AI For Business Analysts

AI For Business Analysts — independent reviews, comparisons, pricing and step-by-step guides on Aizhi.

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  Linux color management

  Linux color management has the same goal as the color management systems (CMS) for other operating systems, which is to achieve the best possible color reproduction throughout an imaging workflow from its source (camera, video, scanner, etc.), through imaging software (Digikam, darktable, RawTherapee, GIMP, Krita, Scribus, etc.), and finally onto an output medium (monitor, video projector, printer, etc.). In particular, color management attempts to enable color consistency across media and throughout a color-managed workflow. Linux color management relies on the use of accurate ICC (International Color Consortium) and DCP (DNG Color Profile) profiles describing the behavior of input and output devices, and color-managed applications that are aware of these profiles. These applications perform gamut conversions between device profiles and color spaces. Gamut conversions, based on accurate device profiles, are the essence of color management. Historically, color management was not an initial design consideration of the X Window System on which much of Linux graphics support rests, and thus color-managed workflows have been somewhat more challenging to implement on Linux than on other OS's such as Microsoft Windows or macOS. This situation is now being progressively remedied, and color management under Linux, while functional, has not yet acquired mature status. Although it is now possible to obtain a consistent color-managed workflow under Linux, certain problems still remain: The absence of a central user control panel for color settings. Some hardware devices for color calibration lack Linux drivers, firmware or accessory data. Since ICC color profiles are written to an open specification, they are compatible across operating systems. Hence, a profile produced on one OS should work on any other OS given the availability of the necessary software to read it and perform the gamut conversions. This can be used as a workaround for the lack of support for certain spectrophotometers or colorimeters under Linux: one can simply produce a profile on a different OS and then use it in a Linux workflow. Additionally, certain hardware, such as most printers and certain monitors, can be calibrated under another OS and then used in a fully color-managed workflow on Linux. The popular Ubuntu Linux distribution added initial color management in the 11.10 release (the "Oneiric Ocelot" release). == Requirements for a color-managed workflow == Accurate device profiles obtained with source or output characterization software. Correctly loaded video card lookup tables (LUTs) (or monitor profiles that do not require LUT adjustments). Color-managed applications that are configured to use a correct monitor profile and input/output profiles, with support for control over the rendering intent and black point compensation. Calibration and profiling requires: for input devices (scanner, camera, etc.) a color target which the profiling software will compare to the manufacturer-provided color values of the target. or for output devices (monitor, printer, etc.) a reading with a specific device (spectrophotometer, colorimeter or spectrocolorimeter) of the color patch values and comparing the measured values against the values originally sent for output. === Monitor calibration and profiling === One of the critical elements in any color-managed workflow is the monitor, because, at one step or another, handling and making color adaptation through imaging software is required for most images, thus the ability of the monitor to present accurate colors is crucial. Monitor color management consists of calibration and profiling. The first step, calibration, is done by adjusting the monitor controls and the output of the graphics card (via calibration curves) to match user-definable characteristics, such as brightness, white point and gamma. The calibration settings are stored in a .cal file. The second step, profiling (characterization), involves measuring the calibrated display's response and recording it in a color profile. The profile is stored in an .icc file ("ICC file"). For convenience, the calibration settings are usually stored together with the profile in the ICC file. Note that .icm files are identical to .icc files - the difference is only in the name. Seeing correct colors requires using a monitor profile-aware application, together with the same calibration used when profiling the monitor. Calibration alone does not yield accurate colors. If a monitor was calibrated before it was profiled, the profile will only yield correct colors when used on the monitor with the same calibration (the same monitor control adjustments and the same calibration curves loaded into the video card's lookup table). macOS has built-in support for loading calibration curves and installing a system-wide color profile. Windows 7 onward allows loading calibration curves, though this functionality must be enabled manually. Linux and older versions of Windows require using a standalone LUT loader. === Device profiles === ICC profiles are cross-platform and can thus be created on other operating systems and used under Linux. Monitor profiles, however, require some additional attention. Since a monitor profile depends both on the monitor itself and on the video card, a monitor profile should only be used with the same monitor and video card with which it was created. The monitor settings should not be adjusted after creating the profile. In addition, since most calibration software use LUT adjustments during calibration, the corresponding LUTs must be loaded every time the display server (X11, Wayland) is started (e.g. with every graphical login). In the unlikely case of a colorimeter being unsupported by Linux, a profile created under Windows or macOS can be used under Linux. === Display-channel lookup tables === There are two approaches to loading display channel LUTs: Create a profile that does not modify video card LUTs and thus does not require LUTs be loaded later on. Ideally, this approach would rely on DDC-capable monitors—the internal monitor settings of which are set via calibration software. Unfortunately, monitors capable of making these adjustments through DDC are not common and are generally expensive. There is only one calibration software on Linux that can interact with a DDC monitor. For mainstream monitors, a couple of options exist: BasICColor software, which works with most colorimeters on the market, allows one to adjust display output via the monitor interface, and then to choose a "Profile, do not calibrate" option. By doing this, one can create a profile that does not require video card LUT adjustments. For EyeOne devices, EyeOne Match allows the user to calibrate to "Native" gamma and white point targets, which results in the LUT adjustment curves displayed after the calibration as a simple, linear 1:1 mapping (a straight line from corner to corner). Both BasICColor and EyeOne Match do not presently run under Linux but they are capable of creating a profile that does not require LUT adjustments. Use an LUT loader to actually load the LUT adjustments contained within the profile prepared during calibration. According to the documentation, these loaders do not modify the video card LUT by itself, but achieve the same type of adjustment by modifying the X server gamma ramp. Loaders are available for Linux distributions that use X.org or XFree86—the two most popular X servers on Linux. Other X servers are not guaranteed to work with the currently available loaders. There are two LUT loaders available for Linux: Xcalib is one such loader, and although it is a command-line utility, it is quite easy to use. dispwin is a part of Argyll CMS. If, for any reason, the LUT cannot be loaded, it is still recommended to go through the initial stages of calibration where a user is asked by calibration software to make some manual adjustments to the monitor, as this will often improve display linearity and also provide information on its color temperature. This is especially recommended for CRT monitors. === Color-managed applications === In ICC-aware applications, it is important to make sure the correct profiles are assigned to devices, mainly to the monitor and the printer. Some Linux applications can auto-detect the monitor profile, while others requires that it is specified manually. Although there is no designated place to store device profiles on Linux, /usr/share/color/icc/ has become the de facto standard. Most applications running under WINE have not been fully tested for color accuracy. While 8-bpp programs can have some color resolution difficulties due to depth conversion errors, colors in higher-depth applications should be accurate, as long as those programs perform their gamut conversions based on the same monitor profile as that used for loading the LUT, granted that the corresponding LUT adjustments are loaded. == List of color-managed applications == darktabl

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  Undeniable signature

  An undeniable signature is a digital signature scheme which allows the signer to be selective to whom they allow to verify signatures. The scheme adds explicit signature repudiation, preventing a signer later refusing to verify a signature by omission; a situation that would devalue the signature in the eyes of the verifier. It was invented by David Chaum and Hans van Antwerpen in 1989. == Overview == In this scheme, a signer possessing a private key can publish a signature of a message. However, the signature reveals nothing to a recipient/verifier of the message and signature without taking part in either of two interactive protocols: Confirmation protocol, which confirms that a candidate is a valid signature of the message issued by the signer, identified by the public key. Disavowal protocol, which confirms that a candidate is not a valid signature of the message issued by the signer. The motivation for the scheme is to allow the signer to choose to whom signatures are verified. However, that the signer might claim the signature is invalid at any later point, by refusing to take part in verification, would devalue signatures to verifiers. The disavowal protocol distinguishes these cases removing the signer's plausible deniability. It is important that the confirmation and disavowal exchanges are not transferable. They achieve this by having the property of zero-knowledge; both parties can create transcripts of both confirmation and disavowal that are indistinguishable, to a third-party, of correct exchanges. The designated verifier signature scheme improves upon deniable signatures by allowing, for each signature, the interactive portion of the scheme to be offloaded onto another party, a designated verifier, reducing the burden on the signer. == Zero-knowledge protocol == The following protocol was suggested by David Chaum. A group, G, is chosen in which the discrete logarithm problem is intractable, and all operation in the scheme take place in this group. Commonly, this will be the finite cyclic group of order p contained in Z/nZ, with p being a large prime number; this group is equipped with the group operation of integer multiplication modulo n. An arbitrary primitive element (or generator), g, of G is chosen; computed powers of g then combine obeying fixed axioms. Alice generates a key pair, randomly chooses a private key, x, and then derives and publishes the public key, y = gx. === Message signing === Alice signs the message, m, by computing and publishing the signature, z = mx. === Confirmation (i.e., avowal) protocol === Bob wishes to verify the signature, z, of m by Alice under the key, y. Bob picks two random numbers: a and b, and uses them to blind the message, sending to Alice: c = magb. Alice picks a random number, q, uses it to blind, c, and then signing this using her private key, x, sending to Bob: s1 = cgq ands2 = s1x. Note that s1x = (cgq)x = (magb)xgqx = (mx)a(gx)b+q = zayb+q. Bob reveals a and b. Alice verifies that a and b are the correct blind values, then, if so, reveals q. Revealing these blinds makes the exchange zero knowledge. Bob verifies s1 = cgq, proving q has not been chosen dishonestly, and s2 = zayb+q, proving z is valid signature issued by Alice's key. Note that zayb+q = (mx)a(gx)b+q. Alice can cheat at step 2 by attempting to randomly guess s2. === Disavowal protocol === Alice wishes to convince Bob that z is not a valid signature of m under the key, gx; i.e., z ≠ mx. Alice and Bob have agreed an integer, k, which sets the computational burden on Alice and the likelihood that she should succeed by chance. Bob picks random values, s ∈ {0, 1, ..., k} and a, and sends: v1 = msga and v2 = zsya, where exponentiating by a is used to blind the sent values. Note that v2 = zsya = (mx)s(gx)a = v1x. Alice, using her private key, computes v1x and then the quotient, v1xv2−1 = (msga)x(zsgxa)−1 = msxz−s = (mxz−1)s. Thus, v1xv2−1 = 1, unless z ≠ mx. Alice then tests v1xv2−1 for equality against the values: (mxz−1)i for i ∈ {0, 1, …, k}; which are calculated by repeated multiplication of mxz−1 (rather than exponentiating for each i). If the test succeeds, Alice conjectures the relevant i to be s; otherwise, she conjectures random value. Where z = mx, (mxz−1)i = v1xv2−1 = 1 for all i, s is unrecoverable. Alice commits to i: she picks a random r and sends hash(r, i) to Bob. Bob reveals a. Alice confirms that a is the correct blind (i.e., v1 and v2 can be generated using it), then, if so, reveals r. Revealing these blinds makes the exchange zero knowledge. Bob checks hash(r, i) = hash(r, s), proving Alice knows s, hence z ≠ mx. If Alice attempts to cheat at step 3 by guessing s at random, the probability of succeeding is 1/(k + 1). So, if k = 1023 and the protocol is conducted ten times, her chances are 1 to 2100.

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  Cover-coding

  Cover-coding is a technique for obscuring the data that is transmitted over an insecure link, to reduce the risks of snooping. An example of cover-coding would be for the sender to perform a bitwise XOR (exclusive OR) of the original data with a password or random number which is known to both sender and receiver. The resulting cover-coded data is then transmitted from sender to the receiver, who uncovers the original data by performing a further bitwise XOR (exclusive OR) operation on the received data using the same password or random number. ISO 18000-6C (EPC Class 1 Generation 2) RFID tags protect some operations with a cover code. The reader requests a random number from the tag, and the tag responds with a new random number. The reader then encrypts future communications with this number, using bitwise XOR, to the data it sends. Cover coding is secure if the tag signal can't be intercepted and the random number is not re-used. Compared to the loud transmissions from the reader, tag backscatter is much weaker and difficult -- but not impossible -- to intercept.

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  Content format

  A content format is an encoded format for converting a specific type of data to displayable information. Content formats are used in recording and transmission to prepare data for observation or interpretation. This includes both analog and digitized content. Content formats may be recorded and read by either natural or manufactured tools and mechanisms. In addition to converting data to information, a content format may include the encryption and/or scrambling of that information. Multiple content formats may be contained within a single section of a storage medium (e.g. track, disk sector, computer file, document, page, column) or transmitted via a single channel (e.g. wire, carrier wave) of a transmission medium. With multimedia, multiple tracks containing multiple content formats are presented simultaneously. Content formats may either be recorded in secondary signal processing methods such as a software container format (e.g. digital audio, digital video) or recorded in the primary format (e.g. spectrogram, pictogram). Observable data is often known as raw data, or raw content. A primary raw content format may be directly observable (e.g. image, sound, motion, smell, sensation) or physical data which only requires hardware to display it, such as a phonographic needle and diaphragm or a projector lamp and magnifying glass. The following are examples of some common content formats and content format categories (covering: sensory experience, model, and language used for encoding information):

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  Zero-day vulnerability

  A zero-day (also known as a 0-day) is a vulnerability or security hole in a computer system unknown to its developers or anyone capable of mitigating it. Until the vulnerability is remedied, threat actors can exploit it in a zero-day exploit, or zero-day attack. The term "zero-day" originally referred to the number of days since a new piece of software was released to the public, so "zero-day software" was obtained by hacking into a developer's computer before release. Eventually the term was applied to the vulnerabilities that allowed this hacking, and to the number of days that the vendor has had to fix them. Vendors who discover the vulnerability may create patches or advise workarounds to mitigate it, though users need to deploy that mitigation to eliminate the vulnerability in their systems. Zero-day attacks are severe threats. == Definition == Despite developers' goal of delivering a product that works entirely as intended, virtually all products contain software and hardware bugs. If a bug creates a security risk, it is called a vulnerability. Vulnerabilities vary in their ability to be exploited by malicious actors. Some are not usable at all, while others can be used to disrupt the device with a denial of service attack. The most dangerous allow the attacker to inject and run their own code, without the user being aware of it. Although the term "zero-day" initially referred to the time since the vendor had become aware of the vulnerability, zero-day vulnerabilities can also be defined as the subset of vulnerabilities for which no patch or other fix is available. A zero-day exploit is any exploit that takes advantage of such a vulnerability. == Exploits == An exploit is the delivery mechanism that takes advantage of the vulnerability to penetrate the target's systems, for such purposes as disrupting operations, installing malware, or exfiltrating data. Researchers Lillian Ablon and Andy Bogart write that "little is known about the true extent, use, benefit, and harm of zero-day exploits". Exploits based on zero-day vulnerabilities are considered more dangerous than those that take advantage of a known vulnerability. However, it is likely that most cyberattacks use known vulnerabilities, not zero-days. Governments of states are the primary users of zero-day exploits, not only because of the high cost of finding or buying vulnerabilities, but also the significant cost of writing the attack software. Nevertheless, anyone can use a vulnerability, and according to research by the RAND Corporation, "any serious attacker can always get an affordable zero-day for almost any target". Many targeted attacks and most advanced persistent threats rely on zero-day vulnerabilities. In 2017, the average time to develop an exploit from a zero-day vulnerability was estimated at 22 days. The difficulty of developing exploits has been increasing over time due to increased anti-exploitation features in popular software. === Window of vulnerability === Zero-day vulnerabilities are often classified as alive—meaning that there is no public knowledge of the vulnerability—and dead—the vulnerability has been disclosed, but not patched. If the software's maintainers are actively searching for vulnerabilities, it is a living vulnerability; such vulnerabilities in unmaintained software are called immortal. Zombie vulnerabilities can be exploited in older versions of the software but have been patched in newer versions. Even publicly known and zombie vulnerabilities are often exploitable for an extended period. Security patches can take months to develop, or may never be developed. A patch can have negative effects on the functionality of software and users may need to test the patch to confirm functionality and compatibility. Larger organizations may fail to identify and patch all dependencies, while smaller enterprises and personal users may not install patches. Research suggests that risk of cyberattack increases if the vulnerability is made publicly known or a patch is released. Cybercriminals can reverse engineer the patch to find the underlying vulnerability and develop exploits, often faster than users install the patch. According to research by RAND Corporation published in 2017, zero-day exploits remain usable for 6.9 years on average, although those purchased from a third party only remain usable for 1.4 years on average. The researchers were unable to determine if any particular platform or software (such as open-source software) had any relationship to the life expectancy of a zero-day vulnerability. Although the RAND researchers found that 5.7 percent of a stockpile of secret zero-day vulnerabilities will have been discovered by someone else within a year, another study found a higher overlap rate, as high as 10.8 percent to 21.9 percent per year. == Countermeasures == Because, by definition, there is no patch that can block a zero-day exploit, all systems employing the software or hardware with the vulnerability are at risk. This includes secure systems such as banks and governments that have all patches up to date. Security systems are designed around known vulnerabilities, and repeated exploitations of a zero-day exploit could continue undetected for an extended period of time. Although there have been many proposals for a system that is effective at detecting zero-day exploits, this remains an active area of research in 2023. Many organizations have adopted defense-in-depth tactics so that attacks are likely to require breaching multiple levels of security, which makes it more difficult to achieve. Conventional cybersecurity measures such as training and access control — including multi-factor authentication, least-privilege access, and air-gapping makes it harder to compromise systems with a zero-day exploit. Since writing perfectly secure software is impossible, some researchers argue that driving up the cost of exploits is considered a good strategy to reduce the burden of cyberattacks. == Market == Zero-day exploits can fetch millions of dollars. There are three main types of buyers: White: the vendor, or to third parties such as the Zero Day Initiative that disclose to the vendor. Often such disclosure is in exchange for a bug bounty. Not all companies respond positively to disclosures, as they can cause legal liability and operational overhead. It is not uncommon to receive cease-and-desist letters from software vendors after disclosing a vulnerability for free. Gray: the largest and most lucrative. Government or intelligence agencies buy zero-days and may use it in an attack, stockpile the vulnerability, or notify the vendor. The United States federal government is one of the largest buyers. As of 2013, the Five Eyes (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) captured the plurality of the market and other significant purchasers included Russia, India, Brazil, Malaysia, Singapore, North Korea, and Iran. Middle Eastern countries were poised to become the biggest spenders. Black: organized crime, which typically prefers exploit software rather than just knowledge of a vulnerability. These users are more likely to employ "half-days" where a patch is already available. In 2015, the markets for government and crime were estimated at least ten times larger than the white market. Sellers are often hacker groups that seek out vulnerabilities in widely used software for financial reward. Some will only sell to certain buyers, while others will sell to anyone. White market sellers are more likely to be motivated by non pecuniary rewards such as recognition and intellectual challenge. Selling zero-day exploits is legal. Despite calls for more regulation, law professor Mailyn Fidler says there is little chance of an international agreement because key players such as Russia and Israel are not interested. The sellers and buyers that trade in zero-days tend to be secretive, relying on non-disclosure agreements and classified information laws to keep the exploits secret. If the vulnerability becomes known, it can be patched and its value consequently crashes. Because the market lacks transparency, it can be hard for parties to find a fair price. Sellers might not be paid if the vulnerability was disclosed before it was verified, or if the buyer declined to purchase it but used it anyway. With the proliferation of middlemen, sellers could never know to what use the exploits could be put. Buyers could not guarantee that the exploit was not sold to another party. Both buyers and sellers advertise on the dark web. Research published in 2022 based on maximum prices paid as quoted by a single exploit broker found a 44 percent annualized inflation rate in exploit pricing. Remote zero-click exploits could fetch the highest price, while those that require local access to the device are much cheaper. Vulnerabilities in widely used software are also more expensive. They estimated that around 400 to 1,500 people sold exploits to th

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  Experimental SAGE Subsector

  The Experimental Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) Sector (ESS, Experimental SAGE Subsector until planned Sectors/Subsectors were renamed NORAD Regions, Divisions, and Sectors) was a prototype Cold War Air Defense Sector for developing the Semi Automatic Ground Environment. The Lincoln Laboratory control center in a new building was at Lexington, Massachusetts. == ESS Computer System == The network's Direction Center was completed in a new 1954 building (Building F, 42°27′37″N 071°16′04″W) with prototype peripherals and a single IBM XD-1 computer, a successor to Lincoln Lab's Whirlwind I computer (WWI). In 1955, Air Force personnel began IBM training at the Kingston, New York, prototype facility, and the "4620th Air Defense Wing (experimental SAGE) was established at Lincoln Laboratory"—its "primary mission was computer programming". ESS had a capacity of 48 tracks and used a pre-SAGE ground environment in a "prototype intercept monitor room [at] MIT's Barta building" with "track situation displays, which geographically showed Air Defense Identification Zone lines and antiaircraft circles [and] each console also had a 5-inch CRT for digital information display. Audible alert signals were used, with a different signal for each symbol on a situation display." == Radar stations == Initial service test models of the Burroughs AN/FST-2 Coordinate Data Transmitting Set were placed with radars at South Truro and West Bath, Maine; followed by Texas Tower#2 (TT2) in the Atlantic Ocean, which provided a "triangular pattern with overlap" radar coverage (TT2 later had a connection from the XD-1 via the GE G/A Data Link Output Subsystem through North Truro Air Force Station.) By August 1955, 13 radar stations were networked by the subsector, e.g.: Chatham Clinton, Massachusetts with gap-filler radar Great Boars Head Halibut Point Killingly, Connecticut (41.865734°N 71.820958°W / 41.865734; -71.820958).with gap-filler radar Rockport Air Force Station Scituate, Massachusetts South Truro West Bath, Maine (43°54′7″N 69°50′43″W) with AN/FPS-31 on Jug Handle Hill: ("Lincoln Laboratories experimental radar station") Required by 21 November 1955 were 44 consoles: 38 for the operations floor, 3 on the computer floor for display maintenance, and 3 near the maintenance console (program checkout). WWI was connected to the Experimental SAGE Subsector to verify crosstelling (collateral communication) with the ESS DC, and WWI was also used for a Ground-to-Air (G/A) experiment using a transmitter of the GE G/A Data Link Output Subsystem on Prospect Hill, Waltham, MA sending data to simulated airborne equipment at Lexington. Transmissions from the WWI SAGE Evaluation (WISE) computer system to XD-1 and back were without error by December 1955 when operational software specifications were frozen. Operating procedures for the ESS external sites were complete in March 1956, and == System Operation Testing == From November 15, 1955, to November 7, 1956, three System Operation Tests were conducted which used voice "Ground-to-Air" communication from the Barta control room to aircraft outfitted with SAGE receivers (F-86 interceptors modified to F-86L models in "Project FOLLOW-ON".) Test teams included employees of Bell Telephone Laboratories, Western Electric-ADES, IBM, the RAND Corporation, and Lincoln Labs' Division 6, Division 3, & Division 2 (Division 6 had been created for ESS support.) The North Truro P-10 AN/FST-2 was moved to Almaden Air Force Station (M-96)c. 1957-8 and on August 7, 1958, control of an airborne BOMARC missile that had malfunctioned transferred from the "Experimental SAGE Sector" to a Westinghouse AN/GPA-35 Ground Environment system and the missile crashed into the Atlantic Ocean. By December 31, 1958, ADC Manual 55-28 described the Model 3 SAGE System. == 1959 Experimental Testing == "To prove out the revised SAGE computer program" for Automatic Targeting and Battery Evaluation and ADDC-AADCP crosstelling, a "SAGE/Missile Master" test was conducted beginning in September 1959 with communications between the ESS XD-1 and Martin AN/FSG-1 Antiaircraft Defense System equipment at Fort Banks planned for the CONAD Joint Control Center at Fort Heath—a "SAGE ATABE Simulation Study" (SASS) was also completed 1959–60 by MITRE Corporation.

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  Backdoor (computing)

  A backdoor is a typically covert method of bypassing normal authentication or encryption in a computer, product, embedded device (e.g. a home router), or its embodiment (e.g. part of a cryptosystem, algorithm, chipset, or even a "homunculus computer"—a tiny computer-within-a-computer such as that found in Intel's AMT technology). Backdoors are most often used for securing remote access to a computer, or obtaining access to plaintext in cryptosystems. From there it may be used to gain access to privileged information like passwords, corrupt or delete data on hard drives, or transfer information within compromised networks. In the United States, the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act forces internet providers to provide backdoors for government authorities. In 2024, the U.S. government realized that China had been tapping communications in the U.S. using that infrastructure for months, or perhaps longer; China recorded presidential candidate campaign office phone calls—including employees of the then-vice president of the nation, and of the candidates themselves. A backdoor may take the form of a hidden part of a program, a separate program (e.g. Back Orifice may subvert the system through a rootkit), code in the firmware of the hardware, or parts of an operating system such as Windows, for example, device drivers. Trojan horses can be used to create vulnerabilities in a device. A Trojan horse may appear to be an entirely legitimate program, but when executed, it triggers an activity that may install a backdoor. Although some are secretly installed, other backdoors are deliberate and widely known. These kinds of backdoors have "legitimate" uses such as providing the manufacturer with a way to restore user passwords. Many systems that store information within the cloud fail to create accurate security measures. If many systems are connected within the cloud, hackers can gain access to all other platforms through the most vulnerable system. Default passwords (or other default credentials) can function as backdoors if they are not changed by the user. Some debugging features can also act as backdoors if they are not removed in the release version. In 1993, the United States government attempted to deploy an encryption system, the Clipper chip, with an explicit backdoor for law enforcement and national security access. The chip was unsuccessful. Recent proposals to counter backdoors include creating a database of backdoors' triggers and then using neural networks to detect them. == Overview == The threat of backdoors surfaced when multiuser and networked operating systems became widely adopted. Petersen and Turn discussed computer subversion in a paper published in the proceedings of the 1967 AFIPS Conference. They noted a class of active infiltration attacks that use "trapdoor" entry points into the system to bypass security facilities and permit direct access to data. The use of the word trapdoor here clearly coincides with more recent definitions of a backdoor. However, since the advent of public key cryptography the term trapdoor has acquired a different meaning (see: Trapdoor function), and thus the term "backdoor" is now preferred, only after the term trapdoor went out of use. More generally, such security breaches were discussed at length in a RAND Corporation task force report published under DARPA sponsorship by J.P. Anderson and D.J. Edwards in 1970. While initially targeting the computer vision domain, backdoor attacks have expanded to encompass various other domains, including text, audio, ML-based computer-aided design, and ML-based wireless signal classification. Additionally, vulnerabilities in backdoors have been demonstrated in deep generative models, reinforcement learning (e.g., AI GO), and deep graph models. These broad-ranging potential risks have prompted concerns from national security agencies regarding their potentially disastrous consequences. A backdoor in a login system might take the form of a hard coded user and password combination which gives access to the system. An example of this sort of backdoor was used as a plot device in the 1983 film WarGames, in which the architect of the "WOPR" computer system had inserted a hardcoded password-less account which gave the user access to the system, and to undocumented parts of the system (in particular, a video game-like simulation mode and direct interaction with the artificial intelligence). Although the number of backdoors in systems using proprietary software (software whose source code is not publicly available) is not widely credited, they are nevertheless frequently exposed. Programmers have even succeeded in secretly installing large amounts of benign code as Easter eggs in programs, although such cases may involve official forbearance, if not actual permission. == Examples == === Worms === Many computer worms, such as Sobig and Mydoom, install a backdoor on the affected computer (generally a PC on broadband running Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Outlook). Such backdoors appear to be installed so that spammers can send junk e-mail from the infected machines. Others, such as the Sony/BMG rootkit, placed secretly on millions of music CDs through late 2005, are intended as DRM measures—and, in that case, as data-gathering agents, since both surreptitious programs they installed routinely contacted central servers. A sophisticated attempt to plant a backdoor in the Linux kernel, exposed in November 2003, added a small and subtle code change by subverting the revision control system. In this case, a two-line change appeared to check root access permissions of a caller to the sys_wait4 function, but because it used assignment = instead of equality checking ==, it actually granted permissions to the system. This difference is easily overlooked, and could even be interpreted as an accidental typographical error, rather than an intentional attack. In January 2014, a backdoor was discovered in certain Samsung Android products, like the Galaxy devices. The Samsung proprietary Android versions are fitted with a backdoor that provides remote access to the data stored on the device. In particular, the Samsung Android software that is in charge of handling the communications with the modem, using the Samsung IPC protocol, implements a class of requests known as remote file server (RFS) commands, that allows the backdoor operator to perform via modem remote I/O operations on the device hard disk or other storage. As the modem is running Samsung proprietary Android software, it is likely that it offers over-the-air remote control that could then be used to issue the RFS commands and thus to access the file system on the device. === Object code backdoors === Harder to detect backdoors involve modifying object code, rather than source code—object code is much harder to inspect, as it is designed to be machine-readable, not human-readable. These backdoors can be inserted either directly in the on-disk object code, or inserted at some point during compilation, assembly linking, or loading—in the latter case the backdoor never appears on disk, only in memory. Object code backdoors are difficult to detect by inspection of the object code, but are easily detected by simply checking for changes (differences), notably in length or in checksum, and in some cases can be detected or analyzed by disassembling the object code. Further, object code backdoors can be removed (assuming source code is available) by simply recompiling from source on a trusted system. Thus for such backdoors to avoid detection, all extant copies of a binary must be subverted, and any validation checksums must also be compromised, and source must be unavailable, to prevent recompilation. Alternatively, these other tools (length checks, diff, checksumming, disassemblers) can themselves be compromised to conceal the backdoor, for example detecting that the subverted binary is being checksummed and returning the expected value, not the actual value. To conceal these further subversions, the tools must also conceal the changes in themselves—for example, a subverted checksummer must also detect if it is checksumming itself (or other subverted tools) and return false values. This leads to extensive changes in the system and tools being needed to conceal a single change. As object code can be regenerated by recompiling (reassembling, relinking) the original source code, making a persistent object code backdoor (without modifying source code) requires subverting the compiler itself—so that when it detects that it is compiling the program under attack it inserts the backdoor—or alternatively the assembler, linker, or loader. As this requires subverting the compiler, this in turn can be fixed by recompiling the compiler, removing the backdoor insertion code. This defense can in turn be subverted by putting a source meta-backdoor in the compiler, so that when it detects that it is compiling itself

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  HTTP Strict Transport Security

  HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) is a policy mechanism that helps to protect websites against man-in-the-middle attacks such as protocol downgrade attacks and cookie hijacking. It allows web servers to declare that web browsers (or other complying user agents) should automatically interact with it using only HTTPS connections, which provide Transport Layer Security (TLS/SSL), unlike the insecure HTTP used alone. HSTS is an IETF standards track protocol and is specified in RFC 6797. The HSTS Policy is communicated by the server to the user agent via an HTTP response header field named Strict-Transport-Security. HSTS Policy specifies a period of time during which the user agent should only access the server in a secure fashion. Websites using HSTS often do not accept clear text HTTP, either by rejecting connections over HTTP or systematically redirecting users to HTTPS (though this is not required by the specification). The consequence of this is that a user-agent not capable of doing TLS will not be able to connect to the site. The protection normally only applies after a user has visited the site at least once, relying on the principle of "trust on first use". The way this protection works is that when a user entering or selecting an HTTP (not HTTPS) URL to the site, the client, such as a Web browser, will automatically upgrade to HTTPS without making an HTTP request, thereby preventing any HTTP man-in-the-middle attack from occurring. To counteract this problem, an HSTS preload list maintained by Google Chrome and used by other major web browsers is maintained. If a domain is on this list, the browser skips the initial request and encrypts all communication immediately. Additional domains can be registered at no cost. == Specification history == The HSTS specification was published as RFC 6797 on 19 November 2012 after being approved on 2 October 2012 by the IESG for publication as a Proposed Standard RFC. The authors originally submitted it as an Internet Draft on 17 June 2010. With the conversion to an Internet Draft, the specification name was altered from "Strict Transport Security" (STS) to "HTTP Strict Transport Security", because the specification applies only to HTTP. The HTTP response header field defined in the HSTS specification however remains named "Strict-Transport-Security". The last so-called "community version" of the then-named "STS" specification was published on 18 December 2009, with revisions based on community feedback. The original draft specification by Jeff Hodges from PayPal, Collin Jackson, and Adam Barth was published on 18 September 2009. The HSTS specification is based on original work by Jackson and Barth as described in their paper "ForceHTTPS: Protecting High-Security Web Sites from Network Attacks". Additionally, HSTS is the realization of one facet of an overall vision for improving web security, put forward by Jeff Hodges and Andy Steingruebl in their 2010 paper The Need for Coherent Web Security Policy Framework(s). == HSTS mechanism overview == A server implements an HSTS policy by supplying a header over an HTTPS connection (HSTS headers over HTTP are ignored). For example, a server could send a header such that future requests to the domain for the next year (max-age is specified in seconds; 31,536,000 is equal to one non-leap year) use only HTTPS: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000. When a web application issues HSTS Policy to user agents, conformant user agents behave as follows: Automatically turn any insecure links referencing the web application into secure links (e.g. http://example.com/some/page/ will be modified to https://example.com/some/page/ before accessing the server). If the security of the connection cannot be ensured (e.g. the server's TLS certificate is not trusted), the user agent must terminate the connection and should not allow the user to access the web application. This helps protect web application users against some passive (eavesdropping) and active network attacks. A man-in-the-middle attacker has a greatly reduced ability to intercept requests and responses between a user and a web application server while the user's browser has HSTS Policy in effect for that web application. == Applicability == The most important security vulnerability that HSTS can fix is SSL-stripping man-in-the-middle attacks, first publicly introduced by Moxie Marlinspike in his 2009 BlackHat Federal talk "New Tricks For Defeating SSL In Practice". The SSL (and TLS) stripping attack works by transparently converting a secure HTTPS connection into a plain HTTP connection. The user can see that the connection is insecure, but crucially there is no way of knowing whether the connection should be secure. At the time of Marlinspike's talk, many websites did not use TLS/SSL, therefore there was no way of knowing (without prior knowledge) whether the use of plain HTTP was due to an attack, or simply because the website had not implemented TLS/SSL. Additionally, no warnings are presented to the user during the downgrade process, making the attack fairly subtle to all but the most vigilant. Marlinspike's sslstrip tool, presented at Black Hat DC 2009, fully automates the attack. HSTS addresses this problem by informing the browser that connections to the site should always use TLS/SSL. The HSTS header can be stripped by the attacker if this is the user's first visit. Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge attempt to limit this problem by including a "pre-loaded" list of HSTS sites. Unfortunately this solution cannot scale to include all websites on the internet. See limitations, below. HSTS can also help to prevent having one's cookie-based website login credentials stolen by widely available tools such as Firesheep. Because HSTS is time limited, it is sensitive to attacks involving shifting the victim's computer time e.g. using false NTP packets. == Limitations == The initial request remains unprotected from active attacks if it uses an insecure protocol such as plain HTTP or if the URI for the initial request was obtained over an insecure channel. The same applies to the first request after the activity period specified in the advertised HSTS Policy max-age (sites should set a period of several days or months depending on user activity and behavior). === Solutions with preload list === Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, and Internet Explorer/Microsoft Edge address this limitation by implementing a "HSTS preloaded list", which is a list that contains known sites supporting HSTS. This list is distributed with the browser so that it uses HTTPS for the initial request to the listed sites as well. As previously mentioned, these pre-loaded lists cannot scale to cover the entire Web. A potential solution might be achieved by using DNS records to declare HSTS Policy, and accessing them securely via DNSSEC, optionally with certificate fingerprints to ensure validity (which requires running a validating resolver to avoid last mile issues). Junade Ali has noted that HSTS is ineffective against the use of false domains; by using DNS-based attacks, it is possible for a man-in-the-middle interceptor to serve traffic from an artificial domain which is not on the HSTS Preload list, this can be made possible by DNS Spoofing Attacks, or simply a domain name that misleadingly resembles the real domain name such as www.example.org instead of www.example.com. Even with an HSTS preloaded list, HSTS cannot prevent advanced attacks against TLS itself, such as the BEAST or CRIME attacks introduced by Juliano Rizzo and Thai Duong. Attacks against TLS itself are orthogonal to HSTS policy enforcement. Neither can it protect against attacks on the server - if someone compromises it, it will happily serve any content over TLS. === Privacy issues === HSTS can be used to near-indelibly tag visiting browsers with recoverable identifying data (supercookies) which can persist in and out of browser "incognito" privacy modes. By creating a web page that makes multiple HTTP requests to selected domains, for example, if twenty browser requests to twenty different domains are used, theoretically over one million visitors can be distinguished (220) due to the resulting requests arriving via HTTP vs. HTTPS; the latter being the previously recorded binary "bits" established earlier via HSTS headers. == Browser support == Chromium and Google Chrome since version 4.0.211.0 Firefox since version 4; with Firefox 17, Mozilla integrates a list of websites supporting HSTS. Opera since version 12 Safari since OS X Mavericks (version 10.9, late 2013) Internet Explorer 11 on Windows 8.1 and Windows 7 with KB3058515 installed (Released as a Windows Update in June 2015) Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11 on Windows 10 BlackBerry 10 Browser and WebView since BlackBerry OS 10.3.3. == Deployment best practices == Depending on the actual deployment there are certain threats (e.g. cookie injection attacks) t

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  Noom

  Noom is an American privately held digital health company that provides weight management and behavioral health services through a subscription-based mobile application. Founded in 2008, the company combines behavior change psychology with access to weight loss medications and dietary supplements. The platform incorporates elements of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) and goal-setting strategies, and its programs are designed to support users in developing healthier habits. In addition to its weight management services, Noom has expanded to offer products related to stress management and general wellness. Noom has received both praise and criticism. Supporters cite its focus on mental and behavioral aspects of health, while critics have raised concerns about the accuracy of its calorie goals, the use of algorithmically determined weight loss targets, and questions about the qualifications of some of its coaching staff. == History == Noom was founded in 2008 by friends Artem Petakov and Saeju Jeong. The company's mobile app officially launched in 2016. In 2025, Noom relocated its headquarters from New York City to Princeton, New Jersey. Petakov, a former software engineer at Google, currently leads Noom Ventures, while Jeong serves as Noom's Chairman. In 2023, Geoff Cook was appointed CEO of Noom. In 2019, Noom partnered with Novo Nordisk to offer patients prescribed the diabetes medication Saxenda one year of free access to the Noom platform. In 2020, Noom reported $400 million in revenue. As of April 2021, the company stated it employed approximately 3,000 people, including 2,700 coaches. == Services == === Noom App === The Noom app is the primary platform through which users engage with the company's services. Upon creating an account, users are prompted to provide physical information such as weight, height, and age, along with experiential data including lifestyle habits, personal goals, and perceived obstacles. Users log their meals and physical activity, and in return, the app delivers feedback through multiple channels: algorithmically generated insights, guidance from a human coach, peer interaction, educational articles, and interactive quizzes. The app has been reviewed by a range of media outlets, including newspapers such as the Chicago Tribune and USA Today; health information sources such as WebMD; and lifestyle magazines including Good Housekeeping. === Other services === In 2024, Noom launched Noom Vibe, a mobile application that encourages users to develop healthy habits by awarding "vibes"—a form of points—for activities such as walking or meeting step goals. That same year, Noom introduced a 3D body scanning feature within its app, designed to help users monitor physical changes and prevent muscle atrophy during weight loss. Also in 2024, Noom began offering a compounded GLP-1 medication as part of its weight management program. The formulation includes the same active ingredient found in the anti-obesity medications Wegovy and Ozempic. == Research == In 2016, a study published in Scientific Reports analyzed data from approximately 36,000 users of the Noom app, of whom 78% were female and 22% male. The data were collected between October 2012 and April 2014. To be included in the analysis, users had to log their weight at least twice per month over a period of six consecutive months. The study found that 78% of participants self-reported weight loss while using the app. The median duration of weight reporting was 267 days (approximately nine months). The frequency of data logging was positively correlated with weight loss. Additionally, male users had a higher average starting BMI and reported greater average weight loss compared to female users. In 2017, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recognized Noom as a certified diabetes prevention program, making it the first mobile health application to receive such designation. == Criticisms == === Health programs === Noom has been criticized for promoting elements of diet culture in its advertising campaigns. The app has also faced criticism for setting calorie goals that some users and experts have deemed inappropriately low, and for employing coaches who may lack formal qualifications as registered dietitians. Coaching has been described as relying heavily on canned responses. Upon sign-up, users are prompted to complete a questionnaire consisting of over 50 questions, which is used to generate a personalized program. In 2021, the UK-based organization Privacy International alleged that Noom, along with other diet platforms, used such lengthy surveys to attract users but did not always tailor the resulting programs to the collected data. The organization claimed that many users received the same or highly similar programs regardless of their answers. It also raised concerns about the handling of potentially sensitive health data, alleging a lack of transparency regarding the sharing of such data with third parties, including Facebook, potentially in violation of the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). In a follow-up investigation in 2023, Privacy International reported that Noom had made "significant positive changes" to its data handling practices. However, the organization noted that data was still being shared with Facebook and concluded that "there is still room for improvement." === Billing issues lawsuit === In August 2020, the Better Business Bureau (BBB) issued a warning to consumers regarding Noom's subscription practices. The BBB reported that numerous customers had filed complaints about difficulties canceling their subscriptions after the free trial period, as well as challenges in contacting the company to request refunds. In February 2022, Noom agreed to a $62 million settlement in a class-action lawsuit that alleged the company had used deceptive billing practices related to automatic subscription renewals. Qualifying claimants received approximately $167 each. During the case, a former senior software engineer at Noom testified that the cancellation process was intentionally designed to be difficult, with the goal of generating revenue from customers who failed to cancel in time. In response, Noom stated that it had taken steps to improve transparency around its pricing and policies, including the implementation of self-service cancellation tools.

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  Government Secure Intranet

  Government Secure Intranet (GSi) was a United Kingdom government wide area network, whose main purpose was to enable connected organisations to communicate electronically and securely at low protective marking levels. It was known for the '.gsi.gov.uk' family of domains for government email. Migration away from these domains began in 2019 and was completed in 2023. == History == === Use === Many UK government organisations used the GSi to transfer files on a peer-to-peer (P2P) basis between similarly accredited networks. The network itself was open within the context of its accreditation – it imposed no restrictions on traffic types carried across the network, restrictions and policy control were left to the connecting departments. Email traffic in and out of the network was filtered by an external provider. === Origin === The concept of GSi was defined by the Cabinet Office, and was turned into practical reality by the Internet Special Products group of Cable & Wireless (then known as Mercury Communications) at their Brentford premises. GSi development started late 1996, and can be roughly dated by checking the registration date of its first domain name, 'gsi.net', registered 30 May 1997. The formal go-live date was several months later (according to the Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency (CCTA) this was February 1998). The main drivers behind the development of GSi was the plethora of inter-agency connections in UK government which made managing security and connectivity budgets problematic. GSi not only provided better oversight, it also normalised connectivity. GSi was designed as an accredited, dual link connected Internet Protocol backbone, it imposed no restrictions on what type of traffic it carried; any restrictions were considered a policy decision for each connecting department. The design of GSi partly supported the then developing eGIF interoperability standards. This was a direct consequence of the two key technical people driving the project, one from Cable & Wireless, one from the UK government in the form of the CCTA. GSi used SMTP as mail transport protocol, and the conversion from the then prevalent X.400 email facilities to SMTP proved for many departments an improvement in reliability and speed. In the case of X.400, this conversion also cut email costs substantially as X.400 message conversions were still chargeable even if the conversion failed due to message size. In some cases, the ROI of such an email conversion was as short as two months. The creation of GSi handed Cable & Wireless a monopoly on UK government data connectivity. GSi can be considered one of the more successful UK government IT projects from the point of view of take up - even when still in pilot phase, demand increased to a point where service windows had to be imposed to continue building the platform to full strength. The development of GSi was also the root of the creation of the CESG Listed Adviser Scheme (CLAS). During the build of GSi, the need for accredited advisers became clear as advice on connectivity invariably involved discussing government confidential matters. CESG eventually responded with the above CLAS scheme. === Operations contract === GSi was operated on a five-year renewable contract basis. Energis won this contract from Cable & Wireless in August 2003. Cable & Wireless then bought Energis in 2005, thus regaining control over the platform. Cable and Wireless Worldwide won the GSi Convergence Framework (GCF) contract in 2011. The GSi and Managed Telecommunications Service (MTS) framework agreements finished in August 2011 with contracts running on to 12 February 2012. GCF is intended to facilitate the migration to the Public Services Network. === Previous developments === Government Connect went live across local authorities in England and Wales. Government Connect is a pan-government programme providing an accredited and secure network between central government and every local authority in England and Wales and allows exchange of RESTRICTED information between authorities. The GCSX network is part of the wider GSi and provides connectivity to nearly all central departments. Scottish local authorities have already established a similar network known as the Government Secure Extranet (GSX). Local authorities with a GCSX connection can now use a GCSX email account to exchange sensitive data, including DWP benefits data, patient identifiable data, with health sector staff who have a NHS.net email address, e.g. PCT staff and GPs. As both GCSX and the Police National Network (PNN) are both connected to the wider Government Secure Intranet (GSi), data can be transferred securely between local authorities and the Police. GC Mail can be used now to replace the existing less efficient and less secure methods of exchanging data between local authorities and the Police. Local authorities that deliver Housing and Council Tax benefits are taking part in the e-Transfers programme, which is e-enabling the process for delivery of Local Authority Input Documents (LAIDs) and Local Authority Claim Information (LACIs). Version 4.1 of the Code of Connection for compliance was introduced in 2010. Compared with version 3.2 the main Code of Connection version 4.1 areas of are: Mobile working - full implementation of compliant service Firewall specification (EAL 4) Execution of unauthorised software Requirement for IT Healthchecks (CHECK / CREST / TigerScheme) Labelling e-mails with protective markings. == Public Services Network == The Public Services Network is a UK Government programme that unified the provision of network infrastructure across the United Kingdom public sector into an interconnected "network of networks". This included large elements of GSi. It is now a legacy network. Centrally procured public sector networks migrated across to the PSN framework as they reached the end of their contract terms, either through an interim framework or directly. The Government Secure Intranet (GSi) contracts expired in September 2011, running on to 12 February 2012 and were replaced by the transitional Government Secure Intranet Convergence Framework (GCF).

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  Airborne Networking

  An Airborne Network (AN) is the infrastructure owned by the United States Air Force that provides communication transport services through at least one node that is on a platform capable of flight. == Background == === Definition === The intent of the US Air Force's Airborne Network is to expand the Global Information Grid (GIG) to connect the three major domains of warfare: Air, Space, and Terrestrial. The Transformational Satellite Communications System network currently provides connectivity for all communication through space assets. The Combat Information Transport System and Theater Deployable Communications provide terrestrial connectivity for theatre based operations. The Airborne Network is engineered to utilize all airborne assets to connect with space and surface networks building a seamless communications platform across all domains. === Capabilities === The capabilities identified by this type of system are vastly beyond that of our current military. This system will enable the Air Force to provide a transportable network, flexible enough to communicate with any air, space, or ground asset in the area. The network will provide a beyond line-of-sight (LoS) communications infrastructure that can be packed up and moved in and out of the designated battlespace, enabling the military to have a reliable and secure communications network that extends globally. The network is designed to be flexible enough to provide the right communication and network packages for a specific region, mission, or technology. Operationally, The AN is designed to be self-forming, self-organizing, and self-generating, with nodes joining and leaving the network as they enter and exit a specific region. The network consists of dedicated tactical links, wideband air-to-air links, and ad hoc networks constructed by the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) networking services. JTRS is a software-defined radio that will work with many existing military and civilian radios. It includes integrated encryption and Wideband Networking Software to create mobile ad hoc networks. It also provides system performance analysis and fault diagnostics automatically, reducing the demand for human intervention and network maintenance. === Intended Use === The AN was designed as the cornerstone for the new military doctrine known as Network Centric Warfare. This doctrine was developed to use information superiority to equip warfighters with more precise information enabling commanders and shooters to make smarter decisions faster. The AN contributes to Network Centric Warfare by enabling commanders to provide real-time information to warfighters in the air and on the ground. Warfighters can then utilize more information and make more educated decisions about how to act in a particular situation. Once the act has been carried out commanders will have immediate information about the result and can make judgments on how to continue. All-in-all the AN was designed to reduce the time necessary to identify a target, make clear and educated decisions to pull or not to pull the trigger, and assess battle == Topologies == There are four main network topologies that will be deployed and vary based on the placement of backbone and subnet class networks. === Space, Air, Ground Tether === Establishing a direct connection to another aircraft or ground node, via a point-to-point link for nodes within LOS or via a Satellite Communications (SATCOM) link for nodes that are beyond line-of-sight is known as tethering. SATCOM links provide connectivity to a network ground entry point. Strike aircraft that accompany C2 aircraft such as an AWACS are tethered via point-to-point links. Finally, C2 or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissnce (ISR) aircraft may connect via a LOS link directly to a network ground entry point. Each of these tethered alternatives works exactly like a hub or switch that has an entry point to a larger network and allows their connected users access to that network. === Flat Ad Hoc === A flat ad hoc topology refers to establishing nonpersistent network connections as needed among AN nodes that are present at a given time. With this network the nodes dynamically “discover” other nodes to which they can interconnect and form the network. The specific interconnections between the nodes are not planned in advance, but are made as opportunities arise. The nodes join and leave the network at will, continually changing connections to neighbor nodes based upon their location and mobility characteristics. === Tiered Ad Hoc === Ad hoc networks can be flat in the sense that all nodes are peers of each other in a single network, as discussed above, or they can dynamically organize themselves into hierarchical tiers such that higher tiers are used to move data between more localized subnets. This network topology can be compared to any conventional deployed network that utilizes routers, switches, and hubs to temporarily connect users. === Persistent Backbone === A network topology characterized by a persistent backbone is established using relatively persistent wideband connections among high-value platforms flying relatively stable orbits. It provides the connectivity between the tactical subnets which are considered edge networks relative to the backbone. This provides concentration points for connectivity to the space backbone as well as to terrestrial networks. This type of network topology is comparable to a conventional permanent network with established data trunks, routers, switches, and hubs to connect users. == Architecture == === Network Management === The platform management system enables operators to manage all on-board network elements. It interfaces and interoperates with the Airborne Network management system to enable operators to manage remote network elements in the airborne network. The network management system monitors the health of the network by passively testing the network for faults and latency. The system will also actively troubleshoot faults with probes to identify and isolate faulty connections, and enables operators to apply network parameters and security changes to all systems based on the status of the network. === Routing/Switching === Routing and switching enables data to be dynamically transmitted over the network to other nodes. Routing protocols must be able to identify nodes transmitted within their own platform and data to be sent to other platforms regardless of the current topology. The routing protocol must also provide seamless roaming by ensuring that no routed packets are lost when a node changes its point of attachment to the network. Maintaining scalability is important in routing as the network is constantly changing. The network must be able to function with numerous levels of platforms, varying numbers of fast moving platforms, and varying amounts of traffic per platform. Routers and switches will use metrics to determine the best paths to take when routing data. The routing protocol utilized for the AN will be an Adaptive Quality of Service routing protocol. === Gateways/Proxies === Gateways and proxies enable the connection numerous technology types regardless of age to communicate across the IP-based network. Gateways and proxies are essential in the operation of this network because so many different technologies are used to communicate in each domain. These systems will facilitate the transition of the legacy on-board infrastructure, transmission systems, tactical data link systems, and user applications to the objective airborne network systems. Therefore, they are only temporary until all platforms use a standardized IP radio for transmission. === Performance Enhancing Proxies === Performance Enhancing Proxies improve the performance of user applications running across the Airborne Network by countering wireless network impairments, such as limited bandwidth, long delays, high loss rates, and disruptions in network connections. Proxy systems are implemented between the user application and the network and can be used to improve performance at the application and transport functional layers of the OSI model. Some techniques that can be employed include: Compression: Data compression or header compression can be used to minimize the number of bits sent over the network. Data bundling: Smaller data packets can be combined (bundled) into a single large packet for transmission over the network. Caching: A local cache can be used to save and provide data objects that are requested multiple times, reducing transmissions over the network (and improving response times). Store and forward: Message queuing can be used to ensure message delivery to users who become disconnected from the network or are unable to connect to the network for a period of time. Once the platform connects, the stored messages are sent. Pipelining: Rather than opening several separate network connections pipelining can be used to share a single networ

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  Format-preserving encryption

  In cryptography, format-preserving encryption (FPE), refers to encrypting in such a way that the output (the ciphertext) is in the same format as the input (the plaintext). The meaning of "format" varies. Typically only finite sets of characters are used; numeric, alphabetic or alphanumeric. For example: Encrypting a 16-digit credit card number so that the ciphertext is another 16-digit number. Encrypting an English word so that the ciphertext is another English word. Encrypting an n-bit number so that the ciphertext is another n-bit number (this is the definition of an n-bit block cipher). For such finite domains, and for the purposes of the discussion below, the cipher is equivalent to a permutation of N integers {0, ... , N−1} where N is the size of the domain. == Motivation == === Restricted field lengths or formats === One motivation for using FPE comes from the problems associated with integrating encryption into existing applications, with well-defined data models. A typical example would be a credit card number, such as 1234567812345670 (16 bytes long, digits only). Adding encryption to such applications might be challenging if data models are to be changed, as it usually involves changing field length limits or data types. For example, output from a typical block cipher would turn credit card number into a hexadecimal (e.g.0x96a45cbcf9c2a9425cde9e274948cb67, 34 bytes, hexadecimal digits) or Base64 value (e.g. lqRcvPnCqUJc3p4nSUjLZw==, 24 bytes, alphanumeric and special characters), which will break any existing applications expecting the credit card number to be a 16-digit number. Apart from simple formatting problems, using AES-128-CBC, this credit card number might get encrypted to the hexadecimal value 0xde015724b081ea7003de4593d792fd8b695b39e095c98f3a220ff43522a2df02. In addition to the problems caused by creating invalid characters and increasing the size of the data, data encrypted using the CBC mode of an encryption algorithm also changes its value when it is decrypted and encrypted again. This happens because the random seed value that is used to initialize the encryption algorithm and is included as part of the encrypted value is different for each encryption operation. Because of this, it is impossible to use data that has been encrypted with the CBC mode as a unique key to identify a row in a database. FPE attempts to simplify the transition process by preserving the formatting and length of the original data, allowing a drop-in replacement of plaintext values with their ciphertexts in legacy applications. == Comparison to truly random permutations == Although a truly random permutation is the ideal FPE cipher, for large domains it is infeasible to pre-generate and remember a truly random permutation. So the problem of FPE is to generate a pseudorandom permutation from a secret key, in such a way that the computation time for a single value is small (ideally constant, but most importantly smaller than O(N)). == Comparison to block ciphers == An n-bit block cipher technically is a FPE on the set {0, ..., 2n-1}. If an FPE is needed on one of these standard sized sets (for example, n = 64 for DES and n = 128 for AES) a block cipher of the right size can be used. However, in typical usage, a block cipher is used in a mode of operation that allows it to encrypt arbitrarily long messages, and with an initialization vector as discussed above. In this mode, a block cipher is not an FPE. == Definition of security == In cryptographic literature (see most of the references below), the measure of a "good" FPE is whether an attacker can distinguish the FPE from a truly random permutation. Various types of attackers are postulated, depending on whether they have access to oracles or known ciphertext/plaintext pairs. == Algorithms == In most of the approaches listed here, a well-understood block cipher (such as AES) is used as a primitive to take the place of an ideal random function. This has the advantage that incorporation of a secret key into the algorithm is easy. Where AES is mentioned in the following discussion, any other good block cipher would work as well. === The FPE constructions of Black and Rogaway === Implementing FPE with security provably related to that of the underlying block cipher was first undertaken in a paper by cryptographers John Black and Phillip Rogaway, which described three ways to do this. They proved that each of these techniques is as secure as the block cipher that is used to construct it. This means that if the AES algorithm is used to create an FPE algorithm, then the resulting FPE algorithm is as secure as AES because an adversary capable of defeating the FPE algorithm can also defeat the AES algorithm. Therefore, if AES is secure, then the FPE algorithms constructed from it are also secure. In all of the following, E denotes the AES encryption operation that is used to construct an FPE algorithm and F denotes the FPE encryption operation. ==== FPE from a prefix cipher ==== One simple way to create an FPE algorithm on {0, ..., N-1} is to assign a pseudorandom weight to each integer, then sort by weight. The weights are defined by applying an existing block cipher to each integer. Black and Rogaway call this technique a "prefix cipher" and showed it was provably as good as the block cipher used. Thus, to create an FPE on the domain {0,1,2,3}, given a key K apply AES(K) to each integer, giving, for example, weight(0) = 0x56c644080098fc5570f2b329323dbf62 weight(1) = 0x08ee98c0d05e3dad3eb3d6236f23e7b7 weight(2) = 0x47d2e1bf72264fa01fb274465e56ba20 weight(3) = 0x077de40941c93774857961a8a772650d Sorting [0,1,2,3] by weight gives [3,1,2,0], so the cipher is F(0) = 3 F(1) = 1 F(2) = 2 F(3) = 0 This method is only useful for small values of N. For larger values, the size of the lookup table and the required number of encryptions to initialize the table gets too big to be practical. ==== FPE from cycle walking ==== If there is a set M of allowed values within the domain of a pseudorandom permutation P (for example P can be a block cipher like AES), an FPE algorithm can be created from the block cipher by repeatedly applying the block cipher until the result is one of the allowed values (within M). CycleWalkingFPE(x) { if P(x) is an element of M then return P(x) else return CycleWalkingFPE(P(x)) } The recursion is guaranteed to terminate. (Because P is one-to-one and the domain is finite, repeated application of P forms a cycle, so starting with a point in M the cycle will eventually terminate in M.) This has the advantage that the elements of M do not have to be mapped to a consecutive sequence {0,...,N-1} of integers. It has the disadvantage, when M is much smaller than P's domain, that too many iterations might be required for each operation. If P is a block cipher of a fixed size, such as AES, this is a severe restriction on the sizes of M for which this method is efficient. For example, an application may want to encrypt 100-bit values with AES in a way that creates another 100-bit value. With this technique, AES-128-ECB encryption can be applied until it reaches a value which has all of its 28 highest bits set to 0, which will take an average of 228 iterations to happen. ==== FPE from a Feistel network ==== It is also possible to make a FPE algorithm using a Feistel network. A Feistel network needs a source of pseudo-random values for the sub-keys for each round, and the output of the AES algorithm can be used as these pseudo-random values. When this is done, the resulting Feistel construction is good if enough rounds are used. One way to implement an FPE algorithm using AES and a Feistel network is to use as many bits of AES output as are needed to equal the length of the left or right halves of the Feistel network. If a 24-bit value is needed as a sub-key, for example, it is possible to use the lowest 24 bits of the output of AES for this value. This may not result in the output of the Feistel network preserving the format of the input, but it is possible to iterate the Feistel network in the same way that the cycle-walking technique does to ensure that format can be preserved. Because it is possible to adjust the size of the inputs to a Feistel network, it is possible to make it very likely that this iteration ends very quickly on average. In the case of credit card numbers, for example, there are 1015 possible 16-digit credit card numbers (accounting for the redundant check digit), and because the 1015 ≈ 249.8, using a 50-bit wide Feistel network along with cycle walking will create an FPE algorithm that encrypts fairly quickly on average. === The Thorp shuffle === A Thorp shuffle is like an idealized card-shuffle, or equivalently a maximally-unbalanced Feistel cipher where one side is a single bit. It is easier to prove security for unbalanced Feistel ciphers than for balanced ones. === VIL mode === For domain sizes that are a power of two, and an existing block cipher with a smaller bl

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  Line integral convolution

  In scientific visualization, line integral convolution (LIC) is a method to visualize a vector field (such as fluid motion) at high spatial resolutions. The LIC technique was first proposed by Brian Cabral and Leith Casey Leedom in 1993. In LIC, discrete numerical line integration is performed along the field lines (curves) of the vector field on a uniform grid. The integral operation is a convolution of a filter kernel and an input texture, often white noise. In signal processing, this process is known as a discrete convolution. == Overview == Traditional visualizations of vector fields use small arrows or lines to represent vector direction and magnitude. This method has a low spatial resolution, which limits the density of presentable data and risks obscuring characteristic features in the data. More sophisticated methods, such as streamlines and particle tracing techniques, can be more revealing but are highly dependent on proper seed points. Texture-based methods, like LIC, avoid these problems since they depict the entire vector field at point-like (pixel) resolution. Compared to other integration-based techniques that compute field lines of the input vector field, LIC has the advantage that all structural features of the vector field are displayed, without the need to adapt the start and end points of field lines to the specific vector field. In other words, it shows the topology of the vector field. In user testing, LIC was found to be particularly good for identifying critical points. == Algorithm == === Informal description === LIC causes output values to be strongly correlated along the field lines, but uncorrelated in orthogonal directions. As a result, the field lines contrast each other and stand out visually from the background. Intuitively, the process can be understood with the following example: the flow of a vector field can be visualized by overlaying a fixed, random pattern of dark and light paint. As the flow passes by the paint, the fluid picks up some of the paint's color, averaging it with the color it has already acquired. The result is a randomly striped, smeared texture where points along the same streamline tend to have a similar color. Other physical examples include: whorl patterns of paint, oil, or foam on a river visualisation of magnetic field lines using randomly distributed iron filings fine sand being blown by strong wind === Formal mathematical description === Although the input vector field and the result image are discretized, it pays to look at it from a continuous viewpoint. Let v {\displaystyle \mathbf {v} } be the vector field given in some domain Ω {\displaystyle \Omega } . Although the input vector field is typically discretized, we regard the field v {\displaystyle \mathbf {v} } as defined in every point of Ω {\displaystyle \Omega } , i.e. we assume an interpolation. Streamlines, or more generally field lines, are tangent to the vector field in each point. They end either at the boundary of Ω {\displaystyle \Omega } or at critical points where v = 0 {\displaystyle \mathbf {v} =\mathbf {0} } . For the sake of simplicity, critical points and boundaries are ignored in the following. A field line σ {\displaystyle {\boldsymbol {\sigma }}} , parametrized by arc length s {\displaystyle s} , is defined as d σ ( s ) d s = v ( σ ( s ) ) | v ( σ ( s ) ) | . {\displaystyle {\frac {d{\boldsymbol {\sigma }}(s)}{ds}}={\frac {\mathbf {v} ({\boldsymbol {\sigma }}(s))}{|\mathbf {v} ({\boldsymbol {\sigma }}(s))|}}.} Let σ r ( s ) {\displaystyle {\boldsymbol {\sigma }}_{\mathbf {r} }(s)} be the field line that passes through the point r {\displaystyle \mathbf {r} } for s = 0 {\displaystyle s=0} . Then the image gray value at r {\displaystyle \mathbf {r} } is set to D ( r ) = ∫ − L / 2 L / 2 k ( s ) N ( σ r ( s ) ) d s {\displaystyle D(\mathbf {r} )=\int _{-L/2}^{L/2}k(s)N({\boldsymbol {\sigma }}_{\mathbf {r} }(s))ds} where k ( s ) {\displaystyle k(s)} is the convolution kernel, N ( r ) {\displaystyle N(\mathbf {r} )} is the noise image, and L {\displaystyle L} is the length of field line segment that is followed. D ( r ) {\displaystyle D(\mathbf {r} )} has to be computed for each pixel in the LIC image. If carried out naively, this is quite expensive. First, the field lines have to be computed using a numerical method for solving ordinary differential equations, like a Runge–Kutta method, and then for each pixel the convolution along a field line segment has to be calculated. The final image will normally be colored in some way. Typically, some scalar field in Ω {\displaystyle \Omega } (like the vector length) is used to determine the hue, while the grayscale LIC output determines the brightness. Different choices of convolution kernels and random noise produce different textures; for example, pink noise produces a cloudy pattern where areas of higher flow stand out as smearing, suitable for weather visualization. Further refinements in the convolution can improve the quality of the image. === Programming description === Algorithmically, LIC takes a vector field and noise texture as input, and outputs a texture. The process starts by generating in the domain of the vector field a random gray level image at the desired output resolution. Then, for every pixel in this image, the forward and backward streamline of a fixed arc length is calculated. The value assigned to the current pixel is computed by a convolution of a suitable convolution kernel with the gray levels of all the noise pixels lying on a segment of this streamline. This creates a gray level LIC image. == Versions == === Basic === Basic LIC images are grayscale images, without color and animation. While such LIC images convey the direction of the field vectors, they do not indicate orientation; for stationary fields, this can be remedied by animation. Basic LIC images do not show the length of the vectors (or the strength of the field). === Color === The length of the vectors (or the strength of the field) is usually coded in color; alternatively, animation can be used. === Animation === LIC images can be animated by using a kernel that changes over time. Samples at a constant time from the streamline would still be used, but instead of averaging all pixels in a streamline with a static kernel, a ripple-like kernel constructed from a periodic function multiplied by a Hann function acting as a window (in order to prevent artifacts) is used. The periodic function is then shifted along the period to create an animation. === Fast LIC (FLIC) === The computation can be significantly accelerated by re-using parts of already computed field lines, specializing to a box function as convolution kernel k ( s ) {\displaystyle k(s)} and avoiding redundant computations during convolution. The resulting fast LIC method can be generalized to convolution kernels that are arbitrary polynomials. === Oriented Line Integral Convolution (OLIC) === Because LIC does not encode flow orientation, it cannot distinguish between streamlines of equal direction but opposite orientation. Oriented Line Integral Convolution (OLIC) solves this issue by using a ramp-like asymmetric kernel and a low-density noise texture. The kernel asymmetrically modulates the intensity along the streamline, producing a trace that encodes orientation; the low-density of the noise texture prevents smeared traces from overlapping, aiding readability. Fast Rendering of Oriented Line Integral Convolution (FROLIC) is a variation that approximates OLIC by rendering each trace in discrete steps instead of as a continuous smear. === Unsteady Flow LIC (UFLIC) === For time-dependent vector fields (unsteady flow), a variant called Unsteady Flow LIC has been designed that maintains the coherence of the flow animation. An interactive GPU-based implementation of UFLIC has been presented. === Parallel === Since the computation of an LIC image is expensive but inherently parallel, the process has been parallelized and, with availability of GPU-based implementations, interactive on PCs. === Multidimensional === Note that the domain Ω {\displaystyle \Omega } does not have to be a 2D domain: the method is applicable to higher dimensional domains using multidimensional noise fields. However, the visualization of the higher-dimensional LIC texture is problematic; one way is to use interactive exploration with 2D slices that are manually positioned and rotated. The domain Ω {\displaystyle \Omega } does not have to be flat either; the LIC texture can be computed also for arbitrarily shaped 2D surfaces in 3D space. == Applications == This technique has been applied to a wide range of problems since it first was published in 1993, both scientific and creative, including: Representing vector fields: visualization of steady (time-independent) flows (streamlines) visual exploration of 2D autonomous dynamical systems wind mapping water flow mapping Artistic effects for image generation and stylization: pencil drawing (auto

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  Blocknots

  Blocknots were random sequences of numbers contained in a book and organized by numbered rows and columns and were used as additives in the reciphering of Soviet Union codes, during World War II. The Blocknot consisted of a booklet of fifty sheets of 5-figure random additive, 100 additive groups to a sheet. No sheet was used more than once, thus the blocknots were in effect a form of one-time pad. The Soviet Unions highest grade ciphers that were used in the East, were the 5-figure codebook enciphered with the Blocknot book, and were generally considered unbreakable. == Technical Description == Blocknots were distributed centrally from an office in Moscow. Every Blocknot contained 5-figure groups in a number of sheets, for the enciphering of 5-figure messages. The encipherment was effected by applying additives taken from the pad, of which 50-100 5-figure groups appeared. Each pad had a 5-figure number and each sheet had a 2-figure number running consecutively. There were 5 different types of Blocknots, in two different categories The Individual in which each table of random numbers was used only once. The General in which each page of the Blocknot was valid for one day. The security of the additive sequence rested on the choice of different starting points for each message. In 5-figure messages, the blocknot was one of the first 10 Groups in the message. Its position changed at long intervals, but was always easy to re-identify. The Russians differentiated between three types of blocks: The 3-block, DRIERBLOCK. I-block for Individual Block: 50 pages, additive read off in one direction only. The messages could be used and read only between 2 wireless telegraphy stations on one net. The 6-block, SECHSERBLOCK. Z-block for Circular Block: 30 pages, additive read off in either direction. The messages could be used and read, between all W/T stations in a net. The 2-block, ZWEIERBLOCK. OS-block. Used only in traffic from lower to higher formations. Two other types were used, in lower echelons. Notblock: Used in an emergency. Blocknot used for passing on traffic. The distribution of Blocknots was carried out centrally from Moscow to Army Groups then to Armies. The Army was responsible for their distribution throughout the lower levels of the army down to company level. Independent units took their cipher material with them. Occasionally the same blocknot was distributed to two units on different parts of the front, which enabled Depth to be established. Records of all Blocknots used were kept in Berlin and when a repeat was noticed a BLOCKNOT ANGEBOT message was sent out to all German Signals units, to indicate that it may have been possible to break the code using it. There was no certainty in this. A cryptanalyst with the General der Nachrichtenaufklärung stated while being interrogated by TICOM: It seems that depths of up to 8 were established at the beginning of the Russian Campaign but that no 5-figure code was broken after May 1943 German cryptanalysts who were prisoners of war stated under interrogation, that each of the figures 0 to 9 were placed en clair usually within the first ten groups of the text or sometimes at the end. One indicator was the Blocknot number and the consisted of two random figures, the figure representing the type, and the remaining two, the page of the Blocknot being used. In long messages, 000000 was placed in the message when the end of a page had been reached. == Chi number == The Chi-number was the serial numbering of all 5-figure messages passing through the hands of the Cipher Officer, starting on the first of January and ending on thirty-first December of the current year. It always appeared as the last group in an intercepted message, e.g. 00001 on the 1st January, or when the unit was newly set up. The progression of Chi-numbers was carefully observed and recorded in the form of a graph. A Russian corps had about 10 5-figure messages per day, and Army about 20-30 and a Front about 60–100. After only a relatively short time, the individual curves separated sharply and the type of formation could be recognized by the height of the Chi-number alone. == Monitoring == Blocknots were tracked in a card index, that was maintained by the Signal Intelligence Evaluation Centre (NAAS). The NAAS functionality included evaluation and traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, collation and dissemination of intelligence. The card index, which was one amongst several Card Indexes. A careful recording and study of blocks provided the positive clues in the identification and tracking of formations using 5-figure ciphers. The index was subdivided into two files: Search card index, contained all blocknots and chi-numbers whether or not they were known. Unit card index, contained only known Block and Chi-numbers. Inspector Berger, who was the chief cryptanalyst of NAAS 1 stated that the two files formed: The most important and surest instruments for identifying Russian radio nets, known to him. The Blocknots were also used in the Stationary Intercept Company (Feste), the military unit that were designed to work at a lower level to the NAAS, at the Army level and were semi-motorized, and closer to the front. The Feste used the Blocknot value along with several other parameters to build a network diagram. The network diagram was studied extensively, as part of a 6-stage process, that involved several departments within the Feste. The outcome was a metric which determined the most interesting circuit for traffic monitoring, and least interesting, where monitoring of traffic should cease. == Analysis == Johannes Marquart was a mathematician and cryptanalyst who initially worked for Inspectorate 7/VI and later led Referat Ia of Group IV of the General der Nachrichtenaufklärung. Marquart was assigned the study of the Soviet Union Blocknot traffic. Marquart and his unit conducted extensive research in an attempt to discover the method by which they were produced. All the counts which they made, however, failed to reveal any non-random characteristics in the design of the tables, and while they thought the Blocknots must have been generated by machine, they were never able to draw any concrete deductions as a result of their research. == Example == The Soviet 3rd Guard Tank Army transmits a 5-figure message with the Blocknot of 37581 (one of the first 10 groups in the message). On the same day the Block 37582 was used by the same formation. The next day 37583 appeared. Thereafter, for a period, the Army was not heard by German Wireless telegraphy intercept operators, as it was maintaining wireless silence. After a few days, an unidentified net with the Blocknot 37588 is picked up. This message net is claimed, because of the proximity of the blocks (88/83) to be the 3rd Guard Tank Army. The missing Blocknots 84-87 were presumably used in telegraphic, telephonic or courier communications. The Chi number provides confirmation of the first assumption, based on proximity of blocknots in most cases.

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  Secret London

  Secret London is a Facebook group started by 21-year-old Bristol University graduate, Tiffany Philippou, on 19 January 2010 in response to a Saatchi & Saatchi competition. The group grew rapidly (180,000 members as of 8 February 2010) and is composed mostly of Londoners who use the site to share suggestions and photos of London. After the group's early success, the founder announced her intention to launch a website of the same name by crowdsourcing the design and development. The website was launched on 16 February 2010. == Other secret cities == Following the initial success of Secret London, a number of other secret groups were independently started around the world, some of which already have over 100,000 users. As of 19 February 2010, the list of other groups includes: Secret Frankfurt, Secret Tel Aviv, Secret Paris, Secret New York, Secret Tokyo, Secret Toronto, Secret Los Angeles, Secret Exeter, Secret Boston, Secret Norwich, Secret Singapore, Secret Brighton, Secret Minneapolis, Secret Sydney, Secret Canberra, Secret Brisbane, Secret Wellington, Secret Christchurch, Secret Madeira, Secret Funchal, Secret Bristol and Secret Cardiff. == Controversy == Some commentators have questioned whether it possible to share secrets without compromising them, and whether sharing tips publicly will lead to over-exposure of the businesses who are recommended.

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