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LumenVox

LumenVox is a privately held speech recognition software company based in San Diego, California. LumenVox has been described as one of the market leaders in the speech recognition software industry. == History == LumenVox was founded in 2001 as subsidiary of Progressive Computing. According to LumenVox CEO Edward Miller, when Progressive had initially looked to add speech recognition to its own phone system, it found the existing offerings too expensive and recognized a niche in the market for a more affordable speech recognition product. This led to the development of LumenVox with an aim to bring speech recognition to small-to-midsized businesses. LumenVox is one of the major providers of automatic speech recognition for telephone systems, and as of 2006, became the second largest provider of speech recognition software. == Products == The primary LumenVox product is the LumenVox Speech Engine. It is a speaker-independent automatic speech recognizer that uses the Speech Recognition Grammar Specification for building and defining grammars. It has been integrated with several of the major voice platforms, including Avaya Voice Portal/Interactive Response, Aculab, and BroadSoft's BroadWorks. The Speech Engine was originally derived from CMU Sphinx, but LumenVox has added considerable development effort to make it a commercial-ready product. LumenVox also offers a product called the Speech Tuner, which provides a graphical means of testing and troubleshooting speech recognition applications. == Open source support == LumenVox was recognized as one of the top VoIP companies in 2008 for its work in providing its offerings to the open source community, an effort by the company that began in 2006 when it partnered with Digium. At that time, Digium, maintainer of the open source Asterisk PBX, integrated the LumenVox Speech Engine into Asterisk. This made LumenVox the first commercially available speech recognition engine for Asterisk. As one of the earlier commercial software integrations with Asterisk, the LumenVox integration has been described as one of the applications that helped to mainstream Asterisk. In 2009, LumenVox also began offering access to the Speech Engine as a monthly subscription, bringing the cost of entry down even lower for open source users. LumenVox is also integrated with the open source UniMRCP project, which provides open source client and server libraries for the Media Resource Control Protocol.
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General-Purpose AI Code of Practice

The General-Purpose AI Code of Practice (GPAI CoP) is a compliance tool released by the European Commission on 10 July 2025 to support compliance with the European Union Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act). It provides operational guidance for providers of general-purpose AI models, particularly in relation to Articles 53 and 55 of the AI Act, which entered into application on 2 August 2025. The Code is organised into three chapters (Transparency, Copyright, and Safety and Security) and outlines how providers can meet the Act's relevant obligations. Although non-binding, providers can rely on adherence to the Code, meaning that EU regulators will assume that providers following the Code meet the corresponding legal requirements of the AI Act. As such, signatories to the Code will benefit from reduced administrative burdens and increased legal certainty compared to providers that prove compliance in other ways. While adherence to the Code is voluntary, compliance with the AI Act is not. == Background == The EU AI Act, adopted in 2024, established a risk-based regulatory regime for artificial intelligence in the European Union. The rationale for the GPAI CoP stems from Article 56 of the AI Act, which empowers the EU AI Office to develop a voluntary rulebook to guide how AI model providers can meet their legal obligations – specifically those found in Articles 53 and 55. Under Articles 53 and 55, developers of general-purpose AI models whose training compute exceeds 1023 floating-point operations (FLOPs) and that are placed on the EU market must meet transparency obligations and put in place a policy for EU copyright law. Models trained with more than 1025 FLOPs are classified as presenting systemic risk and are subject to enhanced safety requirements. The Commission may also designate a model as presenting systemic risk if it has equivalent impact or capabilities (Annex XIII criteria), even below that compute figure. Because the AI Act is relatively vague on how model providers should implement these requirements, the Code is meant to help by detailing processes and practices for compliance. == Drafting process == The development of the GPAI CoP was drawn up by 13 independent experts and involved four thematic working groups: Transparency & Copyright, Risk assessment for systemic risk, Technical risk mitigation for systemic risk, and Governance risk mitigation for systemic risk. Each group was coordinated by the European Union Artificial Intelligence Office (EU AI Office), drawing on contributions from nearly 1,000 stakeholders, including AI developers, academics, civil society organisations, national authorities, and international observers. The Code underwent three earlier iterations in November 2024, December 2024, and March 2025, before the final version was published on 10 July 2025, more than two months later than initially planned. The GPAI CoP will likely be updated continuously by the EU AI Office, alongside other tools such as the training data summary template. == Signatories == Among U.S.-based technology companies, Amazon, Anthropic, Google, IBM, Microsoft, and OpenAI have signed the GPAI CoP. xAI, founded by Elon Musk, has signed only one of the three chapters, namely the safety and security chapter. Prominent European AI companies that have signed include Aleph Alpha and Mistral AI. The European Commission maintains an updated list of signatories. As of January 2026, Meta is the most notable company that has declined to sign the Code. Major Chinese AI companies, such as Alibaba, Baidu or Deepseek, have also not signed. Providers that do not sign the GPAI CoP will still have to adhere to the binding requirements of the EU AI Act. The European Commission has indicated that it may take tougher action against companies that didn't sign the Code. == Transparency and Copyright chapters == The first two chapters of the GPAI CoP address transparency and copyright compliance and apply to all GPAI providers. They offer a way to demonstrate compliance with their obligations under Article 53 AI Act. The Transparency chapter addresses the documentation of a model's capabilities, limitations, and points of contact, and expects providers to make key documentation available to downstream providers. Signatories must also publish summaries of the content used to train their models. In the Copyright chapter, Signatories commit to follow a policy that aligns with EU copyright law. For example, they commit to mitigating the risk of copyright-infringing output. == Safety and Security chapter == The Safety and Security chapter is the most extensive chapter of the Code, and it applies to GPAI models with systemic risk, meaning it's only relevant to the small number of providers of the most advanced models. It specifies how Signatories commit to meeting Article 55(1) obligations to: Conduct model evaluations to identify systemic risks Assess and mitigate those risks Track and report serious incidents Ensure the cyber and physical security of their models The chapter outlines a comprehensive risk management process that must be applied before major deployment decisions, such as releasing a new systemic-risk GPAI model in the EU market, or substantially updating an existing one. Signatories commit to identifying systemic risks of their model, analysing and evaluating them, determining whether risk levels are acceptable, and implementing mitigation measures if necessary. This process should be repeated until models achieve an acceptable level of risk across all identified risks. === Risk identification === Signatories commit to analysing and evaluating at least four “specified” categories of systemic risk: CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) Loss of control Cyber offence Harmful manipulation They are also expected to identify other systemic risks to public health, safety, and fundamental rights. The Code instructs providers to consider model capabilities, propensities, and affordances in this identification. Signatories commit to developing risk scenarios illustrating how identified risks could materialise in real-world conditions. === Risk analysis and risk evaluation === After identifying potential systemic risks, Signatories commit to analysing and evaluating the risks in order to determine whether they are acceptable or not, drawing on scientific literature, training data analysis, incident databases, expert consultation, and other sources. They also commit to conducting state-of-the-art model evaluations such as benchmarking, red teaming, and human uplift studies, targeting each risk. The risk analysis process is interconnected: insights from risk modelling should inform model evaluation design, while post-market monitoring should feed back into ongoing analysis. Signatories commit to ultimately estimating the likelihood and severity of each systemic risk. ==== Independent external model evaluations ==== Appendix 3.5 of the Safety and Security chapter requires signatories to ensure that independent external evaluators conduct model evaluations. Signatories may claim an exemption from this requirement only if they can demonstrate that their model is “similarly safe” to another model that has already been shown to comply with the Code, or if they are unable to appoint an appropriately qualified evaluator. The determination of “similarly safe” is based on comparable performance on benchmarks and the similarity of other model characteristics, such as their architecture. The CoP acknowledges that this kind of information is typically available only for models by the same provider, or potentially for open-weights or open-source models. === Risk acceptance criteria === The Code requires providers to compare estimated risks against predefined acceptance criteria, which must be measurable, based on model capabilities, and defined preemptively. While providers get to determine the level of risk they deem acceptable themselves, the pre-defined criteria and acceptance thresholds ensure providers cannot adjust their level of tolerance flexibly ahead of deployment decisions. Only if all risks are below acceptable levels should a model be deployed. === Continuous risk management and governance === The Code mandates ongoing risk management throughout the model lifecycle, including light-touch evaluations, continuous mitigation, post-market monitoring, and incident tracking and reporting. It further requires organisational governance structures assigning responsibility for risk management and expects providers to promote a “healthy risk culture,” including informing employees about the whistleblower protection policy, allowing internal challenges of decisions concerning systemic risk management, and committing to not retaliating against employees who disclose concerns about systemic risks to oversight authorities. === Documentation and transparency === Signatories commit to creating two types of documentation: Safety and Security Frame
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Leela Zero

Leela Zero is a free and open-source computer Go program released on 25 October 2017. It is developed by Belgian programmer Gian-Carlo Pascutto, the author of chess engine Sjeng and Go engine Leela. Leela Zero's algorithm is based on DeepMind's 2017 paper about AlphaGo Zero. Unlike the original Leela, which has a lot of human knowledge and heuristics programmed into it, the program code in Leela Zero only knows the basic rules and nothing more. The knowledge that makes Leela Zero a strong player is contained in a neural network, which is trained based on the results of previous games that the program played. Leela Zero is trained by a distributed effort, which is coordinated at the Leela Zero website. Members of the community provide computing resources by running the client, which generates self-play games and submits them to the server. The self-play games are used to train newer networks. Generally, over 500 clients have connected to the server to contribute resources. The community has provided high quality code contributions as well. == Version history == Leela Zero finished third at the BerryGenomics Cup World AI Go Tournament in Fuzhou, Fujian, China on 28 April 2018. The New Yorker at the end of 2018 characterized Leela and Leela Zero as "the world’s most successful open-source Go engines". In early 2018, another team branched Leela Chess Zero from the same code base, also to verify the methods in the AlphaZero paper as applied to the game of chess. AlphaZero's use of Google TPUs was replaced by a crowd-sourcing infrastructure and the ability to use graphics card GPUs via the OpenCL library. Even so, it is expected to take a year of crowd-sourced training to make up for the dozen hours that AlphaZero was allowed to train for its chess match in the paper. The distributed training server was shut down on 2021-02-15, marking the end of Leela Zero project. The page now directs visitors to KataGo and SAI. The model sizes increased steadily over time. The first released model has hash name d645af97, size 1x8 (1 layer, 8 channels), and released at 2017-11-10 13:04. The last released model has hash name 0e9ea880, size 40x256, and was released at 2021-02-15 09:04. == Technology == Leela Zero is an (almost) exact replication of AlphaGo Zero in both training process and architecture. The training process is Monte-Carlo Tree Search with self-play, exactly the same as AlphaGo Zero. The architecture is the same as AlphaGo Zero (with one difference). Consider the last released model, 0e9ea880. It has 47 million parameters, and the following architecture: The stem of the network takes as input a 18x19x19 tensor representation of the Go board. 8 channels are the positions of the current player's stones from the last eight time steps. (1 if there is a stone, 0 otherwise. If the time step go before the beginning of the game, then 0 in all positions.) 8 channels are the positions of the other player's stones from the last eight time steps. 1 channel is all 1 if black is to move, and 0 otherwise. 1 channel is all 1 if white is to move, and 0 otherwise. (This channel is not present in the original AlphaGo Zero) The body is a ResNet with 40 residual blocks and 256 channels. There are two heads, a policy head and a value head. Policy head outputs a logit array of size 19 × 19 + 1 {\displaystyle 19\times 19+1} , representing the logit of making a move in one of the points, plus the logit of passing. Value head outputs a number in the range ( − 1 , + 1 ) {\displaystyle (-1,+1)} , representing the expected score for the current player. -1 represents current player losing, and +1 winning.
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Type–token distinction

The type–token distinction is the difference between a type of objects (analogous to a class) and the individual tokens of that type (analogous to instances). Since each type may be instantiated by multiple tokens, there are generally more tokens than types of an object. For example, the sentence "A rose is a rose is a rose" contains three word types: three word tokens of the type a, two word tokens of the type is, and three word tokens of the type rose. The distinction is important in disciplines such as logic, linguistics, metalogic, typography, and computer programming. == Overview == The type–token distinction separates types (abstract descriptive concepts) from tokens (objects that instantiate concepts). For example, in the sentence "the bicycle is becoming more popular" the word bicycle represents the abstract concept of bicycles and this abstract concept is a type, whereas in the sentence "the bicycle is in the garage", it represents a particular object and this particular object is a token. Similarly, the word type 'letter' uses only four letter types: L, E, T and R. Nevertheless, it uses both E and T twice. One can say that the word type 'letter' has six letter tokens, with two tokens each of the letter types E and T. Whenever a word type is inscribed, the number of letter tokens created equals the number of letter occurrences in the word type. Some logicians consider a word type to be the class of its tokens. Other logicians counter that the word type has a permanence and constancy not found in the class of its tokens. The type remains the same while the class of its tokens is continually gaining new members and losing old members. == Typography == In typography, the type–token distinction is used to determine the presence of a text printed by movable type: The defining criteria which a typographic print has to fulfill is that of the type identity of the various letter forms which make up the printed text. In other words: each letter form which appears in the text has to be shown as a particular instance ("token") of one and the same type which contains a reverse image of the printed letter. == Charles Sanders Peirce == The distinctions between using words as types or tokens were first made by American logician and philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce in 1906 using terminology that he established. Peirce's type–token distinction applies to words, sentences, paragraphs and so on: to anything in a universe of discourse of character-string theory, or concatenation theory. Peirce's original words are the following: A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a ... printed book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty 'thes' on a page, and, of course, they count as twenty words. In another sense of the word 'word,' however, there is but one word 'the' in the English language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page, or be heard in any voice .... Such a ... Form, I propose to term a Type. A Single ... Object ... such as this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a Token. .... In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the Type signifies.
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ConEmu

ConEmu (short for Console emulator) is a free and open-source tabbed terminal emulator for Windows. ConEmu presents multiple consoles and simple GUI applications as one customizable GUI window with tabs and a status bar. It also provides emulation for ANSI escape codes for color, bypassing the capabilities of the standard Windows Console Host to provide 256 and 24-bit color in Windows. The program has a large range of customization, including custom color palettes for the standard 16 colors, hotkeys, transparency, an auto-hideable mode (similar to the way Quake originally displayed its developer console). Initially, the program was created as a companion to Far Manager, bringing some features common for graphical file managers to this console application (thumbnails and tiles, drag and drop with other windows, true color interface, and others). As of 2012, ConEmu could be used with any other Win32 console application or simple GUI tool (such as Notepad, PuTTY or DOSBox). ConEmu doesn't provide any shell itself, but rather allows using any other shell. It does provide a limited macro language, to control the hosted applications startup.
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Simulation decomposition

SimDec, or Simulation decomposition, is a hybrid uncertainty and sensitivity analysis method, for visually examining the relationships between the output and input variables of a computational model. SimDec maps multivariable scenarios onto the distribution of the model output. This visual analytics approach exposes the underlying nature of the model behavior, including its nonlinear and multivariate interaction effects. SimDec can be used in any range of science, engineering, and social domains. Existing applications include business and environmental issues. == Method == SimDec operates on Monte Carlo simulation (or measured) data where both output and input values are recorded. At least one thousand observations (or simulated iterations) are typically recommended to preserve the readability of the resulting histograms. An outline of the decomposition algorithm, which is readily available in multiple programming languages, proceeds as follows: Select the input variables for decomposition. One can use sensitivity indices (see variance-based sensitivity analysis) to define the most influential variables for decomposition or choose them manually according to the decision-problem context (for example, only those input variables that the decision-maker can act upon). Two to three input variables, ordered by decreasing value of their sensitivity indices, usually provide the most meaningful decomposition results. Divide the inputs into states. The numeric ranges of the inputs are split into several intervals with an equal number of observations in each. For categorical variables, the categories represent states. Form scenarios. All combinations of states of the selected input variables produce unique scenarios or subsets of the data. For example, if the range of X2 is divided into low, medium and high, and X3 takes values of 1 or 2, six scenarios are formed: (i) X2 low & X3 = 1, (ii) X2 low & X3 = 2, (iii) X2 medium & X3 = 1, (iv) X2 medium & X3 = 2, (v) X2 high & X3 = 1, and (vi) X2 high & X3 = 2. Assign scenarios to each output value. The simulation data is used to define the scenario index for each simulation run. For example, if an X2 value falls into the low state and X3 is equal to 2, the corresponding scenario, defined in Step 3, is (ii). Color-code the output distribution. When all output values are assigned scenario indices, they are plotted as series in a stacked histogram, visually separated by color-coding. For ease of visual perception, the states of the most influential input variable are assigned distinct colors, and all the remaining partitions take shades of those colors (see Figure). All of these steps can be run automatically on the given data using the open-source SimDec packages currently available in Python, R, Julia, and Matlab. A SimDec template in Excel runs a Monte Carlo simulation of a spreadsheet model but possesses only a manual option for input selection. == How to read SimDec == === Histogram === Histogram is an approximate representation of the distribution of numerical data. Its horizontal axis shows the range of the variable of interest, and its vertical axis denotes count, also called frequency, or, if divided by the total number of data points, probability. The distribution alone can supply only limited information about the data – its minimum, maximum, and shape (where the most of data occurs). === Judging the importance of inputs === If an input variable has no effect on the output, its states (e.g., low & high) would lie on top of each other on the SimDec histogram, occupying fully overlapping ranges of the output. If an input variable has a strong effect and explains most of the variance of the output, the border between its states on the SimDec histogram would be vertical. Such visualization has an important decision-making implication – e.g., if the high state of X can be achieved, it would guarantee a certain range of Y. All cases in-between with low-to-strong effects would show a diagonal border between the states. The less they overlap, the larger the effect of X on Y. While the horizontal displacement of sub-distributions on the SimDec histogram is the key to interpreting the results, the vertical disposition of sub-distributions is just a technical matter of the order of plotting the series of the stacked histogram. === Exploring the interaction of inputs === When two or more input variables are used for decomposition, it becomes possible to examine their joint effects. A schematic visualization portrays how different types of joint effects of input variables on the output appear on SimDec visualization. Understanding the nature of interaction effects in a computational model and its behavior in general is crucial for effective decision-making. == Limitations == The SimDec method has several limitations: It is based on Monte Carlo simulation and thus requires running a computational model a thousand of times or more. To models that take hours to evaluate once, it would be impossible to use SimDec (unless a supercomputer and/or large of time are available). SimDec is based on a histogram, thus, for binary or categorical output variables, the visualization would be very limited (e.g., only a few bins). The more input variables one selects for the decomposition, the less readable the histogram becomes. Only cases with two and three input variables are presented in.
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Automatic1111

AUTOMATIC1111 Stable Diffusion Web UI (SD WebUI, A1111, or Automatic1111) is an open source generative artificial intelligence program that allows users to generate images from a text prompt. It uses Stable Diffusion as the base model for its image capabilities together with a large set of extensions and features to customize its output. == History == SD WebUI was released on GitHub on August 22, 2022, by AUTOMATIC1111, 1 month after the initial release of Stable Diffusion. At the time, Stable Diffusion could only be run via the command line. SD WebUI quickly rose in popularity and has been described as "the most popular tool for running diffusion models locally." SD WebUI is one of the most popular user interfaces for Stable Diffusion, together with ComfyUI. In February 2024, a book was published by ja:Gijutsu Hyoronsha on using Stable Diffusion with SD WebUI in Japanese. As of July 2024, the project had 136,000 stars on GitHub. == Features == SD WebUI uses Gradio for its user interface. Each parameter in the Stable Diffusion program is exposed via a UI interface within SD WebUI. SD WebUI contains additional parameters not included in Stable Diffusion itself, such as support for Low-rank adaptations, ControlNet and custom variational autoencoders. SD WebUI supports prompt weighting, image-to-image based generation, inpainting, outpainting and image scaling. It supports over 20 samplers including DDIM, Euler, Euler a, DPM++ 2M Karras, and UniPC. It is also used for its various optimizations over the base Stable Diffusion. == Stable Diffusion WebUI Forge == Stable Diffusion WebUI Forge (Forge) is a notable fork of SD WebUI started by Lvmin Zhang, who is also the creator of ControlNet and Fooocus. The initial goal of Forge was to improve the performance and features of SD WebUI with the intention to upstream changes back to SD WebUI. One of Forge's optimizations allowed users with low VRAM to generate images faster on some versions of Stable Diffusion. It improved generation speed for users with 8GB and 6GB VRAM by 30-45% and 60-75%, respectively. Forge also includes extra features such as support for more samplers than standard SD WebUI. Some of Forge's optimizations were borrowed from ComfyUI, and others were developed by the Forge team. In August 2024, Forge added support for the Flux diffusion model developed by Black Forest Labs, which is not yet supported by SD WebUI.
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Catastrophic interference

Catastrophic interference, also known as catastrophic forgetting, is the tendency of an artificial neural network to abruptly and drastically forget previously learned information upon learning new information. Neural networks are an important part of the connectionist approach to cognitive science. The issue of catastrophic interference when modeling human memory with connectionist models was originally brought to the attention of the scientific community by research from McCloskey and Cohen (1989), and Ratcliff (1990). It is a radical manifestation of the 'sensitivity-stability' dilemma or the 'stability-plasticity' dilemma. Specifically, these problems refer to the challenge of making an artificial neural network that is sensitive to, but not disrupted by, new information. Lookup tables and connectionist networks lie on the opposite sides of the stability plasticity spectrum. The former remains completely stable in the presence of new information but lacks the ability to generalize, i.e. infer general principles, from new inputs. On the other hand, connectionist networks like the standard backpropagation network can generalize to unseen inputs, but they are sensitive to new information. Backpropagation models can be analogized to human memory insofar as they have a similar ability to generalize, but these networks often exhibit less stability than human memory. Notably, these backpropagation networks are susceptible to catastrophic interference. This is an issue when modelling human memory, because unlike these networks, humans typically do not show catastrophic forgetting. == Discovery == The term catastrophic interference was originally coined by McCloskey and Cohen (1989) but was also brought to the attention of the scientific community by research from Ratcliff (1990). === The Sequential Learning Problem: McCloskey and Cohen (1989) === McCloskey and Cohen (1989) noted the problem of catastrophic interference during two different experiments with backpropagation neural network modelling. Experiment 1: Learning the ones and twos addition facts In their first experiment they trained a standard backpropagation neural network on a single training set consisting of 17 single-digit ones problems (i.e., 1 + 1 through 9 + 1, and 1 + 2 through 1 + 9) until the network could represent and respond properly to all of them. The error between the actual output and the desired output steadily declined across training sessions, which reflected that the network learned to represent the target outputs better across trials. Next, they trained the network on a single training set consisting of 17 single-digit twos problems (i.e., 2 + 1 through 2 + 9, and 1 + 2 through 9 + 2) until the network could represent, respond properly to all of them. They noted that their procedure was similar to how a child would learn their addition facts. Following each learning trial on the twos facts, the network was tested for its knowledge on both the ones and twos addition facts. Like the ones facts, the twos facts were readily learned by the network. However, McCloskey and Cohen noted the network was no longer able to properly answer the ones addition problems even after one learning trial of the twos addition problems. The output pattern produced in response to the ones facts often resembled an output pattern for an incorrect number more closely than the output pattern for a correct number. This is considered to be a drastic amount of error. Furthermore, the problems 2+1 and 1+2, which were included in both training sets, even showed dramatic disruption during the first learning trials of the twos facts. Experiment 2: Replication of Barnes and Underwood (1959) study In their second connectionist model, McCloskey and Cohen attempted to replicate the study on retroactive interference in humans by Barnes and Underwood (1959). They trained the model on A-B and A-C lists and used a context pattern in the input vector (input pattern), to differentiate between the lists. Specifically the network was trained to respond with the right B response when shown the A stimulus and A-B context pattern and to respond with the correct C response when shown the A stimulus and the A-C context pattern. When the model was trained concurrently on the A-B and A-C items then the network readily learned all of the associations correctly. In sequential training the A-B list was trained first, followed by the A-C list. After each presentation of the A-C list, performance was measured for both the A-B and A-C lists. They found that the amount of training on the A-C list in Barnes and Underwood study that lead to 50% correct responses, lead to nearly 0% correct responses by the backpropagation network. Furthermore, they found that the network tended to show responses that looked like the C response pattern when the network was prompted to give the B response pattern. This indicated that the A-C list apparently had overwritten the A-B list. This could be likened to learning the word dog, followed by learning the word stool and then finding that you think of the word stool when presented with the word dog. McCloskey and Cohen tried to reduce interference through a number of manipulations including changing the number of hidden units, changing the value of the learning rate parameter, overtraining on the A-B list, freezing certain connection weights, changing target values 0 and 1 instead 0.1 and 0.9. However, none of these manipulations satisfactorily reduced the catastrophic interference exhibited by the networks. Overall, McCloskey and Cohen (1989) concluded that: at least some interference will occur whenever new learning alters the weights involved in representing old learning the greater the amount of new learning, the greater the disruption in old knowledge interference was catastrophic in the backpropagation networks when learning was sequential but not concurrent === Constraints Imposed by Learning and Forgetting Functions: Ratcliff (1990) === Ratcliff (1990) used multiple sets of backpropagation models applied to standard recognition memory procedures, in which the items were sequentially learned. After inspecting the recognition performance models he found two major problems: Well-learned information was catastrophically forgotten as new information was learned in both small and large backpropagation networks. Even one learning trial with new information resulted in a significant loss of the old information, paralleling the findings of McCloskey and Cohen (1989). Ratcliff also found that the resulting outputs were often a blend of the previous input and the new input. In larger networks, items learned in groups (e.g. AB then CD) were more resistant to forgetting than were items learned singly (e.g. A then B then C...). However, the forgetting for items learned in groups was still large. Adding new hidden units to the network did not reduce interference. Discrimination between the studied items and previously unseen items decreased as the network learned more. This finding contradicts studies on human memory, which indicated that discrimination increases with learning. Ratcliff attempted to alleviate this problem by adding 'response nodes' that would selectively respond to old and new inputs. However, this method did not work as these response nodes would become active for all inputs. A model which used a context pattern also failed to increase discrimination between new and old items. == Proposed solutions == The main cause of catastrophic interference seems to be overlap in the representations at the hidden layer of distributed neural networks. In a distributed representation, each input tends to create changes in the weights of many of the nodes. Catastrophic forgetting occurs because when many of the weights where "knowledge is stored" are changed, it is unlikely for prior knowledge to be kept intact. During sequential learning, the inputs become mixed, with the new inputs being superimposed on top of the old ones. Another way to conceptualize this is by visualizing learning as a movement through a weight space. This weight space can be likened to a spatial representation of all of the possible combinations of weights that the network could possess. When a network first learns to represent a set of patterns, it finds a point in the weight space that allows it to recognize all of those patterns. However, when the network then learns a new set of patterns, it will move to a place in the weight space for which the only concern is the recognition of the new patterns. To recognize both sets of patterns, the network must find a place in the weight space suitable for recognizing both the new and the old patterns. Below are a number of techniques which have empirical support in successfully reducing catastrophic interference in backpropagation neural networks: === Orthogonality === Many of the early techniques in reducing representational overlap involved making either the input vecto
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Scene text

Scene text is text that appears in an image captured by a camera in an outdoor environment. The detection and recognition of scene text from camera captured images are computer vision tasks which became important after smart phones with good cameras became ubiquitous. The text in scene images varies in shape, font, colour and position. The recognition of scene text is further complicated sometimes by non-uniform illumination and focus. To improve scene text recognition, the International Conference on Document Analysis and Recognition (ICDAR) conducts a robust reading competition once in two years. The competition was held in 2003, 2005 and during every ICDAR conference. International association for pattern recognition (IAPR) has created a list of datasets as Reading systems. == Text detection == Text detection is the process of detecting the text present in the image, followed by surrounding it with a rectangular bounding box. Text detection can be carried out using image based techniques or frequency based techniques. In image based techniques, an image is segmented into multiple segments. Each segment is a connected component of pixels with similar characteristics. The statistical features of connected components are utilised to group them and form the text. Machine learning approaches such as support vector machine and convolutional neural networks are used to classify the components into text and non-text. In frequency based techniques, discrete Fourier transform (DFT) or discrete wavelet transform (DWT) are used to extract the high frequency coefficients. It is assumed that the text present in an image has high frequency components and selecting only the high frequency coefficients filters the text from the non-text regions in an image. == Word recognition == In word recognition, the text is assumed to be already detected and located and the rectangular bounding box containing the text is available. The word present in the bounding box needs to be recognized. The methods available to perform word recognition can be broadly classified into top-down and bottom-up approaches. In the top-down approaches, a set of words from a dictionary is used to identify which word suits the given image. Images are not segmented in most of these methods. Hence, the top-down approach is sometimes referred as segmentation free recognition. In the bottom-up approaches, the image is segmented into multiple components and the segmented image is passed through a recognition engine. Either an off the shelf Optical character recognition (OCR) engine or a custom-trained one is used to recognise the text.
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Agent Communications Language

Agent Communication Language (ACL) consists of computer communication protocols that are intended for AI agents to communicate with each other. In 2007, protocols of this nature were proposed which include: FIPA-ACL (by the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents, a standardization consortium) KQML (Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language) After the surge in Generative AI with the use of Transformers and Large language models, the definition of agent has shifted away from physical agents to signify software systems built using the principles of Agentic AI. A new protocol to emerge in this area is Natural Language Interaction Protocol (NLIP). NLIP is an application-level communication protocol defined between AI Agents or between a human and an AI agent. Ecma International; a standards body which develops and publishes international standards for the information and communication industry; published on 10 December 2025 five new standards and one technical report defining the Natural Language Interaction Protocol (NLIP). As a result, we can define agent communication protocols into two categories: ontology based agent communication protocols and generative AI based agent communication protocols. Ontology based agent communication protocols use a common ontology to be used between agents. An ontology is a part of the agent's knowledge base that describes what kind of things an agent can deal with and how they are related to each other. FIPA-ACL and KQML are examples of such protocols. These protocols rely on speech act theory developed by Searle in the 1960s and enhanced by Winograd and Flores in the 1970s. They define a set of performatives, also called Communicative Acts, and their meaning (e.g. ask-one). The content of the performative is not standardized, but varies from system to system. Implementation support of FIPA-ACL is included in FIPA-OS and Jade. Generative AI based agent communication protocols such as NLIP do not require a shared ontology among communicating agents. In its stead, they use generative AI models to translate natural language text, images, videos or other modalities of data into a local ontology. This provides for hot-extensibility where the same protocol can be used for multiple communication needs, and simplifies version control since different agents can use different versions of a shared ontology. NLIP has been designed with security considerations in mind. The specification and standards comprising NLIP are developed and maintained by Ecma Technical Community 56.
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Tim Houlne

Tim Houlne is an American business executive, entrepreneur, and author known for his work in outsourcing and homeshoring, remote working, and artificial intelligence (AI) in customer service. He is the founder and CEO of Humach, a company that uses human agents and AI in customer experience solutions. Previously, he was co-founder and CEO of Working Solutions, a virtual contact center company in the United States. == Early life and education == Houlne graduated from Missouri Western State University (MWSU) in 1986 with a bachelor's degree in business administration and from the University of Texas in Dallas with an MBA. In 2024, MWSU and North Central Missouri College renamed the Convergent Technology Alliance Center to the Houlne Center for Convergent Technology. The 20,000 square-foot learning laboratory provides training and applied education experiences in industries such as AI, cybersecurity, manufacturing and construction, and service technologies. == Career == In 1998, Houlne co-founded Working Solutions, a Plano, Texas-based U.S. outsourcing company that provides customer service using remote, home-based agents. As CEO, he oversaw the development of a virtual workforce model that routes service calls to either domestic or offshore agents, according to client needs and service requirements. In 2015, Houlne founded Humach, a customer experience outsourcing provider that uses human service agents with AI-based digital agents. The company derives its name from the combination of services provided by humans and machines. Its clients include Amazon, Carfax and McDonald's. The company acquired InfiniteAI in 2020, and Markets EQ in 2025. In 2013, Houlne was named a finalist for the Ernst & Young Entrepreneur of the Year Award (Southwest Region).He is the co-author of several books focused on the evolution of work, the gig economy, and the influence of AI in customer-facing roles. == Works == The New World of Work: From the Cube to the Cloud (2013) ISBN 0982562276 OCLC 813933360 The New World of Work, Second Edition: The Cube, the Cloud and What's Next (2023) ISBN 9781642258318 OCLC 1389815847 The Intelligent Workforce: How Humans & Machines Will Co-Create a Better Future (2024) ISBN 9798887501604 OCLC 1439598569
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TRAIGA

TRAIGA, or the Texas Responsible Artificial Intelligence Governance Act, is a state law regulating the development and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) systems in Texas. Sponsored by Representative Giovanni Capriglione, the Act establishes a framework governing certain uses of AI, outlines prohibited uses, and creates obligations on state government entities, among other provisions. TRAIGA was signed into law in 2025 and took effect on January 1, 2026. The law applies to AI developers and deployers that conduct business in Texas or whose systems are used by Texas residents. It prohibits the intentional development or deployment of AI systems to incite harm, violate constitutional rights, engage in unlawful discrimination, and produce child sexual abuse material or unlawful deepfakes. TRAIGA also establishes the Texas Artificial Intelligence Council and creates a regulatory sandbox program. The Texas Attorney General is charged with enforcement. It has received attention as one of the first comprehensive AI-related laws enacted by a U.S. state. Legal analysts have compared it to the European Union (EU) Artificial Intelligence Act and the Colorado AI Act, noting its intent-based discrimination standard and narrower scope relative to those frameworks. == Background == In June 2023, Texas Governor Greg Abbott signed House Bill 2060, which created an Artificial Intelligence Advisory Council within the Texas Department of Information Resources. The Council was tasked with monitoring the use of AI systems across state government. Its membership included representatives from law enforcement, academia, and the legal profession. After submitting a report to state policymakers, the Council was disbanded in December 2024. Separately, the Texas House Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technologies was created in 2023 to examine the political and social implications of artificial intelligence. Among its recommendations was the creation of a regulatory sandbox to allow for controlled testing of AI systems. This recommendation informed the regulatory sandbox provision included in TRAIGA. == History == In December 2024, Representative Capriglione introduced House Bill 1709, the Texas Responsible Artificial Intelligence Governance Act. The bill sought to create a statewide framework for artificial intelligence, including transparency requirements for companies deploying AI systems, restrictions on certain uses of AI, and the creation of a regulatory sandbox. Modeled in part on the EU Artificial Intelligence Act and the Colorado AI Act, House Bill 1709 focused on "high-risk" AI systems and included provisions addressing private sector liability. House Bill 1709 did not advance during the legislative session. Industry stakeholders raised concerns that several provisions were overly burdensome. The bill informed the development of a revised proposal, House Bill 149, also titled the Texas Responsible Artificial Intelligence Governance Act. The revised version removed requirements for private companies to notify consumers when they interact with AI systems and to conduct impact assessments, among other provisions. In April 2025, an amended version of House Bill 149 passed the Texas House of Representatives and was referred to the Senate Committee on Business and Commerce. The bill later received approval from both chambers, where the House voted on amendments adopted by the Senate. On May 31, 2025, the state legislature passed House Bill 149, one of several AI-related bills considered during the legislative session. Governor Abbott signed TRAIGA into law on June 22, 2025. During the legislative process, a proposed federal moratorium on state-level AI regulation initially raised questions about the enforceability of state AI laws, including TRAIGA. At the time of signing, Governor Abbott stated that Texas would ensure compliance with applicable federal requirements. In July 2025, the United States Senate voted to remove the proposed moratorium from federal legislation. The Act took effect on January 1, 2026. == Provisions == === Definitions and scope === TRAIGA applies to AI developers and deployers that advertise or conduct business in Texas, develop products used by Texas residents, or develop or deploy AI systems within the state. The Act also applies to Texas state and local government entities. The Act defines a developer as a person who develops an AI system and a deployer as one who deploys an AI system in Texas. Consumers are defined as Texas residents. The Act defines an artificial intelligence system as a machine-based system that "infers from the inputs the system receives how to generate outputs, including content, decisions, predictions, or recommendations, that can influence physical or virtual environments." === Government use === The Act requires government agencies to provide consumers with plain language notices before interacting with AI systems. It also prohibits government agencies from using artificial intelligence systems to assign social scores to consumers. It also restricts the use of AI systems to identify individuals using biometric data without the individual’s consent. === Prohibitions === The Act prohibits the development or deployment of artificial intelligence systems intended to cause harm, self-harm, or criminal activity. It also prohibits the development or deployment of AI systems designed to violate constitutional rights or unlawfully discriminate based on protected classes. In addition, the Act prohibits the development or deployment of AI systems that are intended to produce or distribute child sexual abuse material or unlawful deepfakes. === Enforcement === Enforcement authority under the Act rests with the Texas Attorney General. The Act does not create a private right of action. The Act requires the Texas Attorney General to create an online complaint system where consumers may submit allegations of potential violations. The Attorney General can investigate complaints received through this system and may request information relevant to the operation of an AI system, including information about training data. Before initiating an enforcement action, the Attorney General must provide a written notice to the alleged violator, who is then provided with a 60-day period to cure the alleged violation. === Penalties === If a violation is not cured, the Act authorizes civil penalties. Penalties range from $10,000 to $12,000 per curable violation and from $80,000 to $200,000 per non-curable violation. The Act also authorizes additional penalties of $2,000 to $40,000 for each day the violation continues. If the Attorney General determines that a person certified or licensed by a state agency has violated the Act and recommends enforcement, the relevant agency may impose additional administrative sanctions, including license suspension or further monetary penalties. === Safe harbor === The Act provides an affirmative defense for AI developers and deployers who identify potential violations through internal testing or auditing or who demonstrate compliance with National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)'s Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework or a comparable risk management framework. The Act also affords protection to developers and deployers when a third party uses their AI systems in a way that violates the Act. === Texas Artificial Intelligence Council === The Act creates the Texas Artificial Intelligence Council to assist the state legislatures in evaluating artificial intelligence policy and oversight. The Council is charged with developing recommendations for state agencies regarding the use of AI systems and with overseeing the regulatory sandbox. TRAIGA gives the Council the ability to organize AI-related training for state entities and issue reports concerning artificial intelligence. The Council does not have binding rulemaking authority. The Council consists of seven members appointed by the governor, the lieutenant governor, and the speaker of the Texas House of Representatives. === Regulatory sandbox === The Act directs the Texas Department of Information Resources to create a regulatory sandbox program that allows participants to test AI systems under state supervision in a modified regulatory setting. To join the program, companies must submit applications that describe their AI systems and intended use. Approved participants may operate within the sandbox for up to 36 months. During that period, the Attorney General is restricted from initiating enforcement actions for certain categories of violations. == Reception == === Support === During legislative testimony, the Texas Public Policy Foundation stated that TRAIGA would benefit Texas businesses by reducing legal ambiguity and creating clearer compliance standards. Representatives of business groups also expressed support, stating that the Act would not impose overly burdensome regulations. The consum
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Sanchar Saathi

Sanchar Saathi (lit. 'Communication Partner' or 'Communication Companion') is an Indian state-owned app and web portal, operated by the Department of Telecommunications, designed to assist Indian mobile users in tracking and blocking stolen or lost mobile devices. In late 2025, a government order requiring Sanchar Saathi to be pre-installed on all mobile devices sold nationwide, with explicit provisions on preventing users from deleting the app or disabling any of its broad functionalities, triggered widespread backlash. The order was subsequently withdrawn. == Background == The Telecommunications Act 2023 introduced an exceptionally broad definition of the term "telecommunications" and conferred wide-ranging powers on the government. Although the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) assured reporters that this definition would not be used to justify government overreach, a November 2024 amendment to the Telecom Cyber Security Rules expanded it further and introduced the concept of the Telecommunication Identifier User Entity (TIEU), enabling users to be personally identified through their phone numbers. Sanchar Saathi was launched amid a widespread rise in cybercrime and hacking, as part of the Indian government's effort to prevent stolen phones from being used for fraud and to promote a state-backed application. In an official statement, the DoT said, "India has big second-hand mobile device market. Cases have also been observed where stolen or blacklisted devices are being re-sold. It makes the purchaser abettor in crime and causes financial loss to them." == Launch == Sanchar Saathi was originally launched as a web portal in May 2023. It was later launched as a mobile app in January 2025. Describing itself as a "citizen-centric" safety tool, Sanchar Saathi allows users to check a device's IMEI, report and block lost or stolen phones, and flag suspected fraud communications. Under Sanchar Saathi's privacy policy, it can make and manage phone calls, view and send messages, read call logs, access photos and files, access the location and camera of the device in which the app is used, as well as read and write into the device's storage. According to official government data, by December 2025, the Sanchar Saathi app had helped recover more than 700,000 lost and stolen mobile devices across India. Users report around 2,000 fraud incidents through the app each day. == Pre-installation controversy == On 28 November 2025, the Bharatiya Janata Party government, led by prime minister Narendra Modi, privately ordered phone manufacturers, including Apple, Samsung, Xiaomi, Vivo, Oppo, among others, to pre-install the Sanchar Saathi app on new devices sold in the country, alongside mandating that old devices get issued a software update for the installation of the app. The order had a 90-day deadline and further included explicit provisions to ensure that the app is to be "readily visible and accessible to the end users at the time of first use or device setup" and that users should neither be able to delete the app nor disable or restrict any of its broad functionalities. The order caused widespread political backlash. K. C. Venugopal, a general secretary of the main opposition party, the Indian National Congress (or simply the Congress), called the order "beyond unconstitutional" and said, "A pre-loaded government app that cannot be uninstalled is a dystopian tool to monitor every Indian. It is a means to watch over every movement, interaction and decision of each citizen", adding, "Big Brother cannot watch us." Another Congress general secretary, Priyanka Gandhi, termed Sanchar Saathi a "snooping app", and attacked the government for "turning this country into a dictatorship". Uddhav Thackeray, former chief minister of Maharashtra, compared Sanchar Saathi to the Pegasus spyware. Sanjay Hegde, a senior advocate at the Supreme Court of India, said "Here in the garb of security, the intrusion is vast, unfettered, unguided and is totally disproportionate. The app ought to be struck down on that account". The Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF), an Indian digital rights advocacy organisation, said, "Forcing every smartphone to carry a permanent government app for a simple verification task is excessive and violates the Puttaswamy proportionality standard", referring to Puttaswamy v. Union of India, a 2017 landmark decision of the Supreme Court, which asserted that the right to privacy should be protected as a fundamental right. The IFF further said, "For this to work in practice, the app will almost certainly need system level or root level access, similar to carrier or OEM system apps, so that it cannot be disabled. That design choice erodes the protections that normally prevent one app from peering into the data of others, and turns Sanchar Saathi into a permanent, non-consensual point of access sitting inside the operating system of every Indian smartphone user." Moreover, the organisation said that while the app was being "framed as a benign IMEI checker", a server-side update could allow the app to engage in "client side scanning for 'banned' applications, flag VPN usage, correlate SIM activity, or trawl SMS logs in the name of fraud detection. Nothing in the order constrains these possibilities." In reaction to the controversy, Jyotiraditya Scindia, the union minister of communications, said, "There is no snooping or call monitoring", adding, "Obviously you can delete it. There is no problem. This is a matter of customer protection. It is not mandatory. If you don't want to register, and don't want to use the app, don't use it; don't register, and it will lay dormant." Scindia compared the app to other pre-installed mobile apps such as Google Maps, which he said could be deleted if users wished so. However, contrary to Scindia's statement, on many phone brands, such pre-installed apps cannot be deleted, although users can disable them. Furthermore, upon enquiry, Scindia did not clarify whether his remarks applied to the app after the order took effect, making no comment on the provision in the order that would prevent users from deleting the app. When Congress member Renuka Chowdhury submitted an adjournment motion notice in the Rajya Sabha seeking the suspension of all other matters to discuss the Sanchar Saathi issue, Kiren Rijiju, the union minister of parliamentary affairs, accused the opposition of "manufacturing issues" to stall session proceedings. By 2 December, it had been reported that Apple did not plan to comply with the order, citing privacy and security concerns for the iOS ecosystem and the fact that the order would violate its internal policy against the pre-installation of third-party software in iPhones. Although it was clarified that Apple did not intend to take the matter to court or publicly oppose the government, it was said that Apple "can't do this. Period." The order would have also required Google to create a custom version of Android solely for India which would include the Sanchar Saathi app, a requirement described to "not be acceptable to the company". Following the backlash, the order was revoked on 3 December 2025. In a press release, the government said, "Given Sanchar Saathi's increasing acceptance, Government has decided not to make the pre-installation mandatory for mobile manufacturers".
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Artificial intelligence safety institute

An artificial intelligence safety institute is a type of state-backed organization aiming to evaluate and ensure the safety of advanced artificial intelligence (AI) models, also called frontier AI models. AI safety gained prominence in 2023, notably with public declarations about potential existential risks from AI. During the AI Safety Summit in November 2023, the United Kingdom and the United States both created their own AISI. During the AI Seoul Summit in May 2024, international leaders agreed to form a network of AI Safety Institutes, comprising institutes from the UK, the US, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Singapore, South Korea, Australia, Canada and the European Union. In 2025, the UK's AI Safety Institute was renamed the "AI Security Institute", and its US counterpart became the Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI). == Timeline == In 2023, Rishi Sunak, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, expressed his intention to "make the UK not just the intellectual home but the geographical home of global AI safety regulation" and unveiled plans for an AI Safety Summit. He emphasized the need for independent safety evaluations, stating that AI companies cannot "mark their own homework". During the summit in November 2023, the UK AISI was officially established as an evolution of the Frontier AI Taskforce, and the US AISI as part of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Japan followed by launching an AI safety institute in February 2024. Politico reported in April 2024 that many AI companies had not shared pre-deployment access to their most advanced AI models for evaluation. Meta's president of global affairs Nick Clegg said that many AI companies were waiting for the UK and the US AI Safety Institutes to work out common evaluation rules and procedures. An agreement was indeed concluded between the UK and the US in April 2024 to collaborate on at least one joint safety test. Initially established in London, the UK AI Safety Institute announced in May 2024 that it would open an office in San Francisco, where many AI companies are located. This is part of a plan to "set new, international standards on AI safety", according to UK's technology minister Michele Donelan. == International network == At the AI Seoul Summit in May 2024, the European Union and other countries agreed to create their own AI safety institutes, forming an international network. In July 2025, the international network held an exercise to explore issues with evaluating AI agents, especially when it came to leaking sensitive information or cybersecurity. Network members also met at NeurIPS 2025 in the city of San Diego. == Specific institutes == === Australia === The Albanese government announced the creation of the Australian AI Safety Institute on 25 November 2025. === Canada === Canada announced in April 2024 that it would create an AI safety institute, and such an institute was officially founded in November 2024. The institute is housed under Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, though it also partners with the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR). It is supported by a budget of CA$50,000,000 for a five-year timespan. === European Union === The EU AI office, founded in May 2024, is a member of the international network of AI safety institutes. === France === On 31 January 2025, the government of France created the Institut national pour l'évaluation et la sécurité de l'intelligence artificielle (INESIA), or the National Institute for AI Evaluation and Security. === India === The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology held consultations with Meta Platforms, Google, Microsoft, IBM, OpenAI, NASSCOM, Broadband India Forum, Software Alliance, Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs), The Quantum Hub, Digital Empowerment Foundation, and Access Now on October 7, 2024, in relation to the establishment of the AI Safety Institute. The decision was made to shift focus from regulation to standards-setting, risk identification, and damage detection—all of which require interoperable technologies. The AISI may spend the ₹20 crore allotted to the Safe and Trusted Pillar of the IndiaAI Mission for the initial budget. Future funding may come from other components of the IndiaAI Mission. UNESCO and MeitY began consulting on AI Readiness Assessment Methodology under Safety and Ethics in Artificial Intelligence from 2024. It is to encourage the ethical and responsible use of AI in industries. The study will find areas where government can become involved, especially in attempts to strengthen institutional and regulatory capabilities. Minister for Electronics & Information Technology Ashwini Vaishnaw announced the creation of an IndiaAI Safety Institute on January 30, 2025, to ensure the ethical and safe application of AI models. The institute will promote domestic R&D that is grounded in India's social, economic, cultural, and linguistic diversity and is based on Indian datasets. With the help of academic and research institutions, as well as private sector partners, the institute will follow the hub-and-spoke approach to carry out projects within Safe and Trusted Pillar of the IndiaAI Mission. It operates under a "hub-and-spoke" model with collaboration from academic institutions (e.g., IITs), tech firms, and international organizations like UNESCO. === Japan === The Japan AISI (or J-AISI) was founded in February 2024. Part of the Information Technology Promotion Agency, it employs about 23 people. The institute consists of the Council of AISI, the AISI Steering Committee, and a secretariat with six teams. Akiko Murakami (previously of IBM Japan and Sompo Japan) serves as the institute's executive director, and Kenji Hiramoto and Suguru Nishimura serve as the institute's two deputy executive directors. === Kenya === Kenya agreed to join the international network of AI safety institutes, but the country has not announced any details yet. It is the only African state in the network. === Singapore === The Digital Trust Centre was initially founded in June 2022. In May 2024, it was renamed to the Singapore AISI. Part of Nanyang Technological University, the institute partners with Infocomm Media Development Authority and is supported by an investment of S$10,000,000 per year. === South Korea === South Korea announced in May 2024 that it would create an AI safety institute under the umbrella of the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute. It will be supported by a tentative investment of somewhere between 10 and 20 million South Korean won per year, and employ at least 30 people. The institute was founded in November 2024 and is based in Bundang District within the city of Seongnam. === United Kingdom === The United Kingdom founded in April 2023 a safety organisation called Frontier AI Taskforce, with an initial budget of £100 million. In November 2023, it evolved into the AI Safety Institute, and continued to be led by Ian Hogarth. The AISI is part of the United Kingdom's Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. The United Kingdom's AI strategy aims to balance safety and innovation. Unlike the European Union which adopted the AI Act, the UK is reluctant to legislate early, considering that it may lower the sector's growth, and that laws might be rendered obsolete by technological progress. In May 2024, the institute open-sourced an AI safety tool called "Inspect", which evaluates AI model capabilities such as reasoning and their degree of autonomy. In February 2025, the UK body was renamed the AI Security Institute. Observers saw the name change as a signal that the institute will not focus on ethical issues such as algorithmic bias or freedom of speech in AI applications. === United States === The US AISI was founded in November 2023 as part of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). This happened the day after the signature of the Executive Order 14110. In February 2024, Joe Biden's former economic policy adviser Elizabeth Kelly was appointed to lead it. In February 2024, the US government created the US AI Safety Institute Consortium (AISIC), regrouping more than 200 organizations such as Google, Anthropic or Microsoft. In March 2024, a budget of $10 million was allocated. Observers noted that this investment is relatively small, especially considering the presence of many big AI companies in the US. The NIST itself, which hosts the AISI, is also known for its chronic lack of funding. Biden administration's request for additional funding was met with further budget cuts from congressional appropriators. Under President Trump, plans for members of the agency to attend the February 2025 AI Action Summit in Paris were scrapped. The US and the UK refused to sign the summit's final communique. US Vice President JD Vance said "pro-growth AI policies" should be prioritised over safety. The name of the agency was changed in June 2025 to the Center for AI Standards and Innovation
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Leading the Future

Leading the Future is an American super PAC network focused on lobbying for policies friendly to the artificial intelligence industry. It was launched in 2025 with over $100 million from industry stakeholders including Andreessen Horowitz, OpenAI President Greg Brockman and Palantir co-founder Joe Lonsdale. The launch was preceded by talks between Collin McCune, head of government affairs at Andreessen Horowitz, and Chris Lehane, chief global affairs officer at OpenAI. Among the members of the network are the American Mission PAC, which supported Chris Gober, and the Think Big PAC, which targeted Alex Bores. Leading the Future is affiliated with the nonprofit Build American AI, which Axios describes as a dark money advocacy "offshoot" operating alongside the super PAC. NBC News states that the network’s efforts are modeled after the pro-cryptocurrency group Fairshake. Leading the Future is led by Zac Moffatt and Josh Vlasto, the latter of whom previously served as an advisor to Fairshake. In response to the creation of Leading the Future, former members of Congress Brad Carson and Chris Stewart co-founded the super PAC network Public First, aiming to counter the group’s influence. In April 2026, an investigation by Model Republic linked Leading the Future to The Wire By Acutus, an automated news website that allegedly used AI agents posing as human journalists to solicit interviews. The site's content was found to closely mirror the PAC's deregulatory policy goals while targeting researchers and advocates skeptical of rapid AI development. In May 2026, Wired revealed that Build American AI used a "dark money" campaign to pay TikTok and Instagram influencers $5,000 per video to promote scripted narratives framing Chinese AI as a "national security threat." According to internal documents and staff at the marketing agency managing the project, the campaign's explicit goal was to "subtly shift public debate" toward the deregulation of AI industries while intentionally avoiding technical discussions regarding AI quality or safety. During the 2026 primary season Leading the Future went on to endorse several candidates in both Democratic and Republican races with several of them going on to win.
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