Tactical NAV, also known as TACNAV-X, is a location-based tracking app designed for use by military personnel. The app is primarily designed to assist in pinpointing enemy fire and mapping waypoints. Tactical NAV also helps users efficiently relay critical information to tactical operations centers for prompt decision-making regarding airstrikes or medical evacuations. The TACNAV-X platform is intended to enhance situational awareness, refine navigation capabilities, and assist in tactical decision-making across various operational environments. == Overview == Tactical NAV allows users to pinpoint enemy fire. == History == Tactical NAV was designed by U.S. Army Captain Jonathan J. Springer, a Field Artillery officer serving as a Battalion Fire Support Officer (FSO) in the 101st Airborne Division. Springer conceived the idea for the app during his third tour in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. On June 25, 2010, after a rocket attack by the Taliban killed two soldiers in his battalion, he was inspired to create an app that would prevent similar losses in the future, enhance situational awareness, and assist soldiers serving on combat deployments. In 2010, Springer founded TacNav Systems (formerly AppDaddy Technologies) to develop mobile applications for use by military personnel. He tested the app during combat operations in eastern Afghanistan and verified TACNAV-X's accuracy using DAGRs, AFATDS, Falcon View, CPOF, ATAK, and other approved Department of Defense (DoD) systems. As of 2012, the app had been downloaded 8,000 times.
Automated Mathematician
The Automated Mathematician (AM) is one of the earliest successful discovery systems. It was created by Douglas Lenat in Lisp, and in 1977 led to Lenat being awarded the IJCAI Computers and Thought Award. AM worked by generating and modifying short Lisp programs which were then interpreted as defining various mathematical concepts; for example, a program that tested equality between the length of two lists was considered to represent the concept of numerical equality, while a program that produced a list whose length was the product of the lengths of two other lists was interpreted as representing the concept of multiplication. The system had elaborate heuristics for choosing which programs to extend and modify, based on the experiences of working mathematicians in solving mathematical problems. == Controversy == Lenat claimed that the system was composed of hundreds of data structures called "concepts", together with hundreds of "heuristic rules" and a simple flow of control: "AM repeatedly selects the top task from the agenda and tries to carry it out. This is the whole control structure!" Yet the heuristic rules were not always represented as separate data structures; some had to be intertwined with the control flow logic. Some rules had preconditions that depended on the history, or otherwise could not be represented in the framework of the explicit rules. What's more, the published versions of the rules often involve vague terms that are not defined further, such as "If two expressions are structurally similar, ..." (Rule 218) or "... replace the value obtained by some other (very similar) value..." (Rule 129). Another source of information is the user, via Rule 2: "If the user has recently referred to X, then boost the priority of any tasks involving X." Thus, it appears quite possible that much of the real discovery work is buried in unexplained procedures. Lenat claimed that the system had rediscovered both Goldbach's conjecture and the fundamental theorem of arithmetic. Later critics accused Lenat of over-interpreting the output of AM. In his paper Why AM and Eurisko appear to work, Lenat conceded that any system that generated enough short Lisp programs would generate ones that could be interpreted by an external observer as representing equally sophisticated mathematical concepts. However, he argued that this property was in itself interesting—and that a promising direction for further research would be to look for other languages in which short random strings were likely to be useful. == Successor == This intuition was the basis of AM's successor Eurisko, which attempted to generalize the search for mathematical concepts to the search for useful heuristics.
Kubeflow
Kubeflow is an open-source platform for machine learning and MLOps on Kubernetes introduced by Google. The different stages in a typical machine learning lifecycle are represented with different software components in Kubeflow, including model development (Kubeflow Notebooks), model training (Kubeflow Pipelines, Kubeflow Training Operator), model serving (KServe), and automated machine learning (Katib). Each component of Kubeflow can be deployed separately, and it is not a requirement to deploy every component. == History == The Kubeflow project was first announced at KubeCon + CloudNativeCon North America 2017 by Google engineers David Aronchick, Jeremy Lewi, and Vishnu Kannan to address a perceived lack of flexible options for building production-ready machine learning systems. The project has also stated it began as a way for Google to open-source how they ran TensorFlow internally. The first release of Kubeflow (Kubeflow 0.1) was announced at KubeCon + CloudNativeCon Europe 2018. Kubeflow 1.0 was released in March 2020 via a public blog post announcing that many Kubeflow components were graduating to a "stable status", indicating they were now ready for production usage. In October 2022, Google announced that the Kubeflow project had applied to join the Cloud Native Computing Foundation. In July 2023, the foundation voted to accept Kubeflow as an incubating stage project. == Components == === Kubeflow Notebooks for model development === Machine learning models are developed in the notebooks component called Kubeflow Notebooks. The component runs web-based development environments inside a Kubernetes cluster, with native support for Jupyter Notebook, Visual Studio Code, and RStudio. === Kubeflow Pipelines for model training === Once developed, models are trained in the Kubeflow Pipelines component. The component acts as a platform for building and deploying portable, scalable machine learning workflows based on Docker containers. Google Cloud Platform has adopted the Kubeflow Pipelines DSL within its Vertex AI Pipelines product. === Kubeflow Training Operator for model training === For certain machine learning models and libraries, the Kubeflow Training Operator component provides Kubernetes custom resources support. The component runs distributed or non-distributed TensorFlow, PyTorch, Apache MXNet, XGBoost, and MPI training jobs on Kubernetes. === KServe for model serving === The KServe component (previously named KFServing) provides Kubernetes custom resources for serving machine learning models on arbitrary frameworks including TensorFlow, XGBoost, scikit-learn, PyTorch, and ONNX. KServe was developed collaboratively by Google, IBM, Bloomberg, NVIDIA, and Seldon. Publicly disclosed adopters of KServe include Bloomberg, Gojek, the Wikimedia Foundation, and others. === Katib for automated machine learning === Lastly, Kubeflow includes a component for automated training and development of machine learning models, the Katib component. It is described as a Kubernetes-native project and features hyperparameter tuning, early stopping, and neural architecture search. == Release timeline ==
Probabilistic latent semantic analysis
Probabilistic latent semantic analysis (PLSA), also known as probabilistic latent semantic indexing (PLSI, especially in information retrieval circles) is a statistical technique for the analysis of two-mode and co-occurrence data. In effect, one can derive a low-dimensional representation of the observed variables in terms of their affinity to certain hidden variables, just as in latent semantic analysis, from which PLSA evolved. Compared to standard latent semantic analysis which stems from linear algebra and downsizes the occurrence tables (usually via a singular value decomposition), probabilistic latent semantic analysis is based on a mixture decomposition derived from a latent class model. == Model == Considering observations in the form of co-occurrences ( w , d ) {\displaystyle (w,d)} of words and documents, PLSA models the probability of each co-occurrence as a mixture of conditionally independent multinomial distributions: P ( w , d ) = ∑ c P ( d ) P ( c | d ) P ( w | c ) = P ( d ) ∑ c P ( c | d ) P ( w | c ) {\displaystyle P(w,d)=\sum _{c}P(d)P(c|d)P(w|c)=P(d)\sum _{c}P(c|d)P(w|c)} with c {\displaystyle c} being the words' topic. Note that the number of topics is a hyperparameter that must be chosen in advance and is not estimated from the data. The first formulation is the symmetric formulation, where w {\displaystyle w} and d {\displaystyle d} are both generated from the latent class c {\displaystyle c} in similar ways (using the conditional probabilities P ( d | c ) {\displaystyle P(d|c)} and P ( w | c ) {\displaystyle P(w|c)} ), whereas the second formulation is the asymmetric formulation, where, for each document d {\displaystyle d} , a latent class is chosen conditionally to the document according to P ( c | d ) {\displaystyle P(c|d)} , and a word is then generated from that class according to P ( w | c ) {\displaystyle P(w|c)} . Although we have used words and documents in this example, the co-occurrence of any couple of discrete variables may be modelled in exactly the same way. So, the number of parameters is equal to c d + w c {\displaystyle cd+wc} . The number of parameters grows linearly with the number of documents. In addition, although PLSA is a generative model of the documents in the collection it is estimated on, it is not a generative model of new documents. Their parameters are learned using the EM algorithm. == Application == PLSA may be used in a discriminative setting, via Fisher kernels. PLSA has applications in information retrieval and filtering, natural language processing, machine learning from text, bioinformatics, and related areas. It is reported that the aspect model used in the probabilistic latent semantic analysis has severe overfitting problems. == Extensions == Hierarchical extensions: Asymmetric: MASHA ("Multinomial ASymmetric Hierarchical Analysis") Symmetric: HPLSA ("Hierarchical Probabilistic Latent Semantic Analysis") Generative models: The following models have been developed to address an often-criticized shortcoming of PLSA, namely that it is not a proper generative model for new documents. Latent Dirichlet allocation – adds a Dirichlet prior on the per-document topic distribution Higher-order data: Although this is rarely discussed in the scientific literature, PLSA extends naturally to higher order data (three modes and higher), i.e. it can model co-occurrences over three or more variables. In the symmetric formulation above, this is done simply by adding conditional probability distributions for these additional variables. This is the probabilistic analogue to non-negative tensor factorisation. == History == This is an example of a latent class model (see references therein), and it is related to non-negative matrix factorization. The present terminology was coined in 1999 by Thomas Hofmann.
Teacher forcing
Teacher forcing is an algorithm for training the weights of recurrent neural networks (RNNs). It involves feeding observed sequence values (i.e. ground-truth samples) back into the RNN after each step, thus forcing the RNN to stay close to the ground-truth sequence. The term "teacher forcing" can be motivated by comparing the RNN to a human student taking a multi-part exam where the answer to each part (for example a mathematical calculation) depends on the answer to the preceding part. In this analogy, rather than grading every answer in the end, with the risk that the student fails every single part even though they only made a mistake in the first one, a teacher records the score for each individual part and then tells the student the correct answer, to be used in the next part. The use of an external teacher signal is in contrast to real-time recurrent learning (RTRL). Teacher signals are known from oscillator networks. The promise is, that teacher forcing helps to reduce the training time. The term "teacher forcing" was introduced in 1989 by Ronald J. Williams and David Zipser, who reported that the technique was already being "frequently used in dynamical supervised learning tasks" around that time. A NeurIPS 2016 paper introduced the related method of "professor forcing".
Language-Theoretic Security
Language-theoretic security, or LangSec, is an approach to software security that focuses on input handling, complexity, and program design as strategies to improve the verifiability of computer programs. It was introduced in 2005 by Robert J. Hansen and Meredith L. Patterson at BlackHat and in 2011 by Len Sassaman and Patterson. It aims to create a formal description of which software is likely to have security vulnerabilities of particular classes, and why. It considers programs to have an inherent parser component, whether or not explicit, composed of that part of the program which operates on external input before that input is fully parsed. A central hypothesis of language-theoretic security is that vulnerabilities in software increase according to the computational power of the notional input-accepting automaton equivalent to this parser, using the definitions of automata theory. The lower bound on this computational power is the input language complexity of the program. The extent to which reducing this complexity is possible is a function of the specification of the communication protocol or file format the program takes as input. == Parsing as a security mechanism == The behaviour of a program is defined with reference to its expected input. Unexpected input being used by a program is a factor in numerous security bugs, including the so-called Android master key vulnerability (CVE-2013-4787), because accepting unexpected input renders the program's specification ambiguous. In that instance, the unexpected ambiguity came in the form of a ZIP file with duplicate filenames. If a program fully parses its input and only acts on input that unambiguously meets the specification, it follows that the program will avoid these types of vulnerabilities. This is an intentional inversion of the Postel principle. Accepting only unambiguous and valid input is a more formal requirement than input validation or sanitization, and narrows the number of possible but unanticipated program states that can be induced in an application via user input. Conversely, failure to do this is associated with security vulnerabilities. Input sanitization in particular is held to be an inadequate approach to avoiding malicious input because it inherently ignores context-sensitive properties of the input; it can therefore result in paradoxical effects, such as sanitization code activating otherwise inert cross-site scripting payloads in browsers. === Parser differentials === If the language of accepted program input is sufficiently simple, it is possible to verify that two implementations parse the same input language consistently. This is advantageous because it shows no parser differential exists between the two implementations. The requisite level of simplicity is theoretically that for which there is a solution to the equivalence problem. If the two parsers involved in CVE-2013-4787 were equivalent - that is, if they rendered the same output state given the same input state - the vulnerability could not have existed. One strategy for doing this is to publish machine-readable specifications of a format or protocol, and then use a parser generator to generate the parser code. An example of a parser generator built for this purpose is DaeDaLus. The combination of Lex with any of GNU Bison, ANTLR, or Yacc also accomplishes this. However, many parser generators allow the mixing of general purpose code with the parsing definitions, which weakens the guarantees provided by parsing. === Analysis of injection attacks === Injection attacks are generally the result of differences between the serializer (or "unparser") and the corresponding parser at a layer boundary in a system; therefore, they are a special case of parser differentials. In a SQL injection attack, for example, an attacker is able to cause the application with which they are interacting to serialize a SQL query that has different semantics than intended. In the simplest case where the payload ends a string and adds new code, the payload has crossed the code-data boundary in SQL. In language-theoretic security, this is treated as a bug in the serializer of the SQL query, which should instead be written in a way that constrains its possible outputs to those within the scope of the intended query. === Parser combinators === If a parser generator is not used, it is still possible to avoid implementation bugs by using parser combinator such as Nom to implement the parser code. This has the drawback of relying on a programmer correctly translating the specification into the language of the parser generator library, though this task is still less error-prone than hand-coding a parser. == Input format complexity == Complexity in computer programs is associated with security vulnerabilities. Within the domain of language-theoretic security, complexity is described with reference to the computational power of the abstract machine necessary to implement the program, or more particularly, to implement the parser for its input language. This complexity describes whether it is possible to show that there is no unintended or undesired functionality in the program which might be exploitable by an attacker. To be bounded in complexity, the program's input must be well-defined both in terms of form and of semantics. === Weird machines === A weird machine is a model of computation in a program that exists in parallel with, but is distinct from, the intended abstract model of computation in that program. Some classes of weird machine arise from the multi-layered nature of computer programs, or the context in which the programs run; others result from the unanticipated functionality a program has due to its complexity or to software bugs. The more complex the computation model of a program, the more likely it is to implement a weird machine. Depending on context, the weird machine may or may not be concretely useful for an attacker. Since the space of weird machines in the context of some program is the universe of all possible states that are not within the program's intended states, many exploited states including remote code execution and injection attacks belong to the domain of weird machines. A reduction in weird machines is therefore a likely correlate with reduced program vulnerability. === SafeDocs project === SafeDocs is a DARPA project undertaken in 2018 to take existing file formats, create safer subsets of them, and develop programming tools to work for the safer formats. The initial test case for this was PDF. The purpose of creating safer subsets in this case is to lower the minimum bound on parser complexity so that it becomes possible to create tools that will generate correct, normative parsers for them. == Relation to programming languages == The analytic framework of language-theoretic security assumes programs to be virtual machines that execute their input. A document that is read by an application is in this sense a form of machine code, in a generalization of the data as code idea, following the automata theory description of parsers. === Type-safe programming languages === Parsing input and serializing output are operations that consume one data type and emit another. A programming language can therefore check that data is correctly parsed and contains the expected structure by checking data types, and correct serializing (or unparsing) can be implemented as operations on the data types that are relevant to the program's output. This approach can be used to show that the recognizer and unparser patterns have been implemented. It is also possible to implement type checking across a distributed system to enforce parsing and unparsing of the expected structures and to verify that the assumptions made in designing the compositional properties of a distributed system have been followed. === Memory-safe programming languages === In the general case, spatial memory correctness is undecidable. If any proof of spatial memory correctness is to be made, it is therefore necessary to bound the complexity of the code. Interpreted languages such as Java and Python effectively accomplish this via runtime bounds checking, and frameworks for runtime bounds checking also exist for C. The effect of these strategies for spatial memory correctness are to create a halt state in place of a spatial memory correctness violation; therefore, it can be shown that the program will not violate spatial memory correctness, but in exchange, it cannot be shown in the general case that programs will not have runtime bounds checking exceptions. Some programming languages, such as Rust, accomplish this using borrow checking. The borrow checker acts to assure spatial memory correctness by compile-time reference counting. Code for which spatial memory correctness cannot be shown to not be violated therefore does not compile, inherently limiting the complexity of the spatial memory correctness of the program to what is decidable. Thi
Naive Bayes classifier
In statistics, naive (sometimes simple or idiot's) Bayes classifiers are a family of "probabilistic classifiers" which assume that the features are conditionally independent, given the target class. In other words, a naive Bayes model assumes the information about the class provided by each variable is unrelated to the information from the others, with no information shared between the predictors. The highly unrealistic nature of this assumption, called the naive independence assumption, is what gives the classifier its name. These classifiers are some of the simplest Bayesian network models. Naive Bayes classifiers generally perform worse than more advanced models like logistic regressions, especially at quantifying uncertainty (with naive Bayes models often producing wildly overconfident probabilities). However, they are highly scalable, requiring only one parameter for each feature or predictor in a learning problem. Maximum-likelihood training can be done by evaluating a closed-form expression (simply by counting observations in each group), rather than the expensive iterative approximation algorithms required by most other models. Despite the use of Bayes' theorem in the classifier's decision rule, naive Bayes is not (necessarily) a Bayesian method, and naive Bayes models can be fit to data using either Bayesian or frequentist methods. == Introduction == Naive Bayes is a simple technique for constructing classifiers: models that assign class labels to problem instances, represented as vectors of feature values, where the class labels are drawn from some finite set. There is not a single algorithm for training such classifiers, but a family of algorithms based on a common principle: all naive Bayes classifiers assume that the value of a particular feature is independent of the value of any other feature, given the class variable. For example, a fruit may be considered to be an apple if it is red, round, and about 10 cm in diameter. A naive Bayes classifier considers each of these features to contribute independently to the probability that this fruit is an apple, regardless of any possible correlations between the color, roundness, and diameter features. In many practical applications, parameter estimation for naive Bayes models uses the method of maximum likelihood; in other words, one can work with the naive Bayes model without accepting Bayesian probability or using any Bayesian methods. Despite their naive design and apparently oversimplified assumptions, naive Bayes classifiers have worked quite well in many complex real-world situations. In 2004, an analysis of the Bayesian classification problem showed that there are sound theoretical reasons for the apparently implausible efficacy of naive Bayes classifiers. Still, a comprehensive comparison with other classification algorithms in 2006 showed that Bayes classification is outperformed by other approaches, such as boosted trees or random forests. An advantage of naive Bayes is that it only requires a small amount of training data to estimate the parameters necessary for classification. == Probabilistic model == Abstractly, naive Bayes is a conditional probability model: it assigns probabilities p ( C k ∣ x 1 , … , x n ) {\displaystyle p(C_{k}\mid x_{1},\ldots ,x_{n})} for each of the K possible outcomes or classes C k {\displaystyle C_{k}} given a problem instance to be classified, represented by a vector x = ( x 1 , … , x n ) {\displaystyle \mathbf {x} =(x_{1},\ldots ,x_{n})} encoding some n features (independent variables). The problem with the above formulation is that if the number of features n is large or if a feature can take on a large number of values, then basing such a model on probability tables is infeasible. The model must therefore be reformulated to make it more tractable. Using Bayes' theorem, the conditional probability can be decomposed as: p ( C k ∣ x ) = p ( C k ) p ( x ∣ C k ) p ( x ) {\displaystyle p(C_{k}\mid \mathbf {x} )={\frac {p(C_{k})\ p(\mathbf {x} \mid C_{k})}{p(\mathbf {x} )}}\,} In plain English, using Bayesian probability terminology, the above equation can be written as posterior = prior × likelihood evidence {\displaystyle {\text{posterior}}={\frac {{\text{prior}}\times {\text{likelihood}}}{\text{evidence}}}\,} In practice, there is interest only in the numerator of that fraction, because the denominator does not depend on C {\displaystyle C} and the values of the features x i {\displaystyle x_{i}} are given, so that the denominator is effectively constant. The numerator is equivalent to the joint probability model p ( C k , x 1 , … , x n ) {\displaystyle p(C_{k},x_{1},\ldots ,x_{n})\,} which can be rewritten as follows, using the chain rule for repeated applications of the definition of conditional probability: p ( C k , x 1 , … , x n ) = p ( x 1 , … , x n , C k ) = p ( x 1 ∣ x 2 , … , x n , C k ) p ( x 2 , … , x n , C k ) = p ( x 1 ∣ x 2 , … , x n , C k ) p ( x 2 ∣ x 3 , … , x n , C k ) p ( x 3 , … , x n , C k ) = ⋯ = p ( x 1 ∣ x 2 , … , x n , C k ) p ( x 2 ∣ x 3 , … , x n , C k ) ⋯ p ( x n − 1 ∣ x n , C k ) p ( x n ∣ C k ) p ( C k ) {\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}p(C_{k},x_{1},\ldots ,x_{n})&=p(x_{1},\ldots ,x_{n},C_{k})\\&=p(x_{1}\mid x_{2},\ldots ,x_{n},C_{k})\ p(x_{2},\ldots ,x_{n},C_{k})\\&=p(x_{1}\mid x_{2},\ldots ,x_{n},C_{k})\ p(x_{2}\mid x_{3},\ldots ,x_{n},C_{k})\ p(x_{3},\ldots ,x_{n},C_{k})\\&=\cdots \\&=p(x_{1}\mid x_{2},\ldots ,x_{n},C_{k})\ p(x_{2}\mid x_{3},\ldots ,x_{n},C_{k})\cdots p(x_{n-1}\mid x_{n},C_{k})\ p(x_{n}\mid C_{k})\ p(C_{k})\\\end{aligned}}} Now the "naive" conditional independence assumptions come into play: assume that all features in x {\displaystyle \mathbf {x} } are mutually independent, conditional on the category C k {\displaystyle C_{k}} . Under this assumption, p ( x i ∣ x i + 1 , … , x n , C k ) = p ( x i ∣ C k ) . {\displaystyle p(x_{i}\mid x_{i+1},\ldots ,x_{n},C_{k})=p(x_{i}\mid C_{k})\,.} Thus, the joint model can be expressed as p ( C k ∣ x 1 , … , x n ) ∝ p ( C k , x 1 , … , x n ) = p ( C k ) p ( x 1 ∣ C k ) p ( x 2 ∣ C k ) p ( x 3 ∣ C k ) ⋯ = p ( C k ) ∏ i = 1 n p ( x i ∣ C k ) , {\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}p(C_{k}\mid x_{1},\ldots ,x_{n})\varpropto \ &p(C_{k},x_{1},\ldots ,x_{n})\\&=p(C_{k})\ p(x_{1}\mid C_{k})\ p(x_{2}\mid C_{k})\ p(x_{3}\mid C_{k})\ \cdots \\&=p(C_{k})\prod _{i=1}^{n}p(x_{i}\mid C_{k})\,,\end{aligned}}} where ∝ {\displaystyle \varpropto } denotes proportionality since the denominator p ( x ) {\displaystyle p(\mathbf {x} )} is omitted. This means that under the above independence assumptions, the conditional distribution over the class variable C {\displaystyle C} is: p ( C k ∣ x 1 , … , x n ) = 1 Z p ( C k ) ∏ i = 1 n p ( x i ∣ C k ) {\displaystyle p(C_{k}\mid x_{1},\ldots ,x_{n})={\frac {1}{Z}}\ p(C_{k})\prod _{i=1}^{n}p(x_{i}\mid C_{k})} where the evidence Z = p ( x ) = ∑ k p ( C k ) p ( x ∣ C k ) {\displaystyle Z=p(\mathbf {x} )=\sum _{k}p(C_{k})\ p(\mathbf {x} \mid C_{k})} is a scaling factor dependent only on x 1 , … , x n {\displaystyle x_{1},\ldots ,x_{n}} , that is, a constant if the values of the feature variables are known. Often, it is only necessary to discriminate between classes. In that case, the scaling factor is irrelevant, and it is sufficient to calculate the log-probability up to a factor: ln p ( C k ∣ x 1 , … , x n ) = ln p ( C k ) + ∑ i = 1 n ln p ( x i ∣ C k ) − ln Z ⏟ irrelevant {\displaystyle \ln p(C_{k}\mid x_{1},\ldots ,x_{n})=\ln p(C_{k})+\sum _{i=1}^{n}\ln p(x_{i}\mid C_{k})\underbrace {-\ln Z} _{\text{irrelevant}}} The scaling factor is irrelevant, since discrimination subtracts it away: ln p ( C k ∣ x 1 , … , x n ) p ( C l ∣ x 1 , … , x n ) = ( ln p ( C k ) + ∑ i = 1 n ln p ( x i ∣ C k ) ) − ( ln p ( C l ) + ∑ i = 1 n ln p ( x i ∣ C l ) ) {\displaystyle \ln {\frac {p(C_{k}\mid x_{1},\ldots ,x_{n})}{p(C_{l}\mid x_{1},\ldots ,x_{n})}}=\left(\ln p(C_{k})+\sum _{i=1}^{n}\ln p(x_{i}\mid C_{k})\right)-\left(\ln p(C_{l})+\sum _{i=1}^{n}\ln p(x_{i}\mid C_{l})\right)} There are two benefits of using log-probability. One is that it allows an interpretation in information theory, where log-probabilities are units of information in nats. Another is that it avoids arithmetic underflow. === Constructing a classifier from the probability model === The discussion so far has derived the independent feature model, that is, the naive Bayes probability model. The naive Bayes classifier combines this model with a decision rule. One common rule is to pick the hypothesis that is most probable so as to minimize the probability of misclassification; this is known as the maximum a posteriori or MAP decision rule. The corresponding classifier, a Bayes classifier, is the function that assigns a class label y ^ = C k {\displaystyle {\hat {y}}=C_{k}} for some k as follows: y ^ = argmax k ∈ { 1 , … , K } p ( C k ) ∏ i = 1 n p ( x i ∣ C k ) . {\displaystyle {\hat {y}}={\underset {k\in \{1,\ldots ,K\}}{\operatorname {argmax} }}\ p(C_{k})\displays