )} for some T ≥ 1 {\displaystyle T\geq 1} . By "facilitation" they meant the same as extinction, except that b j ≤ 0 {\displaystyle b_{j}\leq 0} . Theorem 6 states that these are equivalent. They considered neural networks that do not change, and those that change by Hebbian learning. That is, they assume that at t = 0 {\displaystyle t=0} , some excitatory synaptic connections are not active. If at any t {\displaystyle t} , both N i ( t ) = 1 , N j ( t ) = 1 {\displaystyle N_{i}(t)=1,N_{j}(t)=1} , then any latent excitatory synapse between i , j {\displaystyle i,j} becomes active. Theorem 7 states that these are equivalent. === Logical expressivity === They considered "temporal propositional expressions" (TPE), which are propositional formulas with one free variable t {\displaystyle t} . For example, N 1 ( t ) ∨ N 2 ( t ) ∧ ¬ N 3 ( t ) {\displaystyle N_{1}(t)\vee N_{2}(t)\wedge \neg N_{3}(t)} is such an expression. Theorem 1 and 2 together showed that neural nets without circles are equivalent to TPE. For neural nets with loops, they noted that "realizable P r {\displaystyle Pr} may involve reference to past events of an indefinite degree of remoteness". These then encodes for sentences like "There was some x such that x was a ψ" or ( ∃ x ) ( ψ x ) {\displaystyle (\exists x)(\psi x)} . Theorems 8 to 10 showed that neural nets with loops can encode all first-order logic with equality and conversely, any looped neural networks is equivalent to a sentence in first-order logic with equality, thus showing that they are equivalent in logical expressiveness. As a remark, they noted that a neural network, if furnished with a tape, scanners, and write-heads, is equivalent to a Turing machine, and conversely, every Turing machine is equivalent to some such neural network. Thus, these neural networks are equivalent to Turing computability and Church's lambda-definability. == Context == === Previous work === The paper built upon several previous strands of work. In the symbolic logic side, it built on the previous work by Carnap, Whitehead, and Russell. This was contributed by Walter Pitts, who had a strong proficiency with symbolic logic. Pitts provided mathematical and logical rigor to McCulloch’s vague ideas on psychons (atoms of psychological events) and circular causality. In the neuroscience side, it built on previous work by the mathematical biology research group centered around Nicolas Rashevsky, of which McCulloch was a member. The paper was published in the Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, which was founded by Rashevsky in 1939. During the late 1930s, Rashevsky's research group was producing papers that had difficulty publishing in other journals at the time, so Rashevsky decided to found a new journal exclusively devoted to mathematical biophysics. Also in the Rashevsky's group was Alston Scott Householder, who in 1941 published an abstract model
The AI Con
The AI Con: How to Fight Big Tech's Hype and Create the Future We Want is a 2025 non-fiction book by linguist Emily M. Bender and sociologist Alex Hanna. It argues that much of what is labeled "artificial intelligence" is a misleading term that obscures ordinary automation while concentrating power in a small number of technology firms. The book was published in May 2025 by Harper in the United States and Bodley Head in the United Kingdom. It was developed alongside the authors' long-running podcast Mystery AI Hype Theater 3000, which critiques exaggerated claims about AI. == Synopsis == The authors present AI as a marketing umbrella that encourages audiences to infer understanding and agency where none exist. They argue readers should treat such language skeptically and to separate specific automated tasks from broad claims of intelligence. The book describes a recurring hype cycle in which corporate narratives justify data and labor extraction, the replacement of human services with cheaper substitutes, and the diversion of attention from present harms to speculative futures. While acknowledging limited uses such as pattern recognition, the authors argue that contemporary systems are best understood as text and media generators shaped by training data and human labor, not as thinking or reasoning entities. A central theme is the social and environmental cost of scaling these systems, including increased energy and water use, the appropriation of creative work for training, and the outsourcing of ghost work to low-paid data workers worldwide. These costs are linked to workplace effects, with the authors arguing that automation rarely eliminates jobs outright and more often degrades them through surveillance, work intensification, and unpaid oversight. As alternatives to passive adoption, the authors propose concrete responses: asking precise questions about what is being automated and why, demanding transparency about data and evaluation, and practicing what they call strategic refusal when deployment conflicts with evidence or values. The book also develops a vocabulary for public debate, rejecting both boosterish and doomerish narratives as grounded in the same assumption that AI is a singular, autonomous force. The authors recommend reading strategies such as favoring trusted human sources over automated summaries and using humor to deflate inflated claims. They describe a link between language to policy and power, arguing that precise terminology can help policymakers and the public resist austerity-driven automation and demand accountability for errors and harms. == Reception == The Guardian praised the book's myth-busting approach and its analysis of how hype erodes cultural and civic life by normalizing synthetic media as a substitute for human judgment. Kirkus Reviews described it as a contrarian account that catalogs concrete risks while cutting through speculative predictions. An interview in Business Insider highlighted the authors' accessible frameworks, including their proposal to describe chatbots as conversation simulators and to evaluate systems in terms of values, labor, and evidence. Coverage in GeekWire emphasized the book's call for resistance through collective bargaining, stronger data rights, and a norm of rejecting deployments that fail basic standards of necessity and evaluation. Some reviews were more critical. A review in LLRX argued that the book's tone could be overly polemical and that it gave limited attention to potential benefits claimed for generative systems. Coverage in the Financial Times, focused on Bender's broader public scholarship, situated the book within her long-standing critique of anthropomorphic narratives about large language models and her advocacy for more democratic oversight of automated systems.
Artificial intelligence arms race
A military artificial intelligence arms race is a technological, economic, and military competition between two or more states to develop and deploy advanced AI technologies and lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). The goal is to gain a strategic or tactical advantage over rivals, similar to previous arms races involving nuclear or conventional military technologies. Since the mid-2010s, many analysts have noted the emergence of such an arms race between superpowers for better AI technology and military AI, driven by increasing geopolitical and military tensions. An AI arms race is sometimes placed in the context of an AI Cold War between the United States and China. Several influential figures and publications have emphasized that whoever develops artificial general intelligence (AGI) first could dominate global affairs in the 21st century. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that the leader in AI will "rule the world." Researchers and experts, such as Leopold Aschenbrenner and Adrian Pecotic respectively, warn that the AGI race between major powers like the U.S. and China could reshape geopolitical power. This includes AI for surveillance, autonomous weapons, decision-making systems, cyber operations, and more. == Terminology == Lethal autonomous weapons systems use artificial intelligence to identify and kill human targets without human intervention. LAWS have colloquially been called "slaughterbots" or "killer robots". Broadly, any competition for superior AI is sometimes framed as an "arms race". Advantages in military AI overlap with advantages in other sectors, as countries pursue both economic and military advantages, as per previous arms races throughout history. == History == In 2014, AI specialist Steve Omohundro warned that "An autonomous weapons arms race is already taking place". According to Siemens, worldwide military spending on robotics was US$5.1 billion in 2010 and US$7.5 billion in 2015. China became a top player in artificial intelligence research in the 2010s. According to the Financial Times, in 2016, for the first time, China published more AI research papers than the entire European Union. When restricted to number of AI papers in the top 5% of cited papers, China overtook the United States in 2016 but lagged behind the European Union. 23% of the researchers presenting at the 2017 American Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) conference were Chinese. Eric Schmidt, the former chairman and chief executive officer of Alphabet, has predicted China will be the leading country in AI by 2025. == Risks == One risk concerns the AI race itself, whether or not the race is won by any one group. There are strong incentives for development teams to cut corners with regard to the safety of the system, increasing the risk of critical failures and unintended consequences. This is in part due to the perceived advantage of being the first to develop advanced AI technology. One team appearing to be on the brink of a breakthrough can encourage other teams to take shortcuts, ignore precautions and deploy a system that is less ready. Some argue that using "race" terminology at all in this context can exacerbate this effect. Another potential danger of an AI arms race is the possibility of losing control of the AI systems; the risk is compounded in the case of a race to artificial general intelligence, which may present an existential risk. In 2023, a United States Air Force official reportedly said that during a computer test, a simulated AI drone killed the human character operating it. The USAF later said the official had misspoken and that it never conducted such simulations. A third risk of an AI arms race is whether or not the race is actually won by one group. The concern is regarding the consolidation of power and technological advantage in the hands of one group. A US government report argued that "AI-enabled capabilities could be used to threaten critical infrastructure, amplify disinformation campaigns, and wage war":1, and that "global stability and nuclear deterrence could be undermined".:11 == By nation == === United States === In 2014, former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel posited the "Third Offset Strategy" that rapid advances in artificial intelligence will define the next generation of warfare. According to data science and analytics firm Govini, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) increased investment in artificial intelligence, big data and cloud computing from $5.6 billion in 2011 to $7.4 billion in 2016. However, the civilian NSF budget for AI saw no increase in 2017. Japan Times reported in 2018 that the United States private investment is around $70 billion per year. The November 2019 'Interim Report' of the United States' National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence confirmed that AI is critical to US technological military superiority. The U.S. has many military AI combat programs, such as the Sea Hunter autonomous warship, which is designed to operate for extended periods at sea without a single crew member, and to even guide itself in and out of port. From 2017, a temporary US Department of Defense directive requires a human operator to be kept in the loop when it comes to the taking of human life by autonomous weapons systems. On October 31, 2019, the United States Department of Defense's Defense Innovation Board published the draft of a report recommending principles for the ethical use of artificial intelligence by the Department of Defense that would ensure a human operator would always be able to look into the 'black box' and understand the kill-chain process. However, a major concern is how the report will be implemented. The Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) (pronounced "jake") is an American organization on exploring the usage of AI (particularly edge computing), Network of Networks, and AI-enhanced communication, for use in actual combat. It is a subdivision of the United States Armed Forces and was created in June 2018. The organization's stated objective is to "transform the US Department of Defense by accelerating the delivery and adoption of AI to achieve mission impact at scale. The goal is to use AI to solve large and complex problem sets that span multiple combat systems; then, ensure the combat Systems and Components have real-time access to ever-improving libraries of data sets and tools." In 2023, Microsoft pitched the DoD to use DALL-E models to train its battlefield management system. OpenAI, the developer of DALL-E, removed the blanket ban on military and warfare use from its usage policies in January 2024. The Biden administration imposed restrictions on the export of advanced NVIDIA chips and GPUs to China in an effort to limit China's progress in artificial intelligence and high-performance computing. The policy aimed to prevent the use of cutting-edge U.S. technology in military or surveillance applications and to maintain a strategic advantage in the global AI race. In 2025, under the second Trump administration, the United States began a broad deregulation campaign aimed at accelerating growth in sectors critical to artificial intelligence, including nuclear energy, infrastructure, and high-performance computing. The goal was to remove regulatory barriers and attract private investment to boost domestic AI capabilities. This included easing restrictions on data usage, speeding up approvals for AI-related infrastructure projects, and incentivizing innovation in cloud computing and semiconductors. Companies like NVIDIA, Oracle, and Cisco played a central role in these efforts, expanding their AI research, data center capacity, and partnerships to help position the U.S. as a global leader in AI development. ==== Project Maven ==== Project Maven is a Pentagon project involving using machine learning and engineering talent to distinguish people and objects in drone videos, apparently giving the government real-time battlefield command and control, and the ability to track, tag and spy on targets without human involvement. Initially the effort was led by Robert O. Work who was concerned about China's military use of the emerging technology. Reportedly, Pentagon development stops short of acting as an AI weapons system capable of firing on self-designated targets. The project was established in a memo by the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense on 26 April 2017. Also known as the Algorithmic Warfare Cross Functional Team, it is, according to Lt. Gen. of the United States Air Force Jack Shanahan in November 2017, a project "designed to be that pilot project, that pathfinder, that spark that kindles the flame front of artificial intelligence across the rest of the [Defense] Department". Its chief, U.S. Marine Corps Col. Drew Cukor, said: "People and computers will work symbiotically to increase the ability of weapon systems to detect objects." Project Maven has been noted by allies, such as Australia's Ian Langford, for the
Cuboid (computer vision)
In computer vision, the term cuboid is used to describe a small spatiotemporal volume extracted for purposes of behavior recognition. The cuboid is regarded as a basic geometric primitive type and is used to depict three-dimensional objects within a three dimensional representation of a flat, two dimensional image. == Production == Cuboids can be produced from both two-dimensional and three-dimensional images. One method used to produce cuboids utilizes scene understanding (SUN) primitive databases, which are collections of pictures that already contain cuboids. By sorting through SUN primitive databases with machine learning tools, computers observe the conditions in which cuboids are produced in images from SUN primitive databases and can learn to produce cuboids from other images. RGB-D images, which are RGB images that also record the depth of each pixel, are occasionally used to produce cuboids because computers no longer need to determine the depth of an object, as they typically do because depth is already recorded. Cuboid production is sensitive to changes in color and illumination, blockage, and background clutter. This means that it is difficult for computers to produce cuboids of objects that are multicolored, irregularly illuminated, or partially covered, or if there are many objects in the background. This is partially due to the fact that algorithms for producing cuboids are still relatively simple. == Usage == Cuboids are created for point cloud-based three-dimensional maps and can be utilized in various situations such as augmented reality, the automated control of cars, drones, and robots, and object detection. Cuboids allow for software to identify a scene through geometric descriptions in an “object-agnostic” fashion. Interest points, locations within images that are identified by a computer as essential to identifying the image, created from two-dimensional images can be used with cuboids for image matching, identifying a room or scene, and instance recognition. Interest points created from three dimensional images can be used with cuboids to recognize activities. This is possible because interest points aid software to focus on only the most important aspects of the images. RGB-D images and SLAM systems are used together in RGB-D SLAM systems, which are employed by Computer-aided design systems to generate point cloud-based three-dimensional maps. Most industrial multi-axis machining tools use computer-aided manufacturing and subsequently work in cuboid work spaces.
Purged cross-validation
Purged cross-validation is a variant of k-fold cross-validation designed to prevent look-ahead bias in time series and other structured data, developed in 2017 by Marcos López de Prado at Guggenheim Partners and Cornell University. It is primarily used in financial machine learning to ensure the independence of training and testing samples when labels depend on future events. It provides an alternative to conventional cross-validation and walk-forward backtesting methods, which often yield overly optimistic performance estimates due to information leakage and overfitting. == Motivation == Standard cross-validation assumes that observations are independently and identically distributed (IID), which often does not hold in time series or financial datasets. If the label of a test sample overlaps in time with the features or labels in the training set, the result may be data leakage and overfitting. Purged cross-validation addresses this issue by removing overlapping observations and, optionally, adding a temporal buffer ("embargo") around the test set to further reduce the risk of leakage. The figure below illustrates standard 5 Fold Cross-Validation == Purging == Purging removes from the training set any observation whose timestamp falls within the time range of formation of a label in the test set. This can be the case for train set observations before and after the test set. Their removal ensures that the algorithm cannot learn during train time information that will be used to assess the performance of the algorithm. See the figure below for an illustration of purging. == Embargoing == Embargoing addresses a more subtle form of leakage: even if an observation does not directly overlap the test set, it may still be affected by test events due to market reaction lag or downstream dependencies. To guard against this, a percentage-based embargo is imposed after each test fold. For example, with a 5% embargo and 1000 observations, the 50 observations following each test fold are excluded from training. Unlike purging, embargoing can only occur after the test set. The figure below illustrates the application of embargo: == Applications == Purged and embargoed cross-validation has been useful in: Backtesting of trading strategies Validation of classifiers on labeled event-driven returns Any machine learning task with overlapping label horizons == Example == To illustrate the effect of purging and embargoing, consider the figures below. Both diagrams show the structure of 5-fold cross-validation over a 20-day period. In each row, blue squares indicate training samples and red squares denote test samples. Each label is defined based on the value of the next two observations, hence creating an overlap. If this overlap is left untreated, test set information leaks into the train set. The second figure applies the Purged CV procedure. Notice how purging removes overlapping observations from the training set and the embargo widens the gap between test and training data. This approach ensures that the evaluation more closely resembles a true out-of-sample test and reduces the risk of backtest overfitting. == Combinatorial Purged Cross-Validation == Walk-forward backtesting analysis, another common cross-validation technique in finance, preserves temporal order but evaluates the model on a single sequence of test sets. This leads to high variance in performance estimation, as results are contingent on a specific historical path. Combinatorial Purged Cross-Validation (CPCV) addresses this limitation by systematically constructing multiple train-test splits, purging overlapping samples, and enforcing an embargo period to prevent information leakage. The result is a distribution of out-of-sample performance estimates, enabling robust statistical inference and more realistic assessment of a model's predictive power. === Methodology === CPCV divides a time-series dataset into N sequential, non-overlapping groups. These groups preserve the temporal order of observations. Then, all combinations of k groups (where k < N) are selected as test sets, with the remaining N − k groups used for training. For each combination, the model is trained and evaluated under strict controls to prevent leakage. To eliminate potential contamination between training and test sets, CPCV introduces two additional mechanisms: Purging: Any training observations whose label horizon overlaps with the test period are excluded. This ensures that future information does not influence model training. Embargoing: After the end of each test period, a fixed number of observations (typically a small percentage) are removed from the training set. This prevents leakage due to delayed market reactions or auto-correlated features. Each data point appears in multiple test sets across different combinations. Because test groups are drawn combinatorially, this process produces multiple backtest "paths," each of which simulates a plausible market scenario. From these paths, practitioners can compute a distribution of performance statistics such as the Sharpe ratio, drawdown, or classification accuracy. === Formal definition === Let N be the number of sequential groups into which the dataset is divided, and let k be the number of groups selected as the test set for each split. Then: The number of unique train-test combinations is given by the binomial coefficient: ( N k ) {\displaystyle {\binom {N}{k}}} Each observation is used in k {\displaystyle k} test sets and contributes to φ [ N , k ] {\displaystyle \varphi [N,k]} unique backtest paths: φ [ N , k ] = k N ( N k ) {\displaystyle \varphi [N,k]={\frac {k}{N}}{\binom {N}{k}}} This yields a distribution of performance metrics rather than a single point estimate, making it possible to apply Monte Carlo-based or probabilistic techniques to assess model robustness. === Illustrative example === Consider the case where N = 6 and k = 2. The number of possible test set combinations is ( 6 2 ) = 15 {\displaystyle {\binom {6}{2}}=15} . Each of the six groups appears in five test splits. Consequently, five distinct backtest paths can be constructed, each incorporating one appearance from every group. ==== Test group assignment matrix ==== This table shows the 15 test combinations. An "x" indicates that the corresponding group is included in the test set for that split. ==== Backtest path assignment ==== Each group contributes to five different backtest paths. The number in each cell indicates the path to which the group's result is assigned for that split. === Advantages === Combinatorial Purged Cross-Validation offers several key benefits over conventional methods: It produces a distribution of performance metrics, enabling more rigorous statistical inference. The method systematically eliminates lookahead bias through purging and embargoing. By simulating multiple historical scenarios, it reduces the dependence on any single market regime or realization. It supports high-confidence comparisons between competing models or strategies. CPCV is commonly used in quantitative strategy research, especially for evaluating predictive models such as classifiers, regressors, and portfolio optimizers. It has been applied to estimate realistic Sharpe ratios, assess the risk of overfitting, and support the use of statistical tools such as the Deflated Sharpe Ratio (DSR). === Limitations === The main limitation of CPCV stems from its high computational cost. However, this cost can be managed by sampling a finite number of splits from the space of all possible combinations.