AI Art Modifier

AI Art Modifier — independent reviews, comparisons, pricing and step-by-step guides on Aizhi.

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  Learning rate

  In machine learning and statistics, the learning rate is a tuning parameter in an optimization algorithm that determines the step size at each iteration while moving toward a minimum of a loss function. Since it influences to what extent newly acquired information overrides old information, it metaphorically represents the speed at which a machine learning model "learns". In the adaptive control literature, the learning rate is commonly referred to as gain. In setting a learning rate, there is a trade-off between the rate of convergence and overshooting. While the descent direction is usually determined from the gradient of the loss function, the learning rate determines how big a step is taken in that direction. Too high a learning rate will make the learning jump over minima, but too low a learning rate will either take too long to converge or get stuck in an undesirable local minimum. In order to achieve faster convergence, prevent oscillations and getting stuck in undesirable local minima the learning rate is often varied during training either in accordance to a learning rate schedule or by using an adaptive learning rate. The learning rate and its adjustments may also differ per parameter, in which case it is a diagonal matrix that can be interpreted as an approximation to the inverse of the Hessian matrix in Newton's method. The learning rate is related to the step length determined by inexact line search in quasi-Newton methods and related optimization algorithms. == Learning rate schedule == Initial rate can be left as system default or can be selected using a range of techniques. A learning rate schedule changes the learning rate during learning and is most often changed between epochs/iterations. This is mainly done with two parameters: decay and momentum. There are many different learning rate schedules but the most common are time-based, step-based and exponential. Decay serves to settle the learning in a nice place and avoid oscillations, a situation that may arise when too high a constant learning rate makes the learning jump back and forth over a minimum, and is controlled by a hyperparameter. Momentum is analogous to a ball rolling down a hill; we want the ball to settle at the lowest point of the hill (corresponding to the lowest error). Momentum both speeds up the learning (increasing the learning rate) when the error cost gradient is heading in the same direction for a long time and also avoids local minima by 'rolling over' small bumps. Momentum is controlled by a hyperparameter analogous to a ball's mass which must be chosen manually—too high and the ball will roll over minima which we wish to find, too low and it will not fulfil its purpose. The formula for factoring in the momentum is more complex than for decay but is most often built in with deep learning libraries such as Keras. Time-based learning schedules alter the learning rate depending on the learning rate of the previous time iteration. Factoring in the decay the mathematical formula for the learning rate is: η n + 1 = η 0 1 + d n {\displaystyle \eta _{n+1}={\frac {\eta _{0}}{1+dn}}} where η {\displaystyle \eta } is the learning rate, η 0 {\displaystyle \eta _{0}} is the original learning rate, d {\displaystyle d} is a decay parameter and n {\displaystyle n} is the iteration step. Step-based learning schedules changes the learning rate according to some predefined steps. The decay application formula is here defined as: η n = η 0 d ⌊ 1 + n r ⌋ {\displaystyle \eta _{n}=\eta _{0}d^{\left\lfloor {\frac {1+n}{r}}\right\rfloor }} where η n {\displaystyle \eta _{n}} is the learning rate at iteration n {\displaystyle n} , η 0 {\displaystyle \eta _{0}} is the initial learning rate, d {\displaystyle d} is how much the learning rate should change at each drop (0.5 corresponds to a halving) and r {\displaystyle r} corresponds to the drop rate, or how often the rate should be dropped (10 corresponds to a drop every 10 iterations). The floor function ( ⌊ … ⌋ {\displaystyle \lfloor \dots \rfloor } ) here drops the value of its input to 0 for all values smaller than 1. Exponential learning schedules are similar to step-based, but instead of steps, a decreasing exponential function is used. The mathematical formula for factoring in the decay is: η n = η 0 e − d n {\displaystyle \eta _{n}=\eta _{0}e^{-dn}} where d {\displaystyle d} is a decay parameter. == Adaptive learning rate == The issue with learning rate schedules is that they all depend on hyperparameters that must be manually chosen for each given learning session and may vary greatly depending on the problem at hand or the model used. To combat this, there are many different types of adaptive gradient descent algorithms such as Adagrad, Adadelta, RMSprop, and Adam which are generally built into deep learning libraries such as Keras.

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  Menu hack

  A menu hack is a non-standard method of ordering food, usually at fast-food or fast casual restaurants, that offers a different result than what is explicitly stated on a menu. Menu hacks may range from a simple alternate flavor to "gaming the system" in order to obtain more food than normal. They are often spread on social media platforms such as TikTok, and are more popular with Generation Z, which has been known to customize their orders more than previous generations. Hacks are sometimes officially added to the menu after their popularity grows. However, in some cases, they have been criticized for overburdening fast food employees with outlandish requests, sparking debate as to whether certain menu hacks are unethical. The list of all possible menu hacks is called a secret menu. == History == The term "menu hack" stems from hacker culture and its tradition of overcoming previously imposed limitations. However, the tradition of ordering from a secret menu dates back to the early days of fast food. "Animal style" fries, a word of mouth menu item ordered from In-N-Out since the 1960s, was rumored to have been created by local surfers. In the Information Age, the rise of social media gave influencers the ability to communicate unique food combinations to their followers, which proved to go viral easily. Design mistakes in food ordering apps also proved to be easily exploitable. In some cases, these hacks boosted the profile of brands on social media, while in others, they caused financial harm when the company was unprepared to handle the sudden influx of unusual orders. One restaurant chain notable for the phenomenon is Chipotle Mexican Grill. A viral hack from Alexis Frost, suggesting a quesadilla with fajita vegetables inside, dipped in Chipotle vinaigrette mixed with sour cream, obtained 1.9 million views on TikTok, overloading the chain's workers, who had to work harder to prepare more vegetables and vinaigrette. Some restaurants began to deny the dish to customers, forcing them to only order meat and cheese on quesadillas. The company ultimately left the dish on the menu, but urged customers to stop ordering it via social media. When it later officially added the Fajita Quesadilla to the menu, digital sales nearly doubled. A method to order nachos, which are not officially on the menu, was also noted by customers. Starbucks is also famous for menu hacks, including the Pink Drink, a "Barbiecore" beverage in which coconut milk replaced the water in the strawberry açaí refresher. After it went viral, the company made it a permanent menu item and distributed it bottled in grocery stores. == Controversy == Menu hacks have been subject to a growing backlash, with employees stating that they "dread" younger customers due to the proliferation of unusual orders. Service industry workers, already overworked and underpaid, have called the rise of menu hacks and their difficulty to make an additional reason to unionize and demand higher wages.

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  Hybrid cryptosystem

  In cryptography, a hybrid cryptosystem is one which combines the convenience of a public-key cryptosystem with the efficiency of a symmetric-key cryptosystem. Public-key cryptosystems are convenient in that they do not require the sender and receiver to share a common secret in order to communicate securely. However, they often rely on complicated mathematical computations and are thus generally much more inefficient than comparable symmetric-key cryptosystems. In many applications, the high cost of encrypting long messages in a public-key cryptosystem can be prohibitive. This is addressed by hybrid systems by using a combination of both. A hybrid cryptosystem can be constructed using any two separate cryptosystems: a key encapsulation mechanism, which is a public-key cryptosystem a data encapsulation scheme, which is a symmetric-key cryptosystem The hybrid cryptosystem is itself a public-key system, whose public and private keys are the same as in the key encapsulation scheme. Note that for very long messages the bulk of the work in encryption/decryption is done by the more efficient symmetric-key scheme, while the inefficient public-key scheme is used only to encrypt/decrypt a short key value. == Implementations and standards == All practical implementations of public key cryptography today employ a hybrid system. Examples include the TLS protocol and the SSH protocol, that use a public-key mechanism for key exchange (such as Diffie-Hellman) and a symmetric-key mechanism for data encapsulation (such as AES). The OpenPGP file format and the PKCS#7 file format are other examples. Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE, published as RFC 9180) is a modern standard for generic hybrid encryption. HPKE is used within multiple IETF protocols, including Messaging Layer Security (MLS), Oblivious DNS over HTTPS, Oblivious HTTP, Privacy Preserving Measurement, and TLS Encrypted Client Hello. Envelope encryption is an example of a usage of hybrid cryptosystems in cloud computing. In a cloud context, hybrid cryptosystems also enable centralized key management. == Example == To encrypt a message addressed to Alice in a hybrid cryptosystem, Bob does the following: Obtains Alice's public key. Generates a fresh symmetric key for the data encapsulation scheme. Encrypts the message under the data encapsulation scheme, using the symmetric key just generated. Encrypts the symmetric key under the key encapsulation scheme, using Alice's public key. Sends both of these ciphertexts to Alice. To decrypt this hybrid ciphertext, Alice does the following: Uses her private key to decrypt the symmetric key contained in the key encapsulation segment. Uses this symmetric key to decrypt the message contained in the data encapsulation segment. == Security == If both the key encapsulation and data encapsulation schemes in a hybrid cryptosystem are secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks, then the hybrid scheme inherits that property as well. However, it is possible to construct a hybrid scheme secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks even if the key encapsulation has a slightly weakened security definition (though the security of the data encapsulation must be slightly stronger). == Envelope encryption == Envelope encryption is term used for encrypting with a hybrid cryptosystem used by all major cloud service providers, often as part of a centralized key management system in cloud computing. Envelope encryption gives names to the keys used in hybrid encryption: Data Encryption Keys (abbreviated DEK, and used to encrypt data) and Key Encryption Keys (abbreviated KEK, and used to encrypt the DEKs). In a cloud environment, encryption with envelope encryption involves generating a DEK locally, encrypting one's data using the DEK, and then issuing a request to wrap (encrypt) the DEK with a KEK stored in a potentially more secure service. Then, this wrapped DEK and encrypted message constitute a ciphertext for the scheme. To decrypt a ciphertext, the wrapped DEK is unwrapped (decrypted) via a call to a service, and then the unwrapped DEK is used to decrypt the encrypted message. In addition to the normal advantages of a hybrid cryptosystem, using asymmetric encryption for the KEK in a cloud context provides easier key management and separation of roles, but can be slower. In cloud systems, such as Google Cloud Platform and Amazon Web Services, a key management system (KMS) can be available as a service. In some cases, the key management system will store keys in hardware security modules, which are hardware systems that protect keys with hardware features like intrusion resistance. This means that KEKs can also be more secure because they are stored on secure specialized hardware. Envelope encryption makes centralized key management easier because a centralized key management system only needs to store KEKs, which occupy less space, and requests to the KMS only involve sending wrapped and unwrapped DEKs, which use less bandwidth than transmitting entire messages. Since one KEK can be used to encrypt many DEKs, this also allows for less storage space to be used in the KMS. This also allows for centralized auditing and access control at one point of access.

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  Conditional disclosure of secrets

  Conditional disclosure of secrets (CDS) is a primitive, studied in information-theoretic cryptography, that allows distributed, non-communicating parties to coordinate the release of information to a third party. CDS was initially introduced for use in the context of private information retrieval, and has been related to communication complexity and non-local quantum computation. == Definition of conditional disclosure of secrets == The conditional disclosure of secrets setting involves three players; Alice, Bob and the referee. Alice receives an input x ∈ { 0 , 1 } n {\displaystyle x\in \{0,1\}^{n}} and a secret z ∈ { 0 , 1 } {\displaystyle z\in \{0,1\}} , and Bob receives a string y ∈ { 0 , 1 } n {\displaystyle y\in \{0,1\}^{n}} . A choice of Boolean function f : { 0 , 1 } 2 n → { 0 , 1 } {\displaystyle f:\{0,1\}^{2n}\rightarrow \{0,1\}} is fixed in advance and known to all players. Alice and Bob cannot communicate with one another, but share a string of random bits which we label r {\displaystyle r} . Alice and Bob compute messages m A = m A ( x , z , r ) {\displaystyle m_{A}=m_{A}(x,z,r)} and m B = m B ( y , r ) {\displaystyle m_{B}=m_{B}(y,r)} , which they send to the referee. The referee knows ( x , y ) {\displaystyle (x,y)} . A CDS protocol consists of the encoding maps applied by Alice and Bob. A protocol is said to be ϵ {\displaystyle \epsilon } -correct if, for all ( x , y ) ∈ f − 1 ( 1 ) {\displaystyle (x,y)\in f^{-1}(1)} , the referee can determine z {\displaystyle z} with probability 1 − ϵ {\displaystyle 1-\epsilon } . A protocol is said to be δ {\displaystyle \delta } -secure if, for all ( x , y ) ∈ f − 1 ( 0 ) {\displaystyle (x,y)\in f^{-1}(0)} the distribution of the messages is δ {\displaystyle \delta } close to a simulator distribution (in total variation distance), where the simulator distribution is independent of z {\displaystyle z} . The communication complexity of a CDS protocol P is the total number of bits of message sent by Alice and Bob. The CDS communication cost of a function, C D S ϵ , δ ( f ) {\displaystyle CDS_{\epsilon ,\delta }(f)} is the minimal communication cost of an ϵ {\displaystyle \epsilon } -correct, δ {\displaystyle \delta } secure protocol that implements f {\displaystyle f} . The randomness complexity and randomness cost of implementing a function in the CDS model are defined similarly, but consider the number of bits of shared random bits held by Alice and Bob. == Basic properties of the primitive == === Amplification === Supposing we have an ϵ {\displaystyle \epsilon } -correct and δ {\displaystyle \delta } -secure CDS protocol, it is known that we can find a new protocol which reduces the correctness and privacy errors at the expense of an increased communication and randomness cost. More specifically, the following theorem has been proven Theorem (Amplification). A CDS protocol for f which supports a single-bit secret with privacy and correctness error of 1/3 can be transformed into a new CDS protocol with privacy and correctness error of 2 − Ω ( k ) {\displaystyle 2^{-\Omega (k)}} and communication/randomness complexity which are larger than those of the original protocol by a multiplicative factor of O(k). In fact, somewhat more than the above theorem is true in that the size of the secret can also be made to be of length k {\displaystyle k} , while simultaneously reducing the correctness and privacy errors as above. The proof involves first encoding the secret z {\displaystyle z} into a secret sharing scheme, and then running the original CDS protocol on each share of the resulting scheme. === Closure === If a CDS protocol for a function f {\displaystyle f} is known, then certain simple modifications of f {\displaystyle f} have CDS protocols with similar efficiency. The simplest case is to consider a CDS protocol for function f {\displaystyle f} and ask for a similarly efficient protocol for the negation of f {\displaystyle f} , labelled ¬ f {\displaystyle \neg f} . This is addressed by the following theorem Theorem (CDS is closed under complement). Suppose that f has a CDS protocol with randomness cost of ρ {\displaystyle \rho } bits, communication complexity of t {\displaystyle t} bits, and privacy and correctness errors δ = ϵ = 2 − k {\displaystyle \delta =\epsilon =2^{-k}} . Then ¬ f {\displaystyle \neg f} has a CDS scheme with similar privacy and correctness errors, and randomness and communication complexity of O ( k 3 ρ 2 t + k 3 ρ 3 ) {\displaystyle O(k^{3}\rho ^{2}t+k^{3}\rho ^{3})} . The cost of a CDS protocol is also closed under formula's, in the following sense. Consider two functions f 1 {\displaystyle f_{1}} and f 2 {\displaystyle f_{2}} . Then, the communication and randomness costs of f 1 ∧ f 2 {\displaystyle f_{1}\wedge f_{2}} as well as f 1 ∨ f 2 {\displaystyle f_{1}\vee f_{2}} are not much larger than the sum of the costs for f 1 {\displaystyle f_{1}} and f 2 {\displaystyle f_{2}} . See Applebaum et al. for a precise statement. == Upper and lower bounds on communication cost == Given a function f {\displaystyle f} we would like to understand the communication and randomness costs to implement f {\displaystyle f} in the CDS setting. Towards understanding this, protocols for implementing CDS have been developed (which give an upper bound on the cost) and lower bound strategies have been developed. For most functions, there is a large gap between the known upper and lower bound, so understanding the cost of CDS remains largely an open problem. This section presents some of what is known so far about the cost of CDS. === Secret sharing based upper bound === A subject with a close relationship to CDS is secret sharing. Secret sharing constructions provide an upper bound on the cost of CDS protocols. A secret sharing scheme encodes a secret, s {\displaystyle s} into a set of shares S 1 , . . . , S n {\displaystyle S_{1},...,S_{n}} . Associated to any secret sharing scheme is an access structure, which consists of a set of authorized sets A = A 1 , . . . , A k {\displaystyle {\mathcal {A}}={A_{1},...,A_{k}}} with A i ⊆ { S 1 , . . . , S n } {\displaystyle A_{i}\subseteq \{S_{1},...,S_{n}\}} . The authorized sets are those subsets of the A i {\displaystyle A_{i}} from which it is possible to recover the secret recorded into the scheme. A succinct way to describe an access structure is in terms of a function f A : { 0 , 1 } n → { 0 , 1 } {\displaystyle f_{\mathcal {A}}:\{0,1\}^{n}\rightarrow \{0,1\}} . Each subset of the shares K [ x ] ⊂ { S 1 , . . . , S n } {\displaystyle K[x]\subset \{S_{1},...,S_{n}\}} is labelled by a string x ∈ { 0 , 1 } n {\displaystyle x\in \{0,1\}^{n}} such that x i = 1 {\displaystyle x_{i}=1} if and only if S i ∈ K {\displaystyle S_{i}\in K} . Then we define f A {\displaystyle f_{\mathcal {A}}} to be such that f A ( x ) = 1 {\displaystyle f_{\mathcal {A}}(x)=1} if and only if K [ x ] ∈ A {\displaystyle K[x]\in {\mathcal {A}}} . In words, the function f A {\displaystyle f_{\mathcal {A}}} is 1 when given an authorized subset as input, and 0 otherwise. A basic result in the theory of secret sharing is that an access structure A {\displaystyle {\mathcal {A}}} can be realized in a secret sharing scheme if and only if f A {\displaystyle f_{\mathcal {A}}} is monotone. The size of a secret sharing scheme is defined as the total number of bits in the shares S i {\displaystyle S_{i}} . For monotone functions, there is an upper bound on the communication cost in CDS for any monotone function f {\displaystyle f} in terms of the size of any secret sharing scheme with access structure given by f {\displaystyle f} , C D S ϵ = 0 , δ = 0 ( f ) ≤ S h a r i n g S i z e ( f ) {\displaystyle CDS_{\epsilon =0,\delta =0}(f)\leq SharingSize(f)} For some concrete classes of secret sharing schemes, this relationship can be extended to general (non-monotone) Boolean functions. This leads to an upper bound on CDS cost in terms of the size of any span program that computes f {\displaystyle f} , C D S ϵ = 0 , δ = 0 ( f ) ≤ S P k ( f ) {\displaystyle CDS_{\epsilon =0,\delta =0}(f)\leq SP_{k}(f)} The class of problems with efficient (polynomial size) span program is the complexity class M o d k L {\displaystyle Mod_{k}L} , so problems in this class have efficient CDS protocols. === Sub-exponential upper bounds for all functions === Using a matching vector family based construction, it has been proven that ∀ f , C D S ϵ = 0 , δ = 0 ( f ) ≤ 2 O ( n log ⁡ n ) {\displaystyle \forall f,\,\,\,\,\,\,CDS_{\epsilon =0,\delta =0}(f)\leq 2^{O({\sqrt {n\log n}})}} . The technique for this proof is similar to one used to prove upper bounds on private information retrieval. This upper bound on CDS also leads to sub-exponential upper bounds on the size of a large class of secret sharing schemes. === Lower bounds from communication complexity === In a CDS protocol, the referee is given the inputs ( x , y ) {\displaystyle (x,y)} . This means it is not clear if the messages sent by Alice a

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  Digital Image Processing with Sound

  DIPS (Digital Image Processing with Sound) is a set of plug-in objects that handle real-time digital image processing in Max/MSP programming environment. Combining with the built-in objects of the environment, DIPS enables to program the interaction between audio and visual events with ease, and supports the realization of interactive multimedia art as well as interactive computer music. == Summary of Features == A plug-in software for Max/MSP (Max 5 and 6) More than 300 Max external objects and abstractions More than 90 OpenGL objects included More than 110 visual effect objects (Dfx library, Core Image Filters) A utility library for the easy of programming (prefix Dlib) A comprehensive set of sample patches, and a detailed tutorial Handling images & movie files (QuickTime, OpenGL) Render and move 3D models (OpenGL) Video signal input (QuickTime, video texture) Video input analysis: motion detect, face tracking (OpenCV, OpenGL) Importing 3D models (.obj file) Importing Quartz Composer files OpenGL Shading Language (GLSL) programming interface Easy integration of visual events using DIPSWindowMixer (OpenGL) == Description == DIPS is a free plug-in software (a set of external objects) for Max/MSP. It supports the designing of the interaction between sound and visual events in Max using Apple’s Core Image, OpenGL and OpenCV technologies, and consequently, provides a powerful and user-friendly programming environment for the creation of interactive multimedia art. DIPS can be used to detect a performer’s motions and to track positions of subtle details, such as the face, mouth, and eyes. It can also be used to measure the distance between objects and a Kinect sensor system, and offers powerful tools for realtime image processing of incoming video stream and stored movie files. In addition, it can be used to create complex images in a virtual three-dimensional space. The DIPS consists of a library of more than 300 Max external objects and abstractions, a comprehensive set of sample patches, and a detailed tutorial. Some of its strong points, in comparison with other similar plug-ins and software, are its ease of programming, power, and efficiency. The sample patches and tutorial contained in the installation package allows composers and artists who are interested in the creation of interactive art to realize sophisticated realtime video effects on a live video signal at their first practice. And because of its ease of programming, it is likely that one will soon acquire skills needed to create state-of-the-art interactive performance works, multimedia installations, interactive multimedia artworks, and Max VJ applications using DIPS. == History == Initially developed by Shu Matsuda in 1997, DIPS was a plug-in software for Max/FTS running on SGI Octane and O2 computers. Since 2000, it has been developed by the DIPS Development Group supervised by Takayuki Rai. Current active group members are Shu Matsuda, Yota Morimoto, Takuto Fukuda, and Keitaro Takahashi. Previously, Chikashi Miyama, Daichi Ando and Takayuki Hamano also contributed to its development. 2013 DIPS5 for Max (Mac OS X) 2009 DIPS4 for Max/MSP (Mac OS X) 2006 DIPS3 for Max/MSP (Mac OS X) 2003 DIPS2 for jMax4 (Mac OS X) 2002 DIPS for jMax2 (Mac OS X & Linux) 2000 DIPS for jMax (Linux)

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  Kerckhoffs's principle

  Kerckhoffs's principle (also called Kerckhoffs's desideratum, assumption, axiom, doctrine or law) of cryptography was stated by the Dutch cryptographer Auguste Kerckhoffs in the 19th century. The principle holds that a cryptosystem should be secure, even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge. This concept is widely embraced by cryptographers, in contrast to security through obscurity, which is not. Kerckhoffs's principle was phrased by the American mathematician Claude Shannon as "the enemy knows the system", i.e., "one ought to design systems under the assumption that the enemy will immediately gain full familiarity with them". In that form, it is called Shannon's maxim. Another formulation by American researcher and professor Steven M. Bellovin is: In other words—design your system assuming that your opponents know it in detail. (A former official at NSA's National Computer Security Center told me that the standard assumption there was that serial number 1 of any new device was delivered to the Kremlin.) == Origins == The invention of telegraphy radically changed military communications and increased the number of messages that needed to be protected from the enemy dramatically, leading to the development of field ciphers which had to be easy to use without large confidential codebooks prone to capture on the battlefield. It was this environment which led to the development of Kerckhoffs's requirements. Auguste Kerckhoffs was a professor of German language at Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) in Paris. In early 1883, Kerckhoffs's article, La Cryptographie Militaire, was published in two parts in the Journal of Military Science, in which he stated six design rules for military ciphers. Translated from French, they are: The system must be practically, if not mathematically, indecipherable; It should not require secrecy, and it should not be a problem if it falls into enemy hands; It must be possible to communicate and remember the key without using written notes, and correspondents must be able to change or modify it at will; It must be applicable to telegraph communications; It must be portable, and should not require several persons to handle or operate; Lastly, given the circumstances in which it is to be used, the system must be easy to use and should not be stressful to use or require its users to know and comply with a long list of rules. Some are no longer relevant given the ability of computers to perform complex encryption. The second rule, now known as Kerckhoffs's principle, is still critically important. == Explanation of the principle == Kerckhoffs viewed cryptography as a rival to, and a better alternative than, steganographic encoding, which was common in the nineteenth century for hiding the meaning of military messages. One problem with encoding schemes is that they rely on humanly-held secrets such as "dictionaries" which disclose for example, the secret meaning of words. Steganographic-like dictionaries, once revealed, permanently compromise a corresponding encoding system. Another problem is that the risk of exposure increases as the number of users holding the secrets increases. Nineteenth century cryptography, in contrast, used simple tables which provided for the transposition of alphanumeric characters, generally given row-column intersections which could be modified by keys which were generally short, numeric, and could be committed to human memory. The system was considered "indecipherable" because tables and keys do not convey meaning by themselves. Secret messages can be compromised only if a matching set of table, key, and message falls into enemy hands in a relevant time frame. Kerckhoffs viewed tactical messages as only having a few hours of relevance. Systems are not necessarily compromised, because their components (i.e. alphanumeric character tables and keys) can be easily changed. === Advantage of secret keys === Using secure cryptography is supposed to replace the difficult problem of keeping messages secure with a much more manageable one, keeping relatively small keys secure. A system that requires long-term secrecy for something as large and complex as the whole design of a cryptographic system obviously cannot achieve that goal. It only replaces one hard problem with another. However, if a system is secure even when the enemy knows everything except the key, then all that is needed is to manage keeping the keys secret. There are a large number of ways the internal details of a widely used system could be discovered. The most obvious is that someone could bribe, blackmail, or otherwise threaten staff or customers into explaining the system. In war, for example, one side will probably capture some equipment and people from the other side. Each side will also use spies to gather information. If a method involves software, someone could do memory dumps or run the software under the control of a debugger in order to understand the method. If hardware is being used, someone could buy or steal some of the hardware and build whatever programs or gadgets needed to test it. Hardware can also be dismantled so that the chip details can be examined under the microscope. === Maintaining security === A generalization some make from Kerckhoffs's principle is: "The fewer and simpler the secrets that one must keep to ensure system security, the easier it is to maintain system security." Bruce Schneier ties it in with a belief that all security systems must be designed to fail as gracefully as possible: Kerckhoffs's principle applies beyond codes and ciphers to security systems in general: every secret creates a potential failure point. Secrecy, in other words, is a prime cause of brittleness—and therefore something likely to make a system prone to catastrophic collapse. Conversely, openness provides ductility. Any security system depends crucially on keeping some things secret. However, Kerckhoffs's principle points out that the things kept secret ought to be those least costly to change if inadvertently disclosed. For example, a cryptographic algorithm may be implemented by hardware and software that is widely distributed among users. If security depends on keeping that secret, then disclosure leads to major logistic difficulties in developing, testing, and distributing implementations of a new algorithm – it is "brittle". On the other hand, if keeping the algorithm secret is not important, but only the keys used with the algorithm must be secret, then disclosure of the keys simply requires the simpler, less costly process of generating and distributing new keys. == Applications == In accordance with Kerckhoffs's principle, the majority of civilian cryptography makes use of publicly known algorithms. By contrast, ciphers used to protect classified government or military information are often kept secret (see Type 1 encryption). However, it should not be assumed that government/military ciphers must be kept secret to maintain security. It is possible that they are intended to be as cryptographically sound as public algorithms, and the decision to keep them secret is in keeping with a layered security posture. == Security through obscurity == It is moderately common for companies to keep the inner workings of a system secret. Some argue this "security by obscurity" makes the product safer and less vulnerable to attack. A counter-argument is that keeping the innards secret may improve security in the short term, but in the long run, only systems that have been published and analyzed should be trusted. Steven Bellovin and Randy Bush commented: Security Through Obscurity Considered Dangerous Hiding security vulnerabilities in algorithms, software, and/or hardware decreases the likelihood they will be repaired and increases the likelihood that they can and will be exploited. Discouraging or outlawing discussion of weaknesses and vulnerabilities is extremely dangerous and deleterious to the security of computer systems, the network, and its citizens. Open Discussion Encourages Better Security The long history of cryptography and cryptoanalysis has shown time and time again that open discussion and analysis of algorithms exposes weaknesses not thought of by the original authors, and thereby leads to better and more secure algorithms. As Kerckhoffs noted about cipher systems in 1883 [Kerc83], "Il faut qu'il n'exige pas le secret, et qu'il puisse sans inconvénient tomber entre les mains de l'ennemi." (Roughly, "the system must not require secrecy and must be able to be stolen by the enemy without causing trouble.")

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  Intranet

  An intranet is a computer network for sharing information, easier communication, collaboration tools, operational systems, and other computing services within an organization, usually to the exclusion of access by outsiders. The term is used in contrast to public networks, such as the Internet, but uses the same technology based on the Internet protocol suite. An organization-wide intranet can constitute a focal point of internal communication and collaboration, and provide a single starting point to access internal and external resources. In its simplest form, an intranet is established with the technologies for local area networks (LANs) and wide area networks (WANs). Many modern intranets have search engines, user profiles, blogs, mobile apps with notifications, and events planning within their infrastructure. An intranet is sometimes contrasted to an extranet. While an intranet is generally restricted to employees of the organization, extranets may also be accessed by customers, suppliers, or other approved parties. Extranets extend a private network onto the Internet with special provisions for authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA protocol). == Uses == Intranets are increasingly being used to deliver tools, such as for collaboration (to facilitate working in groups and teleconferencing) or corporate directories, sales and customer relationship management, or project management. Intranets are also used as corporate culture-change platforms. For example, a large number of employees using an intranet forum application to host a discussion about key issues could come up with new ideas related to management, productivity, quality, and other corporate issues. In large intranets, website traffic is often similar to public website traffic and can be better understood by using web metrics software to track overall activity. User surveys also improve intranet website effectiveness. Larger businesses allow users within their intranet to access public internet through firewall servers. They have the ability to screen incoming and outgoing messages, keeping security intact. When part of an intranet is made accessible to customers and others outside the business, it becomes part of an extranet. Businesses can send private messages through the public network using special encryption/decryption and other security safeguards to connect one part of their intranet to another. Intranet user-experience, editorial, and technology teams work together to produce in-house sites. Most commonly, intranets are managed by the communications, HR or CIO departments of large organizations, or some combination of these. Because of the scope and variety of content and the number of system interfaces, the intranets of many organizations are much more complex than their respective public websites. Intranets and the use of intranets are growing rapidly. According to the Intranet Design Annual 2007 from Nielsen Norman Group, the number of pages on participants' intranets averaged 200,000 over the years 2001 to 2003 and has grown to an average of 6 million pages over 2005–2007. == Benefits == Intranets can help users locate and view information faster and use applications relevant to their roles and responsibilities. With a web browser interface, users can access data held in any database the organization wants to make available at any time and — subject to security provisions — from anywhere within company workstations, increasing employees' ability to perform their jobs faster, more accurately, and with confidence that they have the right information. It also helps improve services provided to users. Using hypermedia and Web technology, Web publishing allows for the maintenance of and easy access to cumbersome corporate knowledge, such as employee manuals, benefits documents, company policies, business standards, news feeds, and even training, all of which can be accessed throughout a company using common Internet standards (Acrobat files, Flash files, CGI applications). Because each business unit can update the online copy of a document, the most recent version is usually available to employees using the intranet. Intranets are also used as a platform for developing and deploying applications to support business operations and decisions across the internetworked enterprise. Information is easily accessible to all authorised users, enabling collaboration. Being able to communicate in real-time through integrated third-party tools, such as an instant messenger, promotes the sharing of ideas and removes blockages to communication to help boost a business's productivity. Intranets can serve as powerful tools for communicating (such as through chat, email and/or blogs) within a given organization about vertically strategic initiatives that have a global reach throughout said organization. The type of information that can easily be conveyed is the purpose of the initiative and what it is aiming to achieve, who is driving it, results achieved to date, and whom to speak to for more information. By providing this information on the intranet, staff can keep up-to-date with the strategic focus of their organization. For example, when Nestlé had a number of food processing plants in Scandinavia, their central support system had to deal with a number of queries every day. When Nestlé decided to invest in an intranet, they quickly realized the savings. Gerry McGovern says that the savings from the reduction in query calls was substantially greater than the investment in the intranet. Users can view information and data via a web browser rather than maintaining physical documents such as procedure manuals, internal phone list and requisition forms. This can potentially save the business money on printing, duplicating documents, and the environment, as well as document maintenance overhead. For example, the HRM company PeopleSoft "derived significant cost savings by shifting HR processes to the intranet". McGovern goes on to say the manual cost of enrolling in benefits was found to be US$109.48 per enrollment. "Shifting this process to the intranet reduced the cost per enrollment to $21.79; a saving of 80 percent". Another company that saved money on expense reports was Cisco. "In 1996, Cisco processed 54,000 reports and the amount of dollars processed was USD19 million". Many companies dictate computer specifications which, in turn, may allow Intranet developers to write applications that only have to work on one browser such that there are no cross-browser compatibility issues. Being able to specifically address one's "viewer" is a great advantage. Since intranets are user-specific (requiring database/network authentication prior to access), users know exactly who they are interfacing with and can personalize their intranet based on role (job title, department) or individual ("Congratulations Jane, on your 3rd year with our company!"). Since "involvement in decision making" is one of the main drivers of employee engagement, offering tools (like forums or surveys) that foster peer-to-peer collaboration and employee participation can make employees feel more valued and involved. == Planning and creation == Most organizations devote considerable resources into the planning and implementation of their intranet as it is of strategic importance to the organization's success. Some of the planning would include topics such as determining the purpose and goals of the intranet, identifying persons or departments responsible for implementation and management and devising functional plans, page layouts and designs. The appropriate staff would also ensure that implementation schedules and phase-out of existing systems were organized, while defining and implementing security of the intranet and ensuring it lies within legal boundaries and other constraints. In order to produce a high-value end product, systems planners should determine the level of interactivity (e.g. wikis, on-line forms) desired. Planners may also consider whether the input of new data and updating of existing data is to be centrally controlled or devolve. These decisions sit alongside to the hardware and software considerations (like content management systems), participation issues (like good taste, harassment, confidentiality), and features to be supported. Intranets are often static sites; they are a shared drive, serving up centrally stored documents alongside internal articles or communications (often one-way communication). By leveraging firms which specialise in 'social' intranets, organisations are beginning to think of how their intranets can become a 'communication hub' for their entire team. The actual implementation would include steps such as securing senior management support and funding, conducting a business requirement analysis and identifying users' information needs. From the technical perspective, there would need to be a coordinated installation of the web server and user access netw

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  Data stream management system

  A data stream management system (DSMS) is a computer software system to manage continuous data streams. It is similar to a database management system (DBMS), which is, however, designed for static data in conventional databases. A DBMS also offers a flexible query processing so that the information needed can be expressed using queries. However, in contrast to a DBMS, a DSMS executes a continuous query that is not only performed once, but is permanently installed. Therefore, the query is continuously executed until it is explicitly uninstalled. Since most DSMS are data-driven, a continuous query produces new results as long as new data arrive at the system. This basic concept is similar to complex event processing so that both technologies are partially coalescing. == Functional principle == One important feature of a DSMS is the possibility to handle potentially infinite and rapidly changing data streams by offering flexible processing at the same time, although there are only limited resources such as main memory. The following table provides various principles of DSMS and compares them to traditional DBMS. == Processing and streaming models == One of the biggest challenges for a DSMS is to handle potentially infinite data streams using a fixed amount of memory and no random access to the data. There are different approaches to limit the amount of data in one pass, which can be divided into two classes. For the one hand, there are compression techniques that try to summarize the data and for the other hand there are window techniques that try to portion the data into (finite) parts. === Synopses === The idea behind compression techniques is to maintain only a synopsis of the data, but not all (raw) data points of the data stream. The algorithms range from selecting random data points called sampling to summarization using histograms, wavelets or sketching. One simple example of a compression is the continuous calculation of an average. Instead of memorizing each data point, the synopsis only holds the sum and the number of items. The average can be calculated by dividing the sum by the number. However, it should be mentioned that synopses cannot reflect the data accurately. Thus, a processing that is based on synopses may produce inaccurate results. === Windows === Instead of using synopses to compress the characteristics of the whole data streams, window techniques only look on a portion of the data. This approach is motivated by the idea that only the most recent data are relevant. Therefore, a window continuously cuts out a part of the data stream, e.g. the last ten data stream elements, and only considers these elements during the processing. There are different kinds of such windows like sliding windows that are similar to FIFO lists or tumbling windows that cut out disjoint parts. Furthermore, the windows can also be differentiated into element-based windows, e.g., to consider the last ten elements, or time-based windows, e.g., to consider the last ten seconds of data. There are also different approaches to implementing windows. There are, for example, approaches that use timestamps or time intervals for system-wide windows or buffer-based windows for each single processing step. Sliding-window query processing is also suitable to being implemented in parallel processors by exploiting parallelism between different windows and/or within each window extent. == Query processing == Since there are a lot of prototypes, there is no standardized architecture. However, most DSMS are based on the query processing in DBMS by using declarative languages to express queries, which are translated into a plan of operators. These plans can be optimized and executed. A query processing often consists of the following steps. === Formulation of continuous queries === The formulation of queries is mostly done using declarative languages like SQL in DBMS. Since there are no standardized query languages to express continuous queries, there are a lot of languages and variations. However, most of them are based on SQL, such as the Continuous Query Language (CQL), StreamSQL and ESP. There are also graphical approaches where each processing step is a box and the processing flow is expressed by arrows between the boxes. The language strongly depends on the processing model. For example, if windows are used for the processing, the definition of a window has to be expressed. In StreamSQL, a query with a sliding window for the last 10 elements looks like follows: This stream continuously calculates the average value of "price" of the last 10 tuples, but only considers those tuples whose prices are greater than 100.0. In the next step, the declarative query is translated into a logical query plan. A query plan is a directed graph where the nodes are operators and the edges describe the processing flow. Each operator in the query plan encapsulates the semantic of a specific operation, such as filtering or aggregation. In DSMSs that process relational data streams, the operators are equal or similar to the operators of the Relational algebra, so that there are operators for selection, projection, join, and set operations. This operator concept allows the very flexible and versatile processing of a DSMS. === Optimization of queries === The logical query plan can be optimized, which strongly depends on the streaming model. The basic concepts for optimizing continuous queries are equal to those from database systems. If there are relational data streams and the logical query plan is based on relational operators from the Relational algebra, a query optimizer can use the algebraic equivalences to optimize the plan. These may be, for example, to push selection operators down to the sources, because they are not so computationally intensive like join operators. Furthermore, there are also cost-based optimization techniques like in DBMS, where a query plan with the lowest costs is chosen from different equivalent query plans. One example is to choose the order of two successive join operators. In DBMS this decision is mostly done by certain statistics of the involved databases. But, since the data of a data streams is unknown in advance, there are no such statistics in a DSMS. However, it is possible to observe a data stream for a certain time to obtain some statistics. Using these statistics, the query can also be optimized later. So, in contrast to a DBMS, some DSMS allows to optimize the query even during runtime. Therefore, a DSMS needs some plan migration strategies to replace a running query plan with a new one. === Transformation of queries === Since a logical operator is only responsible for the semantics of an operation but does not consist of any algorithms, the logical query plan must be transformed into an executable counterpart. This is called a physical query plan. The distinction between a logical and a physical operator plan allows more than one implementation for the same logical operator. The join, for example, is logically the same, although it can be implemented by different algorithms like a Nested loop join or a Sort-merge join. Notice, these algorithms also strongly depend on the used stream and processing model. Finally, the query is available as a physical query plan. === Execution of queries === Since the physical query plan consists of executable algorithms, it can be directly executed. For this, the physical query plan is installed into the system. The bottom of the graph (of the query plan) is connected to the incoming sources, which can be everything like connectors to sensors. The top of the graph is connected to the outgoing sinks, which may be for example a visualization. Since most DSMSs are data-driven, a query is executed by pushing the incoming data elements from the source through the query plan to the sink. Each time when a data element passes an operator, the operator performs its specific operation on the data element and forwards the result to all successive operators. == Examples == AURORA, StreamBase Systems, Inc. Archived 23 March 2009 at the Wayback Machine Hortonworks DataFlow IBM Streams NIAGARA Query Engine NiagaraST: A Research Data Stream Management System at Portland State University Odysseus, an open source Java-based framework for Data Stream Management Systems Pipeline DB PIPES Archived 24 December 2016 at the Wayback Machine, webMethods Business Events QStream SAS Event Stream Processing SQLstream STREAM StreamGlobe StreamInsight TelegraphCQ WSO2 Stream Processor

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  Cone tracing

  Cone tracing and beam tracing are a derivative of the ray tracing algorithm that replaces rays, which have no thickness, with thick rays. == Principles == In ray tracing, rays are often modeled as geometric ray with no thickness to perform efficient geometric queries such as a ray-triangle intersection. From a physics of light transport point of view, however, this is an inaccurate model provided the pixel on the sensor plane has non-zero area. In the simplified pinhole camera optics model, the energy reaching the pixel comes from the integral of radiance from the solid angle by which the sensor pixel sees the scene through the pinhole at the focal plane. This yields the key notion of pixel footprint on surfaces or in the texture space, which is the back projection of the pixel on to the scene. Note that this approach can also represent a lens-based camera and thus depth of field effects, using a cone whose cross-section decreases from the lens size to zero at the focal plane, and then increases. Real optical system do not focus on exact points because of diffraction and imperfections. This can be modeled with a point spread function (PSF) weighted within a solid angle larger than the pixel. From a signal processing point of view, ignoring the point spread function and approximating the integral of radiance with a single, central sample (through a ray with no thickness) can lead to strong aliasing because the "projected geometric signal" has very high frequencies exceeding the Nyquist-Shannon maximal frequency that can be represented using the uniform pixel sampling rate. The physically based image formation model can be approximated by the convolution with the point spread function assuming the function is shift-invariant and linear. In practice, techniques such as multisample anti-aliasing estimate this cone-based model by oversampling the signal and then performing a convolution (the reconstruction filter). The backprojected cone footprint onto the scene can also be used to directly pre-filter the geometry and textures of the scene. Note that contrary to intuition, the reconstruction filter should not be the pixel footprint (as the pinhole camera model would suggest), since a box filter has poor spectral properties. Conversely, the ideal sinc function is not practical, having infinite support with possibly negative values which often creates ringing artifacts due to the Gibbs phenomenon. A Gaussian or a Lanczos filter are considered good compromises. == Computer graphics models == Cone and Beam early papers rely on different simplifications: the first considers a circular section and treats the intersection with various possible shapes. The second treats an accurate pyramidal beam through the pixel and along a complex path, but it only works for polyhedrical shapes. Cone tracing solves certain problems related to sampling and aliasing, which can plague conventional ray tracing. However, cone tracing creates a host of problems of its own. For example, just intersecting a cone with scene geometry leads to an enormous variety of possible results. For this reason, cone tracing has remained mostly unpopular. In recent years, increases in computer speed have made Monte Carlo algorithms like distributed ray tracing - i.e. stochastic explicit integration of the pixel - much more used than cone tracing because the results are exact provided enough samples are used. But the convergence is so slow that even in the context of off-line rendering a huge amount of time can be required to avoid noise. Differential cone-tracing, considering a differential angular neighborhood around a ray, avoids the complexity of exact geometry intersection but requires a LOD representation of the geometry and appearance of the objects. MIPmapping is an approximation of it limited to the integration of the surface texture within a cone footprint. Differential ray-tracing extends it to textured surfaces viewed through complex paths of cones reflected or refracted by curved surfaces. Raymarching methods over signed distance fields (SDFs) naturally allow easy use of cone-like tracing, at zero additional cost to the tracing, and both speeds up tracing and improves quality. Voxel cone tracing is a real-time algorithm that uses a hierarchical voxel representation of scene geometry, such as a sparse voxel octree, to support fast cone tracing for indirect illumination. This approach allows for the approximation of effects like glossy reflections and ambient occlusion at interactive framerates without the need for precomputation.

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  Cryptographic multilinear map

  A cryptographic n {\displaystyle n} -multilinear map is a kind of multilinear map, that is, a function e : G 1 × ⋯ × G n → G T {\displaystyle e:G_{1}\times \cdots \times G_{n}\rightarrow G_{T}} such that for any integers a 1 , … , a n {\displaystyle a_{1},\ldots ,a_{n}} and elements g i ∈ G i {\displaystyle g_{i}\in G_{i}} , e ( g 1 a 1 , … , g n a n ) = e ( g 1 , … , g n ) ∏ i = 1 n a i {\displaystyle e(g_{1}^{a_{1}},\ldots ,g_{n}^{a_{n}})=e(g_{1},\ldots ,g_{n})^{\prod _{i=1}^{n}a_{i}}} , and which in addition is efficiently computable and satisfies some security properties. It has several applications on cryptography, as key exchange protocols, identity-based encryption, and broadcast encryption. There exist constructions of cryptographic 2-multilinear maps, known as bilinear maps, however, the problem of constructing such multilinear maps for n > 2 {\displaystyle n>2} seems much more difficult and the security of the proposed candidates is still unclear. == Definition == === For n = 2 === In this case, multilinear maps are mostly known as bilinear maps or pairings, and they are usually defined as follows: Let G 1 , G 2 {\displaystyle G_{1},G_{2}} be two additive cyclic groups of prime order q {\displaystyle q} , and G T {\displaystyle G_{T}} another cyclic group of order q {\displaystyle q} written multiplicatively. A pairing is a map: e : G 1 × G 2 → G T {\displaystyle e:G_{1}\times G_{2}\rightarrow G_{T}} , which satisfies the following properties: Bilinearity ∀ a , b ∈ F q ∗ , ∀ P ∈ G 1 , Q ∈ G 2 : e ( a P , b Q ) = e ( P , Q ) a b {\displaystyle \forall a,b\in F_{q}^{},\ \forall P\in G_{1},Q\in G_{2}:\ e(aP,bQ)=e(P,Q)^{ab}} Non-degeneracy If g 1 {\displaystyle g_{1}} and g 2 {\displaystyle g_{2}} are generators of G 1 {\displaystyle G_{1}} and G 2 {\displaystyle G_{2}} , respectively, then e ( g 1 , g 2 ) {\displaystyle e(g_{1},g_{2})} is a generator of G T {\displaystyle G_{T}} . Computability There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e {\displaystyle e} . In addition, for security purposes, the discrete logarithm problem is required to be hard in both G 1 {\displaystyle G_{1}} and G 2 {\displaystyle G_{2}} . === General case (for any n) === We say that a map e : G 1 × ⋯ × G n → G T {\displaystyle e:G_{1}\times \cdots \times G_{n}\rightarrow G_{T}} is an n {\displaystyle n} -multilinear map if it satisfies the following properties: All G i {\displaystyle G_{i}} (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n {\displaystyle 1\leq i\leq n} ) and G T {\displaystyle G_{T}} are groups of same order; if a 1 , … , a n ∈ Z {\displaystyle a_{1},\ldots ,a_{n}\in \mathbb {Z} } and ( g 1 , … , g n ) ∈ G 1 × ⋯ × G n {\displaystyle (g_{1},\ldots ,g_{n})\in G_{1}\times \cdots \times G_{n}} , then e ( g 1 a 1 , … , g n a n ) = e ( g 1 , … , g n ) ∏ i = 1 n a i {\displaystyle e(g_{1}^{a_{1}},\ldots ,g_{n}^{a_{n}})=e(g_{1},\ldots ,g_{n})^{\prod _{i=1}^{n}a_{i}}} ; the map is non-degenerate in the sense that if g 1 , … , g n {\displaystyle g_{1},\ldots ,g_{n}} are generators of G 1 , … , G n {\displaystyle G_{1},\ldots ,G_{n}} , respectively, then e ( g 1 , … , g n ) {\displaystyle e(g_{1},\ldots ,g_{n})} is a generator of G T {\displaystyle G_{T}} There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e {\displaystyle e} . In addition, for security purposes, the discrete logarithm problem is required to be hard in G 1 , … , G n {\displaystyle G_{1},\ldots ,G_{n}} . === Candidates === All the candidates multilinear maps are actually slightly generalizations of multilinear maps known as graded-encoding systems, since they allow the map e {\displaystyle e} to be applied partially: instead of being applied in all the n {\displaystyle n} values at once, which would produce a value in the target set G T {\displaystyle G_{T}} , it is possible to apply e {\displaystyle e} to some values, which generates values in intermediate target sets. For example, for n = 3 {\displaystyle n=3} , it is possible to do y = e ( g 2 , g 3 ) ∈ G T 2 {\displaystyle y=e(g_{2},g_{3})\in G_{T_{2}}} then e ( g 1 , y ) ∈ G T {\displaystyle e(g_{1},y)\in G_{T}} . The three main candidates are GGH13, which is based on ideals of polynomial rings; CLT13, which is based approximate GCD problem and works over integers, hence, it is supposed to be easier to understand than GGH13 multilinear map; and GGH15, which is based on graphs.

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  Branch number

  In cryptography, the branch number is a numerical value that characterizes the amount of diffusion introduced by a vectorial Boolean function F that maps an input vector a to output vector F ( a ) {\displaystyle F(a)} . For the (usual) case of a linear F the value of the differential branch number is produced by: applying nonzero values of a (i.e., values that have at least one non-zero component of the vector) to the input of F; calculating for each input value a the Hamming weight W {\displaystyle W} (number of nonzero components), and adding weights W ( a ) {\displaystyle W(a)} and W ( F ( a ) ) {\displaystyle W(F(a))} together; selecting the smallest combined weight across for all nonzero input values: B d ( F ) = min a ≠ 0 ( W ( a ) + W ( F ( a ) ) ) {\displaystyle B_{d}(F)={\underset {a\neq 0}{\min }}(W(a)+W(F(a)))} . If both a and F ( a ) {\displaystyle F(a)} have s components, the result is obviously limited on the high side by the value s + 1 {\displaystyle s+1} (this "perfect" result is achieved when any single nonzero component in a makes all components of F ( a ) {\displaystyle F(a)} to be non-zero). A high branch number suggests higher resistance to the differential cryptanalysis: the small variations of input will produce large changes on the output and in order to obtain small variations of the output, large changes of the input value will be required. The term was introduced by Daemen and Rijmen in early 2000s and quickly became a typical tool to assess the diffusion properties of the transformations. == Mathematics == The branch number concept is not limited to the linear transformations, Daemen and Rijmen provided two general metrics: differential branch number, where the minimum is obtained over inputs of F that are constructed by independently sweeping all the values of two nonzero and unequal vectors a, b ( ⊕ {\displaystyle \oplus } is a component-by-component exclusive-or): B d ( F ) = min a ≠ b ( W ( a ⊕ b ) + W ( F ( a ) ⊕ F ( b ) ) {\displaystyle B_{d}(F)={\underset {a\neq b}{\min }}(W(a\oplus b)+W(F(a)\oplus F(b))} ; for linear branch number, the independent candidates α {\displaystyle \alpha } and β {\displaystyle \beta } are independently swept; they should be nonzero and correlated with respect to F (the L A T ( α , β ) {\displaystyle LAT(\alpha ,\beta )} coefficient of the linear approximation table of F should be nonzero): B l ( F ) = min α ≠ 0 , β , L A T ( α , β ) ≠ 0 ( W ( α ) + W ( β ) ) {\displaystyle B_{l}(F)={\underset {\alpha \neq 0,\beta ,LAT(\alpha ,\beta )\neq 0}{\min }}(W(\alpha )+W(\beta ))} .

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  WYSIWYS

  In cryptography, What You See Is What You Sign (WYSIWYS) is a property of digital signature systems that ensures the semantic content of signed messages can not be changed, either by accident or intent. == Mechanism of WYSIWYS == When digitally signing a document, the integrity of the signature relies not just on the soundness of the digital signature algorithms that are used, but also on the security of the computing platform used to sign the document. The WYSIWYS property of digital signature systems aims to tackle this problem by defining a desirable property that the visual representation of a digital document should be consistent across computing systems, particularly at the points of digital signature and digital signature verification. It is relatively easy to change the interpretation of a digital document by implementing changes on the computer system where the document is being processed, and the greater the semantic distance, the easier it gets. From a semantic perspective this creates uncertainty about what exactly has been signed. WYSIWYS is a property of a digital signature system that ensures that the semantic interpretation of a digitally signed message cannot be changed, either by accident or by intent. This property also ensures that a digital document to be signed can not contain hidden semantic content that can be revealed after the signature has been applied. Though a WYSIWYS implementation is only as secure as the computing platform it is running on, various methods have been proposed to make WYSIWYS more robust. The term WYSIWYS was coined by Peter Landrock and Torben Pedersen to describe some of the principles in delivering secure and legally binding digital signatures for Pan-European projects.

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  Pythia (machine learning)

  Pythia is an ancient text restoration model that recovers missing characters from damaged text input using deep neural networks. It was created by Yannis Assael, Thea Sommerschield, and Jonathan Prag, researchers from Google DeepMind and the University of Oxford. To study the society and the history of ancient civilisations, ancient history relies on disciplines such as epigraphy, the study of ancient inscribed texts. Hundreds of thousands of these texts, known as inscriptions, have survived to our day, but are often damaged over the centuries. Illegible parts of the text must then be restored by specialists, called epigraphists, in order to extract meaningful information from the text and use it to expand our knowledge of the context in which the text was written. Pythia takes as input the damaged text, and is trained to return hypothesised restorations of ancient Greek inscriptions, working as an assistive aid for ancient historians. Its neural network architecture works at both the character- and word-level, thereby effectively handling long-term context information, and dealing efficiently with incomplete word representations. Pythia is applicable to any discipline dealing with ancient texts (philology, papyrology, codicology) and can work in any language (ancient or modern).

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  Superincreasing sequence

  In mathematics, a sequence of positive real numbers ( s 1 , s 2 , . . . ) {\displaystyle (s_{1},s_{2},...)} is called superincreasing if every element of the sequence is greater than the sum of all previous elements in the sequence. Formally, this condition can be written as s n + 1 > ∑ j = 1 n s j {\displaystyle s_{n+1}>\sum _{j=1}^{n}s_{j}} for all n ≥ 1. == Program == The following Python source code tests a sequence of numbers to determine if it is superincreasing: This produces the following output: Sum: 0 Element: 1 Sum: 1 Element: 3 Sum: 4 Element: 6 Sum: 10 Element: 13 Sum: 23 Element: 27 Sum: 50 Element: 52 Is it a superincreasing sequence? True == Examples == (1, 3, 6, 13, 27, 52) is a superincreasing sequence, but (1, 3, 4, 9, 15, 25) is not. The series a^x for a>=2 == Properties == Multiplying a superincreasing sequence by a positive real constant keeps it superincreasing.

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  Backdoor (computing)

  A backdoor is a typically covert method of bypassing normal authentication or encryption in a computer, product, embedded device (e.g. a home router), or its embodiment (e.g. part of a cryptosystem, algorithm, chipset, or even a "homunculus computer"—a tiny computer-within-a-computer such as that found in Intel's AMT technology). Backdoors are most often used for securing remote access to a computer, or obtaining access to plaintext in cryptosystems. From there it may be used to gain access to privileged information like passwords, corrupt or delete data on hard drives, or transfer information within compromised networks. In the United States, the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act forces internet providers to provide backdoors for government authorities. In 2024, the U.S. government realized that China had been tapping communications in the U.S. using that infrastructure for months, or perhaps longer; China recorded presidential candidate campaign office phone calls—including employees of the then-vice president of the nation, and of the candidates themselves. A backdoor may take the form of a hidden part of a program, a separate program (e.g. Back Orifice may subvert the system through a rootkit), code in the firmware of the hardware, or parts of an operating system such as Windows, for example, device drivers. Trojan horses can be used to create vulnerabilities in a device. A Trojan horse may appear to be an entirely legitimate program, but when executed, it triggers an activity that may install a backdoor. Although some are secretly installed, other backdoors are deliberate and widely known. These kinds of backdoors have "legitimate" uses such as providing the manufacturer with a way to restore user passwords. Many systems that store information within the cloud fail to create accurate security measures. If many systems are connected within the cloud, hackers can gain access to all other platforms through the most vulnerable system. Default passwords (or other default credentials) can function as backdoors if they are not changed by the user. Some debugging features can also act as backdoors if they are not removed in the release version. In 1993, the United States government attempted to deploy an encryption system, the Clipper chip, with an explicit backdoor for law enforcement and national security access. The chip was unsuccessful. Recent proposals to counter backdoors include creating a database of backdoors' triggers and then using neural networks to detect them. == Overview == The threat of backdoors surfaced when multiuser and networked operating systems became widely adopted. Petersen and Turn discussed computer subversion in a paper published in the proceedings of the 1967 AFIPS Conference. They noted a class of active infiltration attacks that use "trapdoor" entry points into the system to bypass security facilities and permit direct access to data. The use of the word trapdoor here clearly coincides with more recent definitions of a backdoor. However, since the advent of public key cryptography the term trapdoor has acquired a different meaning (see: Trapdoor function), and thus the term "backdoor" is now preferred, only after the term trapdoor went out of use. More generally, such security breaches were discussed at length in a RAND Corporation task force report published under DARPA sponsorship by J.P. Anderson and D.J. Edwards in 1970. While initially targeting the computer vision domain, backdoor attacks have expanded to encompass various other domains, including text, audio, ML-based computer-aided design, and ML-based wireless signal classification. Additionally, vulnerabilities in backdoors have been demonstrated in deep generative models, reinforcement learning (e.g., AI GO), and deep graph models. These broad-ranging potential risks have prompted concerns from national security agencies regarding their potentially disastrous consequences. A backdoor in a login system might take the form of a hard coded user and password combination which gives access to the system. An example of this sort of backdoor was used as a plot device in the 1983 film WarGames, in which the architect of the "WOPR" computer system had inserted a hardcoded password-less account which gave the user access to the system, and to undocumented parts of the system (in particular, a video game-like simulation mode and direct interaction with the artificial intelligence). Although the number of backdoors in systems using proprietary software (software whose source code is not publicly available) is not widely credited, they are nevertheless frequently exposed. Programmers have even succeeded in secretly installing large amounts of benign code as Easter eggs in programs, although such cases may involve official forbearance, if not actual permission. == Examples == === Worms === Many computer worms, such as Sobig and Mydoom, install a backdoor on the affected computer (generally a PC on broadband running Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Outlook). Such backdoors appear to be installed so that spammers can send junk e-mail from the infected machines. Others, such as the Sony/BMG rootkit, placed secretly on millions of music CDs through late 2005, are intended as DRM measures—and, in that case, as data-gathering agents, since both surreptitious programs they installed routinely contacted central servers. A sophisticated attempt to plant a backdoor in the Linux kernel, exposed in November 2003, added a small and subtle code change by subverting the revision control system. In this case, a two-line change appeared to check root access permissions of a caller to the sys_wait4 function, but because it used assignment = instead of equality checking ==, it actually granted permissions to the system. This difference is easily overlooked, and could even be interpreted as an accidental typographical error, rather than an intentional attack. In January 2014, a backdoor was discovered in certain Samsung Android products, like the Galaxy devices. The Samsung proprietary Android versions are fitted with a backdoor that provides remote access to the data stored on the device. In particular, the Samsung Android software that is in charge of handling the communications with the modem, using the Samsung IPC protocol, implements a class of requests known as remote file server (RFS) commands, that allows the backdoor operator to perform via modem remote I/O operations on the device hard disk or other storage. As the modem is running Samsung proprietary Android software, it is likely that it offers over-the-air remote control that could then be used to issue the RFS commands and thus to access the file system on the device. === Object code backdoors === Harder to detect backdoors involve modifying object code, rather than source code—object code is much harder to inspect, as it is designed to be machine-readable, not human-readable. These backdoors can be inserted either directly in the on-disk object code, or inserted at some point during compilation, assembly linking, or loading—in the latter case the backdoor never appears on disk, only in memory. Object code backdoors are difficult to detect by inspection of the object code, but are easily detected by simply checking for changes (differences), notably in length or in checksum, and in some cases can be detected or analyzed by disassembling the object code. Further, object code backdoors can be removed (assuming source code is available) by simply recompiling from source on a trusted system. Thus for such backdoors to avoid detection, all extant copies of a binary must be subverted, and any validation checksums must also be compromised, and source must be unavailable, to prevent recompilation. Alternatively, these other tools (length checks, diff, checksumming, disassemblers) can themselves be compromised to conceal the backdoor, for example detecting that the subverted binary is being checksummed and returning the expected value, not the actual value. To conceal these further subversions, the tools must also conceal the changes in themselves—for example, a subverted checksummer must also detect if it is checksumming itself (or other subverted tools) and return false values. This leads to extensive changes in the system and tools being needed to conceal a single change. As object code can be regenerated by recompiling (reassembling, relinking) the original source code, making a persistent object code backdoor (without modifying source code) requires subverting the compiler itself—so that when it detects that it is compiling the program under attack it inserts the backdoor—or alternatively the assembler, linker, or loader. As this requires subverting the compiler, this in turn can be fixed by recompiling the compiler, removing the backdoor insertion code. This defense can in turn be subverted by putting a source meta-backdoor in the compiler, so that when it detects that it is compiling itself

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