The Principles for a Data Economy – Data Rights and Transactions is a transatlantic legal project carried out jointly by the American Law Institute (ALI) and the European Law Institute (ELI). The Principles for a Data Economy deals with a range of different legal questions that arise in the data economy. Since data is different from other tradeable items, the Principles draw up legal rules for data transactions and data rights that take into account the interests of different stakeholders involved in the data economy. The Principles are designed to facilitate contractual relations as well as the drafting of model agreements and can guide courts and legislators worldwide. The project proposes a set of principles that can be implemented in any legal system and is designed to work in conjunction with any kind of data privacy/data protection law, intellectual property law or trade secret law. The Principles do not address or seek to change any of the substantive rules of these bodies of law. The Project Team consists of Neil B Cohen and Christiane Wendehorst (as Project Reporters) and Lord John Thomas as well as Steven O. Weise (as Project Chairs). == Characteristics of data == The law governing trades in commerce has historically focused on trade in items that are tangible like goods or on intangible assets, such as shares or licenses. However, data does not fit into any of these traditional categories, nor does it qualify as a service. It is often unclear how traditional legal rules and doctrines can apply to data, as data is different from other assets in many ways. For example, data can be multiplied at basically no cost and can be used in parallel for a variety of different purposes by many different people at the same time (data is a “non-rivalrous” resource). Uncertainty regarding the applicable rules to govern the data economy may inhibit innovation and growth and trouble stakeholders like data-driven industries, start-ups, and consumers. == Stakeholders in the data economy == The Principles have taken the basic types of players and relations which can be found in data ecosystems as a starting point to provide guidance in different situations. The central actors in the data economy are data controllers (also called “data holders”). They are in a position to access the data and decide for which purposes and means this data should be processed. A controller may exercise control all by itself or share it with co-controllers, such as under a data pooling arrangement. Data processors provide the processing of data on a controller’s behalf as a service. Another important group of stakeholders includes those that contribute to the generation of data (e.g. data subjects). Other players in the data economy include data assemblers or data intermediaries (e.g. data trusts). == History of the project and timeline == Before the official adoption of the project by ALI and ELI bodies in 2018, the project team carried out a Feasibility Study from October 2016 to February 2018. In the following years, the project team produced a number of drafts (e.g. “Preliminary Drafts” No. 1 to 4, “Tentative Draft No. 1”) and project progress were regularly discussed with advisory bodies and members of both the ALI and the ELI. The project reporters also included feedback and insights from industry stakeholders and experts that was gained after several meetings and workshops, hosted, inter alia by UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT and several national governmental institutions. Tentative Draft No. 2 was presented at the ALI Annual Meeting in May 2021 and approved by ALI membership. The latest draft ("Final Council Draft") was also approved by the ELI Council and ELI Membership. The Principles for a Data Economy were presented at an international conference with representatives from institutions such as the Uniform Law Commission (ULC), the European Commission, UNIDROIT, the OECD, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the World Economic Forum (WEF) in October 2021. == Project structure == The current draft (“Tentative Draft No. 2”) of the Principles consists of five Parts that each governs different aspects of the data economy: General Provisions, Data Contracts, Data Rights, Third Party Aspects of Data Activities, and Multi-State Issues. === General Provisions === Part I includes general provisions that apply to all other Parts of the Principles for a Data Economy. This Part sets out the purpose of the Principles: they aim to make existing law in the field of the data economy more coherent and support the development of the law in this field by courts and legislators worldwide. It is also clarified that the Principles have a wide scope of application and can be used in a variety of ways by stakeholders in the data economy. The Principles may, for example, serve private parties as a basis for contract formation, guide the deliberations of arbitral tribunals or inspire national legislation. Part I then defines several key terms, such as ‘digital data’ and ‘data right’. The scope of the Principles is limited to matters where information is recorded as an asset, resource or tradeable commodity and where large amounts of data, rather than single pieces of information, are concerned. This Part also clarifies that remedies with respect to data contracts and data rights are left to the applicable national law. === Data Contracts === Part II lists different types of contracts that often occur in the data economy and establishes two broad categories, namely contracts for the supply and sharing of data and contracts for services with regard to data. Contracts for the supply and sharing of data include, e.g. data transfer contracts or data pooling arrangements, while contracts for services with regard to data cover contracts for the processing of data or data intermediary contracts. The Principles provide default terms for each contract type, on issues such as the manner in which data should supply or which characteristics the data supplied should meet. These default terms 'automatically' become part of the contract unless the parties agree otherwise. === Data Rights === Part III governs legally protected interests of players in the data economy that stem from the characteristics of data as a resource (e.g. its non-rivalrous nature) or from public interest considerations. Such data rights may include the right to data access, the right to require the controller to desist from data activities or to correct incorrect/incomplete data, or even to receive an economic share in profits derived from the use of data. For example, the Principles deal with data rights of stakeholders that had a share in the co-generation of data and identify different factors to be considered in determining whether to afford a party a data right. The underlying idea that parties who have contributed to the generation of data should have some rights in the utilization of the data is also recognized by governmental institutions, such as by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), and the term co-generated data, which was coined by the Principles for a Data Economy, has been adopted, inter alia by the European Commission, the German Data Ethics Commission and the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI). This Part also deals with data rights for the public interest, such as data sharing rights in the field of innovation. === Third Party Aspects === Part IV governs different situations in which data transactions interfere with the rights of third parties. Such rights include intellectual property rights or rights derived from data privacy or data protection law. This Part sets out under which circumstances data activities should be considered wrongful vis à vis another party. For example, a data activity (like data processing or the onward supply of data) could be considered wrongful, if a controller interferes with the rights of data subjects that are protected by data-protection law. A data activity could also be wrongful if the controller is non-compliant with contractual limitations on data activities, enforceable by the protected party (e.g. a controller may only process data for a certain purpose). If someone obtained access to data by unauthorized means (i.e. data “theft”) this could also be considered wrongful. The Part on Third-Party Aspects also takes a detailed look at the effects of the onward supply of data can have on third parties, while balancing the protection of third parties on the one hand, with the interests of data recipients and the desire to encourage data sharing on the other. === Multi-State Issues === As transactions in the data economy are international by nature and hardly occur within one legal system alone, the Part V of the Principles also briefly touches upon the applicability of the rules and doctrines of private international law to such transactions. == Links == Website of the “Principles for a Data Economy – Data Rights and Transaction
Baby Bundle (app)
Baby Bundle is a parenting mobile app for iPhone and iPad. It was designed to help new parents through pregnancy and the first two years of parenthood. Developed in collaboration with medical experts, it helps track and record the child's development and growth, offers parental advice, manages vaccinations and health check-ups, stores photos and provides baby monitoring services. == History == Baby Bundle was founded in the United Kingdom by brothers, Nick and Anthony von Christierson. Each worked in investment banking prior to developing Baby Bundle, Nick at Greenhill & Co., and Anthony at Goldman Sachs. The idea for the app came when a friend's wife voiced her frustration over having multiple parenting apps on her smartphone. Nick and Anthony left their jobs to create a single app that would include all those features. They conducted market research by interviewing more than 500 parents in the UK and US. It took them a year to build the app, which was named by their mother. Looking for endorsement, they first went to the US in 2013 and partnered with parenting expert and pediatrician Dr. Jennifer Trachtenberg. Baby Bundle was launched in the US and Canadian App Stores in April 2014. In the same month, it became the #1 parenting app in iTunes and was featured by Apple as the #1 Editor's pick across all categories. Mashable called it one of the "Top 5 Can’t Miss Apps." Baby Bundle raised $1.8m seed round in March 2015 to fund development. The money came from a range of angel investors from across the US, UK and Asia. The von Christierson brothers have signed a deal to co-brand the app in the Middle East and expect to launch in Europe and Africa. == Features == Baby Bundle is an app for both the iPhone or iPad and provides smart monitoring tools and trackers for pregnancy and child development. It acts as a growth and daily activity tracker and offers parental advice, manages vaccinations and health check-ups. It has a parenting guide with tips and advice on what to expect when the baby arrives. An interactive forum also lets parents ask questions from others in the community. The app is free and also include paid premium features like the ability to turn two iPhones running into a baby monitor, a cloud service to share the child's data with a spouse and the ability to store data on more than one baby.
Is an AI Photo Editor Worth It in 2026?
Shopping for the best AI photo editor? An AI photo editor is software that uses machine learning to help you get more done — it keeps getting smarter as the underlying models improve. Pricing, accuracy, and the size of the model behind the tool are the three factors that most affect daily usefulness. Whether you are a beginner or a pro, the right AI photo editor slots into your workflow and pays for itself fast. Below we compare features, pricing, and real output so you can choose with confidence.
Isabelle Guyon
Isabelle Guyon (French pronunciation: [izabɛl ɡɥijɔ̃]; born August 15, 1961) is a French-born researcher in machine learning known for her work on support-vector machines, artificial neural networks and bioinformatics. She is a Chair Professor at the University of Paris-Saclay. Guyon serves as the Director of Research at Google DeepMind since October 2022. She is considered to be a pioneer in the field, with her contribution to the support-vector machines with Vladimir Vapnik and Bernhard Boser. == Biography == After graduating from the French engineering school ESPCI Paris in 1985, she joined the group of Gerard Dreyfus at the Université Pierre-et-Marie-Curie to do a PhD on neural networks architectures and training. Guyon defended her thesis in 1988 and was hired the year after at AT&T Bell Laboratories, first as a post-doc, then as a group leader. She worked at Bell Labs for six years, where she explored several research areas, from neural networks to pattern recognition and computational learning theory, with application to handwriting recognition. She collaborated with Yann LeCun, Léon Bottou, Vladimir Vapnik, Corinna Cortes, Yoshua Bengio, Patrice Simard, and met her future husband, Bernhard Boser. In 1996, Guyon left Bell Labs and raised her children at Berkeley, California. In Berkeley, she created her own machine learning consulting company, Clopinet. She became interested in medical applications, and used her previous work to classify the genes responsible for different types of cancers. Since 2003, Guyon has organized many challenges in data science, in order to stimulate research in this field. She founded ChaLearn in 2011, a non-profit organization aimed at creating machine learning challenges open to everyone. She was Program Chair of NeurIPS 2016 and became General Chair of NeurIPS in 2017. She is also Action Editor for the Journal of Machine Learning Research and Series Editor for Series: Challenges in Machine Learning. She is a member of the European Laboratory for Learning and Intelligent Systems. In 2016, Guyon came back to France to take the Chair Professorship in Big data between the University of Paris-Saclay and INRIA. She works in TAU (TAckling the Underspecified), a research collaboration of the Laboratoire de recherche en informatique. Together with Bernhard Schölkopf and Vladimir Vapnik, she received in 2020 the BBVA Foundation Frontiers of Knowledge Awards for her work in machine learning. == Scientific work == Guyon has worked in many subfields of machine learning, including neural networks, support-vector machines, feature selection and applications of machine learning to biology. === Support-vector machines === Among her most notable contributions, Guyon co-invented support-vector machines (SVM) in 1992, with Bernhard Boser and Vladimir Vapnik. SVM is a supervised machine learning algorithm, comparable to neural networks or decision trees, which has quickly become a classical technique in machine learning. SVMs have especially contributed to the popularization of kernel methods. === Neural networks === During her years at Bell Labs, Guyon took part of numerous projects involving neural networks. In particular, she wrote some of the first papers on the use of neural network for handwriting recognition using the MNIST database. She is also a co-inventor of the siamese neural networks, a neural network architecture used to learn similarities, with applications to signature, face or object recognition. === Machine learning for biology === Guyon is the author of many publications at the intersection of biology (cancer research and genomics) and artificial intelligence. She has notably introduced the use of support-vector machines to detect cancer using genes. === Machine learning challenges === Through her non-profit organization ChaLearn, Guyon has organized and directed challenges open to everyone in order to solve open problems in machine learning, including computer vision, neurosciences, particle physics, feature selection, causality and automated machine learning. Most of the challenges organized by ChaLearn have resulted in publications. Among the most cited ones are: Guyon et al., Result analysis of the NIPS 2003 feature selection challenge, Advances in neural information processing systems, 2005, link Escalera et al., ChaLearn Looking at People Challenge 2014: Dataset and Results, Computer Vision - ECCV 2014 Workshops, Springer International Publishing, 2014, link Guyon et al., A brief Review of the ChaLearn AutoML Challenge, JMLR: Workshop and Conference Proceedings 64:21-30, 2016, link Adam-Bourdario et al., The Higgs boson machine learning challenge, JMLR: Workshop and Conference Proceedings 42:19-55, 2015, link == Private life == She is married to Bernhard Boser, a professor at UC Berkeley. She has twins and one daughter, all three of whom have completed a science degree. Guyon has three citizenships: French by birth, Swiss by marriage and American by naturalization. == Awards and honors == Nomination at the French Academy of technologies (2024) Recipient of the BBVA Foundation Frontiers of Knowledge Awards (2020) American Medical Informatics Association Fellow (2011) == Publications == Bernhard Boser, Isabelle Guyon and Vladmir Vapnik, A training algorithm for optimal margin classifiers, Proceedings of the fifth annual workshop on Computational learning theory, 1992, doi:10.1145/130385.130401 Jane Bromley, Isabelle Guyon, Yann LeCun, Eduard Säckinger and Roopak Shah, Signature verification using a" siamese" time delay neural network, Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 1994. Isabelle Guyon and André Elisseeff, An introduction to variable and feature selection, Journal of Machine Learning Research, 2003. Isabelle Guyon, Jason Weston, Stephen Barnhill and Vladimir Vapnik, Gene selection for cancer classification using support vector machines, Machine Learning, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, doi:10.1023/A:1012487302797
Node2vec
node2vec is an algorithm to generate vector representations of nodes on a graph. The node2vec framework learns low-dimensional representations for nodes in a graph through the use of random walks through a graph starting at a target node. It is useful for a variety of machine learning applications. node2vec follows the intuition that random walks through a graph can be treated like sentences in a corpus. Each node in a graph is treated like an individual word, and a random walk is treated as a sentence. By feeding these "sentences" into a skip-gram, or by using the continuous bag of words model, paths found by random walks can be treated as sentences, and traditional data-mining techniques for documents can be used. The algorithm generalizes prior work which is based on rigid notions of network neighborhoods, and argues that the added flexibility in exploring neighborhoods is the key to learning richer representations of nodes in graphs. The algorithm is considered one of the best graph classifiers.
Zero-day vulnerability
A zero-day (also known as a 0-day) is a vulnerability or security hole in a computer system unknown to its developers or anyone capable of mitigating it. Until the vulnerability is remedied, threat actors can exploit it in a zero-day exploit, or zero-day attack. The term "zero-day" originally referred to the number of days since a new piece of software was released to the public, so "zero-day software" was obtained by hacking into a developer's computer before release. Eventually the term was applied to the vulnerabilities that allowed this hacking, and to the number of days that the vendor has had to fix them. Vendors who discover the vulnerability may create patches or advise workarounds to mitigate it, though users need to deploy that mitigation to eliminate the vulnerability in their systems. Zero-day attacks are severe threats. == Definition == Despite developers' goal of delivering a product that works entirely as intended, virtually all products contain software and hardware bugs. If a bug creates a security risk, it is called a vulnerability. Vulnerabilities vary in their ability to be exploited by malicious actors. Some are not usable at all, while others can be used to disrupt the device with a denial of service attack. The most dangerous allow the attacker to inject and run their own code, without the user being aware of it. Although the term "zero-day" initially referred to the time since the vendor had become aware of the vulnerability, zero-day vulnerabilities can also be defined as the subset of vulnerabilities for which no patch or other fix is available. A zero-day exploit is any exploit that takes advantage of such a vulnerability. == Exploits == An exploit is the delivery mechanism that takes advantage of the vulnerability to penetrate the target's systems, for such purposes as disrupting operations, installing malware, or exfiltrating data. Researchers Lillian Ablon and Andy Bogart write that "little is known about the true extent, use, benefit, and harm of zero-day exploits". Exploits based on zero-day vulnerabilities are considered more dangerous than those that take advantage of a known vulnerability. However, it is likely that most cyberattacks use known vulnerabilities, not zero-days. Governments of states are the primary users of zero-day exploits, not only because of the high cost of finding or buying vulnerabilities, but also the significant cost of writing the attack software. Nevertheless, anyone can use a vulnerability, and according to research by the RAND Corporation, "any serious attacker can always get an affordable zero-day for almost any target". Many targeted attacks and most advanced persistent threats rely on zero-day vulnerabilities. In 2017, the average time to develop an exploit from a zero-day vulnerability was estimated at 22 days. The difficulty of developing exploits has been increasing over time due to increased anti-exploitation features in popular software. === Window of vulnerability === Zero-day vulnerabilities are often classified as alive—meaning that there is no public knowledge of the vulnerability—and dead—the vulnerability has been disclosed, but not patched. If the software's maintainers are actively searching for vulnerabilities, it is a living vulnerability; such vulnerabilities in unmaintained software are called immortal. Zombie vulnerabilities can be exploited in older versions of the software but have been patched in newer versions. Even publicly known and zombie vulnerabilities are often exploitable for an extended period. Security patches can take months to develop, or may never be developed. A patch can have negative effects on the functionality of software and users may need to test the patch to confirm functionality and compatibility. Larger organizations may fail to identify and patch all dependencies, while smaller enterprises and personal users may not install patches. Research suggests that risk of cyberattack increases if the vulnerability is made publicly known or a patch is released. Cybercriminals can reverse engineer the patch to find the underlying vulnerability and develop exploits, often faster than users install the patch. According to research by RAND Corporation published in 2017, zero-day exploits remain usable for 6.9 years on average, although those purchased from a third party only remain usable for 1.4 years on average. The researchers were unable to determine if any particular platform or software (such as open-source software) had any relationship to the life expectancy of a zero-day vulnerability. Although the RAND researchers found that 5.7 percent of a stockpile of secret zero-day vulnerabilities will have been discovered by someone else within a year, another study found a higher overlap rate, as high as 10.8 percent to 21.9 percent per year. == Countermeasures == Because, by definition, there is no patch that can block a zero-day exploit, all systems employing the software or hardware with the vulnerability are at risk. This includes secure systems such as banks and governments that have all patches up to date. Security systems are designed around known vulnerabilities, and repeated exploitations of a zero-day exploit could continue undetected for an extended period of time. Although there have been many proposals for a system that is effective at detecting zero-day exploits, this remains an active area of research in 2023. Many organizations have adopted defense-in-depth tactics so that attacks are likely to require breaching multiple levels of security, which makes it more difficult to achieve. Conventional cybersecurity measures such as training and access control — including multi-factor authentication, least-privilege access, and air-gapping makes it harder to compromise systems with a zero-day exploit. Since writing perfectly secure software is impossible, some researchers argue that driving up the cost of exploits is considered a good strategy to reduce the burden of cyberattacks. == Market == Zero-day exploits can fetch millions of dollars. There are three main types of buyers: White: the vendor, or to third parties such as the Zero Day Initiative that disclose to the vendor. Often such disclosure is in exchange for a bug bounty. Not all companies respond positively to disclosures, as they can cause legal liability and operational overhead. It is not uncommon to receive cease-and-desist letters from software vendors after disclosing a vulnerability for free. Gray: the largest and most lucrative. Government or intelligence agencies buy zero-days and may use it in an attack, stockpile the vulnerability, or notify the vendor. The United States federal government is one of the largest buyers. As of 2013, the Five Eyes (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) captured the plurality of the market and other significant purchasers included Russia, India, Brazil, Malaysia, Singapore, North Korea, and Iran. Middle Eastern countries were poised to become the biggest spenders. Black: organized crime, which typically prefers exploit software rather than just knowledge of a vulnerability. These users are more likely to employ "half-days" where a patch is already available. In 2015, the markets for government and crime were estimated at least ten times larger than the white market. Sellers are often hacker groups that seek out vulnerabilities in widely used software for financial reward. Some will only sell to certain buyers, while others will sell to anyone. White market sellers are more likely to be motivated by non pecuniary rewards such as recognition and intellectual challenge. Selling zero-day exploits is legal. Despite calls for more regulation, law professor Mailyn Fidler says there is little chance of an international agreement because key players such as Russia and Israel are not interested. The sellers and buyers that trade in zero-days tend to be secretive, relying on non-disclosure agreements and classified information laws to keep the exploits secret. If the vulnerability becomes known, it can be patched and its value consequently crashes. Because the market lacks transparency, it can be hard for parties to find a fair price. Sellers might not be paid if the vulnerability was disclosed before it was verified, or if the buyer declined to purchase it but used it anyway. With the proliferation of middlemen, sellers could never know to what use the exploits could be put. Buyers could not guarantee that the exploit was not sold to another party. Both buyers and sellers advertise on the dark web. Research published in 2022 based on maximum prices paid as quoted by a single exploit broker found a 44 percent annualized inflation rate in exploit pricing. Remote zero-click exploits could fetch the highest price, while those that require local access to the device are much cheaper. Vulnerabilities in widely used software are also more expensive. They estimated that around 400 to 1,500 people sold exploits to th
Moses (machine translation)
Moses is a statistical machine translation engine that can be used to train statistical models of text translation from a source language to a target language, developed by the University of Edinburgh. Moses then allows new source-language text to be decoded using these models to produce automatic translations in the target language. Training requires a parallel corpus of passages in the two languages, typically manually translated sentence pairs. Moses is free and open-source software, released under the GNU Library Public License (LGPL), and available as source code and binary files for Windows and Linux. Its development is supported mainly by the EuroMatrix project, with funding by the European Commission. Among its features are: A beam search algorithm that quickly finds the highest probability translation within a set of choices Phrase-based translation of short text chunks Handles words with multiple factored representations to enable integrating linguistic and other information (e.g., surface form, lemma and morphology, part-of-speech, word class) Decodes ambiguous forms of a source sentence, represented as a confusion network, to support integrating with upstream tools such as speech recognizers Support for large language models (LMs) such as IRSTLM (an exact LM using memory-mapping) and RandLM (an inexact LM based on Bloom filters)