Imitation learning is a paradigm in reinforcement learning, where an agent learns to perform a task by supervised learning from expert demonstrations . It is also called learning from demonstration and apprenticeship learning. It has been applied to underactuated robotics, self-driving cars, quadcopter navigation, helicopter aerobatics, and locomotion. == Approaches == Expert demonstrations are recordings of an expert performing the desired task, often collected as state-action pairs ( o t ∗ , a t ∗ ) {\displaystyle (o_{t}^{},a_{t}^{})} . === Behavior Cloning === Behavior Cloning (BC) is the most basic form of imitation learning. Essentially, it uses supervised learning to train a policy π θ {\displaystyle \pi _{\theta }} such that, given an observation o t {\displaystyle o_{t}} , it would output an action distribution π θ ( ⋅ | o t ) {\displaystyle \pi _{\theta }(\cdot |o_{t})} that is approximately the same as the action distribution of the experts. BC is susceptible to distribution shift. Specifically, if the trained policy differs from the expert policy, it might find itself straying from expert trajectory into observations that would have never occurred in expert trajectories. This was already noted by ALVINN, where they trained a neural network to drive a van using human demonstrations. They noticed that because a human driver never strays far from the path, the network would never be trained on what action to take if it ever finds itself straying far from the path. === DAgger === DAgger (Dataset Aggregation) improves on behavior cloning by iteratively training on a dataset of expert demonstrations. In each iteration, the algorithm first collects data by rolling out the learned policy π θ {\displaystyle \pi _{\theta }} . Then, it queries the expert for the optimal action a t ∗ {\displaystyle a_{t}^{}} on each observation o t {\displaystyle o_{t}} encountered during the rollout. Finally, it aggregates the new data into the dataset D ← D ∪ { ( o 1 , a 1 ∗ ) , ( o 2 , a 2 ∗ ) , . . . , ( o T , a T ∗ ) } {\displaystyle D\leftarrow D\cup \{(o_{1},a_{1}^{}),(o_{2},a_{2}^{}),...,(o_{T},a_{T}^{})\}} and trains a new policy on the aggregated dataset. === Decision transformer === The Decision Transformer approach models reinforcement learning as a sequence modelling problem. Similar to Behavior Cloning, it trains a sequence model, such as a Transformer, that models rollout sequences ( R 1 , o 1 , a 1 ) , ( R 2 , o 2 , a 2 ) , … , ( R t , o t , a t ) , {\displaystyle (R_{1},o_{1},a_{1}),(R_{2},o_{2},a_{2}),\dots ,(R_{t},o_{t},a_{t}),} where R t = r t + r t + 1 + ⋯ + r T {\displaystyle R_{t}=r_{t}+r_{t+1}+\dots +r_{T}} is the sum of future reward in the rollout. During training time, the sequence model is trained to predict each action a t {\displaystyle a_{t}} , given the previous rollout as context: ( R 1 , o 1 , a 1 ) , ( R 2 , o 2 , a 2 ) , … , ( R t , o t ) {\displaystyle (R_{1},o_{1},a_{1}),(R_{2},o_{2},a_{2}),\dots ,(R_{t},o_{t})} During inference time, to use the sequence model as an effective controller, it is simply given a very high reward prediction R {\displaystyle R} , and it would generalize by predicting an action that would result in the high reward. This was shown to scale predictably to a Transformer with 1 billion parameters that is superhuman on 41 Atari games. === Other approaches === See for more examples. == Related approaches == Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) learns a reward function that explains the expert's behavior and then uses reinforcement learning to find a policy that maximizes this reward. Recent works have also explored multi-agent extensions of IRL in networked systems. Generative Adversarial Imitation Learning (GAIL) uses generative adversarial networks (GANs) to match the distribution of agent behavior to the distribution of expert demonstrations. It extends a previous approach using game theory.
Computer security compromised by hardware failure
Computer security compromised by hardware failure is a branch of computer security applied to hardware. The objective of computer security includes protection of information and property from theft, corruption, or natural disaster, while allowing the information and property to remain accessible and productive to its intended users. Such secret information could be retrieved by different ways. This article focus on the retrieval of data thanks to misused hardware or hardware failure. Hardware could be misused or exploited to get secret data. This article collects main types of attack that can lead to data theft. Computer security can be compromised by devices, such as keyboards, monitors or printers (thanks to electromagnetic or acoustic emanation for example) or by components of the computer, such as the memory, the network card or the processor (thanks to time or temperature analysis for example). == Devices == === Monitor === The monitor is the main device used to access data on a computer. It has been shown that monitors radiate or reflect data on their environment, potentially giving attackers access to information displayed on the monitor. ==== Electromagnetic emanations ==== Video display units radiate: narrowband harmonics of the digital clock signals; broadband harmonics of the various 'random' digital signals such as the video signal. Known as compromising emanations or TEMPEST radiation, a code word for a U.S. government programme aimed at attacking the problem, the electromagnetic broadcast of data has been a significant concern in sensitive computer applications. Eavesdroppers can reconstruct video screen content from radio frequency emanations. Each (radiated) harmonic of the video signal shows a remarkable resemblance to a broadcast TV signal. It is therefore possible to reconstruct the picture displayed on the video display unit from the radiated emission by means of a normal television receiver. If no preventive measures are taken, eavesdropping on a video display unit is possible at distances up to several hundreds of meters, using only a normal black-and-white TV receiver, a directional antenna and an antenna amplifier. It is even possible to pick up information from some types of video display units at a distance of over 1 kilometer. If more sophisticated receiving and decoding equipment is used, the maximum distance can be much greater. ==== Compromising reflections ==== What is displayed by the monitor is reflected on the environment. The time-varying diffuse reflections of the light emitted by a CRT monitor can be exploited to recover the original monitor image. This is an eavesdropping technique for spying at a distance on data that is displayed on an arbitrary computer screen, including the currently prevalent LCD monitors. The technique exploits reflections of the screen's optical emanations in various objects that one commonly finds close to the screen and uses those reflections to recover the original screen content. Such objects include eyeglasses, tea pots, spoons, plastic bottles, and even the eye of the user. This attack can be successfully mounted to spy on even small fonts using inexpensive, off-the-shelf equipment (less than 1500 dollars) from a distance of up to 10 meters. Relying on more expensive equipment allowed to conduct this attack from over 30 meters away, demonstrating that similar attacks are feasible from the other side of the street or from a close by building. Many objects that may be found at a usual workplace can be exploited to retrieve information on a computer's display by an outsider. Particularly good results were obtained from reflections in a user's eyeglasses or a tea pot located on the desk next to the screen. Reflections that stem from the eye of the user also provide good results. However, eyes are harder to spy on at a distance because they are fast-moving objects and require high exposure times. Using more expensive equipment with lower exposure times helps to remedy this problem. The reflections gathered from curved surfaces on close by objects indeed pose a substantial threat to the confidentiality of data displayed on the screen. Fully invalidating this threat without at the same time hiding the screen from the legitimate user seems difficult, without using curtains on the windows or similar forms of strong optical shielding. Most users, however, will not be aware of this risk and may not be willing to close the curtains on a nice day. The reflection of an object, a computer display, in a curved mirror creates a virtual image that is located behind the reflecting surface. For a flat mirror this virtual image has the same size and is located behind the mirror at the same distance as the original object. For curved mirrors, however, the situation is more complex. === Keyboard === ==== Electromagnetic emanations ==== Computer keyboards are often used to transmit confidential data such as passwords. Since they contain electronic components, keyboards emit electromagnetic waves. These emanations could reveal sensitive information such as keystrokes. Electromagnetic emanations have turned out to constitute a security threat to computer equipment. The figure below presents how a keystroke is retrieved and what material is necessary. The approach is to acquire the raw signal directly from the antenna and to process the entire captured electromagnetic spectrum. Thanks to this method, four different kinds of compromising electromagnetic emanations have been detected, generated by wired and wireless keyboards. These emissions lead to a full or a partial recovery of the keystrokes. The best practical attack fully recovered 95% of the keystrokes of a PS/2 keyboard at a distance up to 20 meters, even through walls. Because each keyboard has a specific fingerprint based on the clock frequency inconsistencies, it can determine the source keyboard of a compromising emanation, even if multiple keyboards from the same model are used at the same time. The four different kinds way of compromising electromagnetic emanations are described below. ===== The Falling Edge Transition Technique ===== When a key is pressed, released or held down, the keyboard sends a packet of information known as a scan code to the computer. The protocol used to transmit these scan codes is a bidirectional serial communication, based on four wires: Vcc (5 volts), ground, data and clock. Clock and data signals are identically generated. Hence, the compromising emanation detected is the combination of both signals. However, the edges of the data and the clock lines are not superposed. Thus, they can be easily separated to obtain independent signals. ===== The Generalized Transition Technique ===== The Falling Edge Transition attack is limited to a partial recovery of the keystrokes. This is a significant limitation. The GTT is a falling edge transition attack improved, which recover almost all keystrokes. Indeed, between two traces, there is exactly one data rising edge. If attackers are able to detect this transition, they can fully recover the keystrokes. ===== The Modulation Technique ===== Harmonics compromising electromagnetic emissions come from unintentional emanations such as radiations emitted by the clock, non-linear elements, crosstalk, ground pollution, etc. Determining theoretically the reasons of these compromising radiations is a very complex task. These harmonics correspond to a carrier of approximately 4 MHz which is very likely the internal clock of the micro-controller inside the keyboard. These harmonics are correlated with both clock and data signals, which describe modulated signals (in amplitude and frequency) and the full state of both clock and data signals. This means that the scan code can be completely recovered from these harmonics. ===== The Matrix Scan Technique ===== Keyboard manufacturers arrange the keys in a matrix. The keyboard controller, often an 8-bit processor, parses columns one-by-one and recovers the state of 8 keys at once. This matrix scan process can be described as 192 keys (some keys may not be used, for instance modern keyboards use 104/105 keys) arranged in 24 columns and 8 rows. These columns are continuously pulsed one-by-one for at least 3μs. Thus, these leads may act as an antenna and generate electromagnetic emanations. If an attacker is able to capture these emanations, he can easily recover the column of the pressed key. Even if this signal does not fully describe the pressed key, it still gives partial information on the transmitted scan code, i.e. the column number. Note that the matrix scan routine loops continuously. When no key is pressed, we still have a signal composed of multiple equidistant peaks. These emanations may be used to remotely detect the presence of powered computers. Concerning wireless keyboards, the wireless data burst transmission can be used as an electromagnetic trigger to detect exactly when a key is pressed, while the matrix s
Sports Card Investor
Sports Card Investor is an American sports collectibles media platform and mobile application founded by Geoff Wilson. The platform provides market data, analysis, and editorial content focused on sports trading cards and related collectibles. It operates a website, mobile app, and digital media channels covering developments in the sports card industry. The company posted its first YouTube video in July 2019, shortly before a period of rapid growth in sports card collecting in the early 2020s, which was marked by increased trading volumes and mainstream media attention. == History == Sports Card Investor was founded by Geoff Wilson, an entrepreneur and collector who began publishing sports card–related content online before launching the platform's dedicated app and subscription tools. In February 2020, the company launched Market Movers, the first website and app to chart sports card prices and track card collections. The platform expanded its media presence through partnerships and distribution agreements. In 2023, Yahoo Sports announced a new collectibles coverage initiative that included additional content from Sports Card Investor. In February 2024, the Sports Card Investor studio relocated to CardsHQ in Atlanta, Georgia, and visitors to the facility can watch Sports Card Investor videos being filmed. == Platform and content == The Sports Card Investor app provides users with pricing data, portfolio-tracking tools, and market-trend analysis for trading cards. The company also produces video and editorial content discussing market developments, grading trends, and major card releases. Coverage in industry publications has referenced Sports Card Investor in discussions about shifts in sports card licensing rights and hobby market reactions. == Industry context == The growth of Sports Card Investor coincided with a broader resurgence in trading card markets, including record sales and expanded retail presence. Mainstream outlets have cited the company and its founder in reporting on collectibles investing trends, grading practices, and market volatility. The Sports Card Investor app has attracted over 37,000 reviews on the Apple App Store, reflecting its strong user engagement within the sports card community.
Cone tracing
Cone tracing and beam tracing are a derivative of the ray tracing algorithm that replaces rays, which have no thickness, with thick rays. == Principles == In ray tracing, rays are often modeled as geometric ray with no thickness to perform efficient geometric queries such as a ray-triangle intersection. From a physics of light transport point of view, however, this is an inaccurate model provided the pixel on the sensor plane has non-zero area. In the simplified pinhole camera optics model, the energy reaching the pixel comes from the integral of radiance from the solid angle by which the sensor pixel sees the scene through the pinhole at the focal plane. This yields the key notion of pixel footprint on surfaces or in the texture space, which is the back projection of the pixel on to the scene. Note that this approach can also represent a lens-based camera and thus depth of field effects, using a cone whose cross-section decreases from the lens size to zero at the focal plane, and then increases. Real optical system do not focus on exact points because of diffraction and imperfections. This can be modeled with a point spread function (PSF) weighted within a solid angle larger than the pixel. From a signal processing point of view, ignoring the point spread function and approximating the integral of radiance with a single, central sample (through a ray with no thickness) can lead to strong aliasing because the "projected geometric signal" has very high frequencies exceeding the Nyquist-Shannon maximal frequency that can be represented using the uniform pixel sampling rate. The physically based image formation model can be approximated by the convolution with the point spread function assuming the function is shift-invariant and linear. In practice, techniques such as multisample anti-aliasing estimate this cone-based model by oversampling the signal and then performing a convolution (the reconstruction filter). The backprojected cone footprint onto the scene can also be used to directly pre-filter the geometry and textures of the scene. Note that contrary to intuition, the reconstruction filter should not be the pixel footprint (as the pinhole camera model would suggest), since a box filter has poor spectral properties. Conversely, the ideal sinc function is not practical, having infinite support with possibly negative values which often creates ringing artifacts due to the Gibbs phenomenon. A Gaussian or a Lanczos filter are considered good compromises. == Computer graphics models == Cone and Beam early papers rely on different simplifications: the first considers a circular section and treats the intersection with various possible shapes. The second treats an accurate pyramidal beam through the pixel and along a complex path, but it only works for polyhedrical shapes. Cone tracing solves certain problems related to sampling and aliasing, which can plague conventional ray tracing. However, cone tracing creates a host of problems of its own. For example, just intersecting a cone with scene geometry leads to an enormous variety of possible results. For this reason, cone tracing has remained mostly unpopular. In recent years, increases in computer speed have made Monte Carlo algorithms like distributed ray tracing - i.e. stochastic explicit integration of the pixel - much more used than cone tracing because the results are exact provided enough samples are used. But the convergence is so slow that even in the context of off-line rendering a huge amount of time can be required to avoid noise. Differential cone-tracing, considering a differential angular neighborhood around a ray, avoids the complexity of exact geometry intersection but requires a LOD representation of the geometry and appearance of the objects. MIPmapping is an approximation of it limited to the integration of the surface texture within a cone footprint. Differential ray-tracing extends it to textured surfaces viewed through complex paths of cones reflected or refracted by curved surfaces. Raymarching methods over signed distance fields (SDFs) naturally allow easy use of cone-like tracing, at zero additional cost to the tracing, and both speeds up tracing and improves quality. Voxel cone tracing is a real-time algorithm that uses a hierarchical voxel representation of scene geometry, such as a sparse voxel octree, to support fast cone tracing for indirect illumination. This approach allows for the approximation of effects like glossy reflections and ambient occlusion at interactive framerates without the need for precomputation.
Vx-underground
vx-underground, also known as VXUG, is an educational website about malware and cybersecurity. It claims to have the largest online repository of malware. The site was launched in May, 2019 and has grown to host over 35 million pieces of malware samples. On their account on Twitter, VXUG reports on and verifies cybersecurity breaches. == Reception == Kim Crawley compared the site to VirusTotal and states that vx-underground is more susceptible to suspicion for law enforcement. == Data breach reports == In May 2024, the International Baccalaureate organizations faced allegations over supposed breaches in their IT infrastructure after an incident of examination leaks. Upon inspecting leaked data, VXUG were the first to report that the breach seemed legitimate on the morning of May 6.
2024 National Public Data breach
In August 2024, three class-action lawsuits were filed against National Public Data along with over 14 complaints filed in federal court, claiming that the company permitted hackers to steal sensitive private information covering millions of individuals. The theft was alleged to have occurred in April 2024. One of the lawsuits specifically claims that in April, a hacker going by the moniker "USDoD" posted a notice on the dark web, offering the data for sale at the price of US$3.5 million. The information stolen is alleged to include 2.9 billion records containing full names, current and past addresses, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, and telephone numbers. The stolen data contains records for people in the US, UK, and Canada. National Public Data confirmed on August 16, 2024, there was a breach originating from someone trying to breach their systems since December 2023, with the breach occurring from April 2024 and over the next few months. The company also confirmed that 2.9 billion records were obtained, though they were still working to determine how many people were affected by the breach, and were working with law enforcement to identify the hacker. == Jerico Pictures == Jerico Pictures, Inc., doing business as National Public Data, was a data broker company that performed employee background checks. Their primary service was collecting information from public data sources, including criminal records, addresses, and employment history, and offering that information for sale. On October 2, 2024, Jerico Pictures filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy as it currently faces over a dozen lawsuits over the breach, and is potentially liable "for credit monitoring for hundreds of millions of potentially impacted individuals." In December 2024, National Public Data shut down, showing a closure notice on its website.
Computer security compromised by hardware failure
Computer security compromised by hardware failure is a branch of computer security applied to hardware. The objective of computer security includes protection of information and property from theft, corruption, or natural disaster, while allowing the information and property to remain accessible and productive to its intended users. Such secret information could be retrieved by different ways. This article focus on the retrieval of data thanks to misused hardware or hardware failure. Hardware could be misused or exploited to get secret data. This article collects main types of attack that can lead to data theft. Computer security can be compromised by devices, such as keyboards, monitors or printers (thanks to electromagnetic or acoustic emanation for example) or by components of the computer, such as the memory, the network card or the processor (thanks to time or temperature analysis for example). == Devices == === Monitor === The monitor is the main device used to access data on a computer. It has been shown that monitors radiate or reflect data on their environment, potentially giving attackers access to information displayed on the monitor. ==== Electromagnetic emanations ==== Video display units radiate: narrowband harmonics of the digital clock signals; broadband harmonics of the various 'random' digital signals such as the video signal. Known as compromising emanations or TEMPEST radiation, a code word for a U.S. government programme aimed at attacking the problem, the electromagnetic broadcast of data has been a significant concern in sensitive computer applications. Eavesdroppers can reconstruct video screen content from radio frequency emanations. Each (radiated) harmonic of the video signal shows a remarkable resemblance to a broadcast TV signal. It is therefore possible to reconstruct the picture displayed on the video display unit from the radiated emission by means of a normal television receiver. If no preventive measures are taken, eavesdropping on a video display unit is possible at distances up to several hundreds of meters, using only a normal black-and-white TV receiver, a directional antenna and an antenna amplifier. It is even possible to pick up information from some types of video display units at a distance of over 1 kilometer. If more sophisticated receiving and decoding equipment is used, the maximum distance can be much greater. ==== Compromising reflections ==== What is displayed by the monitor is reflected on the environment. The time-varying diffuse reflections of the light emitted by a CRT monitor can be exploited to recover the original monitor image. This is an eavesdropping technique for spying at a distance on data that is displayed on an arbitrary computer screen, including the currently prevalent LCD monitors. The technique exploits reflections of the screen's optical emanations in various objects that one commonly finds close to the screen and uses those reflections to recover the original screen content. Such objects include eyeglasses, tea pots, spoons, plastic bottles, and even the eye of the user. This attack can be successfully mounted to spy on even small fonts using inexpensive, off-the-shelf equipment (less than 1500 dollars) from a distance of up to 10 meters. Relying on more expensive equipment allowed to conduct this attack from over 30 meters away, demonstrating that similar attacks are feasible from the other side of the street or from a close by building. Many objects that may be found at a usual workplace can be exploited to retrieve information on a computer's display by an outsider. Particularly good results were obtained from reflections in a user's eyeglasses or a tea pot located on the desk next to the screen. Reflections that stem from the eye of the user also provide good results. However, eyes are harder to spy on at a distance because they are fast-moving objects and require high exposure times. Using more expensive equipment with lower exposure times helps to remedy this problem. The reflections gathered from curved surfaces on close by objects indeed pose a substantial threat to the confidentiality of data displayed on the screen. Fully invalidating this threat without at the same time hiding the screen from the legitimate user seems difficult, without using curtains on the windows or similar forms of strong optical shielding. Most users, however, will not be aware of this risk and may not be willing to close the curtains on a nice day. The reflection of an object, a computer display, in a curved mirror creates a virtual image that is located behind the reflecting surface. For a flat mirror this virtual image has the same size and is located behind the mirror at the same distance as the original object. For curved mirrors, however, the situation is more complex. === Keyboard === ==== Electromagnetic emanations ==== Computer keyboards are often used to transmit confidential data such as passwords. Since they contain electronic components, keyboards emit electromagnetic waves. These emanations could reveal sensitive information such as keystrokes. Electromagnetic emanations have turned out to constitute a security threat to computer equipment. The figure below presents how a keystroke is retrieved and what material is necessary. The approach is to acquire the raw signal directly from the antenna and to process the entire captured electromagnetic spectrum. Thanks to this method, four different kinds of compromising electromagnetic emanations have been detected, generated by wired and wireless keyboards. These emissions lead to a full or a partial recovery of the keystrokes. The best practical attack fully recovered 95% of the keystrokes of a PS/2 keyboard at a distance up to 20 meters, even through walls. Because each keyboard has a specific fingerprint based on the clock frequency inconsistencies, it can determine the source keyboard of a compromising emanation, even if multiple keyboards from the same model are used at the same time. The four different kinds way of compromising electromagnetic emanations are described below. ===== The Falling Edge Transition Technique ===== When a key is pressed, released or held down, the keyboard sends a packet of information known as a scan code to the computer. The protocol used to transmit these scan codes is a bidirectional serial communication, based on four wires: Vcc (5 volts), ground, data and clock. Clock and data signals are identically generated. Hence, the compromising emanation detected is the combination of both signals. However, the edges of the data and the clock lines are not superposed. Thus, they can be easily separated to obtain independent signals. ===== The Generalized Transition Technique ===== The Falling Edge Transition attack is limited to a partial recovery of the keystrokes. This is a significant limitation. The GTT is a falling edge transition attack improved, which recover almost all keystrokes. Indeed, between two traces, there is exactly one data rising edge. If attackers are able to detect this transition, they can fully recover the keystrokes. ===== The Modulation Technique ===== Harmonics compromising electromagnetic emissions come from unintentional emanations such as radiations emitted by the clock, non-linear elements, crosstalk, ground pollution, etc. Determining theoretically the reasons of these compromising radiations is a very complex task. These harmonics correspond to a carrier of approximately 4 MHz which is very likely the internal clock of the micro-controller inside the keyboard. These harmonics are correlated with both clock and data signals, which describe modulated signals (in amplitude and frequency) and the full state of both clock and data signals. This means that the scan code can be completely recovered from these harmonics. ===== The Matrix Scan Technique ===== Keyboard manufacturers arrange the keys in a matrix. The keyboard controller, often an 8-bit processor, parses columns one-by-one and recovers the state of 8 keys at once. This matrix scan process can be described as 192 keys (some keys may not be used, for instance modern keyboards use 104/105 keys) arranged in 24 columns and 8 rows. These columns are continuously pulsed one-by-one for at least 3μs. Thus, these leads may act as an antenna and generate electromagnetic emanations. If an attacker is able to capture these emanations, he can easily recover the column of the pressed key. Even if this signal does not fully describe the pressed key, it still gives partial information on the transmitted scan code, i.e. the column number. Note that the matrix scan routine loops continuously. When no key is pressed, we still have a signal composed of multiple equidistant peaks. These emanations may be used to remotely detect the presence of powered computers. Concerning wireless keyboards, the wireless data burst transmission can be used as an electromagnetic trigger to detect exactly when a key is pressed, while the matrix s