An inauthentic text is a computer-generated expository document meant to appear as genuine, but which is actually meaningless. Frequently they are created in order to be intermixed with genuine documents and thus manipulate the results of search engines, as with Spam blogs. They are also carried along in email in order to fool spam filters by giving the spam the superficial characteristics of legitimate text. Sometimes nonsensical documents are created with computer assistance for humorous effect, as with Dissociated press or Flarf poetry. They have also been used to challenge the veracity of a publication—MIT students submitted papers generated by a computer program called SCIgen to a conference, where they were initially accepted. This led the students to claim that the bar for submissions was too low. With the amount of computer generated text outpacing the ability of people to humans to curate it, there needs some means of distinguishing between the two. Yet automated approaches to determining absolutely whether a text is authentic or not face intrinsic challenges of semantics. Noam Chomsky coined the phrase "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously" giving an example of grammatically correct, but semantically incoherent sentence; some will point out that in certain contexts one could give this sentence (or any phrase) meaning. The first group to use the expression in this regard can be found below from Indiana University. Their work explains in detail an attempt to detect inauthentic texts and identify pernicious problems of inauthentic texts in cyberspace. The site has a means of submitting text that assesses, based on supervised learning, whether a corpus is inauthentic or not. Many users have submitted incorrect types of data and have correspondingly commented on the scores. This application is meant for a specific kind of data; therefore, submitting, say, an email, will not return a meaningful score.
T Layout
The T-Layout is an architectural and design concept for web applications, specifically tailored to improve the user experience on mobile devices. It features a horizontally scrollable container divided into three distinct sections, each spanning the full width of the screen, and was developed to optimise space usage and streamline navigation. == Background == The T-Layout introduces horizontal scrolling as a complementary method to the conventional pop-up-based navigation system in mobile web applications. In this layout, the central section which is visible by default upon accessing the application, facilitates the main content of a URL address and is flanked by two "helper" sections. This approach minimises the need for extensive user movements, in order to reach navigation controls typically located at the top of the screen. It is aimed at enhancing the user experience on mobile devices by providing an easier way to access essential content such as the main navigation, e-commerce related screens, or user account related information, ensuring that those elements are readily accessible while requiring minimal user effort. The T-Layout was first implemented by E (e-streetwear.com) in their mobile web app layout, and it was inspired by the interfaces of well-tested native mobile apps like Instagram and Revolut. A study titled "Mobile Navigation and User Preferences Survey" indicated a preference among mobile app users for one-handed usage, primarily navigating with their thumb. These insights led to the T-Layout Experiment, which compared the efficiency of using swipe gestures to access navigational elements against reaching traditional navigation controls. == Development history == It was first released as the mobile layout of E in early 2023. It was originally developed based on six principles: user-centric functionality, lightweight filesize, HTML and CSS implementation with minimal or no use of JavaScript required, suitable both for browser and server-rendering architectures, intuitive design, and improved SEO. The development of the T-Layout was driven by the necessity for more ergonomic and user-friendly interfaces in mobile web applications. Its design, reminiscent of the letter 'T', emerged as a solution to several usability challenges mobile device users face, emphasising ease of access and efficient screen space utilisation. In July 2023, E formalised the concept and its technical specifications, introducing it to the web design and development community. In October 2023 the "Mobile Navigation and User Preferences Survey" was conducted, establishing that the vast majority of individuals prefer to use mobile applications by holding the phone in a one-handed grip, utilising only the thumb for gestures when possible. The subsequent "T-Layout Experiment", designed to measure the time in seconds and the distance (user effort) in pixels, required to access navigational elements by traditionally tapping on fixed-positioned controls compared to swiping anywhere on the screen. The results proved that swipe gestures require less time and much less effort. == Styling and features == The main characteristic of the T-Layout is its horizontal scrolling feature, which can improve navigation efficiency while preserving the functionality of traditionally structured user interfaces. Its Implementation can be achieved with a combination of HTML and styling with CSS as well as precompiled Scss and Sass, CSS-in-JS, and styled JSX. It can be either a purely HTML/CSS solution but JavaScript can be utilised as well to add more specific functionalities, while It can be implemented to both existing and new applications. Its application in server-side rendering architectures will ensure that all its underlying principles apply. Although principally each section in the layout has a distinct role and facilitates specific types of content, the T-Layout as a concept is versatile, and it is adaptable allowing modifications in the layout or how it's implemented to cater to the specific needs of different applications.
Strong cryptography
Strong cryptography or cryptographically strong are general terms used to designate the cryptographic algorithms that, when used correctly, provide a very high (usually insurmountable) level of protection against any eavesdropper, including the government agencies. There is no precise definition of the boundary line between the strong cryptography and (breakable) weak cryptography, as this border constantly shifts due to improvements in hardware and cryptanalysis techniques. These improvements eventually place the capabilities once available only to the NSA within the reach of a skilled individual, so in practice there are only two levels of cryptographic security, "cryptography that will stop your kid sister from reading your files, and cryptography that will stop major governments from reading your files" (Bruce Schneier). The strong cryptography algorithms have high security strength, for practical purposes usually defined as a number of bits in the key. For example, the United States government, when dealing with export control of encryption, considered as of 1999 any implementation of the symmetric encryption algorithm with the key length above 56 bits or its public key equivalent to be strong and thus potentially a subject to the export licensing. To be strong, an algorithm needs to have a sufficiently long key and be free of known mathematical weaknesses, as exploitation of these effectively reduces the key size. At the beginning of the 21st century, the typical security strength of the strong symmetrical encryption algorithms is 128 bits (slightly lower values still can be strong, but usually there is little technical gain in using smaller key sizes). Demonstrating the resistance of any cryptographic scheme to attack is a complex matter, requiring extensive testing and reviews, preferably in a public forum. Good algorithms and protocols are required (similarly, good materials are required to construct a strong building), but good system design and implementation is needed as well: "it is possible to build a cryptographically weak system using strong algorithms and protocols" (just like the use of good materials in construction does not guarantee a solid structure). Many real-life systems turn out to be weak when the strong cryptography is not used properly, for example, random nonces are reused A successful attack might not even involve algorithm at all, for example, if the key is generated from a password, guessing a weak password is easy and does not depend on the strength of the cryptographic primitives. A user can become the weakest link in the overall picture, for example, by sharing passwords and hardware tokens with the colleagues. == Background == The level of expense required for strong cryptography originally restricted its use to the government and military agencies, until the middle of the 20th century the process of encryption required a lot of human labor and errors (preventing the decryption) were very common, so only a small share of written information could have been encrypted. US government, in particular, was able to keep a monopoly on the development and use of cryptography in the US into the 1960s. In the 1970, the increased availability of powerful computers and unclassified research breakthroughs (Data Encryption Standard, the Diffie-Hellman and RSA algorithms) made strong cryptography available for civilian use. Mid-1990s saw the worldwide proliferation of knowledge and tools for strong cryptography. By the 21st century the technical limitations were gone, although the majority of the communication were still unencrypted. At the same the cost of building and running systems with strong cryptography became roughly the same as the one for the weak cryptography. The use of computers changed the process of cryptanalysis, famously with Bletchley Park's Colossus. But just as the development of digital computers and electronics helped in cryptanalysis, it also made possible much more complex ciphers. It is typically the case that use of a quality cipher is very efficient, while breaking it requires an effort many orders of magnitude larger - making cryptanalysis so inefficient and impractical as to be effectively impossible. == Cryptographically strong algorithms == This term "cryptographically strong" is often used to describe an encryption algorithm, and implies, in comparison to some other algorithm (which is thus cryptographically weak), greater resistance to attack. But it can also be used to describe hashing and unique identifier and filename creation algorithms. See for example the description of the Microsoft .NET runtime library function Path.GetRandomFileName. In this usage, the term means "difficult to guess". An encryption algorithm is intended to be unbreakable (in which case it is as strong as it can ever be), but might be breakable (in which case it is as weak as it can ever be) so there is not, in principle, a continuum of strength as the idiom would seem to imply: Algorithm A is stronger than Algorithm B which is stronger than Algorithm C, and so on. The situation is made more complex, and less subsumable into a single strength metric, by the fact that there are many types of cryptanalytic attack and that any given algorithm is likely to force the attacker to do more work to break it when using one attack than another. There is only one known unbreakable cryptographic system, the one-time pad, which is not generally possible to use because of the difficulties involved in exchanging one-time pads without them being compromised. So any encryption algorithm can be compared to the perfect algorithm, the one-time pad. The usual sense in which this term is (loosely) used, is in reference to a particular attack, brute force key search — especially in explanations for newcomers to the field. Indeed, with this attack (always assuming keys to have been randomly chosen), there is a continuum of resistance depending on the length of the key used. But even so there are two major problems: many algorithms allow use of different length keys at different times, and any algorithm can forgo use of the full key length possible. Thus, Blowfish and RC5 are block cipher algorithms whose design specifically allowed for several key lengths, and who cannot therefore be said to have any particular strength with respect to brute force key search. Furthermore, US export regulations restrict key length for exportable cryptographic products and in several cases in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g., famously in the case of Lotus Notes' export approval) only partial keys were used, decreasing 'strength' against brute force attack for those (export) versions. More or less the same thing happened outside the US as well, as for example in the case of more than one of the cryptographic algorithms in the GSM cellular telephone standard. The term is commonly used to convey that some algorithm is suitable for some task in cryptography or information security, but also resists cryptanalysis and has no, or fewer, security weaknesses. Tasks are varied, and might include: generating randomness encrypting data providing a method to ensure data integrity Cryptographically strong would seem to mean that the described method has some kind of maturity, perhaps even approved for use against different kinds of systematic attacks in theory and/or practice. Indeed, that the method may resist those attacks long enough to protect the information carried (and what stands behind the information) for a useful length of time. But due to the complexity and subtlety of the field, neither is almost ever the case. Since such assurances are not actually available in real practice, sleight of hand in language which implies that they are will generally be misleading. There will always be uncertainty as advances (e.g., in cryptanalytic theory or merely affordable computer capacity) may reduce the effort needed to successfully use some attack method against an algorithm. In addition, actual use of cryptographic algorithms requires their encapsulation in a cryptosystem, and doing so often introduces vulnerabilities which are not due to faults in an algorithm. For example, essentially all algorithms require random choice of keys, and any cryptosystem which does not provide such keys will be subject to attack regardless of any attack resistant qualities of the encryption algorithm(s) used. == Legal issues == Widespread use of encryption increases the costs of surveillance, so the government policies aim to regulate the use of the strong cryptography. In the 2000s, the effect of encryption on the surveillance capabilities was limited by the ever-increasing share of communications going through the global social media platforms, that did not use the strong encryption and provided governments with the requested data. Murphy talks about a legislative balance that needs to be struck between the power of the government that are broad enough to be able to follow the qui
Data thinking
Data Thinking is a framework that integrates data science with the design process. It combines computational thinking, statistical thinking, and domain-specific knowledge to guide the development of data-driven solutions in product development. The framework is used to explore, design, develop, and validate solutions, with a focus on user experience and data analytics, including data collection and interpretation The framework aims to apply data literacy and inform decision-making through data-driven insights. == Major components == According to "Computational thinking in the era of data science": Data thinking involves understanding that solutions require both data-driven and domain-knowledge-driven rules. Data thinking evaluates whether data accurately represents real-life scenarios and improves data collection where necessary. The framework highlights the importance of preserving domain-specific meaning during data analysis. Data thinking incorporates statistical and logical analysis to identify patterns and irregularities. Data thinking involves testing solutions in real-life contexts and iteratively improving models based on new data. The process requires evaluating problems from multiple abstraction levels and understanding the potential for biases in generalizations. == Major phases == === Strategic context and risk analysis === Analyzing the broader digital strategy and assessing risks and opportunities is a common step before beginning a project. Techniques like coolhunting, trend analysis, and scenario planning can be used to assist with this. === Ideation and exploration === In this phase, focus areas are identified, and use cases are developed by integrating organizational goals, user needs, and data requirements. Design thinking methods, such as personas and customer journey mapping, are applied. === Prototyping === A proof of concept is created to test feasibility and refine solutions through iterative evaluation to optimize for effective performance. === Implementation and monitoring === Solutions are tested and monitored for performance and continual improvement. == Implementing Data Thinking == The following resources explain more about data thinking and its applications: "Data Thinking: Framework for data-based solutions" by StackFuel "What is Data Thinking? A modern approach to designing a data strategy" by Mantel Group "Data Science Thinking" by SpringerLink These sources provide detailed insights into the methodology, phases, and benefits of adopting Data Thinking in organizational processes.
Honey encryption
Honey encryption is a type of data encryption that "produces a ciphertext, which, when decrypted with an incorrect key as guessed by the attacker, presents a plausible-looking yet incorrect plaintext." == Creators == Ari Juels and Thomas Ristenpart of the University of Wisconsin, the developers of the encryption system, presented a paper on honey encryption at the 2014 Eurocrypt cryptography conference. == Method of protection == A brute-force attack involves repeated decryption with random keys; this is equivalent to picking random plaintexts from the space of all possible plaintexts with a uniform distribution. This is effective because even though the attacker is equally likely to see any given plaintext, most plaintexts are extremely unlikely to be legitimate i.e. the distribution of legitimate plaintexts is non-uniform. Honey encryption defeats such attacks by first transforming the plaintext into a space such that the distribution of legitimate plaintexts is uniform. Thus an attacker guessing keys will see legitimate-looking plaintexts frequently and random-looking plaintexts infrequently. This makes it difficult to determine when the correct key has been guessed. In effect, honey encryption "[serves] up fake data in response to every incorrect guess of the password or encryption key." The security of honey encryption relies on the fact that the probability of an attacker judging a plaintext to be legitimate can be calculated (by the encrypting party) at the time of encryption. This makes honey encryption difficult to apply in certain applications e.g. where the space of plaintexts is very large or the distribution of plaintexts is unknown. It also means that honey encryption can be vulnerable to brute-force attacks if this probability is miscalculated. For example, it is vulnerable to known-plaintext attacks: if the attacker has a crib that a plaintext must match to be legitimate, they will be able to brute-force even Honey Encrypted data if the encryption did not take the crib into account. == Example == An encrypted credit card number is susceptible to brute-force attacks because not every string of digits is equally likely. The number of digits can range from 13 to 19, though 16 is the most common. Additionally, it must have a valid IIN and the last digit must match the checksum. An attacker can also take into account the popularity of various services: an IIN from MasterCard is probably more likely than an IIN from Diners Club Carte Blanche. Honey encryption can protect against these attacks by first mapping credit card numbers to a larger space where they match their likelihood of legitimacy. Numbers with invalid IINs and checksums are not mapped at all (i.e. have probability 0 of legitimacy). Numbers from large brands like MasterCard and Visa map to large regions of this space, while less popular brands map to smaller regions, etc. An attacker brute-forcing such an encryption scheme would only see legitimate-looking credit card numbers when they brute-force, and the numbers would appear with the frequency the attacker would expect from the real world. == Application == Juels and Ristenpart aim to use honey encryption to protect data stored on password manager services. Juels stated that "password managers are a tasty target for criminals," and worries that "if criminals get a hold of a large collection of encrypted password vaults they could probably unlock many of them without too much trouble." Hristo Bojinov, CEO and founder of Anfacto, noted that "Honey Encryption could help reduce their vulnerability. But he notes that not every type of data will be easy to protect this way. … Not all authentication or encryption system yield themselves to being honeyed."
Curve (tonality)
In image editing, a curve is a remapping of image tonality, specified as a function from input level to output level, used as a way to emphasize colours or other elements in a picture. Curves can usually be applied to all channels together in an image, or to each channel individually. Applying a curve to all channels typically changes the brightness in part of the spectrum. Light parts of a picture can be easily made lighter and dark parts darker to increase contrast. Applying a curve to individual channels can be used to stress a colour. This is particularly efficient in the Lab colour space due to the separation of luminance and chromaticity, but it can also be used in RGB, CMYK or whatever other colour models the software supports.
Customer data management
Customer data management (CDM) is the ways in which businesses keep track of their customer information and survey their customer base in order to obtain feedback. CDM includes a range of software or cloud computing applications designed to give large organizations rapid and efficient access to customer data. Surveys and data can be centrally located and widely accessible within a company, as opposed to being warehoused in separate departments. CDM encompasses the collection, analysis, organizing, reporting and sharing of customer information throughout an organization. Businesses need a thorough understanding of their customers’ needs if they are to retain and increase their customer base. Efficient CDM solutions provide companies with the ability to deal instantly with customer issues and obtain immediate feedback. As a result, customer retention and customer satisfaction can show marked improvement. According to a study by Aberdeen Group, "above-average and best-in-class companies... attain greater than 20% annual improvement in retention rates, revenues, data accuracy and partner/customer satisfaction rates." == Customer data management and cloud computing == Cloud computing offers an attractive choice for CDM in many companies due to its accessibility and cost-effectiveness. Businesses can decide who, within their company, should have the ability to create, adjust, analyze or share customer information. In December 2010, 52% of Information Technology (IT) professionals worldwide were deploying, or planning to deploy, cloud computing; this percentage is far higher in many countries. == Background == Customer data management, as a term, was coined in the 1990s, pre-dating the alternative term enterprise feedback management (EFM). CDM was introduced as a software solution that would replace earlier disc-based or paper-based surveys and spreadsheet data. Initially, CDM solutions were marketed to businesses as software, which were specific to one company, and often to one department within that company. This was superseded by application service providers (ASPs) where software was hosted for end user organizations, thus avoiding the necessity for IT professionals to deploy and support software. However, ASPs with their single-tenancy architecture were, in turn, superseded by software as a service (SaaS), engineered for multi-tenancy. By 2007 SaaS applications, giving businesses on-demand access to their customer information, were rapidly gaining popularity compared with ASPs. Cloud computing now includes SaaS and many prominent CDM providers offer cloud-based applications to their clients. In recent years, there has been a push away from the term EFM, with many of those working in this area advocating the slightly updated use of CDM. The return to the term CDM is largely based on the greater need for clarity around the solutions offered by companies, and on the desire to retire terminology veering on techno-jargon that customers may have a hard time understanding.