Trying to pick the best AI sales assistant? An AI sales assistant is software that uses machine learning to help you get more done — it scales effortlessly from a single task to thousands. The best picks balance beginner-friendly simplicity with the depth power users need, and they ship updates often. Whether you are a beginner or a pro, the right AI sales assistant slots into your workflow and pays for itself fast. Read on for hands-on impressions, pricing tiers, and the standout features that matter.
TipTop Technologies
TipTop Technologies is a real-time web and social search engine with a platform for semantic analysis of natural language. Tip-Top Search provides results capturing individual and group sentiment, opinions, and experiences there from the content of various sorts such as real-time messages from Twitter or consumer product reviews on Amazon.com. TipTop Technologies and ITC Infotech collaborated to create a search interface suitable for both enterprise and consumer applications. Tip-Top's products are part of the "emerging Web 3.0 applications which use semantic technologies to augment the underlying Web system's functionalities." Their main product is 360, an AI tool that incorporates multiple AI applications under one wing. Jonathan AlBright professor at Elon University, found videos generated by TipTop Technologies software on YouTube in his research into artificial intelligence, described it as AI-generated "fake news". Through semantic analysis of large data sets, TipTop gleaned behavioral insights from Tweets around events like Halloween, Thanksgiving, Holiday Gifting, the Super Bowl, and the Oscar Nominees for the Academy Awards coverage. Sentiment analysis, concept trend tracking, and real-time market research are other applications included in the TipTop Search product. TipTop's insight engine solves the problem of real-time data noise, and its ability to "sort the 'good tweets' from the 'bad tweets' when it comes to a product, service, or a region..." In addition, products like TipTop Shopping with customizable search widgets bring together consumer reviews, social search, and sentiment analysis enabling product comparisons across attributes like the overall value and aiding purchasing decisions through user-driven product tips and pits. TipTop Finance adds another complexity to real-time search results by incorporating corporate sentiment, company stock tickers, and social media into TipTop's existing social search platform. Additional success applying semantic technologies has been with polling, "if you compare these Gallup results with TipTop, a sentiment engine based on Twitter, the results are not way off. It does surprise you but it tells me that sentiment analysis in case of public opinion about a burning social issue or a famous personality is relatively easier." With the increasing amount of unstructured, opinion-oriented, and user-generated content available on the Web, TipTop's technology aims to make sense of all this data, and deliver it in a useful way for consumer and enterprise users alike. TipTop Technologies is a privately held company with its headquarters in the San Francisco Bay Area, and team members are located globally.
Environmental impact of AI
The environmental impact of the design, training, deployment and use of artificial intelligence includes the greenhouse gas emissions from generating electricity for data centres and computing hardware, operational and upstream water use, and material impacts from hardware manufacturing, mining and electronic waste. Estimating AI's environmental effects can be difficult because results depend on how impacts are measured, including whether accounting includes only model computation or also data-centre overhead, idle capacity, hardware manufacture, and local electricity supply. As these issues have received greater attention, governments and regulators have increasingly considered data-centre reporting requirements, energy-efficiency standards, and broader transparency measures for AI-related resource use. == Carbon footprint and energy use == AI-related energy use arises at multiple stages, including model training, fine-tuning, inference, storage, networking, and supporting infrastructure such as cooling and power conversion. === Individual level === Published estimates of energy use per AI request vary widely across models, tasks and measurement methods. A benchmark study presented at the 2024 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency found substantial differences between task types, with lower energy use for some text tasks and much higher energy use for image generation in the study's test conditions. In that benchmark, simple classification tasks consumed about 0.002–0.007 Wh per prompt on average (about 9% of a smartphone charge for 1,000 prompts), while text generation and text summarisation each used about 0.05 Wh per prompt; image generation averaged 2.91 Wh per prompt, and the least efficient image model in the study used 11.49 Wh per image (roughly equivalent to half a smartphone charge). First-party measurements in production environments have also been published. A 2025 Google study on Gemini assistant serving reported median per-prompt energy, emissions, and water-use estimates under the authors' accounting framework, while noting that different system boundaries can produce substantially different results. The study reported a median text-prompt estimate of about 0.24 Wh, which is roughly as much energy as watching nine seconds of television. The study also stated that software and infrastructure improvements reduced energy use by a factor of 33 and carbon emissions by a factor of 44 for a typical prompt over one year within the authors' framework. Researchers at the University of Michigan measured the energy consumption of various Meta Llama 3.1 models released in 2024 and found that smaller language models (8 billion parameters) use about 114 joules (0.03167 Wh) per response, while larger models (405 billion parameters) require up to 6,700 joules (1.861 Wh) per response. This corresponds to the energy needed to run a microwave oven for roughly one-tenth of a second and eight seconds, respectively. Comparisons between AI systems and human labour for specific tasks have produced mixed results and remain sensitive to assumptions about output quality, workload and system boundaries. A 2024 study in Scientific Reports reported 130 to 2900 times lower estimated carbon emissions for selected AI systems than for human writers and illustrators under its assumptions. A later Scientific Reports paper reported a counterexample for programming tasks under its assumptions, finding 5 to 19 times higher estimated emissions for the evaluated AI system than for human programmers on the benchmark used in that study. === System level === ==== Energy use and efficiency ==== AI electricity intensity depends not only on model architecture but also on hardware and facility efficiency. Data-centre operators commonly report Power usage effectiveness (PUE), which measures the ratio of total facility energy to IT equipment energy; a lower PUE indicates less overhead energy for cooling and other supporting infrastructure. Operators may also publish metrics and case studies on hardware efficiency, cooling systems and power sourcing. In its 2024 environmental report, Google stated that its 2023 total greenhouse gas emissions increased 13% year over year, primarily because of increased data-centre energy consumption and supply-chain emissions, while also reporting lower PUE than industry averages for its own facilities. The International Energy Agency has also reported that data centres remain a relatively small share of global electricity use overall, but that their local effects can be much more pronounced because demand is geographically concentrated. ==== Carbon footprint ==== At system level, AI contributes to rising electricity demand in data centres and related infrastructure. The International Energy Agency estimated that data centres used about 415 TWh of electricity in 2024, or around 1.5% of global electricity consumption, and projected that data-centre electricity use could rise to about 945 TWh by 2030, with AI identified as the main driver of that growth alongside other digital services. The carbon footprint of AI systems depends strongly on electricity sources, hardware efficiency, utilisation rates, and what stages are included in the accounting. Training large models can require substantial electricity, while total lifecycle impacts also depend on deployment scale and the amount of inference performed after training. Early analyses of frontier-model development reported rapid historical growth in training compute for selected systems, although later trends have depended on changes in model design, hardware and efficiency gains. Accounting methods that include upstream or embodied impacts, such as hardware manufacture and facilities construction, can materially affect estimates of AI-related emissions. === Decisions and strategies by individual companies === Large technology companies have reported that the expansion of AI and cloud infrastructure affects their sustainability targets, electricity demand, and resource use. Google, for example, attributed part of its emissions growth in 2023 to increased data-centre energy consumption and supply-chain emissions in its 2024 environmental report. Cloud and AI companies have also announced measures intended to reduce environmental impacts, including investment in more efficient hardware, low-carbon electricity procurement, alternative cooling systems, and water stewardship programmes. The extent, comparability, and third-party verification of such disclosures vary between firms and jurisdictions. == Water usage == Data centres can use water directly for cooling and indirectly through the water used in electricity generation, depending on the local energy mix. Public reporting on data-centre water use has often been inconsistent, making comparisons between operators and regions difficult. To standardise operational reporting, The Green Grid proposed the metric water usage effectiveness (WUE), defined as annual site water use divided by IT equipment energy use. WUE does not by itself measure local water stress, source sustainability, or all upstream water impacts. Studies of AI water use also distinguish between water withdrawal and water consumption. Research on AI-specific water use has argued that the water footprint of AI systems can be difficult to observe and may vary substantially by location, cooling design, and electricity source. A 2025 Communications of the ACM article summarised methods for estimating AI water footprints and emphasised the distinction between water withdrawal and water consumption. Li and colleagues estimated that global AI water withdrawal could reach 4.2–6.6 billion cubic metres in 2027 under the scenarios examined in their article. Using GPT-3, released by OpenAI in 2020, as an example, they estimated that training the model in Microsoft's U.S. data centres could consume about 700,000 litres of onsite water and about 5.4 million litres in total when offsite electricity-related water use was included; they also estimated that 10–50 medium-length GPT-3 responses could consume about 500 mL of water, depending on when and where the model was deployed. Published prompt-level estimates have also varied by system and accounting framework: the 2025 Google study on Gemini assistant serving reported a median text-prompt estimate of about 0.26 mL under its framework. Location can materially affect the significance of data-centre water use. Research on U.S. data centres found that one-fifth of servers' direct water footprint came from moderately to highly water-stressed watersheds, while nearly half of servers were fully or partially powered by plants located in water-stressed regions. A 2025 Reuters report, citing data from Verisk Maplecroft and NatureFinance, said that an average mid-sized data centre uses about 1.4 million litres of water per day for cooling and that Phoenix would experience a 32% increase in annual water stress if currently pl
Neural scaling law
In machine learning, a neural scaling law is an empirical scaling law that describes how neural network performance changes as key factors are scaled up or down. These factors typically include the number of parameters, training dataset size, and training cost. Some models also exhibit performance gains by scaling inference through increased test-time compute (TTC), extending neural scaling laws beyond training to the deployment phase. == Introduction == In general, a deep learning model can be characterized by four parameters: model size, training dataset size, training cost, and the post-training error rate (e.g., the test set error rate). Each of these variables can be defined as a real number, usually written as N , D , C , L {\displaystyle N,D,C,L} (respectively: parameter count, dataset size, computing cost, and loss). A neural scaling law is a theoretical or empirical statistical law between these parameters. There are also other parameters with other scaling laws. === Size of the model === In most cases, the model's size is simply the number of parameters. However, one complication arises with the use of sparse models, such as mixture-of-expert models. With sparse models, during inference, only a fraction of their parameters are used. In comparison, most other kinds of neural networks, such as transformer models, always use all their parameters during inference. === Size of the training dataset === The size of the training dataset is usually quantified by the number of data points within it. Larger training datasets are typically preferred, as they provide a richer and more diverse source of information from which the model can learn. This can lead to improved generalization performance when the model is applied to new, unseen data. However, increasing the size of the training dataset also increases the computational resources and time required for model training. With the "pretrain, then finetune" method used for most large language models, there are two kinds of training dataset: the pretraining dataset and the finetuning dataset. Their sizes have different effects on model performance. Generally, the finetuning dataset is less than 1% the size of pretraining dataset. In some cases, a small amount of high quality data suffices for finetuning, and more data does not necessarily improve performance. Many scaling laws, due to their inherent diminishing returns nature, value data based on a submodular set function which was shown in a paper on this topic. === Cost of training === Training cost is typically measured in terms of time (how long it takes to train the model) and computational resources (how much processing power and memory are required). It is important to note that the cost of training can be significantly reduced with efficient training algorithms, optimized software libraries, and parallel computing on specialized hardware such as GPUs or TPUs. The cost of training a neural network model is a function of several factors, including model size, training dataset size, the training algorithm complexity, and the computational resources available. In particular, doubling the training dataset size does not necessarily double the cost of training, because one may train the model for several times over the same dataset (each being an "epoch"). === Performance === The performance of a neural network model is evaluated based on its ability to accurately predict the output given some input data. Common metrics for evaluating model performance include: Negative log-likelihood per token (logarithm of perplexity) for language modeling; Accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score for classification tasks; Mean squared error (MSE) or mean absolute error (MAE) for regression tasks; Elo rating in a competition against other models, such as gameplay or preference by a human judge. Performance can be improved by using more data, larger models, different training algorithms, regularizing the model to prevent overfitting, and early stopping using a validation set. When the performance is a number bounded within the range of [ 0 , 1 ] {\displaystyle [0,1]} , such as accuracy, precision, etc., it often scales as a sigmoid function of cost, as seen in the figures. == Examples == === (Hestness, Narang, et al, 2017) === The 2017 paper is a common reference point for neural scaling laws fitted by statistical analysis on experimental data. Previous works before the 2000s, as cited in the paper, were either theoretical or orders of magnitude smaller in scale. Whereas previous works generally found the scaling exponent to scale like L ∝ D − α {\displaystyle L\propto D^{-\alpha }} , with α ∈ { 0.5 , 1 , 2 } {\displaystyle \alpha \in \{0.5,1,2\}} , the paper found that α ∈ [ 0.07 , 0.35 ] {\displaystyle \alpha \in [0.07,0.35]} . Of the factors they varied, only task can change the exponent α {\displaystyle \alpha } . Changing the architecture optimizers, regularizers, and loss functions, would only change the proportionality factor, not the exponent. For example, for the same task, one architecture might have L = 1000 D − 0.3 {\displaystyle L=1000D^{-0.3}} while another might have L = 500 D − 0.3 {\displaystyle L=500D^{-0.3}} . They also found that for a given architecture, the number of parameters necessary to reach lowest levels of loss, given a fixed dataset size, grows like N ∝ D β {\displaystyle N\propto D^{\beta }} for another exponent β {\displaystyle \beta } . They studied machine translation with LSTM ( α ∼ 0.13 {\displaystyle \alpha \sim 0.13} ), generative language modelling with LSTM ( α ∈ [ 0.06 , 0.09 ] , β ≈ 0.7 {\displaystyle \alpha \in [0.06,0.09],\beta \approx 0.7} ), ImageNet classification with ResNet ( α ∈ [ 0.3 , 0.5 ] , β ≈ 0.6 {\displaystyle \alpha \in [0.3,0.5],\beta \approx 0.6} ), and speech recognition with two hybrid (LSTMs complemented by either CNNs or an attention decoder) architectures ( α ≈ 0.3 {\displaystyle \alpha \approx 0.3} ). === (Henighan, Kaplan, et al, 2020) === A 2020 analysis studied statistical relations between C , N , D , L {\displaystyle C,N,D,L} over a wide range of values and found similar scaling laws, over the range of N ∈ [ 10 3 , 10 9 ] {\displaystyle N\in [10^{3},10^{9}]} , C ∈ [ 10 12 , 10 21 ] {\displaystyle C\in [10^{12},10^{21}]} , and over multiple modalities (text, video, image, text to image, etc.). In particular, the scaling laws it found are (Table 1 of ): For each modality, they fixed one of the two C , N {\displaystyle C,N} , and varying the other one ( D {\displaystyle D} is varied along using D = C / 6 N {\displaystyle D=C/6N} ), the achievable test loss satisfies L = L 0 + ( x 0 x ) α {\displaystyle L=L_{0}+\left({\frac {x_{0}}{x}}\right)^{\alpha }} where x {\displaystyle x} is the varied variable, and L 0 , x 0 , α {\displaystyle L_{0},x_{0},\alpha } are parameters to be found by statistical fitting. The parameter α {\displaystyle \alpha } is the most important one. When N {\displaystyle N} is the varied variable, α {\displaystyle \alpha } ranges from 0.037 {\displaystyle 0.037} to 0.24 {\displaystyle 0.24} depending on the model modality. This corresponds to the α = 0.34 {\displaystyle \alpha =0.34} from the Chinchilla scaling paper. When C {\displaystyle C} is the varied variable, α {\displaystyle \alpha } ranges from 0.048 {\displaystyle 0.048} to 0.19 {\displaystyle 0.19} depending on the model modality. This corresponds to the β = 0.28 {\displaystyle \beta =0.28} from the Chinchilla scaling paper. Given fixed computing budget, optimal model parameter count is consistently around N o p t ( C ) = ( C 5 × 10 − 12 petaFLOP-day ) 0.7 = 9.0 × 10 − 7 C 0.7 {\displaystyle N_{opt}(C)=\left({\frac {C}{5\times 10^{-12}{\text{petaFLOP-day}}}}\right)^{0.7}=9.0\times 10^{-7}C^{0.7}} The parameter 9.0 × 10 − 7 {\displaystyle 9.0\times 10^{-7}} varies by a factor of up to 10 for different modalities. The exponent parameter 0.7 {\displaystyle 0.7} varies from 0.64 {\displaystyle 0.64} to 0.75 {\displaystyle 0.75} for different modalities. This exponent corresponds to the ≈ 0.5 {\displaystyle \approx 0.5} from the Chinchilla scaling paper. It's "strongly suggested" (but not statistically checked) that D o p t ( C ) ∝ N o p t ( C ) 0.4 ∝ C 0.28 {\displaystyle D_{opt}(C)\propto N_{opt}(C)^{0.4}\propto C^{0.28}} . This exponent corresponds to the ≈ 0.5 {\displaystyle \approx 0.5} from the Chinchilla scaling paper. The scaling law of L = L 0 + ( C 0 / C ) 0.048 {\displaystyle L=L_{0}+(C_{0}/C)^{0.048}} was confirmed during the training of GPT-3 (Figure 3.1 ). === Chinchilla scaling (Hoffmann, et al, 2022) === One particular scaling law ("Chinchilla scaling") states that, for a large language model (LLM) autoregressively trained for one epoch, with a cosine learning rate schedule, we have: { C = C 0 N D L = A N α + B D β + L 0 {\displaystyle {\begin{cases}C=C_{0}ND\\L={\frac {A}{N^{\alpha }}}+{\frac {B}{D^{\beta }}}+L_{0}\end{cases}}} where the variables are C {\displaystyle C} is the cost o
AI data center
An AI data center is a specialized data center facility designed for the computationally intensive tasks of training and running inference for artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning models. Unlike general-purpose data centers, they are optimized for the parallel processing demands of AI workloads, typically using hardware such as AI accelerators (e.g., GPUs, TPUs) and high-speed interconnects. The global push to construct these specialized facilities accelerated dramatically during the AI boom of the 2020s. Memory manufacturers prioritized production of High Bandwidth Memory (HBM) essential for AI servers, which led to a global memory supply shortage amid a broader competition for advanced chips, power, and infrastructure. Major tech companies are estimated to spend $650 billion on AI data centers in 2026. == Architecture == Data centers for building and running large machine learning models contain specialized computer chips, GPUs, that use 2 to 4 times as much energy as their regular CPU counterparts (250-500 watts). AI data centers use 60 or more kilowatts per server rack, whereas more standard data centers typically use 5 to 10 kilowatts per rack. == Operators == As of August 2025, The Information tracked 18 planned or existing AI data centers in the United States, operated by Amazon Web Services, CoreWeave, Crusoe, Meta, Microsoft/OpenAI, Oracle, Tesla, and xAI. Other AI data center operators include Digital Realty and Alibaba. Data centers are also being built in China, India, Europe, Saudi Arabia, and Canada. The New Yorker described CoreWeave as the most prominent AI data center operator in the United States. Two types of data center providers for machine learning have been noted: hyperscalers and neoclouds. The Verge listed large technology companies such as Google, Meta, Microsoft, Oracle and Amazon as hyperscalers. The New York Times described neoclouds as "a new generation of data center providers". CoreWeave, Nebius, Nscale, and Lambda have been described as examples of neoclouds. In January 2025, OpenAI, in partnership with Oracle and Softbank, announced the Stargate project, which as of September 2025 is composed of six built or proposed AI data centers in the United States. In response to the Stargate project, Amazon launched in October 2025 an AI data center on 1,200 acres of farmland in Indiana. This data center, known as Project Rainier, is one of the largest AI data centers in the world, with Amazon spending $11 billion on the project. Rainier is specifically intended for training and running machine learning models from Anthropic. As of that time, this facility contains seven data centers (out of an estimated 30 planned) and will use 2.2 gigawatts of electricity (equivalent to 1 million households) and millions of gallons of water per year. Computer chips from Annapurna Labs and Anthropic, Trainium 2, were designed for use in such facilities. Amazon pumped millions of gallons of water out of the ground to construct the data center, and as of June 2025, Indiana state officials are investigating whether this dewatering process led to dry wells for local residents. In November 2025, Anthropic announced a plan in partnership with Fluidstack to develop artificial intelligence infrastructure in the United States, including data centers in New York and Texas, worth $50 billion. Other AI data center projects include the Colossus supercomputer from xAI, a Louisiana-based project from Meta, Hyperion, expected to use 5 GW of power, and a second Ohio-based Meta project, Prometheus, with a capacity of 1 GW. A 3,200-acre AI data center, capable of 4.4-4.5 GW of power and located on the decommissioned Homer City Generating Station, is under construction as of 2025, and will use seven 30-acre gas generating stations supplied by EQT. As of December 2025, CRH is working on over 100 data centers in the United States. In 2025, ExxonMobil and NextEra announced plans to build a data center powered by natural gas and using carbon capture technology, with 1.2 GW of power capacity. They previously purchased 2,500 acres of land in the Southeastern United States and plan to market the data center to an artificial intelligence company. The increased interest in AI data centers has led to several executives from companies in that space becoming billionaires, including CoreWeave, QTS, Nebius, Astera Labs, Groq, Fermi (which is connected to former United States Secretary of Energy Rick Perry), Snowflake and Cipher Mining. Several companies involved in cryptocurrency mining, such as Bitdeer, CoreWeave, Cipher Mining, TeraWulf, IREN, Core Scientific, and CleanSpark have also been involved with AI data centers. == Finances == Between January and August 2024, Microsoft, Meta, Google and Amazon collectively spent $125 billion on AI data centers. Citigroup forecasted that $2.8 trillion would be spent on AI data centers by 2030, while McKinsey and Company estimated that almost $7 trillion would be spent globally by that time. According to S&P Global, $61 billion has been spent on the data center market as a whole in 2025, while debt issuance for data centers was $182 billion during the same year. Large technology companies have offloaded the financial risks of building AI data centers by setting up special purpose vehicles or by contracting with neoclouds. For example, Meta's Hyperion was mostly funded by Blue Owl Capital, which did so using a bond offering from PIMCO. Those bonds were sold to a number of clients, including BlackRock. Meta did not borrow money itself and instead established a special purpose vehicle from which it would rent the data center. This deal was structured by Morgan Stanley for $30 billion, the largest known private capital transaction as of 2025. Neoclouds such as CoreWeave have gone into debt to buy computer chips from Nvidia for their data centers, and the chips themselves have been used for loan collateral. As of December 2025, CoreWeave took out three GPU-backed loans, collectively worth $12.4 billion, from private credit firms (Blackstone, Coatue, BlackRock, PIMCO) and from banks (Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo). Thus, these companies provide an indirect connection between private credit and established banks. Data centers have also established asset-backed securities, and debt for data centers has its own derivative financial products. The real estate industry, including asset managers, public companies and private investors, has also invested in data centers. == Energy sourcing == == Environmental footprint == Average AI data centers have an electricity footprint equivalent to 100,000 households, and use billions of gallons of water for cooling their hardware. In 2025, the International Energy Agency estimated that the larger AI data centers currently under construction could consume as much electricity as 2 million households. A 2024 report from the United States Department of Energy stated that data centers overall used 17 billion gallons of water per year in the United States, primarily due to "rapid proliferation of AI servers", and that this usage was forecasted to grow to nearly 80 billion gallons by 2028. Researchers estimated that AI data centers in the United States would emit 24-44 million metric tons of carbon dioxide and use 731–1,125 million cubic meters of water per year between 2024 and 2030. Peaking power plants, which have been proposed as a power source for AI data centers, emit sulfur dioxide and have historically been located disproportionately near communities of color in the United States. Reciprocating internal combustion engines, proposed as another power source for a data center, emit PM 2.5, nitrogen oxides, and volatile organic compounds. == AI data centers in the United States == In the United States, both the Biden administration and second Trump administration supported the construction of AI data centers. In January 2025, then-president Joe Biden signed an executive order for federal government agencies to support AI data centers on federal sites built by private companies, study their effect on energy prices, and encourage their use of renewable energy. In April 2025, the United States Department of Energy suggested 16 possible sites, including Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. In its July 2025 AI Action Plan, the second Trump administration supported increased production of AI data centers. Several US states have incentivized local data center construction. For example, in 2024, lawmakers in Michigan approved tax breaks for data center equipment and construction material. Some data center companies have also invested or promised to invest in the infrastructure of local communities. In December 2025, Democratic senators Elizabeth Warren, Chris Van Hollen, and Richard Blumenthal wrote to seven technology companies (Google, Microsoft, Amazon, Meta, CoreWeave, Digital Realty, and Equinix) that they w
Cognitive robotics
Cognitive robotics or cognitive technology is a subfield of robotics concerned with endowing a robot with intelligent behavior by providing it with a processing architecture that will allow it to learn and reason about how to behave in response to complex goals in a complex world. Cognitive robotics may be considered the engineering branch of embodied cognitive science and embodied embedded cognition, consisting of robotic process automation, artificial intelligence, machine learning, deep learning, optical character recognition, image processing, process mining, analytics, software development and system integration. == Core issues == While traditional cognitive modeling approaches have assumed symbolic coding schemes as a means for depicting the world, translating the world into these kinds of symbolic representations has proven to be problematic if not untenable. Perception and action and the notion of symbolic representation are therefore core issues to be addressed in cognitive robotics. == Starting point == Cognitive robotics views human or animal cognition as a starting point for the development of robotic information processing, as opposed to more traditional artificial intelligence techniques. Target robotic cognitive capabilities include perception processing, attention allocation, anticipation, planning, complex motor coordination, reasoning about other agents and perhaps even about their own mental states. Robotic cognition embodies the behavior of intelligent agents in the physical world (or a virtual world, in the case of simulated cognitive robotics). Ultimately, the robot must be able to act in the real world. == Learning techniques == === Motor Babble === A preliminary robot learning technique called motor babbling involves correlating pseudo-random complex motor movements by the robot with resulting visual and/or auditory feedback such that the robot may begin to expect a pattern of sensory feedback given a pattern of motor output. Desired sensory feedback may then be used to inform a motor control signal. This is thought to be analogous to how a baby learns to reach for objects or learns to produce speech sounds. For simpler robot systems, where, for instance, inverse kinematics may feasibly be used to transform anticipated feedback (desired motor result) into motor output, this step may be skipped. === Imitation === Once a robot can coordinate its motors to produce a desired result, the technique of learning by imitation may be used. The robot monitors the performance of another agent and then the robot tries to imitate that agent. It is often a challenge to transform imitation information from a complex scene into a desired motor result for the robot. Note that imitation is a high-level form of cognitive behavior and imitation is not necessarily required in a basic model of embodied animal cognition. === Knowledge acquisition === A more complex learning approach is "autonomous knowledge acquisition": the robot is left to explore the environment on its own. A system of goals and beliefs is typically assumed. A somewhat more directed mode of exploration can be achieved by "curiosity" algorithms, such as Intelligent Adaptive Curiosity or Category-Based Intrinsic Motivation. These algorithms generally involve breaking sensory input into a finite number of categories and assigning some sort of prediction system (such as an artificial neural network) to each. The prediction system keeps track of the error in its predictions over time. Reduction in prediction error is considered learning. The robot then preferentially explores categories in which it is learning (or reducing prediction error) the fastest. == Other architectures == Some researchers in cognitive robotics have tried using architectures such as (ACT-R and Soar (cognitive architecture)) as a basis of their cognitive robotics programs. These highly modular symbol-processing architectures have been used to simulate operator performance and human performance when modeling simplistic and symbolized laboratory data. The idea is to extend these architectures to handle real-world sensory input as that input continuously unfolds through time. What is needed is a way to somehow translate the world into a set of symbols and their relationships. == Questions == Some of the fundamental questions to be answered in cognitive robotics are: How much human programming should or can be involved to support the learning processes? How can one quantify progress? Some of the adopted ways are reward and punishment. But what kind of reward and what kind of punishment? In humans, when teaching a child, for example, the reward would be candy or some encouragement, and the punishment can take many forms. But what is an effective way with robots?
Cognitive robotics
Cognitive robotics or cognitive technology is a subfield of robotics concerned with endowing a robot with intelligent behavior by providing it with a processing architecture that will allow it to learn and reason about how to behave in response to complex goals in a complex world. Cognitive robotics may be considered the engineering branch of embodied cognitive science and embodied embedded cognition, consisting of robotic process automation, artificial intelligence, machine learning, deep learning, optical character recognition, image processing, process mining, analytics, software development and system integration. == Core issues == While traditional cognitive modeling approaches have assumed symbolic coding schemes as a means for depicting the world, translating the world into these kinds of symbolic representations has proven to be problematic if not untenable. Perception and action and the notion of symbolic representation are therefore core issues to be addressed in cognitive robotics. == Starting point == Cognitive robotics views human or animal cognition as a starting point for the development of robotic information processing, as opposed to more traditional artificial intelligence techniques. Target robotic cognitive capabilities include perception processing, attention allocation, anticipation, planning, complex motor coordination, reasoning about other agents and perhaps even about their own mental states. Robotic cognition embodies the behavior of intelligent agents in the physical world (or a virtual world, in the case of simulated cognitive robotics). Ultimately, the robot must be able to act in the real world. == Learning techniques == === Motor Babble === A preliminary robot learning technique called motor babbling involves correlating pseudo-random complex motor movements by the robot with resulting visual and/or auditory feedback such that the robot may begin to expect a pattern of sensory feedback given a pattern of motor output. Desired sensory feedback may then be used to inform a motor control signal. This is thought to be analogous to how a baby learns to reach for objects or learns to produce speech sounds. For simpler robot systems, where, for instance, inverse kinematics may feasibly be used to transform anticipated feedback (desired motor result) into motor output, this step may be skipped. === Imitation === Once a robot can coordinate its motors to produce a desired result, the technique of learning by imitation may be used. The robot monitors the performance of another agent and then the robot tries to imitate that agent. It is often a challenge to transform imitation information from a complex scene into a desired motor result for the robot. Note that imitation is a high-level form of cognitive behavior and imitation is not necessarily required in a basic model of embodied animal cognition. === Knowledge acquisition === A more complex learning approach is "autonomous knowledge acquisition": the robot is left to explore the environment on its own. A system of goals and beliefs is typically assumed. A somewhat more directed mode of exploration can be achieved by "curiosity" algorithms, such as Intelligent Adaptive Curiosity or Category-Based Intrinsic Motivation. These algorithms generally involve breaking sensory input into a finite number of categories and assigning some sort of prediction system (such as an artificial neural network) to each. The prediction system keeps track of the error in its predictions over time. Reduction in prediction error is considered learning. The robot then preferentially explores categories in which it is learning (or reducing prediction error) the fastest. == Other architectures == Some researchers in cognitive robotics have tried using architectures such as (ACT-R and Soar (cognitive architecture)) as a basis of their cognitive robotics programs. These highly modular symbol-processing architectures have been used to simulate operator performance and human performance when modeling simplistic and symbolized laboratory data. The idea is to extend these architectures to handle real-world sensory input as that input continuously unfolds through time. What is needed is a way to somehow translate the world into a set of symbols and their relationships. == Questions == Some of the fundamental questions to be answered in cognitive robotics are: How much human programming should or can be involved to support the learning processes? How can one quantify progress? Some of the adopted ways are reward and punishment. But what kind of reward and what kind of punishment? In humans, when teaching a child, for example, the reward would be candy or some encouragement, and the punishment can take many forms. But what is an effective way with robots?