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Inductive programming

Inductive programming (IP) is a special area of automatic programming, covering research from artificial intelligence and programming, which addresses learning of typically declarative (logic or functional) and often recursive programs from incomplete specifications, such as input/output examples or constraints. Depending on the programming language used, there are several kinds of inductive programming. Inductive functional programming, which uses functional programming languages such as Lisp or Haskell, and most especially inductive logic programming, which uses logic programming languages such as Prolog and other logical representations such as description logics, have been more prominent, but other (programming) language paradigms have also been used, such as constraint programming or probabilistic programming. == Definition == Inductive programming incorporates all approaches which are concerned with learning programs or algorithms from incomplete (formal) specifications. Possible inputs in an IP system are a set of training inputs and corresponding outputs or an output evaluation function, describing the desired behavior of the intended program, traces or action sequences which describe the process of calculating specific outputs, constraints for the program to be induced concerning its time efficiency or its complexity, various kinds of background knowledge such as standard data types, predefined functions to be used, program schemes or templates describing the data flow of the intended program, heuristics for guiding the search for a solution or other biases. Output of an IP system is a program in some arbitrary programming language containing conditionals and loop or recursive control structures, or any other kind of Turing-complete representation language. In many applications the output program must be correct with respect to the examples and partial specification, and this leads to the consideration of inductive programming as a special area inside automatic programming or program synthesis, usually opposed to 'deductive' program synthesis, where the specification is usually complete. In other cases, inductive programming is seen as a more general area where any declarative programming or representation language can be used and we may even have some degree of error in the examples, as in general machine learning, the more specific area of structure mining or the area of symbolic artificial intelligence. A distinctive feature is the number of examples or partial specification needed. Typically, inductive programming techniques can learn from just a few examples. The diversity of inductive programming usually comes from the applications and the languages that are used: apart from logic programming and functional programming, other programming paradigms and representation languages have been used or suggested in inductive programming, such as functional logic programming, constraint programming, probabilistic programming, abductive logic programming, modal logic, action languages, agent languages and many types of imperative languages. == History == The early works of Plotkin, and his "relative least general generalization (rlgg)", had an enormous impact in inductive logic programming. There were some encouraging results on learning recursive Prolog programs such as quicksort from examples together with suitable background knowledge, for example with GOLEM. However, after initial success, the community got disappointed by limited progress about the induction of recursive programs with ILP less and less focusing on recursive programs and leaning more and more towards a machine learning setting with applications in relational data mining and knowledge discovery. In parallel to work in ILP, Koza proposed genetic programming in the early 1990s as a generate-and-test based approach to learning programs. The idea of genetic programming was further developed into the inductive programming system ADATE and the systematic-search-based system MagicHaskeller. Here again, functional programs are learned from sets of positive examples together with an output evaluation (fitness) function which specifies the desired input/output behavior of the program to be learned. The early work in grammar induction (also known as grammatical inference) is related to inductive programming, as rewriting systems or logic programs can be used to represent production rules. In fact, early works in inductive inference considered grammar induction and Lisp program inference as basically the same problem. The results in terms of learnability were related to classical concepts, such as identification-in-the-limit, as introduced in the seminal work of Gold. More recently, the language learning problem was addressed by the inductive programming community. In the recent years, the classical approaches have been resumed and advanced with great success. Therefore, the synthesis problem has been reformulated on the background of constructor-based term rewriting systems taking into account modern techniques of functional programming, as well as moderate use of search-based strategies and usage of background knowledge as well as automatic invention of subprograms. Many new and successful applications have recently appeared beyond program synthesis, most especially in the area of data manipulation, programming by example and cognitive modelling (see below). Other ideas have also been explored with the common characteristic of using declarative languages for the representation of hypotheses. For instance, the use of higher-order features, schemes or structured distances have been advocated for a better handling of recursive data types and structures; abstraction has also been explored as a more powerful approach to cumulative learning and function invention. One powerful paradigm that has been recently used for the representation of hypotheses in inductive programming (generally in the form of generative models) is probabilistic programming (and related paradigms, such as stochastic logic programs and Bayesian logic programming). == Application areas == The first workshop on Approaches and Applications of Inductive Programming (AAIP) Archived 2016-03-03 at the Wayback Machine held in conjunction with ICML 2005 identified all applications where "learning of programs or recursive rules are called for, [...] first in the domain of software engineering where structural learning, software assistants and software agents can help to relieve programmers from routine tasks, give programming support for end users, or support of novice programmers and programming tutor systems. Further areas of application are language learning, learning recursive control rules for AI-planning, learning recursive concepts in web-mining or for data-format transformations". Since then, these and many other areas have shown to be successful application niches for inductive programming, such as end-user programming, the related areas of programming by example and programming by demonstration, and intelligent tutoring systems. Other areas where inductive inference has been recently applied are knowledge acquisition, artificial general intelligence, reinforcement learning and theory evaluation, and cognitive science in general. There may also be prospective applications in intelligent agents, games, robotics, personalisation, ambient intelligence and human interfaces.
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Air Force Network

Air Force Network (AFNet) is an Indian Air Force (IAF) owned, operated and managed digital information grid. The AFNet replaces the Indian Air Force's (IAF) old communication network set-up using the tropo-scatter technology of the 1950s making it a true net-centric combat force. The IAF project is part of the overall mission to network all three services; The Indian Army, The Indian Navy and The Indian Air Force. The former Defence Minister AK Antony inaugurated the IAF's the AFNET on 14 September 2010 dedicating it to the people of India, for their direct or indirect participation in the communication revolution. == Background == Armed Forces in India has been using troposcatters as primary means of military communications since the 1950s, thereby occupying huge and expensive 2G and 3G spectrums which otherwise could have been used for expanding and de-clogging the civilian wireless communication network. The rapid expansion of civilian mobile telephony leading to need for larger bandwidth for wireless communication and commercial need to operate the 3G network necessitated the Government of India to have the Indian Armed Forces vacate the spectrum occupied by them. Thus the government of India through Department of Telecommunication (DoT) started a project called "Network for Spectrum" to set up a fiber optics network for the exclusive use of Indian Armed Forces in exchange for spectrum being released by the Defence Forces. The aim of 'Network for Spectrum' being twofold - to facilitate the growth of national tele-density on the one hand, and ensuring modernization of defence communications with the state-of-the-art communication infrastructure, and to support net-centric military operations. The Department of Telecom and the Ministry of Defence signed the memorandum of understanding for vacating the spectrum and setting up dedicated network for the use of defence forces. In this MoU, DoT agreed to laying of 40,000 route kilometres of optical fibre cable connecting 219 Army stations, 33 Navy stations and 162 points for the Air Force. It further agreed to setting up an exclusive defence band and Defence Interest Zone along 100 km of the international border, where spectrum will be reserved only for use by the Armed Forces. The total cost of implementing "Network for Spectrum" project is estimated to be ₹ 10,000 crores. AFNet is Indian Air Force component of Digital Information Grid under "Network for Spectrum" project and the AFNet has been extended and connected to the Digital Information Grid Project under implementation for the Indian Navy and the Indian Army on 2015. == Project Origin == The Air Force Network (AFNet) had been developed by the Indian Air Force at a cost of ₹1,077 crore (US$235.53 million) in collaboration with HCL Technologies and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited. It will replace the Air Force's more than half-a-century-old telecom network. This project is part of the defence ministry's initiative to digitize the communication systems of the three armed forces under "Network for Spectrum" initiative to improve coordination among themselves and other Military and Strategic Institution. IAF was the first to complete this gigabyte digital information grid implemented under the AFNet project. AFNet will be connected and extended to a Unified Digital Grid encompassing all the legs of Indian Armed Forces. The then defence minister, A. K. Antony, inaugurated the AFNet, IAF's gigabyte digital information grid. The grid is aimed at improving the network-centric warfare capability of the Air Force. The event also saw the presence of other personalities including the then Minister of Communication & IT, A. Raja; the Marshal of the Air Force, Arjan Singh; the Chief of the Air Staff, the Chief of the Army Staff and other officials from the three services and members of the Industry. The event also featured a practice interception of a simulated aerial target by a MiG-29 which took off from an airbase in the Punjab sector using the AFNet capabilities. Further capabilities in line with network centric warfare were also demonstrated. This included sharing information, videos and pictures by operational assets and platforms like UAVs and AWACS to decision-makers who are several hundred kilometres apart. == Technology, Design & Structure == AFNet incorporates the latest traffic transportation technology in form of Internet Protocol (IP) packets over the network using Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS). A large Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) layer with stringent quality of service enforcement will facilitate robust, high quality voice, video and conferencing solutions. AFNet will prove to be an effective force multiplier for intelligence analysis, mission planning and control, post-mission feedback and related activities like maintenance, logistics and administration. A comprehensive design with multi-layer security precautions for “Defence in Depth” have been planned by incorporating encryption technologies, Intrusion Prevention Systems to ensure the resistance of the IT system against information manipulation and eavesdropping. The network is secured with a host of advanced state-of-the-art encryption technologies. It is designed for high reliability with redundancy built into the network design itself. The AFNet is also capable of transmitting video from unmanned surveillance aircraft (UAV), pictures from airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) to decision makers on the ground and providing intelligence inputs from remote areas. The AFNet is also expected to facilitate accelerated economic growth by providing radio frequency spectrum for telecommunication purposes. AFNET will be the largest Multi-protocol Label Switching (MPLS) network in the defence segment. == Demonstration == At the AFNet launch, the IAF showcased a practice interception of simulated enemy targets by a pair of Mig-29 fighter aircraft airborne from an advanced airbase in the Punjab sector using the gigabyte digital information grid. During the AFNet-assisted operations, the Indian fighter jets neutralised intruding targets in the western sector, which was played out live on the giant screens at the Air Force auditorium offering a glimpse of the harnessed potential of the system. The final orders for engaging the enemy targets were issued live by Antony, whose queries about how the operation went were responded to by the pilot as "excellent". Various other functionalities contributing towards Network Centric Warfare were also showcased. These consisted of facilitating video from Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), pictures from an AWACS aircraft to the decision-makers on ground sitting hundreds of kilometres away, providing intelligence inputs from far-flung areas at central locations seamlessly. This was possible mainly because of the robust networking platform provided by AFNet. == Integrated Air Command and Control System == Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) is an automated command and control system for air defence operated by the Indian Air Force. IACCS operations rides the AFNET backbone integrating all ground-based and airborne sensors, air defense weapon systems and command and control (C2) nodes. Subsequent integration with other services networks and civil radars will provide an integrated Air Situation Picture to operators to carry out AD role. The project was envisaged in 1995 following the Purulia arms drop case and was a part of IAF’s first Air Power Doctrinal manual issued in the 2000s, later revised in 2022. The first node in the western sectors had been operationalised by September 2010. The first five nodes located in the western and south western sectors were commissioned in 2011. The Air Force was preparing to seek clearance for five further nodes which would cover the rest of the nation including the island territories. Through the IACCS, IAF will connect all of its space, air and ground assets quickly, for total awareness of a region. This will offer connectivity for all the ground platforms and airborne platforms (including AEW&C), as a part of the network centricity of IAF. The IACCS also facilitates real-time transport of images, data and voice, amongst satellites, aircraft and ground stations. By 2018, five IACCS nodes had been established including Barnala (Punjab), Wadsar (Gujarat), Aya Nagar (Delhi), Jodhpur (Rajasthan) and Ambala (Haryana). Following this, under Phase-II, 4 additional nodes and 10 sub-nodes are to be set up. The major nodes will be established in the Eastern, Central, Southern and Andaman and Nicobar sectors. The second phase will cost ₹8,000 crore (equivalent to ₹110 billion or US$1.1 billion in 2023). IACCS successfully integrated all operating radars, including its own, the Army's, and civilian ones, in 2023. This enabled the autonomous firing response capability to take down incoming missiles, aircraft, and UAVs. The Akashteer system of the Indian Army is being integrated with the IACCS
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Perfectly Imperfect (platform)

Perfectly Imperfect is an online newsletter and social media platform. It was initially founded in 2020 as a biweekly email newsletter that focused on recommendations. In January 2024, Perfectly Imperfect launched PI.FYI, a social media platform. The platform is based around sharing recommendations. Its main feed is presented in reverse chronological order and is not algorithmically curated. == History == Perfectly Imperfect was started during the COVID-19 pandemic by Tyler Bainbridge, alongside college friends Alex Cushing and Serey Morm, whom he met at UMass Lowell; Morm later departed. Motivated by a dissatisfaction with algorithm-driven recommendation culture, they launched on Substack in September 2020. Its early newsletter format, PI, published brief recommendation lists and personal notes from contributors. Contributors have included a mix of underground artists and more established creative figures, such as Charli XCX, Chloe Cherry, Chloe Wise, and Meetka Otto. In October 2024, PI announced it was leaving Substack to launch its own site. == Overview == The current platform, PI.FYI, features both editorial content (guest columns, long-form essays, staff picks) and user-generated recommendations. The platform also supports "Ask" posts, where users can solicit recommendations from the community, and allows commenting, liking, and profile customization. In August 2025, it launched an events feature. In 2022, Perfectly Imperfect hosted their first offline event at Baby's All Right in Brooklyn, with a performance by The Dare. They have since expanded their event promotion/sponsorship to markets such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, and even Auckland.
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Radical trust

Radical trust is the confidence that any structured organization, such as a government, library, business, religion, or museum, has in collaboration and empowerment within online communities. Specifically, it pertains to the use of blogs, wiki and online social networking platforms by organizations to cultivate relationships with an online community that then can provide feedback and direction for the organization's interest. The organization 'trusts' and uses that input in its management. One of the first appearances of the notion of radical trust appears in an info graphic outlining the base principles of web 2.0 in Tim O'Reilly's weblog post "What is Web 2.0". Radical Trust is listed as the guiding example of trusting the validity of consumer generated media. This concept is considered to be an underlying assumption of Library 2.0. The adoption of radical trust by a library would require its management let go of some of its control over the library and building an organization without an end result in mind. The direction a library would take would be based on input provided by people through online communities. These changes in the organization may merely be anecdotal in nature, making this method of organization management dramatically distinct from data-based or evidence based management. In marketing, Collin Douma further describes the notion of radical trust as a key mindset required for marketers and advertisers to enter the social media marketing space. Conventional marketing dictates and maintains control of messages to cause the greatest persuasion in consumer decisions, but Douma argued that in the social media space, brands would need to cede that control in order to build brand loyalty.
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Pixorial

Pixorial was a cloud-based consumer photo sharing, video sharing and video editing platform. The company was formed in 2007 in Centennial, Colorado as a media conversion service. In 2013, Pixorial was chosen as one of two video storage companies to partner with the launch of Google Drive. Pixorial allowed users to edit and share videos on social channels by connecting through their Pixorial account. The company closed on July 18, 2014, and its assets were acquired by LifeLogger Technologies Corp in November 2015. == History == The company was founded in 2007 and launched in 2009 by former Netscape employee Andres Espineira. Changing its focus to video editing software in 2009, Pixorial began developing an app that would be launched for iOS and Android devices in 2011. Later developments in the app in 2012 would also included real time filters, which were later removed. With the launch of Google Drive in 2012, Pixorial was chosen as an integrated video partner. This integration with Google Drive allowed users to access videos stored in Google Drive within the web app of Pixorial. After the Google Drive launch, Pixorial developed a crowdsourced, location-based video sharing app, Krowds. The app was cited in July 2012 by PC Magazine as one of "The 8 Best Apps for Making and Sharing Videos on Your iPhone". In late July, Pixorial replaced its original mobile app with the MyPlayer HD app that optimized HD video viewing for large screen viewing including tablets and smart televisions. Pixorial's services terminated on July 18, 2014. == Products == === Krowds App === Pixorial's app was launched in April 2013 for iOS, and in May for Android, as a tool to aggregate event videos through location based collections. The app was launched to generally positive reviews. === Movie Creator === Launched July 12, 2012 Pixorial's Movie Creator allowed users to edit movies in a simple story-telling platform Movie Creator's features include transitions, text boxes, access to free music tracks, credits, and social media sharing capabilities. The Pixorial platform allowed users to view, share, and edit videos without modifying the original. Movie Creator integrated pictures and video to create user movies. == Awards == 2012 Apex Award from the Colorado Technology Association, for Best Technology Project of the Year 2010 Computerworld Laureate for Media, Arts and Entertainment
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CANaerospace

CANaerospace is a higher layer protocol based on Controller Area Network (CAN) which has been developed by Stock Flight Systems in 1998 for aeronautical applications. == Background == CANaerospace supports airborne systems employing the Line-replaceable unit (LRU) concept to share data across CAN and ensures interoperability between CAN LRUs by defining CAN physical layer characteristics, network layers, communication mechanisms, data types and aeronautical axis systems. CANaerospace is an open source project, was initiated to standardize the interface between CAN LRUs on the system level. CANaerospace is continuously being developed further and has also been published by NASA as the Advanced General Aviation Transport Experiments Databus Standard in 2001. It found widespread use in aeronautical research worldwide. A major research aircraft that employs several CANaerospace networks for real-time computer interconnection is the Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA), a Boeing 747SP with a 2.5m astronomic telescope. CANaerospace is also frequently used in flight simulation and connects entire aircraft cockpits (i.e. in Eurofighter Typhoon simulators) to the simulation host computers. In Italy CANaerospace is used as UAV data bus technology. Furthermore, CANaerospace serves as communication network in several general aviation avionics systems. The CANaerospace interface definition closes the gap between the ISO/OSI layer 1 and 2 CAN protocol (which is implemented in the CAN controller itself) and the specific requirements of distributed systems in aircraft. It may be used as a primary or ancillary avionics network and was designed to meet the following requirements: Democratic network: CANaerospace does not require any master/slave relationships between LRUs or a "bus controller", thereby avoiding a potential single source of failure. Every node in the network has the same rights for participation in the bus traffic. Self-identifying message format: Each CANaerospace message contains information about the type of the data and the transmitting node. This allows the data to be unambiguously recognized at each receiving node. Continuous Message Numbering: Each CANaerospace message contains a continuously incremented number which allows coherent processing of messages in the receiving stations. Message Status Code: Each CANaerospace message contains information about the integrity of the data is conveying. This allows receiving stations to evaluate the quality of the received data and to react accordingly. Emergency Event Signaling: CANaerospace defines a mechanism that allows each node to transmit information about exception or error situations. This information can be used by other stations to determine the network health. Node Service Interface: As an enhancement to CAN, CANaerospace provides a means for individual stations on the network to communicate with each other using connection-oriented and connectionless services. Predefined CAN Identifier Assignment: CANaerospace offers a predefined identifier assignment list for normal operation data. In addition to the predefined list, user-defined identifier assignment lists may be used. Ease of Implementation: The amount of code to implement CANaerospace is very little by design in order to minimize the effort for testing and certification of flight safety critical systems. Openness to Extensions: All CANaerospace definitions are extendable to provide flexibility for future enhancements and to allow adaptions to the requirements of specific applications. Free Availability: No cost whatsoever apply for the use of CANaerospace. The specification can be downloaded from the Internet == Physical interface == To ensure interoperability and reliable communication, CANaerospace specifies the electrical characteristics, bus transceiver requirements and data rates with the corresponding tolerances based on ISO 11898. The bit timing calculation (baud rate accuracy, sample point definition) and robustness to electromagnetic interference are given special emphasis. Also addressed are CAN connector, wiring considerations and design guidelines to maximize electromagnetic compatibility. == Communication layers == The Bosch CAN specification itself allows messages being transmitted both periodically and aperiodically but does not cover issues like data representation, node addressing or connection-oriented protocols. CAN is entirely based on Anyone-to-Many (ATM) communication which means that CAN messages are always received by all stations in the network. The advantage of the CAN concept is inherent data consistency between all stations, the drawback is that it does not allow node addressing which is the basis for Peer-to-Peer (PTP) communication. Using CAN networks in aeronautical applications, however, demands a standard targeted to the specific requirements of airborne systems which implies that communication between individual stations in the network must be possible to enable the required degree of system monitoring. Consequently, CANaerospace defines additional ISO/OSI layer 3, 4 and 6 functions to support node addressing and unified ATM/PTP communication mechanisms. PTP communication allows to set up client/server interactions between individual stations in the network either temporarily or permanently. More than one of these interactions may be in effect at any given time and each node may be client for one operation and server for another at the same time. This CANaerospace mechanism is called "Node Service Concept" and allows i.e. to distribute system functions over several stations in the network or to control dynamic system reconfiguration in case of failure. The Node Service concept supports both connection-oriented and connectionless interactions like with TCP/IP and UDP/IP for Ethernet. Enabling both ATM and PTP communication for CAN requires the introduction of independent network layers to isolate the different types of communication. This is realized for CANaerospace by forming CAN identifier groups as shown in Figure 1. The resulting structure creates Logical Communication Channels (LCCs) and assigns a specific communication type (ATM, PTP) to each of the LCCs. User-defined LCCs provide the necessary freedom for designers and allow the implementation of CANaerospace according to the needs of specific applications. Figure 1: Logical Communication Channels for CANaerospace As a side effect, the CAN identifier groups in Figure 1 affect the priority of the message transmission in case of bus arbitration. The communication channels are therefore arranged according to their relative importance: Emergency Event Data Channel (EED): This communication channel is used for messages which require immediate action (i.e. system degradation or reconfiguration) and have to be transmitted with very high priority. Emergency Event Data uses ATM communication exclusively. High/Low Priority Node Service Data Channel (NSH/NSL): These communication channels are used for client/server interactions using PTP communication. The corresponding services may be of the connection-oriented as well as the connectionless type. NSH/NSL may also be used to support test and maintenance functions. Normal Operation Data Channel (NOD): This communication channel is used for the transmission of the data which is generated during normal system operation and described in the CANaerospace identifier assignment list. These messages may be transmitted periodically or aperiodically as well as synchronously or asynchronously. All messages which cannot be assigned to other communication channels shall use this channel. High/Low Priority User-Defined Data Channel (UDH/UDL): This channel is dedicated to communication which cannot, due to their specific characteristics, be assigned other channels without violating the CANaerospace specification. As long as the defined identifier range is used, the message content and the communication type (ATM, PTP) for these channels may be specified by the system designer. To ensure interoperability it is highly recommended that the use of these channels is minimized. Debug Service Data Channel (DSD): This channel is dedicated to messages which are used temporarily for development and test purposes only and are not transmitted during normal operation. As long as the defined identifier range is used, the message content and the communication type (ATM, PTP) for these channels may be specified by the system designer. == Data representation == The majority of the real-time control systems used in aeronautics employ "big endian" processor architectures. This data representation was therefore specified for CANaerospace as well. With big endian data representation, the most significant bit of any datum is arranged leftmost and transmitted first on CANaerospace as shown in Figure 2. Figure 2: "Big Endian" Data Representation for CANaerospace CANaerospace uses a self-identifying message
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Initialization vector

In cryptography, an initialization vector (IV) or starting variable is an input to a cryptographic primitive being used to provide the initial state. The IV is typically required to be random or pseudorandom, but sometimes an IV only needs to be unpredictable or unique. Randomization is crucial for some encryption schemes to achieve semantic security, a property whereby repeated usage of the scheme under the same key does not allow an attacker to infer relationships between (potentially similar) segments of the encrypted message. For block ciphers, the use of an IV is described by the modes of operation. Some cryptographic primitives require the IV only to be non-repeating, and the required randomness is derived internally. In this case, the IV is commonly called a nonce (a number used only once), and the primitives (e.g. CBC) are considered stateful rather than randomized. This is because an IV need not be explicitly forwarded to a recipient but may be derived from a common state updated at both sender and receiver side. (In practice, a short nonce is still transmitted along with the message to consider message loss.) An example of stateful encryption schemes is the counter mode of operation, which has a sequence number for a nonce. The IV size depends on the cryptographic primitive used; for block ciphers it is generally the cipher's block-size. In encryption schemes, the unpredictable part of the IV has at best the same size as the key to compensate for time/memory/data tradeoff attacks. When the IV is chosen at random, the probability of collisions due to the birthday problem must be taken into account. Traditional stream ciphers such as RC4 do not support an explicit IV as input, and a custom solution for incorporating an IV into the cipher's key or internal state is needed. Some designs realized in practice are known to be insecure; the WEP protocol is a notable example, and is prone to related-IV attacks. == Motivation == A block cipher is one of the most basic primitives in cryptography, and frequently used for data encryption. However, by itself, it can only be used to encode a data block of a predefined size, called the block size. For example, a single invocation of the AES algorithm transforms a 128-bit plaintext block into a ciphertext block of 128 bits in size. The key, which is given as one input to the cipher, defines the mapping between plaintext and ciphertext. If data of arbitrary length is to be encrypted, a simple strategy is to split the data into blocks each matching the cipher's block size, and encrypt each block separately using the same key. This method is not secure as equal plaintext blocks get transformed into equal ciphertexts, and a third party observing the encrypted data may easily determine its content even when not knowing the encryption key. To hide patterns in encrypted data while avoiding the re-issuing of a new key after each block cipher invocation, a method is needed to randomize the input data. In 1980, the NIST published a national standard document designated Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) PUB 81, which specified four so-called block cipher modes of operation, each describing a different solution for encrypting a set of input blocks. The first mode implements the simple strategy described above, and was specified as the electronic codebook (ECB) mode. In contrast, each of the other modes describe a process where ciphertext from one block encryption step gets intermixed with the data from the next encryption step. To initiate this process, an additional input value is required to be mixed with the first block, and which is referred to as an initialization vector. For example, the cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode requires an unpredictable value, of size equal to the cipher's block size, as additional input. This unpredictable value is added to the first plaintext block before subsequent encryption. In turn, the ciphertext produced in the first encryption step is added to the second plaintext block, and so on. The ultimate goal for encryption schemes is to provide semantic security: by this property, it is practically impossible for an attacker to draw any knowledge from observed ciphertext. It can be shown that each of the three additional modes specified by the NIST are semantically secure under so-called chosen-plaintext attacks. == Properties == Properties of an IV depend on the cryptographic scheme used. A basic requirement is uniqueness, which means that no IV may be reused under the same key. For block ciphers, repeated IV values devolve the encryption scheme into electronic codebook mode: equal IV and equal plaintext result in equal ciphertext. In stream cipher encryption uniqueness is crucially important as plaintext may be trivially recovered otherwise. Example: Stream ciphers encrypt plaintext P to ciphertext C by deriving a key stream K from a given key and IV and computing C as C = P xor K. Assume that an attacker has observed two messages C1 and C2 both encrypted with the same key and IV. Then knowledge of either P1 or P2 reveals the other plaintext since C1 xor C2 = (P1 xor K) xor (P2 xor K) = P1 xor P2. Many schemes require the IV to be unpredictable by an adversary. This is effected by selecting the IV at random or pseudo-randomly. In such schemes, the chance of a duplicate IV is negligible, but the effect of the birthday problem must be considered. As for the uniqueness requirement, a predictable IV may allow recovery of (partial) plaintext. Example: Consider a scenario where a legitimate party called Alice encrypts messages using the cipher-block chaining mode. Consider further that there is an adversary called Eve that can observe these encryptions and is able to forward plaintext messages to Alice for encryption (in other words, Eve is capable of a chosen-plaintext attack). Now assume that Alice has sent a message consisting of an initialization vector IV1 and starting with a ciphertext block CAlice. Let further PAlice denote the first plaintext block of Alice's message, let E denote encryption, and let PEve be Eve's guess for the first plaintext block. Now, if Eve can determine the initialization vector IV2 of the next message she will be able to test her guess by forwarding a plaintext message to Alice starting with (IV2 xor IV1 xor PEve); if her guess was correct this plaintext block will get encrypted to CAlice by Alice. This is because of the following simple observation: CAlice = E(IV1 xor PAlice) = E(IV2 xor (IV2 xor IV1 xor PAlice)). Depending on whether the IV for a cryptographic scheme must be random or only unique the scheme is either called randomized or stateful. While randomized schemes always require the IV chosen by a sender to be forwarded to receivers, stateful schemes allow sender and receiver to share a common IV state, which is updated in a predefined way at both sides. == Block ciphers == Block cipher processing of data is usually described as a mode of operation. Modes are primarily defined for encryption as well as authentication, though newer designs exist that combine both security solutions in so-called authenticated encryption modes. While encryption and authenticated encryption modes usually take an IV matching the cipher's block size, authentication modes are commonly realized as deterministic algorithms, and the IV is set to zero or some other fixed value. == Stream ciphers == In stream ciphers, IVs are loaded into the keyed internal secret state of the cipher, after which a number of cipher rounds are executed prior to releasing the first bit of output. For performance reasons, designers of stream ciphers try to keep that number of rounds as small as possible, but because determining the minimal secure number of rounds for stream ciphers is not a trivial task, and considering other issues such as entropy loss, unique to each cipher construction, related-IVs and other IV-related attacks are a known security issue for stream ciphers, which makes IV loading in stream ciphers a serious concern and a subject of ongoing research. == WEP IV == The 802.11 encryption algorithm called WEP (short for Wired Equivalent Privacy) used a short, 24-bit IV, leading to reused IVs with the same key, which led to it being easily cracked. Packet injection allowed for WEP to be cracked in times as short as several seconds. This ultimately led to the deprecation of WEP. == SSL 2.0 IV == In cipher-block chaining mode (CBC mode), the IV need not be secret, but must be unpredictable (In particular, for any given plaintext, it must not be possible to predict the IV that will be associated to the plaintext in advance of the generation of the IV.) at encryption time. Additionally for the output feedback mode (OFB mode), the IV must be unique. In particular, the (previously) common practice of re-using the last ciphertext block of a message as the IV for the next message is insecure (for example, this method was used by SSL 2.0). If an attacker knows
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Social media and suicide

Since the rise of social media, there have been numerous cases of individuals being influenced towards committing suicide or self-harm through their use of social media, and even of individuals arranging to broadcast suicide attempts, some successful, on social media. Researchers have studied social media and suicide to determine what, if any, risks social media poses in terms of suicide, and to identify methods of mitigating such risks, if they exist. The search for a correlation has not yet uncovered a clear answer. == Background == Suicide is one of the leading causes of death worldwide, and as of 2020, the second leading cause of death in the United States for those aged 15–34. According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, suicide was the third leading cause of death among adolescents in the US, from 1999 to 2006. In 2020, people in the US had a suicide rate of 13.5 per 100,000. Suicide was a leading cause of death in the United States accounting for 48,183 deaths in 2021. Suicide rates increased by 30 per cent from 2000 to 2018 and declined in 2019 and 2020. Suicide remains a significant public health issue worldwide, despite prevention efforts and treatments. Suicide has been identified not only as an individual phenomenon but also as being influenced by social and environmental factors. There is growing evidence that online activity has influenced suicide-related behavior. The use of social media throughout the 21st century has grown exponentially. For this reason, there are a variety of sources that are accessible to the public in various forms, especially social media sites such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, Snapchat, TikTok and many more. Although these platforms were intended to allow people to connect virtually, these platforms can lead to cyber-bullying, insecurity, and emotional distress, and sometimes may influence a person to attempt suicide. Bullying, whether on social media or elsewhere, physical or not, significantly increases victims' risk of suicidal behavior. Since social media was introduced some people have taken their lives as a result of cyberbullying. Furthermore, suicide rates among teenagers have increased from 2010 to 2022 as social media has become something that people interact with more throughout their day-to-day lives. Media algorithms tend to popularize videos and posts to inform the country of the rising trouble, which may create a popular appeal to the young and immature minds of teenagers. This is why, social media could provide higher risks with the promotion of different kinds of pro-suicidal sites, message boards, chat rooms, and forums. Moreover, the Internet not only reports suicide incidents but documents suicide methods (for example, suicide pacts, an agreement between two or more people to kill themselves at a particular time and often by the same lethal means). Therefore, the role the Internet plays, particularly social media, in suicide-related behavior is a topic of growing interest. == Cyberbullying == There is substantial evidence that the Internet and social media can influence suicide-related behavior. Such evidence includes an increase in exposure to graphic content. A research study conducted by Sameer Hinduja and Justin Patchin found a correlation between cyberbullying and suicide. According to their findings, cyber-bullying increases suicidal thoughts by 14.5 percent and suicide attempts by 8.7 percent. Particularly alarming is the fact that children and young people under 25 who are victims of cyberbullying are more than twice as likely to self-harm and engage in suicidal behavior. Overall, teen suicide rates have increased within the past decade.This presents a significant public health concern, with over 40,000 suicides in the United States and nearly one million worldwide annually. Adolescents involved in cyberbullying often downplay its seriousness by calling it a joke or blaming the victim. These moral disengagement strategies can normalize harmful behavior and reduce feelings of guilt. This normalization may increase emotional distress and contribute to risks like depression and suicidal thoughts. Recent data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reveals that 14.9 per cent of teenagers have experienced online bullying, while 13.6 per cent of teenagers have seriously attempted suicide. Both of these incidents are in increasing numbers in the United States. Furthermore, in numerous recent incidents, cyber-bullying led the victim to commit suicide; this phenomenon is now known as cyberbullicide. Many parents and children are unaware of the dangers and potential legal consequences of cyberbullying. As a response, anti-bullying regulations implemented by schools aim to prevent any form of bullying, including through technology, and protect students from online harassment. While some states have enacted laws against cyberbullying, there are currently no federal regulations addressing this issue. == Social media's influence on suicide == The media may portray suicidal behavior or language which can potentially influence people to act on these suicidal ideation. This may include news reports of actual suicides that have occurred or television shows and films that reenact suicides. Some organizations have proposed guidelines about how the media should report suicide. There is evidence that compliance with the guidelines varies. Some research showed that it is unclear whether the guidelines have successfully reduced the number of suicides. On the contrary, other research studies stated that the guidelines have worked in some cases. == Impact of pro-suicidal sites, message boards, chat rooms and forums == Social media platforms have transformed traditional methods of communication by allowing instantaneous and interactive sharing of information created and controlled by individuals, groups, organizations, and governments. As of the third quarter of 2022, Facebook had 266 million monthly active users, between Canada and the US. An immense quantity of information on the topic of suicide is available on the Internet and via social media. The information available on social media on the topic of suicide can influence suicidal behavior, both negatively and positively. The social cognitive theory plays a vital role in suicide attempts influenced through social media. This theory is demonstrated when one is influenced by what they see through various processes that form into modeled behaviors. This can be shown when people post their suicide attempts online or promote suicidal behavior in general. Contributors to these social media platforms may also exert peer pressure and encourage others to take their own lives, idolize those who have killed themselves, and facilitate suicide pacts. These pro-suicidal sites reported the following. For example, on a Japanese message board in 2008, it was shared that people can kill themselves using hydrogen sulfide gas. Shortly afterwards, 220 people attempted suicide in this way, and 208 were successful. Biddle et al. conducted a systematic Web search of 12 suicide-associated terms (e.g., suicide, suicide methods, how to kill yourself, and best suicide methods) to analyze the search results, and found that pro-suicide sites and chat rooms that discussed general issues associated with suicide most often occurred within the first few hits of a search. In another study, 373 suicide-related websites were found using Internet search engines and examined. Among them, 31% were suicide-neutral, 29% were anti-suicide, and 11% were pro-suicide. Together, these studies have shown that obtaining pro-suicide information on the Internet, including detailed information on suicide methods, is very easy. While social media has been prevalent in young adult suicide, some young adults find comfort and solace through these platforms. Young adults are making connections with people in like situations that are helping them feel less lonely. Although the public opinion is that message boards are harmful, the following studies show how they point to suicide prevention and have positive influences. A study using content analysis analyzed all of the postings on the AOL Suicide Bulletin Board over 11 months and concluded that most contributions contained positive, empathetic, and supportive postings. Then, a multi-method study was able to demonstrate that the users of such forums experience a great deal of social support and only a small amount of social strain. Lastly, in the survey participants were asked to assess the extent of their suicidal thoughts on a 7-level scale (0, absolutely no suicidal thoughts, to 7, very strong suicidal thoughts) for the time directly before their first forum visit and at the time of the survey. The study found a significant reduction after using the forum. The study however cannot conclude the forum is the only reason for the decrease. Together, these studies show how forums can reduce the number of
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CamScanner

CamScanner is a Chinese mobile app first released in 2010 that allows iOS and Android devices to be used as image scanners. It allows users to 'scan' documents (by taking a photo with the device's camera) and share the photo as either a JPEG or PDF. This app is available free of charge on the Google Play Store and the Apple App Store. The app is based on freemium model, with ad-supported free version and a premium version with additional functions. == History == On August 27, 2019, Russian cyber security company Kaspersky Lab discovered that recent versions of the Android app distributed an advertising library containing a Trojan Dropper, which was also included in some apps preinstalled on several Chinese mobiles. The advertising library decrypts a Zip archive which subsequently downloads additional files from servers controlled by hackers, allowing the hackers to control the device, including by showing intrusive advertising or charging paid subscriptions. Google took the app down after Kaspersky reported its findings. An updated version of the app with the advertising library removed was made available on the Google Play Store as of September 5, 2019. Kaspersky later acknowledged "We appreciate the willingness to cooperate that we've seen from CamScanner representatives, as well as the responsible attitude to user safety they demonstrated while eliminating the threat…The malicious modules were removed from the app immediately upon Kaspersky's warning, and Google Play has restored the app." In June 2020, as tensions along the Line of Actual Control between China and India continued, the Government of India decided to ban 118 Chinese apps, including TikTok and CamScanner citing data and privacy issues. On January 5, 2021, US President Donald Trump signed Executive Order 13971 banning Alipay, Tencent's QQ, QQ Wallet, WeChat Pay, CamScanner, Shareit, VMate and WPS Office to conduct US transactions. The Trump administration explained this act by saying that this move helps prevent personal information such as text, phone calls and photos collected from rivals. However, the Biden administration did not meet the February 2021 deadline for implementing the executive order, allowing these apps to operate in the US and revoked the previous executive order Executive Order 14034 of June 9, 2021.
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Torus interconnect

A torus interconnect is a switch-less network topology for connecting processing nodes in a parallel computer system. == Introduction == In geometry, a torus is created by revolving a circle about an axis coplanar to the circle. While this is a general definition in geometry, the topological properties of this type of shape describes the network topology in its essence. === Geometry illustration === In the representations below, the first is a one dimension torus, a simple circle. The second is a two dimension torus, in the shape of a 'doughnut'. The animation illustrates how a two dimension torus is generated from a rectangle by connecting its two pairs of opposite edges. At one dimension, a torus topology is equivalent to a ring interconnect network, in the shape of a circle. At two dimensions, it becomes equivalent to a two dimension mesh, but with extra connection at the edge nodes. === Torus network topology === A torus interconnect is a switch-less topology that can be seen as a mesh interconnect with nodes arranged in a rectilinear array of N = 2, 3, or more dimensions, with processors connected to their nearest neighbors, and corresponding processors on opposite edges of the array connected.[1] In this lattice, each node has 2N connections. This topology is named for the lattice formed in this way, which is topologically homogeneous to an N-dimensional torus. == Visualization == The first 3 dimensions of torus network topology are easier to visualize and are described below: 1D Torus: one dimension, n nodes are connected in closed loop with each node connected to its two nearest neighbors. Communication can take place in two directions, +x and −x. A 1D Torus is the same as ring interconnection. 2D Torus: two dimensions with degree of four, the nodes are imagined laid out in a two-dimensional rectangular lattice of n rows and n columns, with each node connected to its four nearest neighbors, and corresponding nodes on opposite edges connected. Communication can take place in four directions, +x, −x, +y, and −y. The total nodes of a 2D Torus is n2. 3D Torus: three dimensions, the nodes are imagined in a three-dimensional lattice in the shape of a rectangular prism, with each node connected with its six neighbors, with corresponding nodes on opposing faces of the array connected. Each edge consists of n nodes. communication can take place in six directions, +x, −x, +y, −y, +z, −z. Each edge of a 3D Torus consist of n nodes. The total nodes of 3D Torus is n3. ND Torus: N dimensions, each node of an N dimension torus has 2N neighbors, Communication can take place in 2N directions. Each edge consists of n nodes. Total nodes of this torus is nN. The main motivation of having higher dimension of torus is to achieve higher bandwidth, lower latency, and higher scalability. Higher-dimensional arrays are difficult to visualize. The above ruleset shows that each higher dimension adds another pair of nearest neighbor connections to each node. == Performance == A number of supercomputers on the TOP500 list use three-dimensional torus networks, e.g. IBM's Blue Gene/L and Blue Gene/P, and the Cray XT3. IBM's Blue Gene/Q uses a five-dimensional torus network. Fujitsu's K computer and the PRIMEHPC FX10 use a proprietary three-dimensional torus 3D mesh interconnect called Tofu. === 3D Torus performance simulation === Sandeep Palur and Dr. Ioan Raicu from Illinois Institute of Technology conducted experiments to simulate 3D torus performance. Their experiments ran on a computer with 250GB RAM, 48 cores and x86_64 architecture. The simulator they used was ROSS (Rensselaer’s Optimistic Simulation System). They mainly focused on three aspects: Varying network size Varying number of servers Varying message size They concluded that throughput decreases with the increase of servers and network size. Otherwise, throughput increases with the increase of message size. === 6D Torus product performance === Fujitsu Limited developed a 6D torus computer model called "Tofu". In their model, a 6D torus can achieve 100 GB/s off-chip bandwidth, 12 times higher scalability than a 3D torus, and high fault tolerance. The model is used in the K computer and Fugaku. === Cost === While long wrap-around links may be the easiest way to visualize the connection topology, in practice, restrictions on cable lengths often make long wrap-around links impractical. Instead, directly connected nodes—including nodes that the above visualization places on opposite edges of a grid, connected by a long wrap-around link—are physically placed nearly adjacent to each other in a folded torus network. Every link in the folded torus network is very short—almost as short as the nearest-neighbor links in a simple grid interconnect—and therefore low-latency.
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Social Media (Age-Restricted Users) Bill

The Social Media (Age-Restricted Users) Bill is a member's bill by National Party Member of Parliament Catherine Wedd that seeks to ban children under the age of 16 years from accessing social media by forcing social media companies to implement age verification measures. It is modelled after the Australian government's Online Safety Amendment. In mid October 2025, the New Zealand Parliament confirmed plans to introduce the social media age restriction bill. == Background == In late November 2024, the Albanese government of Australia, with support from the opposition Coalition parties, passed the Online Safety Amendment creating a world-first age verification regime targeting social media platforms operating in the country. The ban targets several social media platforms including Facebook, Instagram, Kick, Reddit, Snapchat, Threads, TikTok, Twitch, X (formerly Twitter) and YouTube. These platforms were required to implement age verification systems and to remove under-age users by 10 December 2025, when the law change came into effect. == Draft provisions == The draft Social Media (Age-Restricted Users) Bill defines social media platforms as electronic platforms that enable social media interactions between two or more end-users, facilitates communication between multiple end-users and allows users to post content on the platform. The proposed bill requires social media companies to take action to prevent users under the age of 16 from creating accounts on their platforms. It also creates a framework for courts to impose fines on platforms that fail to take reasonable steps to prevent underaged users from accessing the platform. == Legislative history == === Draft legislation === On 6 May 2025, Wedd announced a private member's bill called the "Social Media (Age-Restricted Users) Bill" that would bar access to social media platforms for people under the age of 16 years. She said that she was motivated as the mother of four children to support families, parents and teachers' efforts to manage their children's online exposure and the passage of the Australian Online Safety Amendment legislation in December 2024. Since National's coalition partner ACT New Zealand had refused to support the bill, the Sixth National Government announce it as a member's bill rather than a government bill. Prime Minister Christopher Luxon has confirmed that National would seek cross-party support for the legislation. ACT MP and the Minister of Internal Affairs Brooke van Velden said that the Government would watch the implementation of the Australian social media age restriction policy. In October 2025, Wedd's bill was drawn from the parliamentary ballot. In addition, Labour Reuben Davidson drafted a similar member's bill that would hold social media providers responsible for restricting "harmful content" and imposed NZ$50,000 fines for non-compliance. In November 2025, Luxon reiterated his support for social media age restriction legislation and said the New Zealand government would introduce a bill in 2026 before the 2026 New Zealand general election. He also confirmed that Education Minister Erica Stanford was leading an investigation into what lessons could be learnt from the Australian legislation. At the request of ACT MP Parmjeet Parmar, Parliament's Education and Workforce Committee held an inquiry into a proposed social media ban in early October 2025. The committee was led by National MP Carl Bates and received 430 submissions from 400 groups and individuals. The committee also heard from 87 in-person submissions. On 10 December 2025, the committee made 12 recommendations including restricting social media access to persons under the age of 16, re-evaluating existing legislation such as the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act and the Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015, and regulating online platforms and Internet service providers. The ACT party released a dissenting view disagreeing with the need for a law restricting social media access to under-16 year olds. In mid-May 2026, the Government confirmed that work on the proposed bill to ban under-16 year olds from social media had been paused. The New Zealand Parliament held a debate on the proposed bill on 13 May following a select committee inquiry into the harms caused by social media platforms. While the opposition Labour Party has agreed to support the member's bill, the ACT and Green parties opposed the proposed bill on the grounds that the rules were easy to circumvent, that at-risk groups could become more isolated, and that social media also harmed other age groups. == Responses == === Academia and civil society === In late July 2025, the New Zealand Council for Civil Liberties (NZCCL) expressed concern that the proposed social media age restriction could infringe upon the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, the Privacy Act 2020 and the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of the Child. The NZCCL also questioned the practicality of age verification software, a social media age limit and whether it would fulfil its stated goal of combating online harm. In August 2025, University of Auckland criminologist and senior lecturer Claire Meehan expressed concern that the social media age restriction legislation would cut children from their friendship and support networks. She also said that children and young people were digital natives who could use VPNs to circumvent the ban. Similar sentiments were echoed by Victoria University of Wellington media and communications lecturer Alex Beattie and "Ocean Today" Instagram social media influencer "Charlie." In October 2025, New Zealand Initiative representative Dr Eric Crampton expressed concern that a social media age restriction would involve the introduction of digital IDs. He argued that a new law was unnecessary and said that parents could limit their children's exposure to social media via Google's Family Link and Apple's equivalent. Similarly, Institute of Economic Affairs public policy fellow Matthew Lesh and the British Free Speech Union expressed concerns that young people could use VPNs to circumvent a social media ban, citing the spike in VPN usage in the United Kingdom following the passage of the Online Safety Act 2023. The advocacy group B416's co-chair Anna Curzon advocated for a social media ban on underage users, stating that social media apps "are made to be addictive" and made it difficult for parents to relate with their children. In late November 2025, B416's co-founder Anna Mowbray expressed support for the Government's social media age restriction bill but expressed disappointment that Luxon had not timed his announcement with the launch of the group's campaign. Generation-Z Aotearoa co-founder Lola Fisher has called on the New Zealand Government to consult with young people on the development of the legislation. === Government agencies and departments === In early October 2025, Privacy Commissioner Michael Webster expressed concern that social media platforms requiring users to prove their age via digital IDs could raise privacy concerns. Webster suggested that age verification systems could relay on various documents including passports. He said that age estimation technologies had high error rates and that age inference technologies relied on data mining. === Political parties === In early May 2025, the National Party government expressed support for a social media age restriction legislation. By contrast, its coalition partner ACT has opposed such legislation. ACT leader David Seymour described the ban as hasty and unworkable since it did not involve parents. Meanwhile, New Zealand First leader Winston Peters expressed support for a social media age restriction but said the bill should be subject to a select committee inquiry. The opposition Labour Party leader Chris Hipkins has expressed interest in a social media age restriction legislation but emphasised the need for consensus. Meanwhile, Green Party co-leader Chlöe Swarbrick said she wanted to learn more about the bill but described it as simplistic. Fellow Greens co-leader Marama Davidson said that the proposed bill would punish children and young people for the harm caused by big tech platforms. === Tech companies === In early October 2025, representatives of TikTok and Meta Platforms cautioned against proposed social media ban on under-16 years olds. During a one-day parliamentary inquiry, Ella Woods-Joyce, TikTok's public policy lead for Australia and New Zealand, and Mia Garlick, Meta's regional director of policy, expressed concern that the social media age restriction could send children and young people to less regulated online spaces. Woods-Joyce highlighted TikTok's policy of closing down accounts belonging to users under the age of 13 years while Garlick highlighted Meta's policy of placing users under the age of 16 in private accounts by default. In early February 2026 Meta's vice president and global head of safety, Antigone Da
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Social media use in African politics

Since the Egyptian Revolution in 2011 and the Tunisian Revolution, social media, especially Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, began to gain traction as a political tool in Africa. Various political actors have used social media to pursue a wide range of political objectives. State actors can use social media to encourage political discourse, campaign, or implement censorship and surveillance. Non-state actors, such as civil society organizations and opposition movements, can use social media to address political concerns and to organize widespread uprisings, such as the 2014 Burkinabé uprising. Meanwhile, extremist organizations can use social media to further their propaganda and recruitment. However, social media has been criticized for its limited accessibility and for facilitating the spread of misinformation, causing some skepticism about its effectiveness. Due to low entry barriers and user-generated content, social media provides a platform where people from different social classes can engage and interact with one another. Under traditional media, the public had limited opportunities to voice their political opinions. Social media enables people to both create and consume content. The public has become increasingly comfortable and confident in expressing political opinions online, often away from government scrutiny. Scholars argue that social media use has democratizing effects in African countries. == State actors == === Promoting political discourse === Through social media, the government and its citizens can discuss policy ideas, policy implementation, and political actions. Regardless of geographical location and distance, people are able to voice their opinions to the government. Social media includes citizens who were previously not able to express their discontent or share their ideas to the government. As state actors keep the public informed, social media can increase civic engagement. With more civic engagement, policies can be discussed without politicization. Before the commonplace use of social media, African countries faced weak feedback mechanisms that effectively excluded the average African citizen from policy discourse. In South Africa, the government uses social media to connect with constituencies. The South African president runs an official Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Flickr accounts to engage with the public. === Campaigning === Political parties also use social media for political campaigns during election periods. In South Africa, the ANC (African National Congress) and DA (Democratic Alliance) use social media for political purposes. These parties specifically use Facebook as a tool for campaigning and engaging with the public to improve their relationship with citizens. Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan employed social media to campaign for the presidential election in 2011, which he won. When President Goodluck Jonathan announced his bid for the presidency on social media in 2010, it reached about 217,000 people. As his campaign progressed, President Goodluck Jonathan was able to increase his followers to half a million by early 2011. === Censorship & Surveillance === While state actors can use social media to encourage their party or discourse, social media can be used to censor and surveil citizens. For example, the ANC and DA use Facebook to monitor South Africans. The government is able to track down people who have spoken against the government and translate this information into physical action to stop any possibility of a revolution. Social media platforms can be shut down to manipulate the flow of information. In Chad, citizens cannot access information through online platforms. This censorship blocked "Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp and Viber". In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the government shut down the internet before contested elections. In Zimbabwe, the government shut down the internet to hide civilian protests against fuel price increases. == Non-state actors == === Civil society organizations (CSOs) === Civil society organizations have also used social media networks in an effort to recruit supporters and communicate with the public. CSOs can use social media to mobilize people to support their cause, such as the Ghanaian Committee for Joint Action (CJA). In 2005 and 2006, the CJA gathered support to protest against the 50% fuel price increase. CSOs can play the role of a counterforce against state actors and state propaganda during times of crises, such as protests and military clashes. In some cases, CSOs release their own videos and photos on social media which challenges traditional forms of media. CSOs have also served to monitor elections to reduce corruption and violence during election day. For instance, the Zambian Bantu Watch started the #bantuwatch social media campaign to monitor the 2011 presidential election. Zambians used Facebook and Twitter to report polling station results to mitigate election fraud and election violence. In South Africa, CSOs created 'amandla.mobi' to campaign for public policies by creating petitions. Through 'amandla.mobi', CSOs are able to circulate petitions on social media to collect signatures. South African CSOs reported how social media helped their organizations to gain support and share ideas. However, CSOs struggle to attract media attention and often have to pay for media coverage. === Opposition forces against the government === Social media is also used by the public or opposition forces against the government. Through horizontal social media, organizing can lead to street protests and revolutions, some of which are successful. For instance, during the Egyptian revolution of 2011, "The Day of the Revolution Against Torture, Poverty, Corruption, and Unemployment" and "We Are All Khaled Said" gathered support against President Hosni Mubarak. In particular, "We Are All Khaled Said" had Egyptian citizens gather around the death of Khaled Said who was brutally tortured and killed by the Egyptian government because Said wanted to uncover government corruption. As unrest erupted into public demonstrations, President Hosni Mubarak was forced to resign. Witnessing the success of social media during the Egyptian revolution, the Tunisian Revolution, or the Jasmine Revolution, mobilized through Facebook and Twitter. Likewise, in South Africa, Malawi, and Mozambique, these countries have used social media as "new protest drums." Due to social media's low entry barrier, opposition forces against the government can facilitate political discourse that can lead to accountability. Whistleblowers and opposition forces are able to expose corruption through social media, where they face less repression while reaching a larger audience. For example, the youth of Zimbabwe and South Africa use Facebook to discuss politics without judgment. Specifically, in Zimbabwe, political youth used Facebook to avoid state surveillance. Social media is used as a supplemental tool for activism. In 2015, South African student activists started the hashtag #RhodesMustFall to push the issue of colonialism and racism at the forefront of the public. === Extremist organizations === Social media is easily accessible and created by user-based content. Therefore, marginalized groups are able to use social media to spread extremist ideas. For instance, Boko Haram created the Media Office of West Africa Province and perpetuated propaganda through Twitter and YouTube. Boko Haram's online propaganda campaign targets and persuades young dissuaded Nigerians to join their cause. It is important to note that social media has also been used against Boko Haram. In April 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped 276 schoolgirls and an international campaign fought for their return through #BringBackOurGirls. Another extremist group, Al-Shabaab, has created an online presence through Twitter and YouTube. Through these social media networks, Al-Shabaab recruits new members to their extremist group through their propaganda which emphasizes the group's successes. Albeit their efforts, Al-Shabaab has not been very successful in coordinating their members but they are successful in financing their group. Furthermore, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) use social media to target and recruit individuals to their cause. ISIL's social media usage is more diverse compared to Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab; ISIL uses "Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, WhatsApp, Telegram, JustPaste.it, Kik and Ask.fm." Since ISIL's Twitter accounts kept getting shut down, ISIL uses Telegram and WhatsApp chat rooms to privately conduct meetings. Due to the spread of extremist ideology, Zhuravskaya et al. acknowledge social media's potential to be misused. == Challenges == Although social media can be used as a political tool, it faces challenges in Africa. Due to low literacy rates in Africa, social media networks exclude many of the population members. In addition, lack of access to electricity and the internet can fur
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Invoicera

Invoicera is an online invoicing software. The software was created by a company with the same name that was founded in 2006, had 125 employees, and is based in India. It allows users to monitor, dispatch, and accept invoices in one web service. After signing up for the service, users are assigned a personal subdomain to set up their invoice configuration. It allows users to add clients' data to the service through uploading a Microsoft Excel file. Invoicera is compatible with businesses of varying sizes, including freelancers, small businesses, and large businesses. It is compatible with Basecamp, a project-management tool, so Invoicera can upload data from Basecamp. The software interfaces with more than 25 payment gateways. It supports subscriptions and repeated invoices and allows clients to schedule late fees when payments have not been made on time. Invoicera uses freemium model, letting users dispatch an unrestricted number of invoices to at most three customers. Chelsea Krause wrote in a 2019 review for Merchant Maverick, "Unfortunately, the software isn't as developed as it could be. Time tracking and reporting are limited and there are no live bank feeds — which is surprising for a company so focused on automation (especially since even many of the worst invoicing options out there still offer live bank feeds)." She further criticized Invoicera for having bad customer service and the software for not having recent changes. Brian Turner wrote in TechRadar that Invoicera had fewer templates compared to the other services he reviewed but "the ones offered are fully customizable". Rob Clymo wrote in TechRadar that "Invoicera lets you automate your invoicing and billing needs without too much in the way of hassle" and that although it "isn't a complete accounts solution ... it's a powerful supplement".
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Torus interconnect

A torus interconnect is a switch-less network topology for connecting processing nodes in a parallel computer system. == Introduction == In geometry, a torus is created by revolving a circle about an axis coplanar to the circle. While this is a general definition in geometry, the topological properties of this type of shape describes the network topology in its essence. === Geometry illustration === In the representations below, the first is a one dimension torus, a simple circle. The second is a two dimension torus, in the shape of a 'doughnut'. The animation illustrates how a two dimension torus is generated from a rectangle by connecting its two pairs of opposite edges. At one dimension, a torus topology is equivalent to a ring interconnect network, in the shape of a circle. At two dimensions, it becomes equivalent to a two dimension mesh, but with extra connection at the edge nodes. === Torus network topology === A torus interconnect is a switch-less topology that can be seen as a mesh interconnect with nodes arranged in a rectilinear array of N = 2, 3, or more dimensions, with processors connected to their nearest neighbors, and corresponding processors on opposite edges of the array connected.[1] In this lattice, each node has 2N connections. This topology is named for the lattice formed in this way, which is topologically homogeneous to an N-dimensional torus. == Visualization == The first 3 dimensions of torus network topology are easier to visualize and are described below: 1D Torus: one dimension, n nodes are connected in closed loop with each node connected to its two nearest neighbors. Communication can take place in two directions, +x and −x. A 1D Torus is the same as ring interconnection. 2D Torus: two dimensions with degree of four, the nodes are imagined laid out in a two-dimensional rectangular lattice of n rows and n columns, with each node connected to its four nearest neighbors, and corresponding nodes on opposite edges connected. Communication can take place in four directions, +x, −x, +y, and −y. The total nodes of a 2D Torus is n2. 3D Torus: three dimensions, the nodes are imagined in a three-dimensional lattice in the shape of a rectangular prism, with each node connected with its six neighbors, with corresponding nodes on opposing faces of the array connected. Each edge consists of n nodes. communication can take place in six directions, +x, −x, +y, −y, +z, −z. Each edge of a 3D Torus consist of n nodes. The total nodes of 3D Torus is n3. ND Torus: N dimensions, each node of an N dimension torus has 2N neighbors, Communication can take place in 2N directions. Each edge consists of n nodes. Total nodes of this torus is nN. The main motivation of having higher dimension of torus is to achieve higher bandwidth, lower latency, and higher scalability. Higher-dimensional arrays are difficult to visualize. The above ruleset shows that each higher dimension adds another pair of nearest neighbor connections to each node. == Performance == A number of supercomputers on the TOP500 list use three-dimensional torus networks, e.g. IBM's Blue Gene/L and Blue Gene/P, and the Cray XT3. IBM's Blue Gene/Q uses a five-dimensional torus network. Fujitsu's K computer and the PRIMEHPC FX10 use a proprietary three-dimensional torus 3D mesh interconnect called Tofu. === 3D Torus performance simulation === Sandeep Palur and Dr. Ioan Raicu from Illinois Institute of Technology conducted experiments to simulate 3D torus performance. Their experiments ran on a computer with 250GB RAM, 48 cores and x86_64 architecture. The simulator they used was ROSS (Rensselaer’s Optimistic Simulation System). They mainly focused on three aspects: Varying network size Varying number of servers Varying message size They concluded that throughput decreases with the increase of servers and network size. Otherwise, throughput increases with the increase of message size. === 6D Torus product performance === Fujitsu Limited developed a 6D torus computer model called "Tofu". In their model, a 6D torus can achieve 100 GB/s off-chip bandwidth, 12 times higher scalability than a 3D torus, and high fault tolerance. The model is used in the K computer and Fugaku. === Cost === While long wrap-around links may be the easiest way to visualize the connection topology, in practice, restrictions on cable lengths often make long wrap-around links impractical. Instead, directly connected nodes—including nodes that the above visualization places on opposite edges of a grid, connected by a long wrap-around link—are physically placed nearly adjacent to each other in a folded torus network. Every link in the folded torus network is very short—almost as short as the nearest-neighbor links in a simple grid interconnect—and therefore low-latency.
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Chaos Communication Congress

The Chaos Communication Congress is an annual hacker conference organized by the Chaos Computer Club. The congress features a variety of lectures and workshops on technical and political issues related to security, cryptography, privacy and online freedom of speech. It has taken place regularly at the end of the year since 1984, with the current date and duration (27–30 December) established in 2005. It is considered one of the largest events of its kind, alongside DEF CON in Las Vegas. == History == The congress is held in Germany. It started in 1984 in Hamburg, moved to Berlin in 1998, and back to Hamburg in 2012, having exceeded the capacity of the Berlin venue with more than 4500 attendees. Since then, it attracts an increasing number of people: around 6600 attendees in 2012, over 13000 in 2015, and more than 15000 in 2017. From 2017 to 2019, it took place at the Trade Fair Grounds in Leipzig, since the Hamburg venue (CCH) was closed for renovation in 2017 and the existing space was not enough for the growing congress. The congress moved back to Hamburg in 2023, after the renovation of CCH was finished. A large range of speakers are featured. The event is organized by volunteers called Chaos Angels. The non-members entry fee for four days was €100 in 2016, and was raised to €120 in 2018 to include a public transport ticket for the Leipzig area. An important part of the congress are the assemblies, semi-open spaces with clusters of tables and internet connections for groups and individuals to collaborate and socialize in projects, workshops and hands-on talks. These assembly spaces, introduced at the 2012 meeting, combine the hack center project space and distributed group spaces of former years. From 1997 to 2004 the congress also hosted the annual German Lockpicking Championships. 2005 was the first year the Congress lasted four days instead of three and lacked the German Lockpicking Championships. 2020 was the first year where the Congress did not take place at a physical location due to the COVID-19 pandemic, giving way to the first Remote Chaos Experience (rC3). The Chaos Computer Club announced to return to the now newly renovated Congress Center Hamburg for the 37th edition of the Chaos Communication Congress. The announcement confirms the usual date of 27-30 December, notably omitting the year it will be held. On 18 October 2022, they confirmed that the congress will indeed not be held in 2022. On 6 October 2023, the CCC announced that 37C3 will take place again on the usual dates in 2023. === Timeline ===
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