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Spatial anti-aliasing

In digital signal processing, spatial anti-aliasing is a technique for minimizing the distortion artifacts (aliasing) when representing a high-resolution image at a lower resolution. Anti-aliasing is used in digital photography, computer graphics, digital audio, and many other applications. Anti-aliasing means removing signal components that have a higher frequency than is able to be properly resolved by the recording (or sampling) device. This removal is done before (re)sampling at a lower resolution. When sampling is performed without removing this part of the signal, it causes undesirable artifacts such as black-and-white noise. In signal acquisition and audio, anti-aliasing is often done using an analog anti-aliasing filter to remove the out-of-band component of the input signal prior to sampling with an analog-to-digital converter. In digital photography, optical anti-aliasing filters made of birefringent materials smooth the signal in the spatial optical domain. The anti-aliasing filter essentially blurs the image slightly in order to reduce the resolution to or below that achievable by the digital sensor (the larger the pixel pitch, the lower the achievable resolution at the sensor level). == Examples == In computer graphics, anti-aliasing improves the appearance of "jagged" polygon edges, or "jaggies", so they are smoothed out on the screen. However, it incurs a performance cost for the graphics card and uses more video memory. The level of anti-aliasing determines how smooth polygon edges are (and how much video memory it consumes). Near the top of an image with a receding checker-board pattern, the image is difficult to recognise and often not considered aesthetically pleasing. In contrast, when anti-aliased the checker-board near the top blends into grey, which is usually the desired effect when the resolution is insufficient to show the detail. Even near the bottom of the image, the edges appear much smoother in the anti-aliased image. Multiple methods exist, including the sinc filter, which is considered a better anti-aliasing algorithm. When magnified, it can be seen how anti-aliasing interpolates the brightness of the pixels at the boundaries to produce grey pixels since the space is occupied by both black and white tiles. These help make the sinc filter antialiased image appear much smoother than the original. In a simple diamond image, anti-aliasing blends the boundary pixels; this reduces the aesthetically jarring effect of the sharp, step-like boundaries that appear in the aliased graphic. Anti-aliasing is often applied in rendering text on a computer screen, to suggest smooth contours that better emulate the appearance of text produced by conventional ink-and-paper printing. Particularly with fonts displayed on typical LCD screens, it is common to use subpixel rendering techniques like ClearType. Sub-pixel rendering requires special colour-balanced anti-aliasing filters to turn what would be severe colour distortion into barely-noticeable colour fringes. Equivalent results can be had by making individual sub-pixels addressable as if they were full pixels, and supplying a hardware-based anti-aliasing filter as is done in the OLPC XO-1 laptop's display controller. Pixel geometry affects all of this, whether the anti-aliasing and sub-pixel addressing are done in software or hardware. == Simplest approach to anti-aliasing == The most basic approach to anti-aliasing a pixel is determining what percentage of the pixel is occupied by a given region in the vector graphic - in this case a pixel-sized square, possibly transposed over several pixels - and using that percentage as the colour. A Python program producing a basic plot of a single, white-on-black anti-aliased point using the method is as follows: This method is generally best suited for simple graphics, such as basic lines or curves, and applications that would otherwise have to convert absolute coordinates to pixel-constrained coordinates, such as 3D graphics. It is a fairly fast function, but it is relatively low-quality, and gets slower as the complexity of the shape increases. For purposes requiring very high-quality graphics or very complex vector shapes, this will probably not be the best approach. Note: The plot_antialiased_point routine above cannot blindly set the colour value to the percent calculated. It must add the new value to the existing value at that location up to a maximum of 1. Otherwise, the brightness of each pixel will be equal to the darkest value calculated in time for that location which produces a very bad result. For example, if one point sets a brightness level of 0.90 for a given pixel and another point calculated later barely touches that pixel and has a brightness of 0.05, the final value set for that pixel should be 0.95, not 0.05. For more sophisticated shapes, the algorithm may be generalized as rendering the shape to a pixel grid with higher resolution than the target display surface (usually a multiple that is a power of 2 to reduce distortion), then using bicubic interpolation to determine the average intensity of each real pixel on the display surface. == Signal processing approach to anti-aliasing == In this approach, the ideal image is regarded as a signal. The image displayed on the screen is taken as samples, at each (x,y) pixel position, of a filtered version of the signal. Ideally, one would understand how the human brain would process the original signal, and provide an on-screen image that will yield the most similar response by the brain. The most widely accepted analytic tool for such problems is the Fourier transform; this decomposes a signal into basis functions of different frequencies, known as frequency components, and gives us the amplitude of each frequency component in the signal. The waves are of the form: cos ⁡ ( 2 j π x ) cos ⁡ ( 2 k π y ) {\displaystyle \ \cos(2j\pi x)\cos(2k\pi y)} where j and k are arbitrary non-negative integers. There are also frequency components involving the sine functions in one or both dimensions, but for the purpose of this discussion, the cosine will suffice. The numbers j and k together are the frequency of the component: j is the frequency in the x direction, and k is the frequency in the y direction. The goal of an anti-aliasing filter is to greatly reduce frequencies above a certain limit, known as the Nyquist frequency, so that the signal will be accurately represented by its samples, or nearly so, in accordance with the sampling theorem; there are many different choices of detailed algorithm, with different filter transfer functions. Current knowledge of human visual perception is not sufficient, in general, to say what approach will look best. == Two dimensional considerations == The previous discussion assumes that the rectangular mesh sampling is the dominant part of the problem. The filter usually considered optimal is not rotationally symmetrical, as shown in this first figure; this is because the data is sampled on a square lattice, not using a continuous image. This sampling pattern is the justification for doing signal processing along each axis, as it is traditionally done on one dimensional data. Lanczos resampling is based on convolution of the data with a discrete representation of the sinc function. If the resolution is not limited by the rectangular sampling rate of either the source or target image, then one should ideally use rotationally symmetrical filter or interpolation functions, as though the data were a two dimensional function of continuous x and y. The sinc function of the radius has too long a tail to make a good filter (it is not even square-integrable). A more appropriate analog to the one-dimensional sinc is the two-dimensional Airy disc amplitude, the 2D Fourier transform of a circular region in 2D frequency space, as opposed to a square region. One might consider a Gaussian plus enough of its second derivative to flatten the top (in the frequency domain) or sharpen it up (in the spatial domain), as shown. Functions based on the Gaussian function are natural choices, because convolution with a Gaussian gives another Gaussian whether applied to x and y or to the radius. Similarly to wavelets, another of its properties is that it is halfway between being localized in the configuration (x and y) and in the spectral (j and k) representation. As an interpolation function, a Gaussian alone seems too spread out to preserve the maximum possible detail, and thus the second derivative is added. As an example, when printing a photographic negative with plentiful processing capability and on a printer with a hexagonal pattern, there is no reason to use sinc function interpolation. Such interpolation would treat diagonal lines differently from horizontal and vertical lines, which is like a weak form of aliasing. == Practical real-time anti-aliasing approximations == There are only a handful of primitives used at the lowest level in a real-time rend
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Malleability (cryptography)

Malleability is a property of some cryptographic algorithms. An encryption algorithm is said to be malleable if it is possible to transform a ciphertext into another ciphertext which decrypts to a related plaintext. That is, given an encryption of a plaintext m {\displaystyle m} , it is possible to generate another ciphertext which decrypts to f ( m ) {\displaystyle f(m)} , for a known function f {\displaystyle f} , without necessarily knowing or learning m {\displaystyle m} . Malleability is often an undesirable property in a general-purpose cryptosystem, since it allows an attacker to modify the contents of a message. For example, suppose that a bank uses a stream cipher to hide its financial information, and a user sends an encrypted message containing, say, "TRANSFER $0000100.00 TO ACCOUNT #199." If an attacker can modify the message on the wire, and can guess the format of the unencrypted message, the attacker could change the amount of the transaction, or the recipient of the funds, e.g. "TRANSFER $0100000.00 TO ACCOUNT #227". Malleability does not refer to the attacker's ability to read the encrypted message. Both before and after tampering, the attacker cannot read the encrypted message. On the other hand, some cryptosystems are malleable by design. In other words, in some circumstances it may be viewed as a feature that anyone can transform an encryption of m {\displaystyle m} into a valid encryption of f ( m ) {\displaystyle f(m)} (for some restricted class of functions f {\displaystyle f} ) without necessarily learning m {\displaystyle m} . Such schemes are known as homomorphic encryption schemes. A cryptosystem may be semantically secure against chosen-plaintext attacks or even non-adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA1) while still being malleable. However, security against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA2) is equivalent to non-malleability. == Example malleable cryptosystems == In a stream cipher, the ciphertext is produced by taking the exclusive or of the plaintext and a pseudorandom stream based on a secret key k {\displaystyle k} , as E ( m ) = m ⊕ S ( k ) {\displaystyle E(m)=m\oplus S(k)} . An adversary can construct an encryption of m ⊕ t {\displaystyle m\oplus t} for any t {\displaystyle t} , as E ( m ) ⊕ t = m ⊕ t ⊕ S ( k ) = E ( m ⊕ t ) {\displaystyle E(m)\oplus t=m\oplus t\oplus S(k)=E(m\oplus t)} . In the RSA cryptosystem, a plaintext m {\displaystyle m} is encrypted as E ( m ) = m e mod n {\displaystyle E(m)=m^{e}{\bmod {n}}} , where ( e , n ) {\displaystyle (e,n)} is the public key. Given such a ciphertext, an adversary can construct an encryption of m t {\displaystyle mt} for any t {\displaystyle t} , as E ( m ) ⋅ t e mod n = ( m t ) e mod n = E ( m t ) {\textstyle E(m)\cdot t^{e}{\bmod {n}}=(mt)^{e}{\bmod {n}}=E(mt)} . For this reason, RSA is commonly used together with padding methods such as OAEP or PKCS1. In the ElGamal cryptosystem, a plaintext m {\displaystyle m} is encrypted as E ( m ) = ( g b , m A b ) {\displaystyle E(m)=(g^{b},mA^{b})} , where ( g , A ) {\displaystyle (g,A)} is the public key. Given such a ciphertext ( c 1 , c 2 ) {\displaystyle (c_{1},c_{2})} , an adversary can compute ( c 1 , t ⋅ c 2 ) {\displaystyle (c_{1},t\cdot c_{2})} , which is a valid encryption of t m {\displaystyle tm} , for any t {\displaystyle t} . In contrast, the Cramer-Shoup system (which is based on ElGamal) is not malleable. In the Paillier, ElGamal, and RSA cryptosystems, it is also possible to combine several ciphertexts together in a useful way to produce a related ciphertext. In Paillier, given only the public key and an encryption of m 1 {\displaystyle m_{1}} and m 2 {\displaystyle m_{2}} , one can compute a valid encryption of their sum m 1 + m 2 {\displaystyle m_{1}+m_{2}} . In ElGamal and in RSA, one can combine encryptions of m 1 {\displaystyle m_{1}} and m 2 {\displaystyle m_{2}} to obtain a valid encryption of their product m 1 m 2 {\displaystyle m_{1}m_{2}} . Block ciphers in the cipher block chaining mode of operation, for example, are partly malleable: flipping a bit in a ciphertext block will completely mangle the plaintext it decrypts to, but will result in the same bit being flipped in the plaintext of the next block. This allows an attacker to 'sacrifice' one block of plaintext in order to change some data in the next one, possibly managing to maliciously alter the message. This is essentially the core idea of the padding oracle attack on CBC, which allows the attacker to decrypt almost an entire ciphertext without knowing the key. For this and many other reasons, a message authentication code is required to guard against any method of tampering. == Complete non-malleability == Fischlin, in 2005, defined the notion of complete non-malleability as the ability of the system to remain non-malleable while giving the adversary additional power to choose a new public key which could be a function of the original public key. In other words, the adversary shouldn't be able to come up with a ciphertext whose underlying plaintext is related to the original message through a relation that also takes public keys into account.
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Kruskal count

The Kruskal count (also known as Kruskal's principle, Dynkin–Kruskal count, Dynkin's counting trick, Dynkin's card trick, coupling card trick or shift coupling) is a probabilistic concept originally demonstrated by the Russian mathematician Evgenii Borisovich Dynkin in the 1950s or 1960s discussing coupling effects and rediscovered as a card trick by the American mathematician Martin David Kruskal in the early 1970s as a side-product while working on another problem. It was published by Kruskal's friend Martin Gardner and magician Karl Fulves in 1975. This is related to a similar trick published by magician Alexander F. Kraus in 1957 as Sum total and later called Kraus principle. Besides uses as a card trick, the underlying phenomenon has applications in cryptography, code breaking, software tamper protection, code self-synchronization, control-flow resynchronization, design of variable-length codes and variable-length instruction sets, web navigation, object alignment, and others. == Card trick == The trick is performed with cards, but is more a magical-looking effect than a conventional magic trick. The magician has no access to the cards, which are manipulated by members of the audience. Thus sleight of hand is not possible. Rather the effect is based on the mathematical fact that the output of a Markov chain, under certain conditions, is typically independent of the input. A simplified version using the hands of a clock performed by David Copperfield is as follows. A volunteer picks a number from one to twelve and does not reveal it to the magician. The volunteer is instructed to start from 12 on the clock and move clockwise by a number of spaces equal to the number of letters that the chosen number has when spelled out. This is then repeated, moving by the number of letters in the new number. The output after three or more moves does not depend on the initially chosen number and therefore the magician can predict it.
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Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle

The Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) is the approach Microsoft uses to integrate security into DevOps processes (sometimes called a DevSecOps approach). You can use this SDL guidance and documentation to adapt this approach and practices to your organization. == Overview == The practices outlined in the SDL approach are applicable to all types of software development and across all platforms, ranging from traditional waterfall methodologies to modern DevOps approaches. They can generally be applied to the following: Software – whether you are developing software code for firmware, AI applications, operating systems, drivers, IoT Devices, mobile device apps, web services, plug-ins or applets, hardware microcode, low-code/no-code apps, or other software formats. Note that most practices in the SDL are applicable to secure computer hardware development as well. Platforms – whether the software is running on a ‘serverless’ platform approach, on an on-premises server, a mobile device, a cloud hosted VM, a user endpoint, as part of a Software as a Service (SaaS) application, a cloud edge device, an IoT device, or anywhere else. == Practices == The SDL recommends 10 security practices to incorporate into your development workflows. Applying the 10 security practices of SDL is an ongoing process of improvement so a key recommendation is to begin from some point and keep enhancing as you proceed. This continuous process involves changes to culture, strategy, processes, and technical controls as you embed security skills and practices into DevOps workflows. The 10 SDL practices are: Establish security standards, metrics, and governance Require use of proven security features, languages, and frameworks Perform security design review and threat modeling Define and use cryptography standards Secure the software supply chain Secure the engineering environment Perform security testing Ensure operational platform security Implement security monitoring and response Provide security training == Versions ==
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Conservative morphological anti-aliasing

Conservative morphological anti-aliasing (CMAA) is an antialiasing technique originally developed by Filip Strugar at Intel. CMAA is an image-based, post processing technique similar to that of morphological antialiasing. CMAA uses 4 main steps which are image analysis for color discontinuities, locally dominant edge detection, simple shape handling, and lastly symmetrical long edge shape handling. A couple of years after CMAA was introduced, Intel unveiled an updated version which they named CMAA2.
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Knapsack cryptosystems

Knapsack cryptosystems are cryptosystems whose security is based on the hardness of solving the knapsack problem. They remain quite unpopular because simple versions of these algorithms have been broken for several decades. However, that type of cryptosystem is a good candidate for post-quantum cryptography. The most famous knapsack cryptosystem is the Merkle-Hellman Public Key Cryptosystem, one of the first public key cryptosystems, published the same year as the RSA cryptosystem. However, this system has been broken by several attacks: one from Shamir, one by Adleman, and the low density attack. However, there exist modern knapsack cryptosystems that are considered secure so far: among them is Nasako-Murakami 2006. Knapsack cryptosystems, when not subject to classical cryptoanalysis, are believed to be difficult even for quantum computers. That is not the case for systems that rely on factoring large integers, like RSA, or computing discrete logarithms, like ECDSA, problems solved in polynomial time with Shor's algorithm.
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Visual cryptography

Visual cryptography is a cryptographic technique which allows visual information (pictures, text, etc.) to be encrypted in such a way that the decrypted information appears as a visual image. One of the best-known techniques has been credited to Moni Naor and Adi Shamir, who developed it in 1994. They demonstrated a visual secret sharing scheme, where a binary image was broken up into n shares so that only someone with all n shares could decrypt the image, while any n − 1 shares revealed no information about the original image. Each share was printed on a separate transparency, and decryption was performed by overlaying the shares. When all n shares were overlaid, the original image would appear. There are several generalizations of the basic scheme including k-out-of-n visual cryptography, and using opaque sheets but illuminating them by multiple sets of identical illumination patterns under the recording of only one single-pixel detector, which exposed the image. Using a similar idea, transparencies can be used to implement a one-time pad encryption, where one transparency is a shared random pad, and another transparency acts as the ciphertext. Normally, there is an expansion of space requirement in visual cryptography. But if one of the two shares is structured recursively, the efficiency of visual cryptography can be increased to 100%. Some antecedents of visual cryptography are in patents from the 1960s. Other antecedents are in the work on perception and secure communication. Visual cryptography can be used to protect biometric templates in which decryption does not require any complex computations. == Example == In this example, the binary image has been split into two component images. Each component image has a pair of pixels for every pixel in the original image. These pixel pairs are shaded black or white according to the following rule: if the original image pixel was black, the pixel pairs in the component images must be complementary; randomly shade one ■□, and the other □■. When these complementary pairs are overlapped, they will appear dark gray. On the other hand, if the original image pixel was white, the pixel pairs in the component images must match: both ■□ or both □■. When these matching pairs are overlapped, they will appear light gray. So, when the two component images are superimposed, the original image appears. However, without the other component, a component image reveals no information about the original image; it is indistinguishable from a random pattern of ■□ / □■ pairs. Moreover, if you have one component image, you can use the shading rules above to produce a counterfeit component image that combines with it to produce any image at all. == (2, n) visual cryptography sharing case == Sharing a secret with an arbitrary number of people, n, such that at least 2 of them are required to decode the secret is one form of the visual secret sharing scheme presented by Moni Naor and Adi Shamir in 1994. In this scheme we have a secret image which is encoded into n shares printed on transparencies. The shares appear random and contain no decipherable information about the underlying secret image, however if any 2 of the shares are stacked on top of one another the secret image becomes decipherable by the human eye. Every pixel from the secret image is encoded into multiple subpixels in each share image using a matrix to determine the color of the pixels. In the (2, n) case, a white pixel in the secret image is encoded using a matrix from the following set, where each row gives the subpixel pattern for one of the components: {all permutations of the columns of} : C 0 = [ 1 0 . . . 0 1 0 . . . 0 . . . 1 0 . . . 0 ] . {\displaystyle \mathbf {C_{0}=} {\begin{bmatrix}1&0&...&0\\1&0&...&0\\...\\1&0&...&0\end{bmatrix}}.} While a black pixel in the secret image is encoded using a matrix from the following set: {all permutations of the columns of} : C 1 = [ 1 0 . . . 0 0 1 . . . 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 1 ] . {\displaystyle \mathbf {C_{1}=} {\begin{bmatrix}1&0&...&0\\0&1&...&0\\...\\0&0&...&1\end{bmatrix}}.} For instance in the (2,2) sharing case (the secret is split into 2 shares and both shares are required to decode the secret) we use complementary matrices to share a black pixel and identical matrices to share a white pixel. Stacking the shares we have all the subpixels associated with the black pixel now black while 50% of the subpixels associated with the white pixel remain white. == Cheating the (2, n) visual secret sharing scheme == Horng et al. proposed a method that allows n − 1 colluding parties to cheat an honest party in visual cryptography. They take advantage of knowing the underlying distribution of the pixels in the shares to create new shares that combine with existing shares to form a new secret message of the cheaters choosing. We know that 2 shares are enough to decode the secret image using the human visual system. But examining two shares also gives some information about the 3rd share. For instance, colluding participants may examine their shares to determine when they both have black pixels and use that information to determine that another participant will also have a black pixel in that location. Knowing where black pixels exist in another party's share allows them to create a new share that will combine with the predicted share to form a new secret message. In this way a set of colluding parties that have enough shares to access the secret code can cheat other honest parties. == Visual steganography == 2×2 subpixels can also encode a binary image in each component image. For example, each white pixel of each component image could be represented by two black subpixels, while each black pixel represented by three black subpixels. When overlaid, each white pixel of the secret image is represented by three black subpixels, while each black pixel is represented by all four subpixels black. Each corresponding pixel in the component images is randomly rotated to avoid orientation leaking information about the secret image. == In popular culture == In "Do Not Forsake Me Oh My Darling", a 1967 episode of TV series The Prisoner, the protagonist uses a visual cryptography overlay of multiple transparencies to reveal a secret message – the location of a scientist friend who had gone into hiding.
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IWARP

iWARP is a computer networking protocol that implements remote direct memory access (RDMA) for efficient data transfer over Internet Protocol networks. Contrary to some accounts, iWARP is not an acronym. Because iWARP is layered on Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)-standard congestion-aware protocols such as Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP), it makes few requirements on the network, and can be successfully deployed in a broad range of environments. == History == In 2007, the IETF published five Request for Comments (RFCs) that define iWARP: RFC 5040 A Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol Specification is layered over Direct Data Placement Protocol (DDP). It defines how RDMA Send, Read, and Write operations are encoded using DDP into headers on the network. RFC 5041 Direct Data Placement over Reliable Transports is layered over MPA/TCP or SCTP. It defines how received data can be directly placed into an upper layer protocols receive buffer without intermediate buffers. RFC 5042 Direct Data Placement Protocol (DDP) / Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol (RDMAP) Security analyzes security issues related to iWARP DDP and RDMAP protocol layers. RFC 5043 Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Direct Data Placement (DDP) Adaptation defines an adaptation layer that enables DDP over SCTP. RFC 5044 Marker PDU Aligned Framing for TCP Specification defines an adaptation layer that enables preservation of DDP-level protocol record boundaries layered over the TCP reliable connected byte stream. These RFCs are based on the RDMA Consortium's specifications for RDMA over TCP. The RDMA Consortium's specifications are influenced by earlier RDMA standards, including Virtual Interface Architecture (VIA) and InfiniBand (IB). Since 2007, the IETF has published three additional RFCs that maintain and extend iWARP: RFC 6580 IANA Registries for the Remote Direct Data Placement (RDDP) Protocols published in 2012 defines IANA registries for Remote Direct Data Placement (RDDP) error codes, operation codes, and function codes. RFC 6581 Enhanced Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA) Connection Establishment published in 2011 fixes shortcomings with iWARP connection setup. RFC 7306 Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA) Protocol Extensions published in 2014 extends RFC 5040 with atomic operations and RDMA Write with Immediate Data. == Protocol == The main component in the iWARP protocol is the Direct Data Placement Protocol (DDP), which permits the actual zero-copy transmission. DDP itself does not perform the transmission; the underlying protocol (TCP or SCTP) does. However, TCP does not respect message boundaries; it sends data as a sequence of bytes without regard to protocol data units (PDU). In this regard, DDP itself may be better suited for SCTP, and indeed the IETF proposed a standard RDMA over SCTP. To run DDP over TCP requires a tweak known as marker PDU aligned (MPA) framing to guarantee boundaries of messages. Furthermore, DDP is not intended to be accessed directly. Instead, a separate RDMA protocol (RDMAP) provides the services to read and write data. Therefore, the entire RDMA over TCP specification is really RDMAP over DDP over either MPA/TCP or SCTP. All of these protocols can be implemented in hardware. Unlike IB, iWARP only has reliable connected communication, as this is the only service that TCP and SCTP provide. The iWARP specification omits other features of IB, such as Send with Immediate Data operations. With RFC 7306, the IETF is working to reduce these omissions. == Implementation == Because a kernel implementation of the TCP stack can be seen as a bottleneck, the protocol is typically implemented in hardware RDMA network interface controllers (rNICs). As simple data losses are rare in tightly coupled network environments, the error-correction mechanisms of TCP may be performed by software while the more frequently performed communications are handled strictly by logic embedded on the rNIC. Similarly, connections are often established entirely by software and then handed off to the hardware. Furthermore, the handling of iWARP specific protocol details is typically isolated from the TCP implementation, allowing rNICs to be used for both as RDMA offload and TCP offload (in support of traditional sockets based TCP/IP applications). The portion of the hardware implementation used for implementing the TCP protocol is known as the TCP Offload Engine (TOE). TOE itself does not prevent copying on the reception side, and must be combined with RDMA hardware for zero-copy results. The RDMA / TCP specification is a set of different wire protocols intended to be implemented in hardware (though it seems feasible to emulate it in software for compatibility but without the performance benefits). == Interfaces == iWARP is a protocol, not an implementation, but defines protocol behavior in terms of the operations that are legal for the protocol, known as Verbs. As such, iWARP does not have any single standard programming interface. However, programming interfaces tend to very closely correspond to the Verbs. Several programmatic interfaces have been proposed, including OpenFabrics Verbs, Network Direct, uDAPL, kDAPL, IT-API, and RNICPI. Implementations of some of these interfaces are available for different platforms, including Windows and Linux. == Services available == Networking services implemented over iWARP include those offered in the OpenFabrics Enterprise Distribution (OFED) by the OpenFabrics Alliance for Linux operating systems, and by Microsoft Windows via Network Direct. NVMe over Fabrics (NVMEoF) iSCSI Extensions for RDMA (iSER) Server Message Block Direct (SMB Direct) Sockets Direct Protocol (SDP) SCSI RDMA Protocol (SRP) Network File System over RDMA (NFS over RDMA) GPUDirect
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Accelerated Linear Algebra

XLA (Accelerated Linear Algebra) is an open-source compiler for machine learning developed by the OpenXLA project. XLA is designed to improve the performance of machine learning models by optimizing the computation graphs at a lower level, making it particularly useful for large-scale computations and high-performance machine learning models. Key features of XLA include: Compilation of Computation Graphs: Compiles computation graphs into efficient machine code. Optimization Techniques: Applies operation fusion, memory optimization, and other techniques. Hardware Support: Optimizes models for various hardware, including CPUs, GPUs, and NPUs. Improved Model Execution Time: Aims to reduce machine learning models' execution time for both training and inference. Seamless Integration: Can be used with existing machine learning code with minimal changes. XLA represents a significant step in optimizing machine learning models, providing developers with tools to enhance computational efficiency and performance. == OpenXLA Project == OpenXLA Project is an open-source machine learning compiler and infrastructure initiative intended to provide a common set of tools for compiling and deploying machine learning models across different frameworks and hardware platforms. It provides a modular compilation stack that can be used by major deep learning frameworks like JAX, PyTorch, and TensorFlow. The project focuses on supplying shared components for optimization, portability, and execution across CPUs, GPUs, and specialized accelerators. Its design emphasizes interoperability between frameworks and a standardized set of representations for model computation. == Components == The OpenXLA ecosystem includes several core components: XLA – A deep learning compiler that optimizes computational graphs for multiple hardware targets. PJRT – A runtime interface that allows different back-ends to connect to XLA through a consistent API. StableHLO – A high-level operator set intended to serve as a stable, portable representation for ML models across compilers and frameworks. Shardy – An MLIR-based system for describing and transforming models that run in distributed or multi-device environments. Additional profiling, testing, and integration tools maintained under the OpenXLA organization. == Users and adopters == Several machine learning frameworks can use or interoperate with OpenXLA components, including JAX, TensorFlow, and parts of the PyTorch ecosystem. The project is developed with participation from multiple hardware and software organizations that contribute back-end integrations, testing, or specifications for their devices. This includes Alibaba, Amazon Web Services, AMD, Anyscale, Apple, Arm, Cerebras, Google, Graphcore, Hugging Face, Intel, Meta, NVIDIA and SiFive. == Supported target devices == x86-64 ARM64 NVIDIA GPU AMD GPU Intel GPU Apple GPU Google TPU AWS Trainium, Inferentia Cerebras Graphcore IPU == Governance == OpenXLA is developed as a community project with its work carried out in public repositories, discussion forums, and design meetings. Some components, such as StableHLO, began with stewardship from specific organizations and have outlined plans for more formal and distributed governance models as the project matures. == History == The project was announced in 2022 as an effort to coordinate development of ML compiler technologies across major AI companies, notably: Alibaba, Amazon Web Services, AMD, Anyscale, Apple, Arm, Cerebras, Google, Graphcore, Hugging Face, Intel, Meta, NVIDIA and SiFive.. It consolidated the XLA compiler, introduced StableHLO as a portable operator set, and created a unified structure for additional tools. Development continues within multiple repositories under the OpenXLA umbrella. It was founded by Eugene Burmako, James Rubin, Magnus Hyttsten, Mehdi Amini, Navid Khajouei, and Thea Lamkin from Google's Machine Learning organization.
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Backdoor (computing)

A backdoor is a typically covert method of bypassing normal authentication or encryption in a computer, product, embedded device (e.g. a home router), or its embodiment (e.g. part of a cryptosystem, algorithm, chipset, or even a "homunculus computer"—a tiny computer-within-a-computer such as that found in Intel's AMT technology). Backdoors are most often used for securing remote access to a computer, or obtaining access to plaintext in cryptosystems. From there it may be used to gain access to privileged information like passwords, corrupt or delete data on hard drives, or transfer information within compromised networks. In the United States, the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act forces internet providers to provide backdoors for government authorities. In 2024, the U.S. government realized that China had been tapping communications in the U.S. using that infrastructure for months, or perhaps longer; China recorded presidential candidate campaign office phone calls—including employees of the then-vice president of the nation, and of the candidates themselves. A backdoor may take the form of a hidden part of a program, a separate program (e.g. Back Orifice may subvert the system through a rootkit), code in the firmware of the hardware, or parts of an operating system such as Windows, for example, device drivers. Trojan horses can be used to create vulnerabilities in a device. A Trojan horse may appear to be an entirely legitimate program, but when executed, it triggers an activity that may install a backdoor. Although some are secretly installed, other backdoors are deliberate and widely known. These kinds of backdoors have "legitimate" uses such as providing the manufacturer with a way to restore user passwords. Many systems that store information within the cloud fail to create accurate security measures. If many systems are connected within the cloud, hackers can gain access to all other platforms through the most vulnerable system. Default passwords (or other default credentials) can function as backdoors if they are not changed by the user. Some debugging features can also act as backdoors if they are not removed in the release version. In 1993, the United States government attempted to deploy an encryption system, the Clipper chip, with an explicit backdoor for law enforcement and national security access. The chip was unsuccessful. Recent proposals to counter backdoors include creating a database of backdoors' triggers and then using neural networks to detect them. == Overview == The threat of backdoors surfaced when multiuser and networked operating systems became widely adopted. Petersen and Turn discussed computer subversion in a paper published in the proceedings of the 1967 AFIPS Conference. They noted a class of active infiltration attacks that use "trapdoor" entry points into the system to bypass security facilities and permit direct access to data. The use of the word trapdoor here clearly coincides with more recent definitions of a backdoor. However, since the advent of public key cryptography the term trapdoor has acquired a different meaning (see: Trapdoor function), and thus the term "backdoor" is now preferred, only after the term trapdoor went out of use. More generally, such security breaches were discussed at length in a RAND Corporation task force report published under DARPA sponsorship by J.P. Anderson and D.J. Edwards in 1970. While initially targeting the computer vision domain, backdoor attacks have expanded to encompass various other domains, including text, audio, ML-based computer-aided design, and ML-based wireless signal classification. Additionally, vulnerabilities in backdoors have been demonstrated in deep generative models, reinforcement learning (e.g., AI GO), and deep graph models. These broad-ranging potential risks have prompted concerns from national security agencies regarding their potentially disastrous consequences. A backdoor in a login system might take the form of a hard coded user and password combination which gives access to the system. An example of this sort of backdoor was used as a plot device in the 1983 film WarGames, in which the architect of the "WOPR" computer system had inserted a hardcoded password-less account which gave the user access to the system, and to undocumented parts of the system (in particular, a video game-like simulation mode and direct interaction with the artificial intelligence). Although the number of backdoors in systems using proprietary software (software whose source code is not publicly available) is not widely credited, they are nevertheless frequently exposed. Programmers have even succeeded in secretly installing large amounts of benign code as Easter eggs in programs, although such cases may involve official forbearance, if not actual permission. == Examples == === Worms === Many computer worms, such as Sobig and Mydoom, install a backdoor on the affected computer (generally a PC on broadband running Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Outlook). Such backdoors appear to be installed so that spammers can send junk e-mail from the infected machines. Others, such as the Sony/BMG rootkit, placed secretly on millions of music CDs through late 2005, are intended as DRM measures—and, in that case, as data-gathering agents, since both surreptitious programs they installed routinely contacted central servers. A sophisticated attempt to plant a backdoor in the Linux kernel, exposed in November 2003, added a small and subtle code change by subverting the revision control system. In this case, a two-line change appeared to check root access permissions of a caller to the sys_wait4 function, but because it used assignment = instead of equality checking ==, it actually granted permissions to the system. This difference is easily overlooked, and could even be interpreted as an accidental typographical error, rather than an intentional attack. In January 2014, a backdoor was discovered in certain Samsung Android products, like the Galaxy devices. The Samsung proprietary Android versions are fitted with a backdoor that provides remote access to the data stored on the device. In particular, the Samsung Android software that is in charge of handling the communications with the modem, using the Samsung IPC protocol, implements a class of requests known as remote file server (RFS) commands, that allows the backdoor operator to perform via modem remote I/O operations on the device hard disk or other storage. As the modem is running Samsung proprietary Android software, it is likely that it offers over-the-air remote control that could then be used to issue the RFS commands and thus to access the file system on the device. === Object code backdoors === Harder to detect backdoors involve modifying object code, rather than source code—object code is much harder to inspect, as it is designed to be machine-readable, not human-readable. These backdoors can be inserted either directly in the on-disk object code, or inserted at some point during compilation, assembly linking, or loading—in the latter case the backdoor never appears on disk, only in memory. Object code backdoors are difficult to detect by inspection of the object code, but are easily detected by simply checking for changes (differences), notably in length or in checksum, and in some cases can be detected or analyzed by disassembling the object code. Further, object code backdoors can be removed (assuming source code is available) by simply recompiling from source on a trusted system. Thus for such backdoors to avoid detection, all extant copies of a binary must be subverted, and any validation checksums must also be compromised, and source must be unavailable, to prevent recompilation. Alternatively, these other tools (length checks, diff, checksumming, disassemblers) can themselves be compromised to conceal the backdoor, for example detecting that the subverted binary is being checksummed and returning the expected value, not the actual value. To conceal these further subversions, the tools must also conceal the changes in themselves—for example, a subverted checksummer must also detect if it is checksumming itself (or other subverted tools) and return false values. This leads to extensive changes in the system and tools being needed to conceal a single change. As object code can be regenerated by recompiling (reassembling, relinking) the original source code, making a persistent object code backdoor (without modifying source code) requires subverting the compiler itself—so that when it detects that it is compiling the program under attack it inserts the backdoor—or alternatively the assembler, linker, or loader. As this requires subverting the compiler, this in turn can be fixed by recompiling the compiler, removing the backdoor insertion code. This defense can in turn be subverted by putting a source meta-backdoor in the compiler, so that when it detects that it is compiling itself
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Forking lemma

The forking lemma is any of a number of related lemmas in cryptography research. The lemma states that if an adversary (typically a probabilistic Turing machine), on inputs drawn from some distribution, produces an output that has some property with non-negligible probability, then with non-negligible probability, if the adversary is re-run on new inputs but with the same random tape, its second output will also have the property. This concept was first used by David Pointcheval and Jacques Stern in "Security proofs for signature schemes," published in the proceedings of Eurocrypt 1996. In their paper, the forking lemma is specified in terms of an adversary that attacks a digital signature scheme instantiated in the random oracle model. They show that if an adversary can forge a signature with non-negligible probability, then there is a non-negligible probability that the same adversary with the same random tape can create a second forgery in an attack with a different random oracle. The forking lemma was later generalized by Mihir Bellare and Gregory Neven. The forking lemma has been used and further generalized to prove the security of a variety of digital signature schemes and other random-oracle based cryptographic constructions. == Statement of the lemma == The generalized version of the lemma is stated as follows. Let A be a probabilistic algorithm, with inputs (x, h1, ..., hq; r) that outputs a pair (J, y), where r refers to the random tape of A (that is, the random choices A will make). Suppose further that IG is a probability distribution from which x is drawn, and that H is a set of size h from which each of the hi values are drawn according to the uniform distribution. Let acc be the probability that on inputs distributed as described, the J output by A is greater than or equal to 1. We can then define a "forking algorithm" FA that proceeds as follows, on input x: Pick a random tape r for A. Pick h1, ..., hq uniformly from H. Run A on input (x, h1, ..., hq; r) to produce (J, y). If J = 0, then return (0, 0, 0). Pick h'J, ..., h'q uniformly from H. Run A on input (x, h1, ..., hJ−1, h'J, ..., h'q; r) to produce (J', y'). If J' = J and hJ ≠ h'J then return (1, y, y'), otherwise, return (0, 0, 0). Let frk be the probability that FA outputs a triple starting with 1, given an input x chosen randomly from IG. Then frk ≥ acc ⋅ ( acc q − 1 h ) . {\displaystyle {\text{frk}}\geq {\text{acc}}\cdot \left({\frac {\text{acc}}{q}}-{\frac {1}{h}}\right).} === Intuition === The idea here is to think of A as running two times in related executions, where the process "forks" at a certain point, when some but not all of the input has been examined. In the alternate version, the remaining inputs are re-generated but are generated in the normal way. The point at which the process forks may be something we only want to decide later, possibly based on the behavior of A the first time around: this is why the lemma statement chooses the branching point (J) based on the output of A. The requirement that hJ ≠ h'J is a technical one required by many uses of the lemma. (Note that since both hJ and h'J are chosen randomly from H, then if h is large, as is usually the case, the probability of the two values not being distinct is extremely small.) === Example === For example, let A be an algorithm for breaking a digital signature scheme in the random oracle model. Then x would be the public parameters (including the public key) A is attacking, and hi would be the output of the random oracle on its ith distinct input. The forking lemma is of use when it would be possible, given two different random signatures of the same message, to solve some underlying hard problem. An adversary that forges once, however, gives rise to one that forges twice on the same message with non-negligible probability through the forking lemma. When A attempts to forge on a message m, we consider the output of A to be (J, y) where y is the forgery, and J is such that m was the Jth unique query to the random oracle (it may be assumed that A will query m at some point, if A is to be successful with non-negligible probability). (If A outputs an incorrect forgery, we consider the output to be (0, y).) By the forking lemma, the probability (frk) of obtaining two good forgeries y and y' on the same message but with different random oracle outputs (that is, with hJ ≠ h'J) is non-negligible when acc is also non-negligible. This allows us to prove that if the underlying hard problem is indeed hard, then no adversary can forge signatures. This is the essence of the proof given by Pointcheval and Stern for a modified ElGamal signature scheme against an adaptive adversary. == Known issues with application of forking lemma == The reduction provided by the forking lemma is not tight. Pointcheval and Stern proposed security arguments for Digital Signatures and Blind Signature using Forking Lemma. Claus P. Schnorr provided an attack on blind Schnorr signatures schemes, with more than p o l y l o g ( n ) {\displaystyle polylog(n)} concurrent executions (the case studied and proven secure by Pointcheval and Stern). A polynomial-time attack, for Ω ( n ) {\displaystyle \Omega (n)} concurrent executions, was shown in 2020 by Benhamouda, Lepoint, Raykova, and Orrù. Schnorr also suggested enhancements for securing blind signatures schemes based on discrete logarithm problem.
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Cognos ReportNet

Cognos ReportNet (CRN) was a web-based software product for creating and managing ad hoc and custom-made reports. ReportNet was developed by the Ottawa-based company Cognos (formerly Cognos Incorporated), an IBM company. The web-based reporting tool was launched in September 2003. Since IBM's acquisition of Cognos, ReportNet has been renamed IBM Cognos ReportNet like all other Cognos products. ReportNet uses web services standards such as XML and Simple Object Access Protocol and also supports dynamic HTML and Java. ReportNet is compatible with multiple databases including Oracle, SAP, Teradata, Microsoft SQL server, DB2 and Sybase. The product provides interface in over 10 languages, has Web Services architecture to meet the needs of multi-national, diversified enterprises and helps reduce total cost of ownership. Multiple versions of Cognos ReportNet have since been released by the company. Cognos ReportNet was awarded the Software and Information Industry Association (SIIA) 2005 Codie awards for the "Best Business Intelligence or Knowledge Management Solution" category. CRN's capabilities have been further used in IBM Cognos 8 BI (2005), the latest reporting tool. CRN comes with its own software development kit (SDK). == Launch == Early adopters of Cognos ReportNet for their corporate reporting needs included Bear Stearns, BMW and Alfred Publishing. Around this same time of launch, Cognos competitor Business Objects released version 6.1 of its enterprise reporting tool. Cognos ReportNet has been successful since its launch, raising revenues in 2004 from licensing fees. == Controversy == Cognos rival Business Objects announced in 2005 that BusinessObjects XI significantly outperformed Cognos ReportNet in benchmark tests conducted by VeriTest, an independent software testing firm. The tests performed showed Cognos ReportNet performed poorly when processing styled reports, complex business reports and combination of both. The tests reported a massive 21 times higher report throughput for BusinessObjects XI than Cognos ReportNet at capacity loads. Cognos soon dismissed the claims by stating Business Objects dictated the environment and testing criteria and Cognos did not provide the software to participate in benchmark test. Cognos later performed their own test to demonstrate Cognos ReportNet capabilities. == Components == Cognos Report Studio – A Web-based product for creating complex professional looking reports. Cognos Query Studio - A Web-based product for creating ad-hoc reports. Cognos Framework Manager – A metadata modeling tool to create BI metadata for reporting and dashboard applications. Cognos Connection – Main portal used to access reports, schedule reports and perform administrator activities. == Versions == Cognos ReportNet 1.1 – Java EE-style professional web-based authoring tool. (base version) Cognos ReportNet IBM Special Edition – comes with an embedded version of IBM WebSphere as its application server and IBM DB2 as its data store. Cognos Linux – for Intel-based Linux platforms.
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Cups (app)

Cups (stylized as CUPS) was a mobile app launched in New York City in April 2014. It was a mobile payment and discovery platform for independent coffee shops nearby. The app was active in more than 400 cafes in New York, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Nashville, Minneapolis and Saint Paul, and other U.S. cities. == History == Cups was founded in Israel in 2012 by Gilad Rotem and four other co-founders, who were all high school friends. The company ran a limited beta pilot in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, featuring 80 locations, from September 2012 until September 2014. Customers received all-you-can-drink coffee at certain coffee shops in Tel Aviv for approximately $45 a month. In October 2013, the founders relocated to New York. Cups participated in the Entrepreneur's Roundtable Accelerator program and went live in New York in 2014, initially working with 50 small coffee shops in Manhattan and Brooklyn. In early 2016, the company launched 30 locations in Philadelphia in February, followed by 40 more locations in San Francisco in March. == Functionality == The Cups app gave the user a list of the nearest participating coffee shops to their current location. The app user can order a drink using the app and pay the cashier with their phone. The cashier would enter a code that entered the purchase into the app's system. The app also allowed for onboard tipping and food purchases. The company reimbursed the coffee shop and kept a portion of their sales. In early 2016, the Cups Café Network was launched, using bulk purchasing power to land discounts with service providers which would normally be reserved for larger chains. In this way, the company aimed to help its café partners compete with the larger coffee chains.
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Cover-coding

Cover-coding is a technique for obscuring the data that is transmitted over an insecure link, to reduce the risks of snooping. An example of cover-coding would be for the sender to perform a bitwise XOR (exclusive OR) of the original data with a password or random number which is known to both sender and receiver. The resulting cover-coded data is then transmitted from sender to the receiver, who uncovers the original data by performing a further bitwise XOR (exclusive OR) operation on the received data using the same password or random number. ISO 18000-6C (EPC Class 1 Generation 2) RFID tags protect some operations with a cover code. The reader requests a random number from the tag, and the tag responds with a new random number. The reader then encrypts future communications with this number, using bitwise XOR, to the data it sends. Cover coding is secure if the tag signal can't be intercepted and the random number is not re-used. Compared to the loud transmissions from the reader, tag backscatter is much weaker and difficult -- but not impossible -- to intercept.
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Data proliferation

Data proliferation refers to the prodigious amount of data, structured and unstructured, that businesses and governments continue to generate at an unprecedented rate and the usability problems that result from attempting to store and manage that data. While originally pertaining to problems associated with paper documentation, data proliferation has become a major problem in primary and secondary data storage on computers. While digital storage has become cheaper, the associated costs, from raw power to maintenance and from metadata to search engines, have not kept up with the proliferation of data. Although the power required to maintain a unit of data has fallen, the cost of facilities which house the digital storage has tended to rise. Data proliferation has been documented as a problem for the U.S. military since August 1971, in particular regarding the excessive documentation submitted during the acquisition of major weapon systems. Efforts to mitigate data proliferation and the problems associated with it are ongoing. == Problems caused == The problem of data proliferation is affecting all areas of commerce as a result of the availability of relatively inexpensive data storage devices. This has made it very easy to dump data into secondary storage immediately after its window of usability has passed. This masks problem that could gravely affect the profitability of businesses and the efficient functioning of health services, police and security forces, local and national governments, and many other types of organizations. Data proliferation is problematic for several reasons: Difficulty when trying to find and retrieve information. At Xerox, on average it takes employees more than one hour per week to find hard-copy documents, costing $2,152 a year to manage and store them. For businesses with more than 10 employees, this increases to almost two hours per week at $5,760 per year. In large networks of primary and secondary data storage, problems finding electronic data are analogous to problems finding hard copy data. Data loss and legal liability when data is disorganized, not properly replicated, or cannot be found promptly. In April 2005, the Ameritrade Holding Corporation told 200,000 current and past customers that a tape containing confidential information had been lost or destroyed in transit. In May of the same year, Time Warner Incorporated reported that 40 tapes containing personal data on 600,000 current and former employees had been lost en route to a storage facility. In March 2005, a Florida judge hearing a $2.7 billion lawsuit against Morgan Stanley issued an "adverse inference order" against the company for "willful and gross abuse of its discovery obligations." The judge cited Morgan Stanley for repeatedly finding misplaced tapes of e-mail messages long after the company had claimed that it had turned over all such tapes to the court. Increased manpower requirements to manage increasingly chaotic data storage resources. Slower networks and application performance due to excess traffic as users search and search again for the material they need. High cost in terms of the energy resources required to operate storage hardware. A 100 terabyte system will cost up to $35,040 a year to run—not counting cooling costs. == Proposed solutions == Applications that better utilize modern technology Reductions in duplicate data (especially as caused by data movement) Improvement of metadata structures Improvement of file and storage transfer structures User education and discipline The implementation of Information Lifecycle Management solutions to eliminate low-value information as early as possible before putting the rest into actively managed long-term storage in which it can be quickly and cheaply accessed.
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