Zoho Office Suite is an online office suite developed by Zoho Corporation. == History == Zoho Office Suite was launched in 2005 with a web-based word processor. Additional products, such as those for spreadsheets and presentations, were incorporated later into the suite. The applications are distributed as software as a service (SaaS). == Products == Zoho uses an open API for its Writer, Sheet, Show, Creator, Meeting, and Planner products. It also has plugins into Microsoft Word and Excel, an OpenOffice.org plugin, and a plugin for Firefox. Zoho Office Suite is free for individuals but offers a plan for teams, which includes Zoho WorkDrive, Zoho Workplace and other Zoho apps. In October 2009, Zoho integrated some of their applications with the Google Apps online suite.
Universal psychometrics
Universal psychometrics encompasses psychometrics instruments that could measure the psychological properties of any intelligent agent. Up until the early 21st century, psychometrics relied heavily on psychological tests that require the subject to cooperate and answer questions, the most famous example being an intelligence test. Such methods are only applicable to the measurement of human psychological properties. As a result, some researchers have proposed the idea of universal psychometrics - they suggest developing testing methods that allow for the measurement of non-human entities' psychological properties. For example, it has been suggested that the Turing test is a form of universal psychometrics. This test involves having testers (without any foreknowledge) attempt to distinguish a human from a machine by interacting with both (while not being to see either individuals). It is supposed that if the machine is equally intelligent to a human, the testers will not be able to distinguish between the two, i.e., their guesses will not be better than chance. Thus, Turing test could measure the intelligence (a psychological variable) of an AI. Other instruments proposed for universal psychometrics include reinforcement learning and measuring the ability to predict complexity.
Strong cryptography
Strong cryptography or cryptographically strong are general terms used to designate the cryptographic algorithms that, when used correctly, provide a very high (usually insurmountable) level of protection against any eavesdropper, including the government agencies. There is no precise definition of the boundary line between the strong cryptography and (breakable) weak cryptography, as this border constantly shifts due to improvements in hardware and cryptanalysis techniques. These improvements eventually place the capabilities once available only to the NSA within the reach of a skilled individual, so in practice there are only two levels of cryptographic security, "cryptography that will stop your kid sister from reading your files, and cryptography that will stop major governments from reading your files" (Bruce Schneier). The strong cryptography algorithms have high security strength, for practical purposes usually defined as a number of bits in the key. For example, the United States government, when dealing with export control of encryption, considered as of 1999 any implementation of the symmetric encryption algorithm with the key length above 56 bits or its public key equivalent to be strong and thus potentially a subject to the export licensing. To be strong, an algorithm needs to have a sufficiently long key and be free of known mathematical weaknesses, as exploitation of these effectively reduces the key size. At the beginning of the 21st century, the typical security strength of the strong symmetrical encryption algorithms is 128 bits (slightly lower values still can be strong, but usually there is little technical gain in using smaller key sizes). Demonstrating the resistance of any cryptographic scheme to attack is a complex matter, requiring extensive testing and reviews, preferably in a public forum. Good algorithms and protocols are required (similarly, good materials are required to construct a strong building), but good system design and implementation is needed as well: "it is possible to build a cryptographically weak system using strong algorithms and protocols" (just like the use of good materials in construction does not guarantee a solid structure). Many real-life systems turn out to be weak when the strong cryptography is not used properly, for example, random nonces are reused A successful attack might not even involve algorithm at all, for example, if the key is generated from a password, guessing a weak password is easy and does not depend on the strength of the cryptographic primitives. A user can become the weakest link in the overall picture, for example, by sharing passwords and hardware tokens with the colleagues. == Background == The level of expense required for strong cryptography originally restricted its use to the government and military agencies, until the middle of the 20th century the process of encryption required a lot of human labor and errors (preventing the decryption) were very common, so only a small share of written information could have been encrypted. US government, in particular, was able to keep a monopoly on the development and use of cryptography in the US into the 1960s. In the 1970, the increased availability of powerful computers and unclassified research breakthroughs (Data Encryption Standard, the Diffie-Hellman and RSA algorithms) made strong cryptography available for civilian use. Mid-1990s saw the worldwide proliferation of knowledge and tools for strong cryptography. By the 21st century the technical limitations were gone, although the majority of the communication were still unencrypted. At the same the cost of building and running systems with strong cryptography became roughly the same as the one for the weak cryptography. The use of computers changed the process of cryptanalysis, famously with Bletchley Park's Colossus. But just as the development of digital computers and electronics helped in cryptanalysis, it also made possible much more complex ciphers. It is typically the case that use of a quality cipher is very efficient, while breaking it requires an effort many orders of magnitude larger - making cryptanalysis so inefficient and impractical as to be effectively impossible. == Cryptographically strong algorithms == This term "cryptographically strong" is often used to describe an encryption algorithm, and implies, in comparison to some other algorithm (which is thus cryptographically weak), greater resistance to attack. But it can also be used to describe hashing and unique identifier and filename creation algorithms. See for example the description of the Microsoft .NET runtime library function Path.GetRandomFileName. In this usage, the term means "difficult to guess". An encryption algorithm is intended to be unbreakable (in which case it is as strong as it can ever be), but might be breakable (in which case it is as weak as it can ever be) so there is not, in principle, a continuum of strength as the idiom would seem to imply: Algorithm A is stronger than Algorithm B which is stronger than Algorithm C, and so on. The situation is made more complex, and less subsumable into a single strength metric, by the fact that there are many types of cryptanalytic attack and that any given algorithm is likely to force the attacker to do more work to break it when using one attack than another. There is only one known unbreakable cryptographic system, the one-time pad, which is not generally possible to use because of the difficulties involved in exchanging one-time pads without them being compromised. So any encryption algorithm can be compared to the perfect algorithm, the one-time pad. The usual sense in which this term is (loosely) used, is in reference to a particular attack, brute force key search — especially in explanations for newcomers to the field. Indeed, with this attack (always assuming keys to have been randomly chosen), there is a continuum of resistance depending on the length of the key used. But even so there are two major problems: many algorithms allow use of different length keys at different times, and any algorithm can forgo use of the full key length possible. Thus, Blowfish and RC5 are block cipher algorithms whose design specifically allowed for several key lengths, and who cannot therefore be said to have any particular strength with respect to brute force key search. Furthermore, US export regulations restrict key length for exportable cryptographic products and in several cases in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g., famously in the case of Lotus Notes' export approval) only partial keys were used, decreasing 'strength' against brute force attack for those (export) versions. More or less the same thing happened outside the US as well, as for example in the case of more than one of the cryptographic algorithms in the GSM cellular telephone standard. The term is commonly used to convey that some algorithm is suitable for some task in cryptography or information security, but also resists cryptanalysis and has no, or fewer, security weaknesses. Tasks are varied, and might include: generating randomness encrypting data providing a method to ensure data integrity Cryptographically strong would seem to mean that the described method has some kind of maturity, perhaps even approved for use against different kinds of systematic attacks in theory and/or practice. Indeed, that the method may resist those attacks long enough to protect the information carried (and what stands behind the information) for a useful length of time. But due to the complexity and subtlety of the field, neither is almost ever the case. Since such assurances are not actually available in real practice, sleight of hand in language which implies that they are will generally be misleading. There will always be uncertainty as advances (e.g., in cryptanalytic theory or merely affordable computer capacity) may reduce the effort needed to successfully use some attack method against an algorithm. In addition, actual use of cryptographic algorithms requires their encapsulation in a cryptosystem, and doing so often introduces vulnerabilities which are not due to faults in an algorithm. For example, essentially all algorithms require random choice of keys, and any cryptosystem which does not provide such keys will be subject to attack regardless of any attack resistant qualities of the encryption algorithm(s) used. == Legal issues == Widespread use of encryption increases the costs of surveillance, so the government policies aim to regulate the use of the strong cryptography. In the 2000s, the effect of encryption on the surveillance capabilities was limited by the ever-increasing share of communications going through the global social media platforms, that did not use the strong encryption and provided governments with the requested data. Murphy talks about a legislative balance that needs to be struck between the power of the government that are broad enough to be able to follow the qui
Business intelligence
Business intelligence (BI) consists of strategies, methodologies, and technologies used by enterprises for data analysis and management of business information to inform business strategies and business operations. Common functions of BI technologies include reporting, online analytical processing, analytics, dashboard development, data mining, process mining, complex event processing, business performance management, benchmarking, text mining, predictive analytics, and prescriptive analytics. BI tools can handle large amounts of structured and sometimes unstructured data to help organizations identify, develop, and otherwise create new strategic business opportunities. They aim to allow for the easy interpretation of these big data. Identifying new opportunities and implementing an effective strategy based on insights is assumed to potentially provide businesses with a competitive market advantage and long-term stability, and help them take strategic decisions. Business intelligence can be used by enterprises to support a wide range of business decisions ranging from operational to strategic. Basic operating decisions include product positioning or pricing. Strategic business decisions involve priorities, goals, and directions at the broadest level. In all cases, business intelligence is considered most effective when it combines data from the market in which a company operates (external data) with data from internal company sources, such as financial and operational information. When integrated, external and internal data provide a comprehensive view that creates ‘intelligence’ not possible from any single data source alone. Among their many uses, business intelligence tools empower organizations to gain insight into new markets, to assess demand and suitability of products and services for different market segments, and to gauge the impact of marketing efforts. BI applications use data gathered from a data warehouse (DW) or from a data mart, and the concepts of BI and DW combine as "BI/DW" or as "BIDW". A data warehouse contains a copy of analytical data that facilitates decision support. == History == The earliest known use of the term business intelligence is in Richard Millar Devens' Cyclopædia of Commercial and Business Anecdotes (1865). Devens used the term to describe how the banker Sir Henry Furnese gained profit by receiving and acting upon information about his environment, prior to his competitors: Throughout Holland, Flanders, France, and Germany, he maintained a complete and perfect train of business intelligence. The news of the many battles fought was thus received first by him, and the fall of Namur added to his profits, owing to his early receipt of the news. The ability to collect and react accordingly based on the information retrieved, Devens says, is central to business intelligence. When Hans Peter Luhn, a researcher at IBM, used the term business intelligence in an article published in 1958, he employed the Webster's Dictionary definition of intelligence: "the ability to apprehend the interrelationships of presented facts in such a way as to guide action towards a desired goal." In 1989, Howard Dresner (later a Gartner analyst) proposed business intelligence as an umbrella term to describe "concepts and methods to improve business decision making by using fact-based support systems." It was not until the late 1990s that this usage was widespread. == Definition == According to Solomon Negash and Paul Gray, business intelligence (BI) can be defined as systems that combine: Data gathering Data storage Knowledge management with analysis to evaluate complex corporate and competitive information for presentation to planners and decision makers, with the objective of improving the timeliness and the quality of the input to the decision process." According to Forrester Research, business intelligence is "a set of methodologies, processes, architectures, and technologies that transform raw data into meaningful and useful information used to enable more effective strategic, tactical, and operational insights and decision-making." Under this definition, business intelligence encompasses information management (data integration, data quality, data warehousing, master-data management, text- and content-analytics, et al.). Therefore, Forrester refers to data preparation and data usage as two separate but closely linked segments of the business-intelligence architectural stack. Some elements of business intelligence are: Multidimensional aggregation and allocation Denormalization, tagging, and standardization Realtime reporting with analytical alert A method of interfacing with unstructured data sources Group consolidation, budgeting, and rolling forecasts Statistical inference and probabilistic simulation Key performance indicators optimization Version control and process management Open item management Forrester distinguishes this from the business-intelligence market, which is "just the top layers of the BI architectural stack, such as reporting, analytics, and dashboards." === Compared with competitive intelligence === Though the term business intelligence is sometimes a synonym for competitive intelligence (because they both support decision making), BI uses technologies, processes, and applications to analyze mostly internal, structured data and business processes while competitive intelligence gathers, analyzes, and disseminates information with a topical focus on company competitors. If understood broadly, competitive intelligence can be considered as a subset of business intelligence. === Compared with business analytics === Business intelligence and business analytics are sometimes used interchangeably, but there are alternate definitions. Thomas Davenport, professor of information technology and management at Babson College argues that business intelligence should be divided into querying, reporting, Online analytical processing (OLAP), an "alerts" tool, and business analytics. In this definition, business analytics is the subset of BI focusing on statistics, prediction, and optimization, rather than the reporting functionality. == Unstructured data == Business operations can generate a very large amount of data in the form of emails, memos, notes from call centers, news, user groups, chats, reports, web pages, presentations, image files, video files, and marketing material. According to Merrill Lynch, more than 85% of all business information exists in these forms; a company might only use such a document a single time. Because of the way it is produced and stored, this information is either unstructured or semi-structured. The management of semi-structured data is an unsolved problem in the information technology industry. According to projections from Gartner (2003), white-collar workers spend 30–40% of their time searching, finding, and assessing unstructured data. BI uses both structured and unstructured data. The former is easy to search, and the latter contains a large quantity of the information needed for analysis and decision-making. Because of the difficulty of properly searching, finding, and assessing unstructured or semi-structured data, organizations may not draw upon these vast reservoirs of information, which could influence a particular decision, task, or project. This can ultimately lead to poorly informed decision-making. Therefore, when designing a business intelligence/DW solution, the specific problems associated with semi-structured and unstructured data must be accommodated, as well as those associated with structured data. === Limitations of semi-structured and unstructured data === There are several challenges to developing BI with semi-structured data. According to Inmon & Nesavich, some of those are: Physically accessing unstructured textual data – unstructured data is stored in a huge variety of formats. Terminology – Among researchers and analysts, there is a need to develop standardized terminology. Volume of data – As stated earlier, up to 85% of all data exists as semi-structured data. Couple that with the need for word-to-word and semantic analysis. Searchability of unstructured textual data – A simple search on some data, e.g. apple, results in links where there is a reference to that precise search term. (Inmon & Nesavich, 2008) gives an example: "a search is made on the term felony. In a simple search, the term felony is used, and everywhere there is a reference to felony, a hit to an unstructured document is made. But a simple search is crude. It does not find references to crime, arson, murder, embezzlement, vehicular homicide, and such, even though these crimes are types of felonies". === Metadata === To solve problems with searchability and assessment of data, it is necessary to know something about the content. This can be done by adding context through the use of metadata. Many systems already capture some metadata (e.g. filename, author, size, etc.), but more usef
Ultra (cryptography)
Ultra was the designation adopted by British military intelligence in June 1941 for wartime signals intelligence obtained by breaking high-level encrypted enemy radio and teleprinter communications at the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park. Ultra eventually became the standard designation among the western Allies for all such intelligence. The name arose because the intelligence obtained was considered more important than that designated by the highest British security classification then used (Most Secret) and so was regarded as being Ultra Secret. Several other cryptonyms had been used for such intelligence. The code name "Boniface" was used as a cover name for Ultra. In order to ensure that the successful code-breaking did not become apparent to the Germans, British intelligence created a fictional MI6 master spy, Boniface, who controlled a fictional series of agents throughout Germany. Information obtained through code-breaking was often attributed to the human intelligence from the Boniface network. The U.S. used the codename Magic for its decrypts from Japanese sources, including the "Purple" cipher. Much of the German cipher traffic was encrypted on the Enigma machine. Used properly, the German military Enigma would have been virtually unbreakable; in practice, shortcomings in operation allowed it to be broken. The term "Ultra" has often been used almost synonymously with "Enigma decrypts". However, Ultra also encompassed decrypts of the German Lorenz SZ 40/42 machines that were used by the German High Command, and the Hagelin machine. Many observers, at the time and later, regarded Ultra as immensely valuable to the Allies. Winston Churchill was reported to have told King George VI, when presenting to him Stewart Menzies (head of the Secret Intelligence Service and the person who controlled distribution of Ultra decrypts to the government): "It is thanks to the secret weapon of General Menzies, put into use on all the fronts, that we won the war!" F. W. Winterbotham quoted the western Supreme Allied Commander, Dwight D. Eisenhower, at war's end describing Ultra as having been "decisive" to Allied victory. Sir Harry Hinsley, Bletchley Park veteran and official historian of British Intelligence in World War II, made a similar assessment of Ultra, saying that while the Allies would have won the war without it, "the war would have been something like two years longer, perhaps three years longer, possibly four years longer than it was." However, Hinsley and others have emphasized the difficulties of counterfactual history in attempting such conclusions, and some historians, such as John Keegan, have said the shortening might have been as little as the three months it took the United States to deploy the atomic bomb. == Sources of intelligence == Most Ultra intelligence was derived from reading radio messages that had been encrypted with cipher machines, complemented by material from radio communications using traffic analysis and direction finding. In the early phases of the war, particularly during the eight-month Phoney War, the Germans could transmit most of their messages using land lines and so had no need to use radio. This meant that those at Bletchley Park had some time to build up experience of collecting and starting to decrypt messages on the various radio networks. German Enigma messages were the main source, with those of the German air force (the Luftwaffe) predominating, as they used radio more and their operators were particularly ill-disciplined. === German === ==== Enigma ==== "Enigma" refers to a family of electro-mechanical rotor cipher machines. These produced a polyalphabetic substitution cipher and were widely thought to be unbreakable in the 1920s, when a variant of the commercial Model D was first used by the Reichswehr. The German Army (Heer), Navy, Air Force, Nazi party, Gestapo and German diplomats used Enigma machines in several variants. Abwehr (German military intelligence) used a four-rotor machine without a plugboard and Naval Enigma used different key management from that of the army or air force, making its traffic far more difficult to cryptanalyse; each variant required different cryptanalytic treatment. The commercial versions were not as secure and Dilly Knox of GC&CS is said to have broken one before the war. German military Enigma was first broken in December 1932 by Marian Rejewski and the Polish Cipher Bureau, using a combination of brilliant mathematics, the services of a spy in the German office responsible for administering encrypted communications, and good luck. The Poles read Enigma to the outbreak of World War II and beyond, in France. At the turn of 1939, the Germans made the systems ten times more complex, which required a tenfold increase in Polish decryption equipment, which they could not meet. On 25 July 1939, the Polish Cipher Bureau handed reconstructed Enigma machines and their techniques for decrypting ciphers to the French and British. Gordon Welchman wrote, Ultra would never have got off the ground if we had not learned from the Poles, in the nick of time, the details both of the German military Enigma machine, and of the operating procedures that were in use. At Bletchley Park, some of the key people responsible for success against Enigma included mathematicians Alan Turing and Hugh Alexander and, at the British Tabulating Machine Company, chief engineer Harold Keen. After the war, interrogation of German cryptographic personnel led to the conclusion that German cryptanalysts understood that cryptanalytic attacks against Enigma were possible but were thought to require impracticable amounts of effort and investment. The Poles' early start at breaking Enigma and the continuity of their success gave the Allies an advantage when World War II began. ==== Lorenz cipher ==== In June 1941, the Germans started to introduce on-line stream cipher teleprinter systems for strategic point-to-point radio links, to which the British gave the code-name Fish. Several systems were used, principally the Lorenz SZ 40/42 (codenamed "Tunny" by the British) and Geheimfernschreiber ("Sturgeon"). These cipher systems were cryptanalysed, particularly Tunny, which the British thoroughly penetrated. It was eventually attacked using Colossus machines, which were the first digital programme-controlled electronic computers. In many respects the Tunny work was more difficult than for the Enigma, since the British codebreakers had no knowledge of the machine producing it and no head-start such as that the Poles had given them against Enigma. Although the volume of intelligence derived from this system was much smaller than that from Enigma, its importance was often far higher because it produced primarily high-level, strategic intelligence that was sent between Wehrmacht high command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW). The eventual bulk decryption of Lorenz-enciphered messages contributed significantly, and perhaps decisively, to the defeat of Nazi Germany. Nevertheless, the Tunny story has become much less well known among the public than the Enigma one. At Bletchley Park, some of the key people responsible for success in the Tunny effort included mathematicians W. T. "Bill" Tutte and Max Newman and electrical engineer Tommy Flowers. === Italian === In June 1940, the Italians were using book codes for most of their military messages, except for the Italian Navy, which in early 1941 had started using a version of the Hagelin rotor-based cipher machine C-38. This was broken from June 1941 onwards by the Italian subsection of GC&CS at Bletchley Park. === Japanese === In the Pacific theatre, a Japanese cipher machine, called "Purple" by the Americans, was used for highest-level Japanese diplomatic traffic. It produced a polyalphabetic substitution cipher, but unlike Enigma, was not a rotor machine, being built around electrical stepping switches. It was broken by the US Army Signal Intelligence Service and disseminated as Magic. Detailed reports by the Japanese ambassador to Germany were encrypted on the Purple machine. His reports included reviews of German assessments of the military situation, reviews of strategy and intentions, reports on direct inspections by the ambassador (in one case, of Normandy beach defences), and reports of long interviews with Hitler. The Japanese are said to have obtained an Enigma machine in 1937, although it is debated whether they were given it by the Germans or bought a commercial version, which, apart from the plugboard and internal wiring, was the German Heer/Luftwaffe machine. Having developed a similar machine, the Japanese did not use the Enigma machine for their most secret communications. The chief fleet communications code system used by the Imperial Japanese Navy was called JN-25 by the Americans, and by early 1942 the US Navy had made considerable progress in decrypting Japanese naval messages. The US Army also made progress on the
PhotoWorks (ray tracing software)
PhotoWorks is a raytrace rendering program created by Dassault Systèmes SolidWorks Corporation, formerly supplied as a photorealistic rendering add-in for SolidWorks. The program is based on the Mental Ray rendering engine. It has a library of scenes and materials that can be used with user-created SolidWorks files to create still frame images within the SolidWorks GUI. Since the 2011 release of SolidWorks, PhotoWorks has been replaced by the PhotoView 360 rendering utility. A 2010 review comparing PhotoWorks with three other rendering programs for SolidWorks (including PhotoView 360) gave the program high marks for render speed and built-in materials, but low marks for realism and user interface. Appearance File Type: .p2m
Change data capture
In databases, change data capture (CDC) is a set of software design patterns used to determine and track the data that has changed (the "deltas") so that action can be taken using the changed data. The result is a delta-driven dataset. CDC is an approach to data integration that is based on the identification, capture and delivery of the changes made to enterprise data sources. For instance it can be used for incremental update of data loading. CDC occurs often in data warehouse environments since capturing and preserving the state of data across time is one of the core functions of a data warehouse, but CDC can be utilized in any database or data repository system. == Methodology == System developers can set up CDC mechanisms in a number of ways and in any one or a combination of system layers from application logic down to physical storage. In a simplified CDC context, one computer system has data believed to have changed from a previous point in time, and a second computer system needs to take action based on that changed data. The former is the source, the latter is the target. It is possible that the source and target are the same system physically, but that would not change the design pattern logically. Multiple CDC solutions can exist in a single system. === Timestamps on rows === Tables whose changes must be captured may have a column that represents the time of last change. Names such as LAST_UPDATE, LAST_MODIFIED, etc. are common. Any row in any table that has a timestamp in that column that is more recent than the last time data was captured is considered to have changed. Timestamps on rows are also frequently used for optimistic locking so this column is often available. === Version numbers on rows === Database designers give tables whose changes must be captured a column that contains a version number. Names such as VERSION_NUMBER, etc. are common. One technique is to mark each changed row with a version number. A current version is maintained for the table, or possibly a group of tables. This is stored in a supporting construct such as a reference table. When a change capture occurs, all data with the latest version number is considered to have changed. Once the change capture is complete, the reference table is updated with a new version number. (Do not confuse this technique with row-level versioning used for optimistic locking. For optimistic locking each row has an independent version number, typically a sequential counter. This allows a process to atomically update a row and increment its counter only if another process has not incremented the counter. But CDC cannot use row-level versions to find all changes unless it knows the original "starting" version of every row. This is impractical to maintain.) === Status indicators on rows === This technique can either supplement or complement timestamps and versioning. It can configure an alternative if, for example, a status column is set up on a table row indicating that the row has changed (e.g., a boolean column that, when set to true, indicates that the row has changed). Otherwise, it can act as a complement to the previous methods, indicating that a row, despite having a new version number or a later date, still shouldn't be updated on the target (for example, the data may require human validation). === Time/version/status on rows === This approach combines the three previously discussed methods. As noted, it is not uncommon to see multiple CDC solutions at work in a single system, however, the combination of time, version, and status provides a particularly powerful mechanism and programmers should utilize them as a trio where possible. The three elements are not redundant or superfluous. Using them together allows for such logic as, "Capture all data for version 2.1 that changed between 2005-06-01 00:00 and 2005-07-01 00:00 where the status code indicates it is ready for production." === Triggers on tables === May include a publish/subscribe pattern to communicate the changed data to multiple targets. In this approach, triggers log events that happen to the transactional table into another queue table that can later be "played back". For example, imagine an Accounts table, when transactions are taken against this table, triggers would fire that would then store a history of the event or even the deltas into a separate queue table. The queue table might have schema with the following fields: Id, TableName, RowId, Timestamp, Operation. The data inserted for our Account sample might be: 1, Accounts, 76, 2008-11-02 00:15, Update. More complicated designs might log the actual data that changed. This queue table could then be "played back" to replicate the data from the source system to a target. Data capture offers a challenge in that the structure, contents and use of a transaction log is specific to a database management system. Unlike data access, no standard exists for transaction logs. Most database management systems do not document the internal format of their transaction logs, although some provide programmatic interfaces to their transaction logs (for example: Oracle, DB2, SQL/MP, SQL/MX and SQL Server 2008). Other challenges in using transaction logs for change data capture include: Coordinating the reading of the transaction logs and the archiving of log files (database management software typically archives log files off-line on a regular basis). Translation between physical storage formats that are recorded in the transaction logs and the logical formats typically expected by database users (e.g., some transaction logs save only minimal buffer differences that are not directly useful for change consumers). Dealing with changes to the format of the transaction logs between versions of the database management system. Eliminating uncommitted changes that the database wrote to the transaction log and later rolled back. Dealing with changes to the metadata of tables in the database. CDC solutions based on transaction log files have distinct advantages that include: minimal impact on the database (even more so if one uses log shipping to process the logs on a dedicated host). no need for programmatic changes to the applications that use the database. low latency in acquiring changes. transactional integrity: log scanning can produce a change stream that replays the original transactions in the order they were committed. Such a change stream include changes made to all tables participating in the captured transaction. no need to change the database schema == Confounding factors == As often occurs in complex domains, the final solution to a CDC problem may have to balance many competing concerns. === Unsuitable source systems === Change data capture both increases in complexity and reduces in value if the source system saves metadata changes when the data itself is not modified. For example, some Data models track the user who last looked at but did not change the data in the same structure as the data. This results in noise in the Change Data Capture. === Tracking the capture === Actually tracking the changes depends on the data source. If the data is being persisted in a modern database then Change Data Capture is a simple matter of permissions. Two techniques are in common use: Tracking changes using database triggers Reading the transaction log as, or shortly after, it is written. If the data is not in a modern database, CDC becomes a programming challenge. === Push versus pull === Push: the source process creates a snapshot of changes within its own process and delivers rows downstream. The downstream process uses the snapshot, creates its own subset and delivers them to the next process. Pull: the target that is immediately downstream from the source, prepares a request for data from the source. The downstream target delivers the snapshot to the next target, as in the push model. === Alternatives === Sometimes the slowly changing dimension is used as an alternative method. CDC and SCD are similar in that both methods can detect changes in a data set. The most common forms of SCD are type 1 (overwrite), type 2 (maintain history) or 3 (only previous and current value). SCD 2 can be useful if history is needed in the target system. CDC overwrites in the target system (akin to SCD1), and is ideal when only the changed data needs to arrive at the target, i.e. a delta-driven dataset.