Hekaton (also known as SQL Server In-Memory OLTP) is an in-memory database for OLTP workloads built into Microsoft SQL Server. Hekaton was designed in collaboration with Microsoft Research and was released in SQL Server 2014. Traditional RDBMS systems were designed when memory resources were expensive, and were optimized for disk storage. Hekaton is instead optimized for a working set stored entirely in main memory, but is still accessible via T-SQL like normal tables. It is fundamentally different from the "DBCC PINTABLE" feature in earlier SQL Server versions. Hekaton was announced at the Professional Association for SQL Server (PASS) conference 2012.
Adversarial stylometry
Adversarial stylometry is the practice of altering writing style to reduce the potential for stylometry to discover the author's identity or their characteristics. This task is also known as authorship obfuscation or authorship anonymisation. Stylometry poses a significant privacy challenge in its ability to unmask anonymous authors or to link pseudonyms to an author's other identities, which, for example, creates difficulties for whistleblowers, activists, and hoaxers and fraudsters. The privacy risk is expected to grow as machine learning techniques and text corpora develop. All adversarial stylometry shares the core idea of faithfully paraphrasing the source text so that the meaning is unchanged but the stylistic signals are obscured. Such a faithful paraphrase is an adversarial example for a stylometric classifier. Several broad approaches to this exist, with some overlap: imitation, substituting the author's own style for another's; translation, applying machine translation with the hope that this eliminates characteristic style in the source text; and obfuscation, deliberately modifying a text's style to make it not resemble the author's own. Manually obscuring style is possible, but laborious; in some circumstances, it is preferable or necessary. Automated tooling, either semi- or fully-automatic, could assist an author. How best to perform the task and the design of such tools is an open research question. While some approaches have been shown to be able to defeat particular stylometric analyses, particularly those that do not account for the potential of adversariality, establishing safety in the face of unknown analyses is an issue. Ensuring the faithfulness of the paraphrase is a critical challenge for automated tools. It is uncertain if the practice of adversarial stylometry is detectable in itself. Some studies have found that particular methods produced signals in the output text, but a stylometrist who is uncertain of what methods may have been used may not be able to reliably detect them. == History == Rao & Rohatgi (2000), an early work in adversarial stylometry, identified machine translation as a possibility, but noted that the quality of translators available at the time presented severe challenges. Kacmarcik & Gamon (2006) is another early work. Brennan, Afroz & Greenstadt (2012) performed the first evaluation of adversarial stylometric methods on actual texts. Brennan & Greenstadt (2009) introduced the first corpus of adversarially authored texts specifically for evaluating stylometric methods; other corpora include the International Imitation Hemingway Competition, the Faux Faulkner contest, and the hoax blog A Gay Girl in Damascus. == Motivations == Rao & Rohatgi (2000) suggest that short, unattributed documents (i.e., anonymous posts) are not at risk of stylometric identification, but pseudonymous authors who have not practiced adversarial stylometry in producing corpuses of thousands of words may be vulnerable. Narayanan et al. (2012) attempted large-scale deanonymisation of 100,000 blog authors with mixed results: the identifications were significantly better than chance, but only accurately matched the blog and author a fifth of the time; identification improved with the number of posts written by the author in the corpus. Even if an author is not identified, some of their characteristics may still be deduced stylometrically, or stylometry may narrow the anonymity set of potential authors sufficiently for other information to complete the identification. Detecting author characteristics (e.g., gender or age) is often simpler than identifying an author from a large, possibly open, set of candidates. Modern machine learning techniques offer powerful tools for identification; further development of corpora and computational stylometric techniques are likely to raise further privacy issues. Gröndahl & Asokan (2020a) say that the general validity of the hypothesis underlying stylometry—that authors have invariant, content-independent 'style fingerprints'—is uncertain, but "the deanonymisation attack is a real privacy concern". Those interested in practicing adversarial stylometry and stylistic deception include whistleblowers avoiding retribution; journalists and activists; perpetrators of frauds and hoaxes; authors of fake reviews; literary forgers; criminals disguising their identity from investigators; and, generally, anyone with a desire for anonymity or pseudonymity. Authors, or agents acting on behalf of authors, may also attempt to remove stylistic clues to author characteristics (e.g., race or gender) so that knowledge of those characteristics cannot be used for discrimination (e.g., through algorithmic bias). Another possible use for adversarial stylometry is in disguising automatically generated text as human-authored. == Methods == With imitation, the author attempts to mislead stylometry by matching their style to another author's. An incomplete imitation, where some of the true author's unique characteristics appear alongside the imitated author's, can be a detectable signal for the use of adversarial stylometry. Imitation can be performed automatically with style transfer systems, though this typically requires a large corpus in the target style for the system to learn from. Another approach is translation, which employs machine translation of a source text to eliminate characteristic style, often through multiple translators in sequence to produce a round-trip translation. Such chained translation can lead to texts being significantly altered, even to the point of incomprehensibility; improved translation tools reduce this risk. More simply-structured texts can be easier to machine translate without losing the original meaning. Machine translation blurs into direct stylistic imitation or obfuscation achieved through automated style transfer, which can be viewed as a "translation" with the same language as input and output. With low-quality translation tools, an author can be required to manually correct major translation errors while avoiding the hazard of re-introducing stylistic characteristics. Wang, Juola & Riddell (2022) found that gross errors introduced by Google Translate were rare, but more common with several intermediate translations—however, occasional simple or short sentences and misspellings in the source text appeared verbatim in the output, potentially providing an identifying signal. Chain translation can leave characteristic traces of its application in a document, which may allow reconstruction of the intermediate languages used and the number of translation steps performed. Obfuscation involves deliberately changing the style of a text to reduce its similarity to other texts by some metric; this may be performed at the time of writing by conscious modification, or as part of a revision process with feedback from the metric being targeted as an input to decide when the text has been sufficiently obfuscated. In contrast to translation, complex texts can offer more opportunities for effective obfuscation without altering meaning, and likewise genres with more permissible variation allow more obfuscation. However, longer texts are harder to thoroughly obfuscate. Obfuscation can blend into imitation if the author develops a novel target style, distinct from their original style. With respect to masking author characteristics, obfuscation may aim to achieve a union (adding signals for imitated characteristics) or an intersection (removing signals and normalising) of other authors' styles. Avoiding the author's own idiosyncrasies and producing a "normalised" text is a critical obfuscatory step: an author may have a unique tendency to misspell certain words, use particular variants, or to format a document in a characteristic way. Stylometric signals vary in how simply they can be adversarially masked; an author may easily change their vocabulary by conscious choice, but altering the pattern of grammar or the letter frequency in their text may be harder to achieve, though Juola & Vescovi (2011) report that imitation typically succeeds at masking more characteristics than obfuscation. Automated obfuscation may require large amounts of training data written by the author. Concerning automated implementations of adversarial stylometry, two possible implementations are rule-based systems for paraphrasing; and encoder–decoder architectures, where the text passes through an intermediate format that is (intended to be) style-neutral. Another division in automated methods is whether there is feedback from an identification system or not. With such feedback, finding paraphrases for author masking has been characterised as a heuristic search problem, exploring textual variants until the result is stylistically sufficiently far (in the case of obfuscation) or near (in the case of imitation), which then constitutes an adversarial example for that identification system. == Evaluation == How
Application-release automation
Application-release automation (ARA) refers to the process of packaging and deploying an application or update of an application from development, across various environments, and ultimately to production. ARA solutions must combine the capabilities of deployment automation, environment management and modeling, and release coordination. == Relationship with DevOps == ARA tools help cultivate DevOps best practices by providing a combination of automation, environment modeling and workflow-management capabilities. These practices help teams deliver software rapidly, reliably and responsibly. ARA tools achieve a key DevOps goal of implementing continuous delivery with a large quantity of releases quickly. == Relationship with deployment == ARA is more than just software-deployment automation – it deploys applications using structured release-automation techniques that allow for an increase in visibility for the whole team. It combines workload automation and release-management tools as they relate to release packages, as well as movement through different environments within the DevOps pipeline. ARA tools help regulate deployments, how environments are created and deployed, and how and when releases are deployed. == ARA Solutions == All ARA solutions must include capabilities in automation, environment modeling, and release coordination. Additionally, the solution must provide this functionality without reliance on other tools.
Google Mobile Services
Google Mobile Services (GMS) is a collection of proprietary applications and application programming interfaces (APIs) services from Google that are typically pre-installed on the majority of Android devices, such as smartphones, tablets, and smart TVs. GMS is not a part of the Android Open Source Project (AOSP), which means an Android manufacturer needs to obtain a license from Google in order to legally pre-install GMS on an Android device. This license is provided by Google without any licensing fees except in the EU. == Core applications == The following are core applications that are part of Google Mobile Services: Google Search Google Chrome YouTube Google Play Google Drive Gmail Google Meet Google Maps Google Photos Google TV YouTube Music === Historically === Google+ Google Hangouts Google Wallet Google Play Magazines Google Play Music Google Play Movies & TV Google Duo == Reception, competitors, and regulators == === FairSearch === Numerous European firms filed a complaint to the European Commission stating that Google had manipulated their power and dominance within the market to push their Services to be used by phone manufacturers. The firms were joined under the name FairSearch, and the main firms included were Microsoft, Expedia, TripAdvisor, Nokia and Oracle. FairSearch's major problem with Google's practices was that they believed Google were forcing phone manufacturers to use their Mobile Services. They claimed Google managed this by asking these manufacturers to sign a contract stating that they must preinstall specific Google Mobile Services, such as Maps, Search and YouTube, in order to get the latest version of Android. Google swiftly responded stating that they "continue to work co-operatively with the European Commission". === Aptoide === The third-party Android app store Aptoide also filed an EU competition complaint against Google once again stating that they are misusing their power within the market. Aptoide alleged that Google was blocking third-party app stores from being on Google Play, as well as blocking Google Chrome from downloading any third-party apps and app stores. As of June 2014, Google had not responded to these allegations. === Abuse of Android dominance === In May 2019, Umar Javeed, Sukarma Thapar, Aaqib Javeed vs. Google LLC & Ors. the Competition Commission of India ordered an antitrust probe against Google for abusing its dominant position with Android to block market rivals. In Prima Facie opinion the commission held that mandatory pre-installation of the entire Google Mobile Services (GMS) suite, under Mobile Application Distribution Agreements (MADA), amounts to the imposition of unfair conditions on the device manufacturers. === EU antitrust ruling === On July 18, 2018, the European Commission fined Google €4.34 billion for breaching EU antitrust rules which resulted in a change of licensing policy for the GMS in the EU. A new paid licensing agreement for smartphones and tablets shipped into the EEA was created. The change is that the GMS is now decoupled from the base Android and will be offered under a separate paid licensing agreement. === Privacy policy === At the same time, Google faced problems with various European data protection agencies, most notably In the United Kingdom and France. The problem they faced was that they had a set of 60 rules merged into one, which allowed Google to "track users more closely". Google once again came out and stated that their new policies still abide by European Union laws. === Android distributions without Google Mobile Services === After surveillance and privacy concerns, several custom android distributions have been implemented, such as GrapheneOS, LineageOS, CalyxOS, iodéOS or /e/OS, and they come either without any GMS installed by default or with microG, that adds a compatibility layer.
Neural style transfer
Neural style transfer (NST) software algorithms are able to manipulate digital images, or videos, in order to adopt the appearance or visual style of another image. NST algorithms are characterized by their use of deep neural networks for the sake of image transformation. Common uses for NST are the creation of artificial artwork from photographs, for example by transferring the appearance of famous paintings to user-supplied photographs. Several notable mobile apps use NST techniques for this purpose, including DeepArt and Prisma. This method has been used by artists and designers around the globe to develop new artwork based on existent style(s). == History == NST is an example of image stylization, a problem studied for over two decades within the field of non-photorealistic rendering. The first two example-based style transfer algorithms were image analogies and image quilting. Both of these methods were based on patch-based texture synthesis algorithms. Given a training pair of images–a photo and an artwork depicting that photo–a transformation could be learned and then applied to create new artwork from a new photo, by analogy. If no training photo was available, it would need to be produced by processing the input artwork; image quilting did not require this processing step, though it was demonstrated on only one style. NST was first published in the paper "A Neural Algorithm of Artistic Style" by Leon Gatys et al., originally released to ArXiv 2015, and subsequently accepted by the peer-reviewed CVPR conference in 2016. The original paper used a VGG-19 architecture that has been pre-trained to perform object recognition using the ImageNet dataset. In 2017, Google AI introduced a method that allows a single deep convolutional style transfer network to learn multiple styles at the same time. This algorithm permits style interpolation in real-time, even when done on video media. == Mathematics == This section closely follows the original paper. === Overview === The idea of Neural Style Transfer (NST) is to take two images—a content image p → {\displaystyle {\vec {p}}} and a style image a → {\displaystyle {\vec {a}}} —and generate a third image x → {\displaystyle {\vec {x}}} that minimizes a weighted combination of two loss functions: a content loss L content ( p → , x → ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{\text{content }}({\vec {p}},{\vec {x}})} and a style loss L style ( a → , x → ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{\text{style }}({\vec {a}},{\vec {x}})} . The total loss is a linear sum of the two: L NST ( p → , a → , x → ) = α L content ( p → , x → ) + β L style ( a → , x → ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{\text{NST}}({\vec {p}},{\vec {a}},{\vec {x}})=\alpha {\mathcal {L}}_{\text{content}}({\vec {p}},{\vec {x}})+\beta {\mathcal {L}}_{\text{style}}({\vec {a}},{\vec {x}})} By jointly minimizing the content and style losses, NST generates an image that blends the content of the content image with the style of the style image. Both the content loss and the style loss measures the similarity of two images. The content similarity is the weighted sum of squared-differences between the neural activations of a single convolutional neural network (CNN) on two images. The style similarity is the weighted sum of Gram matrices within each layer (see below for details). The original paper used a VGG-19 CNN, but the method works for any CNN. === Symbols === Let x → {\textstyle {\vec {x}}} be an image input to a CNN. Let F l ∈ R N l × M l {\textstyle F^{l}\in \mathbb {R} ^{N_{l}\times M_{l}}} be the matrix of filter responses in layer l {\textstyle l} to the image x → {\textstyle {\vec {x}}} , where: N l {\textstyle N_{l}} is the number of filters in layer l {\textstyle l} ; M l {\textstyle M_{l}} is the height times the width (i.e. number of pixels) of each filter in layer l {\textstyle l} ; F i j l ( x → ) {\textstyle F_{ij}^{l}({\vec {x}})} is the activation of the i th {\textstyle i^{\text{th}}} filter at position j {\textstyle j} in layer l {\textstyle l} . A given input image x → {\textstyle {\vec {x}}} is encoded in each layer of the CNN by the filter responses to that image, with higher layers encoding more global features, but losing details on local features. === Content loss === Let p → {\textstyle {\vec {p}}} be an original image. Let x → {\textstyle {\vec {x}}} be an image that is generated to match the content of p → {\textstyle {\vec {p}}} . Let P l {\textstyle P^{l}} be the matrix of filter responses in layer l {\textstyle l} to the image p → {\textstyle {\vec {p}}} . The content loss is defined as the squared-error loss between the feature representations of the generated image and the content image at a chosen layer l {\displaystyle l} of a CNN: L content ( p → , x → , l ) = 1 2 ∑ i , j ( A i j l ( x → ) − A i j l ( p → ) ) 2 {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{\text{content }}({\vec {p}},{\vec {x}},l)={\frac {1}{2}}\sum _{i,j}\left(A_{ij}^{l}({\vec {x}})-A_{ij}^{l}({\vec {p}})\right)^{2}} where A i j l ( x → ) {\displaystyle A_{ij}^{l}({\vec {x}})} and A i j l ( p → ) {\displaystyle A_{ij}^{l}({\vec {p}})} are the activations of the i th {\displaystyle i^{\text{th}}} filter at position j {\displaystyle j} in layer l {\displaystyle l} for the generated and content images, respectively. Minimizing this loss encourages the generated image to have similar content to the content image, as captured by the feature activations in the chosen layer. The total content loss is a linear sum of the content losses of each layer: L content ( p → , x → ) = ∑ l v l L content ( p → , x → , l ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{\text{content }}({\vec {p}},{\vec {x}})=\sum _{l}v_{l}{\mathcal {L}}_{\text{content }}({\vec {p}},{\vec {x}},l)} , where the v l {\displaystyle v_{l}} are positive real numbers chosen as hyperparameters. === Style loss === The style loss is based on the Gram matrices of the generated and style images, which capture the correlations between different filter responses at different layers of the CNN: L style ( a → , x → ) = ∑ l = 0 L w l E l , {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{\text{style }}({\vec {a}},{\vec {x}})=\sum _{l=0}^{L}w_{l}E_{l},} where E l = 1 4 N l 2 M l 2 ∑ i , j ( G i j l ( x → ) − G i j l ( a → ) ) 2 . {\displaystyle E_{l}={\frac {1}{4N_{l}^{2}M_{l}^{2}}}\sum _{i,j}\left(G_{ij}^{l}({\vec {x}})-G_{ij}^{l}({\vec {a}})\right)^{2}.} Here, G i j l ( x → ) {\displaystyle G_{ij}^{l}({\vec {x}})} and G i j l ( a → ) {\displaystyle G_{ij}^{l}({\vec {a}})} are the entries of the Gram matrices for the generated and style images at layer l {\displaystyle l} . Explicitly, G i j l ( x → ) = ∑ k F i k l ( x → ) F j k l ( x → ) {\displaystyle G_{ij}^{l}({\vec {x}})=\sum _{k}F_{ik}^{l}({\vec {x}})F_{jk}^{l}({\vec {x}})} Minimizing this loss encourages the generated image to have similar style characteristics to the style image, as captured by the correlations between feature responses in each layer. The idea is that activation pattern correlations between filters in a single layer captures the "style" on the order of the receptive fields at that layer. Similarly to the previous case, the w l {\displaystyle w_{l}} are positive real numbers chosen as hyperparameters. === Hyperparameters === In the original paper, they used a particular choice of hyperparameters. The style loss is computed by w l = 0.2 {\displaystyle w_{l}=0.2} for the outputs of layers conv1_1, conv2_1, conv3_1, conv4_1, conv5_1 in the VGG-19 network, and zero otherwise. The content loss is computed by w l = 1 {\displaystyle w_{l}=1} for conv4_2, and zero otherwise. The ratio α / β ∈ [ 5 , 50 ] × 10 − 4 {\displaystyle \alpha /\beta \in [5,50]\times 10^{-4}} . === Training === Image x → {\displaystyle {\vec {x}}} is initially approximated by adding a small amount of white noise to input image p → {\displaystyle {\vec {p}}} and feeding it through the CNN. Then we successively backpropagate this loss through the network with the CNN weights fixed in order to update the pixels of x → {\displaystyle {\vec {x}}} . After several thousand epochs of training, an x → {\displaystyle {\vec {x}}} (hopefully) emerges that matches the style of a → {\displaystyle {\vec {a}}} and the content of p → {\displaystyle {\vec {p}}} . As of 2017, when implemented on a GPU, it takes a few minutes to converge. == Extensions == In some practical implementations, it is noted that the resulting image has too much high-frequency artifact, which can be suppressed by adding the total variation to the total loss. Compared to VGGNet, AlexNet does not work well for neural style transfer. NST has also been extended to videos. Subsequent work improved the speed of NST for images by using special-purpose normalizations. In a paper by Fei-Fei Li et al. adopted a different regularized loss metric and accelerated method for training to produce results in real-time (three orders of magnitude faster than Gatys). Their idea was to use not the pixel-based loss defined above but rather a 'perceptual loss' measuring t
Text-to-image personalization
Text-to-Image personalization is a task in deep learning for computer graphics that augments pre-trained text-to-image generative models. In this task, a generative model that was trained on large-scale data (usually a foundation model), is adapted such that it can generate images of novel, user-provided concepts. These concepts are typically unseen during training, and may represent specific objects (such as the user's pet) or more abstract categories (new artistic style or object relations). Text-to-Image personalization methods typically bind the novel (personal) concept to new words in the vocabulary of the model. These words can then be used in future prompts to invoke the concept for subject-driven generation, inpainting, style transfer and even to correct biases in the model. To do so, models either optimize word-embeddings, fine-tune the generative model itself, or employ a mixture of both approaches. == Technology == Text-to-Image personalization was first proposed during August 2022 by two concurrent works, Textual Inversion and DreamBooth. In both cases, a user provides a few images (typically 3–5) of a concept, like their own dog, together with a coarse descriptor of the concept class (like the word "dog"). The model then learns to represent the subject through a reconstruction based objective, where prompts referring to the subject are expected to reconstruct images from the training set. In Textual Inversion, the personalized concepts are introduced into the text-to-image model by adding new words to the vocabulary of the model. Typical text-to-image models represent words (and sometimes parts-of-words) as tokens, or indices in a predefined dictionary. During generation, an input prompt is converted into such tokens, each of which is converted into a ‘word-embedding’: a continuous vector representation which is learned for each token as part of the model's training. Textual Inversion proposes to optimize a new word-embedding vector for representing the novel concept. This new embedding vector can then be assigned to a user-chosen string, and invoked whenever the user's prompt contains this string. In DreamBooth, rather than optimizing a new word vector, the full generative model itself is fine-tuned. The user first selects an existing token, typically one which rarely appears in prompts. The subject itself is then represented by a string containing this token, followed by a coarse descriptor of the subject's class. A prompt describing the subject will then take the form: "A photo of
Lenny (chatbot)
Lenny is a chatbot designed to scam bait telemarketers, scammers, and other unwanted incoming calls using messages. == Background == Telemarketers may be perceived by some as annoying and wasting people's time, and some deliberately attempt to scam or defraud people. In April 2018, stats published by YouMail estimated the United States received over three billion robocalls that month. Attempts to block the callers have been hindered by Caller ID spoofing. == Features == The bot was written in 2011, and development taken over by an Alberta-based programmer known as "Mango" two years later. It is driven by sixteen pre-recorded audio clips, spoken in a soft and slow Australian accent in the manner of an elderly man. The bot's original creator stated on Reddit that in building the character he asked himself the question "What would be a telemarketer's worst nightmare?" He answered with this being a lonely old man who is up for a chat, proud of his family and can't focus on the telemarketer's goal. There is no speech recognition or artificial intelligence, and the bot's software is simple and straightforward. The first four clips are played sequentially in order to grab the telemarketer's interest and begin their sales pitch to Lenny, then the remaining twelve are played sequentially on loop until the telemarketer hangs up. The program waits for a gap of 1.5 seconds of silence before playing the next audio clip, to simulate natural breaks in the conversation. The messages are purposefully vague and open-ended so they can be applied to as many conversations as possible. They include references to Lenny's children, the state of the economy, and being interrupted by some ducks outside. According to research into the bot, around 75% of callers realise they are talking to a computer program within two minutes; however, some calls have lasted around an hour. == Distribution == Though other chatbots had been developed earlier, Lenny was the first one to be released for free on a public server and could be accessed by anyone. Recordings of conversations with the bot are widely shared online on websites such as Reddit and YouTube. Though "Mango" only intended Lenny to be used against dishonest telemarketers, such as scammers, he does not mind it being used against callers who are merely annoying. The bot has also been used against political campaigners, such as a supporter of Pierre Poilievre in the 2015 Canadian federal election.