Chris Olah

Chris Olah

Christopher Olah (born 1992 or 1993) is a Canadian machine learning researcher and a co-founder of Anthropic. He is known for his work on neural network interpretability, particularly mechanistic interpretability, and for research and tools that visualise internal representations in neural networks. In 2025, Forbes reported he had become a billionaire due to his ownership in Anthropic. == Early life and education == Olah was born in Canada. According to Wired, he left university at age 18 without earning a degree and later received a Thiel Fellowship, which supported him in pursuing independent work. == Career == Olah has worked on interpretability research at Google Brain, OpenAI, and Anthropic. Time called him one of the pioneers of mechanistic interpretability and noted that he pursued this research line first at Google, then at OpenAI, and later at Anthropic, which he co-founded. Wired reported that Olah was involved in neural network visualisation work including DeepDream in 2015, as part of efforts to better understand what neural networks learn. Later coverage linked him to more structured interpretability approaches such as "activation atlases". The Verge covered activation atlases as a collaboration between Google and OpenAI researchers to help inspect neural network representations. At Anthropic, Olah has been identified in major press coverage as leading interpretability work aimed at mapping internal "features" in large language models and relating interpretability findings to AI safety. Quanta Magazine has also quoted Olah in reporting on interpretability and the internal structure of modern language models. Time included Olah in its TIME100 AI list in 2024. === Vatican address on AI ethics === On May 25, 2026, Olah spoke at the Vatican during the official presentation of Magnifica Humanitas, the first encyclical of Pope Leo XIV, which addresses artificial intelligence and human dignity. Olah said AI could lead to large-scale displacement of human labor and exacerbate global inequality. He said the commercial and geopolitical incentives driving frontier AI labs often conflict with the public good, and described AI systems as "grown" rather than strictly engineered. Olah called for external moral oversight from religious institutions, scholars, and civil society to hold the technology sector accountable.

Depth peeling

In computer graphics, depth peeling is an exact multipass method of order-independent transparency that extracts transparent fragments into depth layers and composites those layers in depth order. Depth peeling has the advantage of being able to generate correct results even for complex images containing intersecting transparent objects. == Method == Depth peeling works by rendering the image multiple times. Depth peeling uses two Z buffers, one that works conventionally, and one that is not modified, and sets the minimum distance at which a fragment can be drawn without being discarded. For each pass, the previous pass' conventional Z-buffer is used as the minimal Z-buffer, so each pass removes already-captured nearer fragments and draws the next depth layer behind them. The resulting images can then be composited in depth order to form a single image. A major drawback of classical depth peeling is performance: it requires one geometry pass per peeled layer, so scenes with high depth complexity require many passes that each re-rasterize the transparent geometry. Later variants reduce the number of passes by peeling multiple layers or both front and back layers in a pass. Dual depth peeling reduces the geometry-pass count from N to N/2+1 by peeling one layer from the front and one from the back in each pass, while multi-layer depth peeling peels several layers per pass and reported up to an 8x speed-up in RGBA8 settings.

Neural cryptography

Neural cryptography is a branch of cryptography dedicated to analyzing the application of stochastic algorithms, especially artificial neural network algorithms, for use in encryption and cryptanalysis. == Definition == Artificial neural networks are well known for their ability to selectively explore the solution space of a given problem. This feature finds a natural niche of application in the field of cryptanalysis. At the same time, neural networks offer a new approach to attack ciphering algorithms based on the principle that any function could be reproduced by a neural network, which is a powerful proven computational tool that can be used to find the inverse-function of any cryptographic algorithm. The ideas of mutual learning, self learning, and stochastic behavior of neural networks and similar algorithms can be used for different aspects of cryptography, like public-key cryptography, solving the key distribution problem using neural network mutual synchronization, hashing or generation of pseudo-random numbers. Another idea is the ability of a neural network to separate space in non-linear pieces using "bias". It gives different probabilities of activating the neural network or not. This is very useful in the case of Cryptanalysis. Two names are used to design the same domain of research: Neuro-Cryptography and Neural Cryptography. The first work that it is known on this topic can be traced back to 1995 in an IT Master Thesis. == Applications == In 1995, Sebastien Dourlens applied neural networks to cryptanalyze DES by allowing the networks to learn how to invert the S-tables of the DES. The bias in DES studied through Differential Cryptanalysis by Adi Shamir is highlighted. The experiment shows about 50% of the key bits can be found, allowing the complete key to be found in a short time. Hardware application with multi micro-controllers have been proposed due to the easy implementation of multilayer neural networks in hardware. One example of a public-key protocol is given by Khalil Shihab . He describes the decryption scheme and the public key creation that are based on a backpropagation neural network. The encryption scheme and the private key creation process are based on Boolean algebra. This technique has the advantage of small time and memory complexities. A disadvantage is the property of backpropagation algorithms: because of huge training sets, the learning phase of a neural network is very long. Therefore, the use of this protocol is only theoretical so far. == Neural key exchange protocol == The most used protocol for key exchange between two parties A and B in the practice is Diffie–Hellman key exchange protocol. Neural key exchange, which is based on the synchronization of two tree parity machines, should be a secure replacement for this method. Synchronizing these two machines is similar to synchronizing two chaotic oscillators in chaos communications. === Tree parity machine === The tree parity machine is a special type of multi-layer feedforward neural network. It consists of one output neuron, K hidden neurons and K×N input neurons. Inputs to the network take three values: x i j ∈ { − 1 , 0 , + 1 } {\displaystyle x_{ij}\in \left\{-1,0,+1\right\}} The weights between input and hidden neurons take the values: w i j ∈ { − L , . . . , 0 , . . . , + L } {\displaystyle w_{ij}\in \left\{-L,...,0,...,+L\right\}} Output value of each hidden neuron is calculated as a sum of all multiplications of input neurons and these weights: σ i = sgn ⁡ ( ∑ j = 1 N w i j x i j ) {\displaystyle \sigma _{i}=\operatorname {sgn}(\sum _{j=1}^{N}w_{ij}x_{ij})} Signum is a simple function, which returns −1,0 or 1: sgn ⁡ ( x ) = { − 1 if x < 0 , 0 if x = 0 , 1 if x > 0. {\displaystyle \operatorname {sgn}(x)={\begin{cases}-1&{\text{if }}x<0,\\0&{\text{if }}x=0,\\1&{\text{if }}x>0.\end{cases}}} If the scalar product is 0, the output of the hidden neuron is mapped to −1 in order to ensure a binary output value. The output of neural network is then computed as the multiplication of all values produced by hidden elements: τ = ∏ i = 1 K σ i {\displaystyle \tau =\prod _{i=1}^{K}\sigma _{i}} Output of the tree parity machine is binary. === Protocol === Each party (A and B) uses its own tree parity machine. Synchronization of the tree parity machines is achieved in these steps Initialize random weight values Execute these steps until the full synchronization is achieved Generate random input vector X Compute the values of the hidden neurons Compute the value of the output neuron Compare the values of both tree parity machines Outputs are the same: one of the suitable learning rules is applied to the weights Outputs are different: go to 2.1 After the full synchronization is achieved (the weights wij of both tree parity machines are same), A and B can use their weights as keys. This method is known as a bidirectional learning. One of the following learning rules can be used for the synchronization: Hebbian learning rule: w i + = g ( w i + σ i x i Θ ( σ i τ ) Θ ( τ A τ B ) ) {\displaystyle w_{i}^{+}=g(w_{i}+\sigma _{i}x_{i}\Theta (\sigma _{i}\tau )\Theta (\tau ^{A}\tau ^{B}))} Anti-Hebbian learning rule: w i + = g ( w i − σ i x i Θ ( σ i τ ) Θ ( τ A τ B ) ) {\displaystyle w_{i}^{+}=g(w_{i}-\sigma _{i}x_{i}\Theta (\sigma _{i}\tau )\Theta (\tau ^{A}\tau ^{B}))} Random walk: w i + = g ( w i + x i Θ ( σ i τ ) Θ ( τ A τ B ) ) {\displaystyle w_{i}^{+}=g(w_{i}+x_{i}\Theta (\sigma _{i}\tau )\Theta (\tau ^{A}\tau ^{B}))} Where: Θ ( a , b ) = 0 {\displaystyle \Theta (a,b)=0} if a ≠ b {\displaystyle a\neq b} otherwise Θ ( a , b ) = 1 {\displaystyle \Theta (a,b)=1} And: g ( x ) {\displaystyle g(x)} is a function that keeps the w i {\displaystyle w_{i}} in the range { − L , − L + 1 , . . . , 0 , . . . , L − 1 , L } {\displaystyle \{-L,-L+1,...,0,...,L-1,L\}} === Attacks and security of this protocol === In every attack it is considered, that the attacker E can eavesdrop messages between the parties A and B, but does not have an opportunity to change them. ==== Brute force ==== To provide a brute force attack, an attacker has to test all possible keys (all possible values of weights wij). By K hidden neurons, K×N input neurons and boundary of weights L, this gives (2L+1)KN possibilities. For example, the configuration K = 3, L = 3 and N = 100 gives us 310253 key possibilities, making the attack impossible with today's computer power. ==== Learning with own tree parity machine ==== One of the basic attacks can be provided by an attacker, who owns the same tree parity machine as the parties A and B. He wants to synchronize his tree parity machine with these two parties. In each step there are three situations possible: Output(A) ≠ Output(B): None of the parties updates its weights. Output(A) = Output(B) = Output(E): All the three parties update weights in their tree parity machines. Output(A) = Output(B) ≠ Output(E): Parties A and B update their tree parity machines, but the attacker can not do that. Because of this situation his learning is slower than the synchronization of parties A and B. It has been proven, that the synchronization of two parties is faster than learning of an attacker. It can be improved by increasing of the synaptic depth L of the neural network. That gives this protocol enough security and an attacker can find out the key only with small probability. ==== Other attacks ==== For conventional cryptographic systems, we can improve the security of the protocol by increasing of the key length. In the case of neural cryptography, we improve it by increasing of the synaptic depth L of the neural networks. Changing this parameter increases the cost of a successful attack exponentially, while the effort for the users grows polynomially. Therefore, breaking the security of neural key exchange belongs to the complexity class NP. Alexander Klimov, Anton Mityaguine, and Adi Shamir say that the original neural synchronization scheme can be broken by at least three different attacks—geometric, probabilistic analysis, and using genetic algorithms. Even though this particular implementation is insecure, the ideas behind chaotic synchronization could potentially lead to a secure implementation. === Permutation parity machine === The permutation parity machine is a binary variant of the tree parity machine. It consists of one input layer, one hidden layer and one output layer. The number of neurons in the output layer depends on the number of hidden units K. Each hidden neuron has N binary input neurons: x i j ∈ { 0 , 1 } {\displaystyle x_{ij}\in \left\{0,1\right\}} The weights between input and hidden neurons are also binary: w i j ∈ { 0 , 1 } {\displaystyle w_{ij}\in \left\{0,1\right\}} Output value of each hidden neuron is calculated as a sum of all exclusive disjunctions (exclusive or) of input neurons and these weights: σ i = θ N ( ∑ j = 1 N w i j ⊕ x i j ) {\displaystyle \sigma _{i}=\theta _{N}(\sum _{j=1}^{N}w_{ij}\oplus x_{ij})} (⊕ means XOR). Th

Tucker decomposition

In mathematics, Tucker decomposition decomposes a tensor into a set of matrices and one small core tensor. It is named after Ledyard R. Tucker although it goes back to Hitchcock in 1927. Initially described as a three-mode extension of factor analysis and principal component analysis it may actually be generalized to higher mode analysis, which is also called higher-order singular value decomposition (HOSVD) or the M-mode SVD. The algorithm to which the literature typically refers when discussing the Tucker decomposition or the HOSVD is the M-mode SVD algorithm introduced by Vasilescu and Terzopoulos, but misattributed to Tucker or De Lathauwer etal. It may be regarded as a more flexible PARAFAC (parallel factor analysis) model. In PARAFAC the core tensor is restricted to be "diagonal". In practice, Tucker decomposition is used as a modelling tool. For instance, it is used to model three-way (or higher way) data by means of relatively small numbers of components for each of the three or more modes, and the components are linked to each other by a three- (or higher-) way core array. The model parameters are estimated in such a way that, given fixed numbers of components, the modelled data optimally resemble the actual data in the least squares sense. The model gives a summary of the information in the data, in the same way as principal components analysis does for two-way data. For a 3rd-order tensor T ∈ F n 1 × n 2 × n 3 {\displaystyle T\in F^{n_{1}\times n_{2}\times n_{3}}} , where F {\displaystyle F} is either R {\displaystyle \mathbb {R} } or C {\displaystyle \mathbb {C} } , Tucker Decomposition can be denoted as follows, T = T × 1 U ( 1 ) × 2 U ( 2 ) × 3 U ( 3 ) {\displaystyle T={\mathcal {T}}\times _{1}U^{(1)}\times _{2}U^{(2)}\times _{3}U^{(3)}} where T ∈ F d 1 × d 2 × d 3 {\displaystyle {\mathcal {T}}\in F^{d_{1}\times d_{2}\times d_{3}}} is the core tensor, a 3rd-order tensor that contains the 1-mode, 2-mode and 3-mode singular values of T {\displaystyle T} , which are defined as the Frobenius norm of the 1-mode, 2-mode and 3-mode slices of tensor T {\displaystyle {\mathcal {T}}} respectively. U ( 1 ) , U ( 2 ) , U ( 3 ) {\displaystyle U^{(1)},U^{(2)},U^{(3)}} are unitary matrices in F d 1 × n 1 , F d 2 × n 2 , F d 3 × n 3 {\displaystyle F^{d_{1}\times n_{1}},F^{d_{2}\times n_{2}},F^{d_{3}\times n_{3}}} respectively. The k-mode product (k = 1, 2, 3) of T {\displaystyle {\mathcal {T}}} by U ( k ) {\displaystyle U^{(k)}} is denoted as T × U ( k ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {T}}\times U^{(k)}} with entries as ( T × 1 U ( 1 ) ) ( i 1 , j 2 , j 3 ) = ∑ j 1 = 1 d 1 T ( j 1 , j 2 , j 3 ) U ( 1 ) ( j 1 , i 1 ) ( T × 2 U ( 2 ) ) ( j 1 , i 2 , j 3 ) = ∑ j 2 = 1 d 2 T ( j 1 , j 2 , j 3 ) U ( 2 ) ( j 2 , i 2 ) ( T × 3 U ( 3 ) ) ( j 1 , j 2 , i 3 ) = ∑ j 3 = 1 d 3 T ( j 1 , j 2 , j 3 ) U ( 3 ) ( j 3 , i 3 ) {\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}({\mathcal {T}}\times _{1}U^{(1)})(i_{1},j_{2},j_{3})&=\sum _{j_{1}=1}^{d_{1}}{\mathcal {T}}(j_{1},j_{2},j_{3})U^{(1)}(j_{1},i_{1})\\({\mathcal {T}}\times _{2}U^{(2)})(j_{1},i_{2},j_{3})&=\sum _{j_{2}=1}^{d_{2}}{\mathcal {T}}(j_{1},j_{2},j_{3})U^{(2)}(j_{2},i_{2})\\({\mathcal {T}}\times _{3}U^{(3)})(j_{1},j_{2},i_{3})&=\sum _{j_{3}=1}^{d_{3}}{\mathcal {T}}(j_{1},j_{2},j_{3})U^{(3)}(j_{3},i_{3})\end{aligned}}} Altogether, the decomposition may also be written more directly as T ( i 1 , i 2 , i 3 ) = ∑ j 1 = 1 d 1 ∑ j 2 = 1 d 2 ∑ j 3 = 1 d 3 T ( j 1 , j 2 , j 3 ) U ( 1 ) ( j 1 , i 1 ) U ( 2 ) ( j 2 , i 2 ) U ( 3 ) ( j 3 , i 3 ) {\displaystyle T(i_{1},i_{2},i_{3})=\sum _{j_{1}=1}^{d_{1}}\sum _{j_{2}=1}^{d_{2}}\sum _{j_{3}=1}^{d_{3}}{\mathcal {T}}(j_{1},j_{2},j_{3})U^{(1)}(j_{1},i_{1})U^{(2)}(j_{2},i_{2})U^{(3)}(j_{3},i_{3})} Taking d i = n i {\displaystyle d_{i}=n_{i}} for all i {\displaystyle i} is always sufficient to represent T {\displaystyle T} exactly, but often T {\displaystyle T} can be compressed or efficiently approximately by choosing d i < n i {\displaystyle d_{i}

ImageNets

ImageNets is an open source framework for rapid prototyping of machine vision algorithms, developed by the Institute of Automation. == Description == ImageNets is an open source and platform independent (Windows & Linux) framework for rapid prototyping of machine vision algorithms. With the GUI ImageNet Designer, no programming knowledge is required to perform operations on images. A configured ImageNet can be loaded and executed from C++ code without the need for loading the ImageNet Designer GUI to achieve higher execution performance. == History == ImageNets was developed by the Institute of Automation, University of Bremen, Germany. The software was first publicly released in 2010. Originally, ImageNets was developed for the Care-Providing Robot FRIEND but it can be used for a wide range of computer vision applications.

Shape table

Shape tables are a feature of the Apple II ROMs which allows for manipulation of small images encoded as a series of vectors. An image (or shape) can be drawn in the high-resolution graphics mode—with scaling and rotation—via software routines in the ROM. Shape tables are supported via Applesoft BASIC and from machine code in the "Programmer's Aid" package that was bundled with the original Integer BASIC ROMs for that computer. Applesoft's high-resolution graphics routines were not optimized for speed, so shape tables were not typically used for performance-critical software such as games, which were typically written in assembly language and used pre-shifted bitmap shapes. Shape tables were used primarily for static shapes and sometimes for fancy text; Beagle Bros offered a number of fonts in Font Mechanic as Applesoft shape tables. == Technical details == The vectors of a two-dimensional graphic, each encoding a direction from the previous pixel along with a flag indicating whether the new pixel should be illuminated or not, were encoded up to three in a byte. These were stored in a table via the Monitor or the POKE command. From there, the graphic could be referenced by number (a table could contain up to 255 shapes), and built-in Applesoft routines permitted scaling, rotating, and drawing or erasing the shape. An XOR mode was also available to allow the shape to be visible on any color background; this had the advantage, also, of allowing the shape to be easily erased by redrawing it. Apple did not provide any utilities for creating shape tables; they had to be created by hand, usually by plotting on graph paper, then calculating the hexadecimal values and entering them into the computer. Beagle Bros created a shape table editing program, which eliminated the "number crunching", called Apple Mechanic, and a related program, Font Mechanic.

Homogeneity blockmodeling

In mathematics applied to analysis of social structures, homogeneity blockmodeling is an approach in blockmodeling, which is best suited for a preliminary or main approach to valued networks, when a prior knowledge about these networks is not available. This is because homogeneity blockmodeling emphasizes the similarity of link (tie) strengths within the blocks over the pattern of links. In this approach, tie (link) values (or statistical data computed on them) are assumed to be equal (homogenous) within blocks. This approach to the generalized blockmodeling of valued networks was first proposed by Aleš Žiberna in 2007 with the basic idea, "that the inconsistency of an empirical block with its ideal block can be measured by within block variability of appropriate values". The newly–formed ideal blocks, which are appropriate for blockmodeling of valued networks, are then presented together with the definitions of their block inconsistencies. Similar approach to the homogeneity blockmodeling, dealing with direct approach for structural equivalence, was previously suggested by Stephen P. Borgatti and Martin G. Everett (1992).