Commitment ordering (CO) is a class of interoperable serializability techniques in concurrency control of databases, transaction processing, and related applications. It allows optimistic (non-blocking) implementations. With the proliferation of multi-core processors, CO has also been increasingly utilized in concurrent programming, transactional memory, and software transactional memory (STM) to achieve serializability optimistically. CO is also the name of the resulting transaction schedule (history) property, defined in 1988 with the name dynamic atomicity. In a CO compliant schedule, the chronological order of commitment events of transactions is compatible with the precedence order of the respective transactions. CO is a broad special case of conflict serializability and effective means (reliable, high-performance, distributed, and scalable) to achieve global serializability (modular serializability) across any collection of database systems that possibly use different concurrency control mechanisms (CO also makes each system serializability compliant, if not already). Each not-CO-compliant database system is augmented with a CO component (the commitment order coordinator—COCO) which orders the commitment events for CO compliance, with neither data-access nor any other transaction operation interference. As such, CO provides a low overhead, general solution for global serializability (and distributed serializability), instrumental for global concurrency control (and distributed concurrency control) of multi-database systems and other transactional objects, possibly highly distributed (e.g., within cloud computing, grid computing, and networks of smartphones). An atomic commitment protocol (ACP; of any type) is a fundamental part of the solution, utilized to break global cycles in the conflict (precedence, serializability) graph. CO is the most general property (a necessary condition) that guarantees global serializability, if the database systems involved do not share concurrency control information beyond atomic commitment protocol (unmodified) messages and have no knowledge of whether transactions are global or local (the database systems are autonomous). Thus CO (with its variants) is the only general technique that does not require the typically costly distribution of local concurrency control information (e.g., local precedence relations, locks, timestamps, or tickets). It generalizes the popular strong strict two-phase locking (SS2PL) property, which in conjunction with the two-phase commit protocol (2PC), is the de facto standard to achieve global serializability across (SS2PL based) database systems. As a result, CO compliant database systems (with any different concurrency control types) can transparently join such SS2PL based solutions for global serializability. In addition, locking based global deadlocks are resolved automatically in a CO based multi-database environment, a vital side-benefit (including the special case of a completely SS2PL based environment; a previously unnoticed fact for SS2PL). Furthermore, strict commitment ordering (SCO; Raz 1991c), the intersection of Strictness and CO, provides better performance (shorter average transaction completion time and resulting in better transaction throughput) than SS2PL whenever read-write conflicts are present (identical blocking behavior for write-read and write-write conflicts; comparable locking overhead). The advantage of SCO is especially during lock contention. Strictness allows both SS2PL and SCO to use the same effective database recovery mechanisms. Two major generalizing variants of CO exist, extended CO (ECO; Raz 1993a) and multi-version CO (MVCO; Raz 1993b). They also provide global serializability without local concurrency control information distribution, can be combined with any relevant concurrency control, and allow optimistic (non-blocking) implementations. Both use additional information for relaxing CO constraints and achieving better concurrency and performance. Vote ordering (VO or Generalized CO (GCO); Raz 2009) is a container schedule set (property) and technique for CO and all its variants. Local VO is necessary for guaranteeing global serializability if the atomic commitment protocol (ACP) participants do not share concurrency control information (have the generalized autonomy property). CO and its variants inter-operate transparently, guaranteeing global serializability and automatic global deadlock resolution together in a mixed, heterogeneous environment with different variants. == Overview == The Commitment ordering (CO; Raz 1990, 1992, 1994, 2009) schedule property has been referred to also as Dynamic atomicity (since 1988), commit ordering, commit order serializability, and strong recoverability (since 1991). The latter is a misleading name since CO is incomparable with recoverability, and the term "strong" implies a special case. This means that a substantial recoverability property does not necessarily have the CO property and vice versa. In 2009 CO has been characterized as a major concurrency control method, together with the previously known (since the 1980s) three major methods: Locking, Time-stamp ordering, and Serialization graph testing, and as an enabler for the interoperability of systems using different concurrency control mechanisms. In a federated database system or any other more loosely defined multidatabase system, which are typically distributed in a communication network, transactions span multiple and possibly Distributed databases. Enforcing global serializability in such system is problematic. Even if every local schedule of a single database is still serializable, the global schedule of a whole system is not necessarily serializable. The massive communication exchanges of conflict information needed between databases to reach conflict serializability would lead to unacceptable performance, primarily due to computer and communication latency. The problem of achieving global serializability effectively had been characterized as open until the public disclosure of CO in 1991 by its inventor Yoav Raz (Raz 1991a; see also Global serializability). Enforcing CO is an effective way to enforce conflict serializability globally in a distributed system since enforcing CO locally in each database (or other transactional objects) also enforces it globally. Each database may use any, possibly different, type of concurrency control mechanism. With a local mechanism that already provides conflict serializability, enforcing CO locally does not cause any other aborts, since enforcing CO locally does not affect the data access scheduling strategy of the mechanism (this scheduling determines the serializability related aborts; such a mechanism typically does not consider the commitment events or their order). The CO solution requires no communication overhead since it uses (unmodified) atomic commitment protocol messages only, already needed by each distributed transaction to reach atomicity. An atomic commitment protocol plays a central role in the distributed CO algorithm, which enforces CO globally by breaking global cycles (cycles that span two or more databases) in the global conflict graph. CO, its special cases, and its generalizations are interoperable and achieve global serializability while transparently being utilized together in a single heterogeneous distributed environment comprising objects with possibly different concurrency control mechanisms. As such, Commitment ordering, including its special cases, and together with its generalizations (see CO variants below), provides a general, high performance, fully distributed solution (no central processing component or central data structure are needed) for guaranteeing global serializability in heterogeneous environments of multidatabase systems and other multiple transactional objects (objects with states accessed and modified only by transactions; e.g., in the framework of transactional processes, and within Cloud computing and Grid computing). The CO solution scales up with network size and the number of databases without any negative impact on performance (assuming the statistics of a single distributed transaction, e.g., the average number of databases involved with a single transaction, are unchanged). With the proliferation of Multi-core processors, Optimistic CO (OCO) has also been increasingly utilized to achieve serializability in software transactional memory, and numerous STM articles and patents utilizing "commit order" have already been published (e.g., Zhang et al. 2006). == The commitment ordering solution for global serializability == === General characterization of CO === Commitment ordering (CO) is a special case of conflict serializability. CO can be enforced with non-blocking mechanisms (each transaction can complete its task without having its data-access blocked, which allows optimistic concurrency control; however, commitment could be blo
Artificial intelligence in education
Artificial intelligence in education (often abbreviated as AIEd) is a subfield of educational technology that studies how to use artificial intelligence to create learning environments. Considerations in the field include data-driven decision-making, AI ethics, data privacy and AI literacy. Concerns include the potential for cheating, over-reliance, equity of access, reduced critical thinking, and the perpetuation of misinformation and bias. == History == Efforts to integrate AI into educational contexts have often followed technological advancement in the history of artificial intelligence. In the 1960s, educators and researchers began developing computer-based instruction systems, such as PLATO, developed by the University of Illinois. In the 1970s and 1980s, intelligent tutoring systems (ITS) were being adapted for classroom instruction. The International Artificial Intelligence in Education Society was founded in 1993. Coinciding with the AI boom of the 2020s, the use of large language models in the global north has been promoted and funded by venture capital and big tech. Companies creating AI services have targeted students and educational institutions as customers. Similarly, pre-AI boom educational companies have expanded their use of AI technologies. These commercial incentives for AIEd use may be related to a potential AI bubble. In the U.S., bipartisan support of AI development in K-12 education has been expressed, but specific implementations and best practices remain contentious. == Theory == AIEd applies theory from education studies, machine learning, and related fields. A 2019 review of the previous decade of studies found that most research prioritized technological design over pedagogical integration. Ouyang and Jiao (2021) propose three paradigms for AI in education, which follow roughly from least to most learner-centered and from requiring least to most technical complexity from the AI systems: AI-directed, learner-as-recipient: AIEd systems present a pre-set curriculum based on statistical patterns that do not adjust to learner's feedback. AI-supported, learner-as-collaborator: Systems that incorporate responsiveness to learner's feedback through, for example, natural language processing, wherein AI can support knowledge construction. AI-empowered, learner-as-leader: This model seeks to position AI as a supplement to human intelligence wherein learners take agency and AI provides consistent and actionable feedback. Some scholars place AI in education within a socio-technical framework. This positions AI alongside other emerging educational technologies, such as computing, the internet, and social media. The framework of Tsao, Heinrichs and Camit (2025) draws on new materialism and posthumanism, specifically Donna Haraway's concept of sympoiesis (making-with). This perspective views learning as an entanglement of human and non-human actors (students, teachers, and AI algorithms), where knowledge is co-composed in contact zones between human context and algorithmic prediction. AI agents have been trained on biased datasets, and thus continue to perpetuate societal biases. Since LLMs were created to produce human-like text, algorithmic bias can be introduced and reproduced. AI's data processing and monitoring reinforce neoliberal approaches to education rather than addressing inequalities. == Applications == Uses of generative AI chatbots in education have included assessment and feedback, machine translations, proof-reading exam question generation and copy editing, or as virtual assistants. Emotional AI in education is the study and development of systems that can detect learners' emotions or provide emotional support in learning. == Usage == === Schools and educators === Following the release of ChatGPT in November 2022, some schools and large school districts blocked access to the site and issued warnings that the use of such tools would be seen as cheating. Governmental and non-governmental organizations such as UNESCO, Article 4 of the European Union's AI Act, and the U.S. Department of Education have published reports advocating for specific AIEd approaches. National higher-education bodies have also published guidance on generative AI, including Ireland's Higher Education Authority, which issued a policy framework for higher education teaching and learning in December 2025. In 2024, UNESCO released updated global guidance for generative AI in education, emphasizing ethical use, teacher training, and data protection to ensure responsible integration of AI tools in learning environments. According to Taso (2025), policy implementation in higher education is interpreted and enacted differently by various organizations. These decentralized policies can lead to inconsistent enforcement and confusion among students regarding what constitutes acceptable use, with the burden of ethical navigation falling on individual teachers and students. AI integration in classrooms has created new forms of invisible labour for educators, who must navigate ambiguous policies, redesign assessments to be AI-resilient, and adjudicate potential academic integrity violations. The use of AI detection tools has also been criticised for creating an adversarial relationship between students and institutions, where students may be falsely accused of misconduct based on probabilistic software. AIEd advocates say that efforts should be made towards increasing global accessibility and training educators to serve underprivileged areas. === Students === Reliance on generative AI has been linked with reduced academic self-esteem and performance, and heightened learned helplessness. Algorithm errors and hallucinations are common flaws in AI agents, making them less trustworthy and reliable. According to a 2025 survey from Inside Higher Ed, 85% of higher education students use generative AI technology in some way, with 25% using AI to complete assignments for them. The most common reason cited for using AI to cheat was pressure to get high grades. 97% of students wanted some form of action from schools on the threat to academic integrity caused by AI, with the most popular options being clearer policies and more education about ethical uses of AI. In September 2025, The Atlantic published an op-ed from a high school senior arguing that the normalization of AI cheating was eroding critical thinking, academic integrity, creativity, and the shared student experience.
User modeling
User modeling is the subdivision of human–computer interaction which describes the process of building up and modifying a conceptual understanding of the user. The main goal of user modeling is customization and adaptation of systems to the user's specific needs. The system needs to "say the 'right' thing at the 'right' time in the 'right' way". To do so it needs an internal representation of the user. Another common purpose is modeling specific kinds of users, including modeling of their skills and declarative knowledge, for use in automatic software-tests. User-models can thus serve as a cheaper alternative to user testing but should not replace user testing. == Background == A user model is the collection and categorization of personal data associated with a specific user. A user model is a (data) structure that is used to capture certain characteristics about an individual user, and a user profile is the actual representation in a given user model. The process of obtaining the user profile is called user modeling. Therefore, it is the basis for any adaptive changes to the system's behavior. Which data is included in the model depends on the purpose of the application. It can include personal information such as users' names and ages, their interests, their skills and knowledge, their goals and plans, their preferences and their dislikes or data about their behavior and their interactions with the system. There are different design patterns for user models, though often a mixture of them is used. Static user models Static user models are the most basic kinds of user models. Once the main data is gathered they are normally not changed again, they are static. Shifts in users' preferences are not registered and no learning algorithms are used to alter the model. Dynamic user models Dynamic user models allow a more up to date representation of users. Changes in their interests, their learning progress or interactions with the system are noticed and influence the user models. The models can thus be updated and take the current needs and goals of the users into account. Stereotype based user models Stereotype based user models are based on demographic statistics. Based on the gathered information users are classified into common stereotypes. The system then adapts to this stereotype. The application therefore can make assumptions about a user even though there might be no data about that specific area, because demographic studies have shown that other users in this stereotype have the same characteristics. Thus, stereotype based user models mainly rely on statistics and do not take into account that personal attributes might not match the stereotype. However, they allow predictions about a user even if there is rather little information about him or her. Highly adaptive user models Highly adaptive user models try to represent one particular user and therefore allow a very high adaptivity of the system. In contrast to stereotype based user models they do not rely on demographic statistics but aim to find a specific solution for each user. Although users can take great benefit from this high adaptivity, this kind of model needs to gather a lot of information first. == Data gathering == Information about users can be gathered in several ways. There are three main methods: Asking for specific facts while (first) interacting with the system Mostly this kind of data gathering is linked with the registration process. While registering users are asked for specific facts, their likes and dislikes and their needs. Often the given answers can be altered afterwards. Learning users' preferences by observing and interpreting their interactions with the system In this case users are not asked directly for their personal data and preferences, but this information is derived from their behavior while interacting with the system. The ways they choose to accomplish a tasks, the combination of things they takes interest in, these observations allow inferences about a specific user. The application dynamically learns from observing these interactions. Different machine learning algorithms may be used to accomplish this task. A hybrid approach which asks for explicit feedback and alters the user model by adaptive learning This approach is a mixture of the ones above. Users have to answer specific questions and give explicit feedback. Furthermore, their interactions with the system are observed and the derived information are used to automatically adjust the user models. Though the first method is a good way to quickly collect main data it lacks the ability to automatically adapt to shifts in users' interests. It depends on the users' readiness to give information and it is unlikely that they are going to edit their answers once the registration process is finished. Therefore, there is a high likelihood that the user models are not up to date. However, this first method allows the users to have full control over the collected data about them. It is their decision which information they are willing to provide. This possibility is missing in the second method. Adaptive changes in a system that learns users' preferences and needs only by interpreting their behavior might appear a bit opaque to the users, because they cannot fully understand and reconstruct why the system behaves the way it does. Moreover, the system is forced to collect a certain amount of data before it is able to predict the users' needs with the required accuracy. Therefore, it takes a certain learning time before a user can benefit from adaptive changes. However, afterwards these automatically adjusted user models allow a quite accurate adaptivity of the system. The hybrid approach tries to combine the advantages of both methods. Through collecting data by directly asking its users it gathers a first stock of information which can be used for adaptive changes. By learning from the users' interactions it can adjust the user models and reach more accuracy. Yet, the designer of the system has to decide, which of these information should have which amount of influence and what to do with learned data that contradicts some of the information given by a user. == System adaptation == Once a system has gathered information about a user it can evaluate that data by preset analytical algorithm and then start to adapt to the user's needs. These adaptations may concern every aspect of the system's behavior and depend on the system's purpose. Information and functions can be presented according to the user's interests, knowledge or goals by displaying only relevant features, hiding information the user does not need, making proposals what to do next and so on. One has to distinguish between adaptive and adaptable systems. In an adaptable system the user can manually change the system's appearance, behavior or functionality by actively selecting the corresponding options. Afterwards the system will stick to these choices. In an adaptive system a dynamic adaption to the user is automatically performed by the system itself, based on the built user model. Thus, an adaptive system needs ways to interpret information about the user in order to make these adaptations. One way to accomplish this task is implementing rule-based filtering. In this case a set of IF... THEN... rules is established that covers the knowledge base of the system. The IF-conditions can check for specific user-information and if they match the THEN-branch is performed which is responsible for the adaptive changes. Another approach is based on collaborative filtering. In this case information about a user is compared to that of other users of the same systems. Thus, if characteristics of the current user match those of another, the system can make assumptions about the current user by presuming that he or she is likely to have similar characteristics in areas where the model of the current user is lacking data. Based on these assumption the system then can perform adaptive changes. == Usages == Adaptive hypermedia: In an adaptive hypermedia system the displayed content and the offered hyperlinks are chosen on basis of users' specific characteristics, taking their goals, interests, knowledge and abilities into account. Thus, an adaptive hypermedia system aims to reduce the "lost in hyperspace" syndrome by presenting only relevant information. Adaptive educational hypermedia: Being a subdivision of adaptive hypermedia the main focus of adaptive educational hypermedia lies on education, displaying content and hyperlinks corresponding to the user's knowledge on the field of study. Intelligent tutoring system: Unlike adaptive educational hypermedia systems intelligent tutoring systems are stand-alone systems. Their aim is to help students in a specific field of study. To do so, they build up a user model where they store information about abilities, knowledge and needs of the user. The system can now adapt to this user by presenting approp
John M. Jumper
John Michael Jumper (born 1 January 1985) is an American chemist and computer scientist. Jumper and Demis Hassabis were awarded the 2024 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for protein structure prediction. As of 2025 Jumper serves as director at Google DeepMind. Jumper and his colleagues created AlphaFold, an artificial intelligence (AI) model to predict protein structures from their amino acid sequence with high accuracy. The AlphaFold team had released 214 million protein structures as of January 2024. The scientific journal Nature included Jumper as one of the ten "people who mattered" in science in their annual listing of Nature's 10 in 2021. == Education == Jumper graduated from Pulaski Academy in 2003. He received a Bachelor of Science with majors in physics and mathematics from Vanderbilt University in 2007, a Master of Philosophy in theoretical condensed matter physics from the University of Cambridge where he was a student of St Edmund's College, Cambridge in 2010 on a Marshall Scholarship, a Master of Science in theoretical chemistry from the University of Chicago in 2012, and a Doctor of Philosophy in theoretical chemistry from the University of Chicago in 2017. His doctoral advisors at the University of Chicago were Tobin R. Sosnick and Karl Freed. == Career and research == Jumper's research investigates algorithms for protein structure prediction. === AlphaFold === AlphaFold is a deep learning algorithm developed by Jumper and his team at DeepMind, a research lab acquired by Google's parent company Alphabet Inc. It is an artificial intelligence program which performs predictions of protein structure. === Awards and honors === In November 2020, AlphaFold was named the winner of the 14th Critical Assessment of Structure Prediction (CASP) competition. This international competition benchmarks algorithms to determine which one can best predict the 3D structure of proteins. AlphaFold won the competition, outperforming other algorithms scoring above 90 for around two-thirds of the proteins in CASP's global distance test (GDT), a test that measures the degree to which a computational program predicted structure is similar to the lab experiment determined structure, with 100 being a complete match, within the distance cutoff used for calculating GDT. In 2021, Jumper was awarded the BBVA Foundation Frontiers of Knowledge Award in the category "Biology and Biomedicine". In 2022 Jumper received the Wiley Prize in Biomedical Sciences and for 2023 the Breakthrough Prize in Life Sciences for developing AlphaFold, which accurately predicts the structure of a protein. In 2023 he was awarded the Canada Gairdner International Award and the Albert Lasker Award for Basic Medical Research. In 2024, Jumper and Demis Hassabis shared half of the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for their protein folding predictions, the other half went to David Baker for computational protein design. In 2025, Jumper received the Golden Plate Award of the American Academy of Achievement and the Marshall Medal of the Marshall Aid Commemoration Commission. He was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society (FRS) that same year. In 2026, he was elected a member of the National Academy of Engineering.
Existential risk from artificial intelligence
Existential risk from artificial intelligence, or AI x-risk, refers to the idea that substantial progress in artificial general intelligence (AGI) and artificial superintelligence (ASI) could lead to human extinction or an irreversible global catastrophe. One argument for the validity of this concern and the importance of this risk references how human beings dominate other species because the human brain possesses distinctive capabilities other animals lack. If AI were to surpass human intelligence and become superintelligent, it might become uncontrollable. Just as the fate of the mountain gorilla depends on human goodwill, the fate of humanity could depend on the actions of a future machine superintelligence. Experts disagree on whether artificial general intelligence (AGI) can achieve the capabilities needed for human extinction. Debates center on AGI's technical feasibility, the speed of self-improvement, and the effectiveness of alignment strategies. Concerns about superintelligence have been voiced by researchers including Geoffrey Hinton, Yoshua Bengio, Demis Hassabis, and Alan Turing, and AI company CEOs such as Dario Amodei (Anthropic), Sam Altman (OpenAI), and Elon Musk (xAI). In 2022, a survey of AI researchers with a 17% response rate found that the majority believed there is a 10 percent or greater chance that human inability to control AI will cause an existential catastrophe. In 2023, hundreds of AI experts and other notable figures signed a statement declaring, "Mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority alongside other societal-scale risks such as pandemics and nuclear war". Following increased concern over AI risks, government leaders such as United Kingdom prime minister Rishi Sunak and United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres called for an increased focus on global AI regulation. In 2025, hundreds of public figures including AI experts, five Nobel Prize laureates, and former senior US national security officials such as Michael Mullen and Susan Rice signed a statement calling for a ban on the development of superintelligence. Two sources of concern stem from the problems of AI control and alignment. Controlling a superintelligent machine or instilling it with human-compatible values may be difficult. Many researchers believe that a superintelligent machine would likely resist attempts to disable it or change its goals as that would prevent it from accomplishing its present goals. It would be extremely challenging to align a superintelligence with the full breadth of significant human values and constraints. In contrast, skeptics such as computer scientist Yann LeCun argue that superintelligent machines will have no desire for self-preservation. A June 2025 study showed that in some circumstances, models may break laws and disobey direct commands to prevent shutdown or replacement, even at the cost of human lives. Researchers warn that an "intelligence explosion"—a rapid, recursive cycle of AI self-improvement—could outpace human oversight and infrastructure, leaving no opportunity to implement safety measures. In this scenario, an AI more intelligent than its creators would recursively improve itself at an exponentially increasing rate, too quickly for its handlers or society at large to control. Empirically, examples like AlphaZero, which taught itself to play Go and quickly surpassed human ability, show that domain-specific AI systems can sometimes progress from subhuman to superhuman ability very quickly, although such machine learning systems do not recursively improve their fundamental architecture. == History == One of the earliest authors to express serious concern that highly advanced machines might pose existential risks to humanity was the novelist Samuel Butler, who wrote in his 1863 essay Darwin among the Machines: The upshot is simply a question of time, but that the time will come when the machines will hold the real supremacy over the world and its inhabitants is what no person of a truly philosophic mind can for a moment question. In 1951, foundational computer scientist Alan Turing wrote the article "Intelligent Machinery, A Heretical Theory", in which he proposed that artificial general intelligences would likely "take control" of the world as they became more intelligent than human beings: Let us now assume, for the sake of argument, that [intelligent] machines are a genuine possibility, and look at the consequences of constructing them... There would be no question of the machines dying, and they would be able to converse with each other to sharpen their wits. At some stage therefore we should have to expect the machines to take control, in the way that is mentioned in Samuel Butler's Erewhon. In 1965, I. J. Good originated the concept now known as an "intelligence explosion" and said the risks were underappreciated: Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then unquestionably be an 'intelligence explosion', and the intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make, provided that the machine is docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control. It is curious that this point is made so seldom outside of science fiction. It is sometimes worthwhile to take science fiction seriously. Scholars such as Marvin Minsky and I. J. Good himself occasionally expressed concern that a superintelligence could seize control, but issued no call to action. In 2000, computer scientist and Sun co-founder Bill Joy penned an influential essay, "Why The Future Doesn't Need Us", identifying superintelligent robots as a high-tech danger to human survival, alongside nanotechnology and engineered bioplagues. Nick Bostrom published Superintelligence in 2014, which presented his arguments that superintelligence poses an existential threat. By 2015, public figures such as physicists Stephen Hawking and Nobel laureate Frank Wilczek, computer scientists Stuart J. Russell and Roman Yampolskiy, and entrepreneurs Elon Musk and Bill Gates were expressing concern about the risks of superintelligence. Also in 2015, the Open Letter on Artificial Intelligence highlighted the "great potential of AI" and encouraged more research on how to make it robust and beneficial. In April 2016, the journal Nature warned: "Machines and robots that outperform humans across the board could self-improve beyond our control—and their interests might not align with ours". In 2020, Brian Christian published The Alignment Problem, which details the history of progress on AI alignment up to that time. In March 2023, key figures in AI, such as Musk, signed a letter from the Future of Life Institute calling a halt to advanced AI training until it could be properly regulated. In May 2023, the Center for AI Safety released a statement signed by numerous experts in AI safety and the AI existential risk that read: Mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority alongside other societal-scale risks such as pandemics and nuclear war. A 2025 open letter by the Future of Life Institute, whose signers include five Nobel Prize laureates, reads: We call for a prohibition on the development of superintelligence, not lifted before there is broad scientific consensus that it will be done safely and controllably, and strong public buy-in. == Potential AI capabilities == === General Intelligence === Artificial general intelligence (AGI) is typically defined as a system that performs at least as well as humans in most or all intellectual tasks. A 2022 survey of AI researchers found that 90% of respondents expected AGI would be achieved in the next 100 years, and half expected the same by 2061. In May 2023, some researchers dismissed existential risks from AGI as "science fiction" based on their high confidence that AGI would not be created anytime soon. But in August 2023, a survey of 2,778 AI researchers found that most believed that AGI would be achieved by 2040. Breakthroughs in large language models (LLMs) have led some researchers to reassess their expectations. Notably, Geoffrey Hinton said in 2023 that he recently changed his estimate from "20 to 50 years before we have general purpose A.I." to "20 years or less". === Superintelligence === In contrast with AGI, Bostrom defines a superintelligence as "any intellect that greatly exceeds the cognitive performance of humans in virtually all domains of interest", including scientific creativity, strategic planning, and social skills. He argues that a superintelligence can outmaneuver humans anytime its goals conflict with humans'. It may choose to hide its true intent until humanity cannot stop it. Bostrom writes that in order to be safe for
Verbot
The Verbot (short for Verbal-Robot) was a chatbot program and artificial intelligence software development kit (SDK) designed for Windows and web platforms. == Early beginning == The origin of verbot traces back to Michael Mauldin's research during his time as a graduate student and post-doctoral fellow at Carnegie Mellon University. The creative foundation also stems from Peter Plantec's work in personality psychology and art direction. === Historic outline === In 1994, Michael Loren Mauldin, founder of Lycos, Inc., developed a prototype chatbot, Julia, which competed in the internationally known Turing test, for the coveted Loebner Prize. The Turing test matches computer scientist judges against machines to see if they can distinguish a computer from a real human. Julia was refined and developed, and in 1997, Dr. Mauldin and Peter Plantec, a clinical psychologist and animator, formed Virtual Personalities, Inc. (now Conversive, Inc.) in order to create a virtual human interface that would incorporate real-time animation as well as speech and natural language processing. The initial release, a stand-alone virtual person called Sylvie, was beta-tested to the public. This release was well received, and finally, after several versions, the production release (deemed version 3) of the Verbally Enhanced Software Robot, or Verbot, was deployed in fall 2000. The grandfather of all Verbots is Rog-O-Matic, which, although it could not talk, could and did explore a virtual world. Julia has been active on the internet in one form or another since 1989. A close cousin of Julia is Lycos, a robot that explores the World Wide Web and answers questions about it. Sylvie was the first Verbot with a face and a voice. Sylvie was the first Virtual Human with advanced, flexible interfacing capability. === Beginnings === The Virtual Personalities story goes back to 1978, where Mauldin was attending Rice University. Fascinated by the idea of ELIZA, he proceeded to write a program called "PET" for his 8 kilobyte Commodore PET Computer. PET included simple induction as a way to post new information, for example: Subject: I like my friend (later) Subject: I like food. PET: I have heard that food is your friend. Meanwhile, Plantec was separately designing a personality for "Entity", a theoretical virtual human that would interact comfortably with humans without pretending to be one. At that time the technology was not advanced enough to realize Entity. Mauldin got so involved with this that he majored in Computer Science and minored in Linguistics. === Rogue === In the late seventies and early eighties, a popular computer game at universities was Rogue, an implementation of Dungeons and Dragons where the player would descend 26 levels in a randomly created dungeon, fighting monsters, gathering treasure, and searching for the elusive "Amulet of Yendor". Mauldin was one of four grad students who devoted a large amount of time to building a program called "Rog-O-Matic" capable of retrieving the amulet and emerging victorious from the dungeon. === TinyMUD === In 1989, when James Aspnes at Carnegie Mellon created the first TinyMUD (a descendant of MUD and AberMUD), Mauldin was one of the first to create a computer player that would explore the text-based world of TinyMUD. But his first robot, Gloria, gradually accreted more and more linguistic ability, to the point that it could pass the "unsuspecting" Turing test. In this version of the test, the human has no reason to suspect that one of the other occupants of the room is controlled by a computer, and so is more polite and asks fewer probing questions. The second generation of Mauldin's TinyMUD robots was Julia, created on Jan. 8, 1990. Julia slowly developed into a more and more capable conversational agent, and assumed useful duties in the TinyMUD world, including tour guide, information assistant, note-taker, and message-relayer. She could even play the card game hearts along with the other human players. In 1991, Julia attended the first Loebner Prize contest in Boston, Massachusetts. Although she only finished third, she was ranked by one judge as more human than one of the human confederates, winning a coveted certificate of humanness in the world's first restricted Turing test. Julia continued to log in to various TinyMUD's and TinyMucks for the next seven years, and chatted with hundreds of people a month over the internet. === Lycos === Julia's job was to explore a virtual world consisting of pages of textual descriptions, with links between them, and to construct an internal map of that world and answer questions about it (including path information such as the shortest route from one room to another, and matching information, such as which rooms contained a certain kind of object or textual description). It was therefore only a very short cognitive leap from Julia to Lycos, another robotic agent that explores a virtual world made of hyperlinked pages of text, and which answers questions about those pages. Sylvie was born and her abilities were expanded greatly to include interfacing with computers and control systems via her serial ports. === Sylvie === Sylvie was the first intelligent animated virtual human. She was designed both as a conversation agent and as a virtual human interface that would form a bridge between the two. She became more popular as a conversation agent, but her designers believe she serves as a prototype for future virtual human interface design that will help us all cope with the increasing complexity of technology. As an aside, Plantec noticed that a large number of Sylvies have been sold in Southeast Asia. Upon investigation, he found out that students had discovered a "test" mode that would allow them to type in English sentences that Sylvie would pronounce in her somewhat stylized English. == Ownership == In 1997, Dr. Mauldin and Peter Plantec formed Virtual Personalities, Inc. to create Natural Language Processing solutions for companies. In 2001 Virtual Personalities, Inc. became Conversive, Inc. to reflect the focus on providing Customer Service and Marketing to the Enterprise Market. In late 2012 Avaya, Inc. acquired Conversive's assets including Verbots. == Verbot versions == The Verbot 4 version was created and released in 2004. In 2005 Version 4.1 of the Verbot Software was released with many feature enhancements and bug fixes, including built-in support for embedding C# code in outputs and conditionals. In early 2006 Conversive launched Verbots Online allowing Verbot 4 users to upload their knowledge and show off their bots to the world. In 2009 Version 5 was released, completely free and fully featured. In early 2012 the last version of Verbot, 5.0.1.2, was released to the general public with support for Windows 7. Later in 2012 Verbots Online completely shut down. == Verbots today == Verbots.com, its community of users, and its forums no longer exist, but the software and users can still be found. There has been no active development since the early 2012 release of Verbot 5.0.1.2.
Regulation of artificial intelligence in the United States
The United States federal government and state governments have developed some regulation of artificial intelligence, including executive orders, federal laws, and state laws. Federal agencies have also developed some sector-specific regulations related to AI. At the federal level, the Biden administration released an October 2023 executive order about AI safety and security, Executive Order 14110, with directives related to AI development and deployment. President Trump revoked that executive order in January 2025 and issued Executive Order 14179. In December 2025, President Trump signed Executive Order 14365, an executive order directing federal agencies to develop a unified national approach to AI policy, evaluate state AI laws for potential conflicts, challenge them through legal action, and condition certain federal funding on state compliance, while exempting state laws related to child safety, data center infrastructure, and state government procurement. In 2025, Congress passed legislation targeting AI-generated deepfakes, the TAKE IT DOWN Act. Several U.S. states have enacted laws related to artificial intelligence. Some are already in effect, including in California. Other states have AI-related legislation coming into effect in 2026 and 2027. In 2025 and 2026, the Trump administration mentioned the patchwork nature of state legislation as a motivation for its push for unified national legislation regulating AI. The administration has criticized state lawmakers, threatened to sue states, and issued letters to discourage them from regulating AI companies and products; some states have continued to propose and enact related laws. Discussions about regulating AI have included topics such as the timeliness of regulating AI, the nature of the federal regulatory framework to govern and promote AI, including what agency should lead, the regulatory and governing powers of that agency, and how to update regulations in the face of rapidly changing technology, as well as the roles of state governments and courts. == Federal government == === Obama administration (2009–2017) === As early as 2016, the Obama administration had begun to focus on the risks and regulations for artificial intelligence. In an October 2016 report titled Preparing For the Future of Artificial Intelligence, the National Science and Technology Council set a precedent to allow researchers to continue to develop new AI technologies with few restrictions. The report stated that "the approach to regulation of AI-enabled products to protect public safety should be informed by assessment of the aspects of risk". The first National Artificial Intelligence Research And Development Strategic Plan was published in October 2016. === First Trump administration (2017–2021) === On August 13, 2018, Section 1051 of the Fiscal Year 2019 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 115-232) established the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence "to consider the methods and means necessary to advance the development of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and associated technologies to comprehensively address the national security and defense needs of the United States." Steering on regulating security-related AI is provided by the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. The Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act (S.1558) is a proposed bill that would establish a federal initiative designed to accelerate research and development on AI for, inter alia, the economic and national security of the United States. On January 7, 2019, following an Executive Order on Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, the White House's Office of Science and Technology Policy released a draft Guidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Applications, which includes ten principles for United States agencies when deciding whether and how to regulate AI. In response, the National Institute of Standards and Technology released a position paper, and the Defense Innovation Board issued recommendations on the ethical use of AI. A year later, the administration called for comments on regulation in another draft of its Guidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Applications. Other specific agencies working on the regulation of AI included the Food and Drug Administration, which created pathways to regulate the incorporation of AI in medical imaging. The National Science and Technology Council also published an updated National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan in 2019, which received public scrutiny and recommendations to further improve it towards enabling Trustworthy AI. === Biden administration (2021–2025) === In March 2021, the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence released their final report. In the report, they stated, "Advances in AI, including the mastery of more general AI capabilities along one or more dimensions, will likely provide new capabilities and applications. Some of these advances could lead to inflection points or leaps in capabilities. Such advances may also introduce new concerns and risks and the need for new policies, recommendations, and technical advances to assure that systems are aligned with goals and values, including safety, robustness and trustworthiness." In June 2022, Senators Rob Portman and Gary Peters introduced the Global Catastrophic Risk Management Act. The bipartisan bill "would also help counter the risk of artificial intelligence... from being abused in ways that may pose a catastrophic risk". On October 4, 2022, President Joe Biden unveiled a new AI Bill of Rights, which outlines five protections Americans should have in the AI age: 1. Safe and Effective Systems, 2. Algorithmic Discrimination Protection, 3.Data Privacy, 4. Notice and Explanation, and 5. Human Alternatives, Consideration, and Fallback. The bill was formally published in October 2022 by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), a U.S. government office that advises the President on science and technology policy matters. In July 2023, the Biden administration secured voluntary commitments from seven companies – Amazon, Anthropic, Google, Inflection, Meta, Microsoft, and OpenAI – to manage the risks associated with AI. The companies committed to ensure AI products undergo both internal and external security testing before public release; to share information on the management of AI risks with the industry, governments, civil society, and academia; to prioritize cybersecurity and protect proprietary AI system components; to develop mechanisms to inform users when content is AI-generated, such as watermarking; to publicly report on their AI systems' capabilities, limitations, and areas of use; to prioritize research on societal risks posed by AI, including bias, discrimination, and privacy concerns; and to develop AI systems to address societal challenges, ranging from cancer prevention to climate change mitigation. In September 2023, eight additional companies – Adobe, Cohere, IBM, Nvidia, Palantir, Salesforce, Scale AI, and Stability AI – subscribed to these voluntary commitments. In January 2023, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) released the Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0), providing voluntary guidance for organizations to identify, assess, and manage risks associated with AI systems. The Biden administration, in October 2023 signaled that they would release an executive order leveraging the federal government's purchasing power to shape AI regulations, hinting at a proactive governmental stance in regulating AI technologies. On October 30, 2023, President Biden released Executive Order 14110 on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence. The Executive Order includes directives on standards for critical infrastructure, AI-enhanced cybersecurity, and federally funded biological synthesis projects. The Executive Order provides the authority to various agencies and departments of the US government, including the Energy and Defense departments, to apply existing consumer protection laws to AI development. The Executive Order builds on the Administration's earlier agreements with AI companies to instate new initiatives to "red-team" or stress-test AI dual-use foundation models, especially those that have the potential to pose security risks, with data and results shared with the federal government. The Executive Order also recognizes AI's social challenges, and calls for companies building AI dual-use foundation models to be wary of these societal problems. For example, the Executive Order states that AI should not "worsen job quality", and should not "cause labor-force disruptions". Additionally, Biden's Executive Order mandates that AI must "advance equity and civil rights", and cannot disadvantage marginalized groups. It also called for foundation models to include "watermarks" to help the publi