The Jordan Antiquities Database and Information System (JADIS) was a computer database of antiquities in Jordan, the first of its kind in the Arab world. It was established by the Department of Antiquities in 1990, in cooperation with the American Center for Oriental Research in Amman and sponsored by the United States Agency for International Development. JADIS was in use until 2002, when it was superseded by a new system, MEGA-J. Over 10,841 antiquities were registered in the database. An introduction and printed summary of the database was published by the Department of Antiquities in 1994, edited by Gaetano Palumbo.
Security type system
In computer science, a type system can be described as a syntactic framework which contains a set of rules that are used to assign a type property (int, boolean, char etc.) to various components of a computer program, such as variables or functions. A security type system works in a similar way, only with a main focus on the security of the computer program, through information flow control. Thus, the various components of the program are assigned security types, or labels. The aim of a such system is to ultimately be able to verify that a given program conforms to the type system rules and satisfies non-interference. Security type systems is one of many security techniques used in the field of language-based security, and is tightly connected to information flow and information flow policies. In simple terms, a security type system can be used to detect if there exists any kind of violation of confidentiality or integrity in a program, i.e. the programmer wants to detect if the program is in line with the information flow policy or not. == A simple information flow policy == Suppose there are two users, A and B. In a program, the following security classes (SC) are introduced: SC = {∅, {A}, {B}, {A,B}}, where ∅ is the empty set. The information flow policy should define the direction that information is allowed to flow, which is dependent on whether the policy allows read or write operations. This example considers read operations (confidentiality). The following flows are allowed: → = {({A}, {A}), ({B}, {B}), ({A,B}, {A,B}), ({A,B}, {A}), ({A,B}, {B}), ({A}, ∅), ({B}, ∅), ({A,B}, ∅)} This can also be described as a superset (⊇). In words: information is allowed to flow towards stricter levels of confidentiality. The combination operator (⊕) can express how security classes can perform read operations with respect to other security classes. For example: {A} ⊕ {A,B} = {A} — the only security class that can read from both {A} and {A,B} is {A}. {A} ⊕ {B} = ∅ — neither {A} nor {B} are allowed to read from both {A} and {B}. This can also be described as an intersection (∩) between security classes. An information flow policy can be illustrated as a Hasse diagram. The policy should also be a lattice, that is, it has a greatest lower-bound and least upper-bound (there always exists a combination between security classes). In the case of integrity, information will flow in the opposite direction, thus the policy will be inverted. == Information flow policy in security type systems == Once the policy is in place, the software developer can apply the security classes to the program components. Use of a security type system is usually combined with a compiler that can perform the verification of the information flow according to the type system rules. For the sake of simplicity, a very simple computer program, together with the information flow policy as described in the previous section, can be used as a demonstration. The simple program is given in the following pseudocode: if y{A} = 1 then x{A,B} := 0 else x{A,B} := 1 Here, an equality check is made on a variable y that is assigned the security class {A}. A variable x with a lower security class ({A,B}) is influenced by this check. This means that information is leaking from class {A} to class {A,B}, which is a violation of the confidentiality policy. This leak should be detected by the security type system. === Example === Designing a security type system requires a function (also known as a security environment) that creates a mapping from variables to security types, or classes. This function can be called Γ, such that Γ(x) = τ, where x is a variable and τ is the security class, or type. Security classes are assigned (also called "judgement") to program components, using the following notation: Types are assigned to read operations by: Γ ⊢ e : τ. Types are assigned to write operations by: Γ ⊢ S : τ cmd. Constants can be assigned any type. The following bottom-up notation can be used to decompose the program: assumption1 ... assumptionn/conclusion. Once the program is decomposed into trivial judgements, by which the type can easily be determined, the types for the less trivial parts of the program can be derived. Each "numerator" is considered in isolation, looking at the type of each statement to see if an allowed type can be derived for the "denominator", based on the defined type system "rules". ==== Rules ==== The main part of the security type system is the rules. They say how the program should be decomposed and how type verification should be performed. This toy program consists of a conditional test and two possible variable assignments. Rules for these two events are defined as follows: Applying this to the simple program introduced above yields: The type system detects the policy violation in line 2, where a read operation of security class {A} is performed, followed by two write operations of a less strict security class {A,B}. In more formalized terms, {A} ⋢ {A,B}, {A,B} (from the rule of the conditional test). Thus, the program is classified as "not typeable". === Soundness === The soundness of a security type system can be informally defined as: If program P is well typed, P satisfies non-interference. Volpano, Smith and Irvine were the first to prove soundness of a security type system for a deterministic imperative programming language with a standard (non-instrumented) semantics using the notion of non-interference.
Brave Leo
Brave Leo is a large language model-based chatbot developed by Brave Software and included with the Brave browser. == History == In November 2023, the company said versions for iOS and Android would be available "in the coming months". == Features == Since January 2024, Leo has used the open-source Mixtral 8x7B from Mistral AI as its default large language model, in addition to LLaMA 2 from Meta Platforms and Claude from Anthropic, both of which have been used previously. Leo can suggest follow-up questions, and summarize webpages, PDFs, and videos. Leo has a $15 (US) per month premium version that enables more requests and uses larger LLMs. == Privacy == The answers given by Leo are not saved. Brave uses the slogan Love Privacy to emphasize its focus on user privacy and data protection. The phrase has been featured in Brave's official marketing campaigns and has been cited in media coverage of the browser's privacy-first approach. == Controversies == In 2023, PC World reported that Leo evades questions about US elections.
Inverse depth parametrization
In computer vision, the inverse depth parametrization is a parametrization used in methods for 3D reconstruction from multiple images such as simultaneous localization and mapping (SLAM). Given a point p {\displaystyle \mathbf {p} } in 3D space observed by a monocular pinhole camera from multiple views, the inverse depth parametrization of the point's position is a 6D vector that encodes the optical centre of the camera c 0 {\displaystyle \mathbf {c} _{0}} when in first observed the point, and the position of the point along the ray passing through p {\displaystyle \mathbf {p} } and c 0 {\displaystyle \mathbf {c} _{0}} . Inverse depth parametrization generally improves numerical stability and allows to represent points with zero parallax. Moreover, the error associated to the observation of the point's position can be modelled with a Gaussian distribution when expressed in inverse depth. This is an important property required to apply methods, such as Kalman filters, that assume normality of the measurement error distribution. The major drawback is the larger memory consumption, since the dimensionality of the point's representation is doubled. == Definition == Given 3D point p = ( x , y , z ) {\displaystyle \mathbf {p} =(x,y,z)} with world coordinates in a reference frame ( e 1 , e 2 , e 3 ) {\displaystyle (e_{1},e_{2},e_{3})} , observed from different views, the inverse depth parametrization y {\displaystyle \mathbf {y} } of p {\displaystyle \mathbf {p} } is given by: y = ( x 0 , y 0 , z 0 , θ , ϕ , ρ ) {\displaystyle \mathbf {y} =(x_{0},y_{0},z_{0},\theta ,\phi ,\rho )} where the first five components encode the camera pose in the first observation of the point, being c 0 = ( x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ) {\displaystyle \mathbf {c_{0}} =(x_{0},y_{0},z_{0})} the optical centre, ϕ {\displaystyle \phi } the azimuth, θ {\displaystyle \theta } the elevation angle, and ρ = 1 ‖ p − c 0 ‖ {\displaystyle \rho ={\frac {1}{\left\Vert \mathbf {p} -\mathbf {c} _{0}\right\Vert }}} the inverse depth of p {\displaystyle p} at the first observation.
Pose (computer vision)
In the fields of computing and computer vision, pose (or spatial pose) represents the position and the orientation of an object, each usually in three dimensions. Poses are often stored internally as transformation matrices. The term “pose” is largely synonymous with the term “transform”, but a transform may often include scale, whereas pose does not. In computer vision, the pose of an object is often estimated from camera input by the process of pose estimation. This information can then be used, for example, to allow a robot to manipulate an object or to avoid moving into the object based on its perceived position and orientation in the environment. Other applications include skeletal action recognition. == Pose estimation == The specific task of determining the pose of an object in an image (or stereo images, image sequence) is referred to as pose estimation. Pose estimation problems can be solved in different ways depending on the image sensor configuration, and choice of methodology. Three classes of methodologies can be distinguished: Analytic or geometric methods: Given that the image sensor (camera) is calibrated and the mapping from 3D points in the scene and 2D points in the image is known. If also the geometry of the object is known, it means that the projected image of the object on the camera image is a well-known function of the object's pose. Once a set of control points on the object, typically corners or other feature points, has been identified, it is then possible to solve the pose transformation from a set of equations which relate the 3D coordinates of the points with their 2D image coordinates. Algorithms that determine the pose of a point cloud with respect to another point cloud are known as point set registration algorithms, if the correspondences between points are not already known. Genetic algorithm methods: If the pose of an object does not have to be computed in real-time a genetic algorithm may be used. This approach is robust especially when the images are not perfectly calibrated. In this particular case, the pose represent the genetic representation and the error between the projection of the object control points with the image is the fitness function. Learning-based methods: These methods use artificial learning-based system which learn the mapping from 2D image features to pose transformation. In short, this means that a sufficiently large set of images of the object, in different poses, must be presented to the system during a learning phase. Once the learning phase is completed, the system should be able to present an estimate of the object's pose given an image of the object. == Camera pose ==
Screen space ambient occlusion
Screen space ambient occlusion (SSAO) is a computer graphics technique for efficiently approximating the ambient occlusion effect in real time. It was developed by Vladimir Kajalin while working at Crytek and was used for the first time in 2007 by the video game Crysis, also developed by Crytek. == Implementation == The algorithm is implemented as a pixel shader, analyzing the scene depth buffer which is stored in a texture. For every pixel on the screen, the pixel shader samples the depth values around the current pixel and tries to compute the amount of occlusion from each of the sampled points. In its simplest implementation, the occlusion factor depends only on the depth difference between sampled point and current point. Without additional smart solutions, such a brute force method would require about 200 texture reads per pixel for good visual quality. This is not acceptable for real-time rendering on current graphics hardware. In order to get high quality results with far fewer reads, sampling is performed using a randomly rotated kernel. The kernel orientation is repeated every N screen pixels in order to have only high-frequency noise in the final picture. In the end this high frequency noise is greatly removed by a NxN post-process blurring step taking into account depth discontinuities (using methods such as comparing adjacent normals and depths). Such a solution allows a reduction in the number of depth samples per pixel to about 16 or fewer while maintaining a high quality result, and allows the use of SSAO in soft real-time applications like computer games. Compared to other ambient occlusion solutions, SSAO has the following advantages: Independent from scene complexity. No data pre-processing needed, no loading time and no memory allocations in system memory. Works with dynamic scenes. Works in the same consistent way for every pixel on the screen. No CPU usage – it can be executed completely on the GPU. May be easily integrated into any modern graphics pipeline. SSAO also has the following disadvantages: Rather local and in many cases view-dependent, as it is dependent on adjacent texel depths which may be generated by any geometry whatsoever. Hard to correctly smooth/blur out the noise without interfering with depth discontinuities, such as object edges (the occlusion should not "bleed" onto objects). Because SSAO operates only on the current depth buffer, it can miss occluding geometry that is not rasterized into the z-buffer and may produce undersampling-related artifacts.
Pose (computer vision)
In the fields of computing and computer vision, pose (or spatial pose) represents the position and the orientation of an object, each usually in three dimensions. Poses are often stored internally as transformation matrices. The term “pose” is largely synonymous with the term “transform”, but a transform may often include scale, whereas pose does not. In computer vision, the pose of an object is often estimated from camera input by the process of pose estimation. This information can then be used, for example, to allow a robot to manipulate an object or to avoid moving into the object based on its perceived position and orientation in the environment. Other applications include skeletal action recognition. == Pose estimation == The specific task of determining the pose of an object in an image (or stereo images, image sequence) is referred to as pose estimation. Pose estimation problems can be solved in different ways depending on the image sensor configuration, and choice of methodology. Three classes of methodologies can be distinguished: Analytic or geometric methods: Given that the image sensor (camera) is calibrated and the mapping from 3D points in the scene and 2D points in the image is known. If also the geometry of the object is known, it means that the projected image of the object on the camera image is a well-known function of the object's pose. Once a set of control points on the object, typically corners or other feature points, has been identified, it is then possible to solve the pose transformation from a set of equations which relate the 3D coordinates of the points with their 2D image coordinates. Algorithms that determine the pose of a point cloud with respect to another point cloud are known as point set registration algorithms, if the correspondences between points are not already known. Genetic algorithm methods: If the pose of an object does not have to be computed in real-time a genetic algorithm may be used. This approach is robust especially when the images are not perfectly calibrated. In this particular case, the pose represent the genetic representation and the error between the projection of the object control points with the image is the fitness function. Learning-based methods: These methods use artificial learning-based system which learn the mapping from 2D image features to pose transformation. In short, this means that a sufficiently large set of images of the object, in different poses, must be presented to the system during a learning phase. Once the learning phase is completed, the system should be able to present an estimate of the object's pose given an image of the object. == Camera pose ==