AI Coding Models

AI Coding Models — independent reviews, comparisons, pricing and step-by-step guides on Aizhi.

  • ARIS Express

    ARIS Express

    ARIS Express is a free-of-charge modeling tool for business process analysis and management. It supports different modeling notations such as BPMN 2, Event-driven Process Chains (EPC), Organizational charts, process landscapes, whiteboards, etc. ARIS Express was initially developed by IDS Scheer, which was bought by Software AG in December 2010. The tool is provided as freeware on the ARIS Community webpage. ARIS Express is notable - having been mentioned in research published by Schumm, Garcia, Krumnow and Greenwood amongst others. == History == ARIS Express was first announced on April 28, 2009 in a press release by IDS Scheer. The first release was on July 28, 2009 in a public beta test on ARIS Community. Only people, who registered before for the beta test were allowed to download and test this beta version. This closed beta test was followed with another public beta test. The official release of ARIS Express 1.0 was on September 9, 2009. In this first stable version, features such as Microsoft Visio import were added, which were not present in the version for the public beta test. On February 26, 2010, ARIS Express 2.0 was released. Major changes compared to version 1.0 include BPMN 2 support, integrated spellchecking and ARISalign integration. On May 25, 2010, version 2.1 of ARIS Express was released. This update improves BPMN 2 support, provides a new online help system for instant feedback, better ARISalign integration and some new symbols in different diagrams. Along with the release, a poster showing the most important modeling concepts supported by ARIS Express was released. In addition, an executable setup is provided for Microsoft Windows-based systems. Beginning of July, an update was released as ARIS Express 2.2, providing bug fixes only. ARIS Express version 2.2 is the current stable release. An official press release published mid of August 2010 said there are more than 50,000 downloads of ARIS Express. On February 2, 2011, version 2.3 of ARIS Express was released. This new version changes the file format of ARIS Express so that models can be shown in an interactive model viewer in ARIS Community. The release announcement contained no details about additional features or changes. == Functionality == === Overview === ARIS Express is a standalone single-user application. It is divided in a home screen and a modeling environment. The home screen is used to create new models or open recently edited ones. The modeling environment is used to edit diagrams. === Supported notations === The following notations are supported by ARIS Express. Users can create diagrams containing an unlimited number of modeling objects. BPMN 2 Collaboration Diagrams Event-driven Process Chains (EPC) Organizational charts Process landscape (value-added chain diagram) Data model in ERM notation IT infrastructure (network diagram) System landscape (component diagram) Whiteboard General diagram === Noteworthy features === Besides common features such as creating new diagrams, saving them as files or adding objects to the modeling canvas, ARIS Express also provides some noteworthy features, which can't be found in most comparable modeling tools. fragments - Often used modeling constructs such as an exclusive decision in a process model can be stored as fragments so that they are available for direct reuse in another model. smart designs - The flow of a process model or hierarchies of other models can be captured in a spreadsheet-like interface. While entering the data in the spreadsheet, the model is generated and laid out in the background while typing. mini toolbar - While moving the mouse pointer over an object in a diagram, a small toolbar is shown allowing quick access to the most important modeling actions. Microsoft Visio import - Diagrams created with Microsoft Visio 2007 or above can be imported to and edited in ARIS Express. A Microsoft Visio export is not provided. ARISalign import - Models created on the online collaboration platform ARISalign can be opened and edited in ARIS Express. === Exports === ARIS Express can export diagrams to different formats such as: PDF JPEG PNG EMF ADF ADF is the file format of ARIS Express. The professional tools of ARIS Platform are able to import diagrams stored in the ADF format. Yet, there are major limitations during import - namely, each object in diagram will be treated as unique object, despite having same type and name, forcing redrawing large sections of diagrams after import. Besides export formats, it is also possible to use the clipboard to copy and paste an ARIS Express diagram into typical office suites such as Microsoft PowerPoint. == Technology == ARIS Express is a Java-based application, which shares some of the features of ARIS Platform products such as ARIS Business Architect and ARIS Business Designer. In contrast to ARIS Platform products, ARIS Express doesn't use a central database for model storage. Instead, each diagram is stored in an ADF file. ARIS Express uses Java Web Start. After download, the application can be started immediately without installation procedure. For Microsoft Windows based systems, an ordinary setup is provided, too. ARIS Express requires Java 1.6.10 or above. On first startup, the user must enter a valid ARIS Community account to register the application. Creating an ARIS Community account is free-of-charge. After installation, no Internet connection is needed to use ARIS Express. ARIS Express uses a mechanism provided by Java Web Start to automatically update the application as soon as a new version becomes available and the user is connected to the Internet during startup. There are reports that this automated update failed while upgrading from version 1.0 to version 2.0. As ARIS Express is based on Java Web Start, it can be installed on any platform supported by Java. The ARIS Community and other Internet sources have reports of successful deployment of ARIS Express on other operating systems than Microsoft Windows. However, ARIS Express is officially supported only on Microsoft Windows. == Miscellaneous == A quick reference sheet is available for ARIS Express. The poster shows all supported diagrams plus the most important modelling concepts for each supported modelling language. ARIS Express contains a hidden game, a so-called Easter Egg. The game can be started by clicking several times on the product logo in the about dialog. Highscores achieved in the game can be submitted to a special page in ARIS Community. A Firefox Personas is available for ARIS Express.

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  • Information Processing Language

    Information Processing Language

    Information Processing Language (IPL) is a programming language created by Allen Newell, Cliff Shaw, and Herbert A. Simon at RAND Corporation and the Carnegie Institute of Technology about 1956. Newell had the job of language specifier-application programmer, Shaw was the system programmer, and Simon had the job of application programmer-user. IPL included features to facilitate AI programming, specifically problem solving. such as lists, dynamic memory allocation, data types, recursion, functions as arguments, generators, and cooperative multitasking. IPL also introduced the concepts of symbol processing and list processing. Unfortunately, all of these innovations were cast in a difficult assembly-language style. Nonetheless, IPL-V (the only public version of IPL) ran on many computers through the mid 1960s. == Basics of IPL == An IPL computer has: A set of symbols. All symbols are addresses, and name cells. Unlike symbols in later languages, symbols consist of a character followed by a number, and are written H1, A29, 9–7, 9–100. Cell names beginning with a letter are regional, and are absolute addresses. Cell names beginning with "9-" are local, and are meaningful within the context of a single list. One list's 9-1 is independent of another list's 9–1. Other symbols (e.g., pure numbers) are internal. A set of cells. Lists are made from several cells including mutual references. Cells have several fields: P, a 3-bit field used for an operation code when the cell is used as an instruction, and unused when the cell is data. Q, a 3-valued field used for indirect reference when the cell is used as an instruction, and unused when the cell is data. SYMB, a symbol used as the value in the cell. A set of primitive processes, which would be termed primitive functions in modern languages. The data structure of IPL is the list, but lists are more intricate structures than in many languages. A list consists of a singly linked sequence of symbols, as might be expected—plus some description lists, which are subsidiary singly linked lists interpreted as alternating attribute names and values. IPL provides primitives to access and mutate attribute value by name. The description lists are given local names (of the form 9–1). So, a list named L1 containing the symbols S4 and S5, and described by associating value V1 to attribute A1 and V2 to A2, would be stored as follows. 0 indicates the end of a list; the cell names 100, 101, etc. are automatically generated internal symbols whose values are irrelevant. These cells can be scattered throughout memory; only L1, which uses a regional name that must be globally known, needs to reside in a specific place. IPL is an assembly language for manipulating lists. It has a few cells which are used as special-purpose registers. H1, for example, is the program counter. The SYMB field of H1 is the name of the current instruction. However, H1 is interpreted as a list; the LINK of H1 is, in modern terms, a pointer to the beginning of the call stack. For example, subroutine calls push the SYMB of H1 onto this stack. H2 is the free-list. Procedures which need to allocate memory grab cells off of H2; procedures which are finished with memory put it on H2. On entry to a function, the list of parameters is given in H0; on exit, the results should be returned in H0. Many procedures return a Boolean result indicating success or failure, which is put in H5. Ten cells, W0-W9, are reserved for public working storage. Procedures are "morally bound" (to quote the CACM article) to save and restore the values of these cells. There are eight instructions, based on the values of P: subroutine call, push/pop S to H0; push/pop the symbol in S to the list attached to S; copy value to S; conditional branch. In these instructions, S is the target. S is either the value of the SYMB field if Q=0, the symbol in the cell named by SYMB if Q=1, or the symbol in the cell named by the symbol in the cell named by SYMB if Q=2. In all cases but conditional branch, the LINK field of the cell tells which instruction to execute next. IPL has a library of some 150 basic operations. These include such operations as: Test symbols for equality Find, set, or erase an attribute of a list Locate the next symbol in a list; insert a symbol in a list; erase or copy an entire list Arithmetic operations (on symbol names) Manipulation of symbols; e.g., test if a symbol denotes an integer, or make a symbol local I/O operations "Generators", which correspond to iterators and filters in functional programming. For example, a generator may accept a list of numbers and produce the list of their squares. Generators could accept suitably designed functions—strictly, the addresses of code of suitably designed functions—as arguments. == History == IPL was first utilized to demonstrate that the theorems in Principia Mathematica which were proven laboriously by hand, by Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead, could in fact be proven by computation. According to Simon's autobiography Models of My Life, this application was originally developed first by hand simulation, using his children as the computing elements, while writing on and holding up note cards as the registers which contained the state variables of the program. IPL was used to implement several early artificial intelligence programs, also by the same authors: the Logic Theorist (1956), the General Problem Solver (1957), and their computer chess program NSS (1958). Several versions of IPL were created: IPL-I (never implemented), IPL-II (1957 for JOHNNIAC), IPL-III (existed briefly), IPL-IV, IPL-V (1958, for IBM 650, IBM 704, IBM 7090, Philco model 212, many others. Widely used). IPL-VI was a proposal for an IPL hardware. A co-processor “IPL-VC” for the CDC 3600 at Argonne National Libraries was developed which could run IPL-V commands. It was used to implement another checker-playing program. This hardware implementation did not improve running times sufficiently to “compete favorably with a language more directly oriented to the structure of present-day machines”. IPL was soon displaced by Lisp, which had much more powerful features, a simpler syntax, and the benefit of automatic garbage collection. == Legacy to computer programming == IPL arguably introduced several programming language features: List manipulation—but only lists of atoms, not general lists Property lists—but only when attached to other lists Higher-order functions—while assembly programming had always allowed computing with the addresses of functions, IPL was an early attempt to generalize this property of assembly language in a principled way Computation with symbols—though symbols have a restricted form in IPL (letter followed by number) Virtual machine Many of these features were generalized, rationalized, and incorporated into Lisp and from there into many other programming languages during the next several decades.

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  • Lernmatrix

    Lernmatrix

    Lernmatrix (German for "learning matrix") is a special type of artificial neural network (ANN) architecture, similar to associative memory, invented around 1960 by Karl Steinbuch, a pioneer in computer science and ANNs. This model for learning systems could establish complex associations between certain sets of characteristics (e.g., letters of an alphabet) and their meanings. == Function == The Lernmatrix generally consists of n "characteristic lines" and m "meaning lines," where each characteristic line is connected to each meaning line, similar to how neurons in the brain are connected by synapses. (This can be realized in various ways – according to Steinbuch, this could be done by hardware or software). To train a Lernmatrix, values are specified on the corresponding characteristic and meaning lines (binary or real); then the connections between all pairs of characteristic and meaning lines are strengthened by the Hebb rule. A trained Lernmatrix, when given a specific input on the characteristic lines, activates the corresponding meaning lines. In modern language, it is a linear projection module. By appropriately interconnecting several Lernmatrices, a switching system can be built that, after completing certain training phases, is ultimately able to automatically determine the most probable associated meaning for an input sequence of features.

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  • Tim Houlne

    Tim Houlne

    Tim Houlne is an American business executive, entrepreneur, and author known for his work in outsourcing and homeshoring, remote working, and artificial intelligence (AI) in customer service. He is the founder and CEO of Humach, a company that uses human agents and AI in customer experience solutions. Previously, he was co-founder and CEO of Working Solutions, a virtual contact center company in the United States. == Early life and education == Houlne graduated from Missouri Western State University (MWSU) in 1986 with a bachelor's degree in business administration and from the University of Texas in Dallas with an MBA. In 2024, MWSU and North Central Missouri College renamed the Convergent Technology Alliance Center to the Houlne Center for Convergent Technology. The 20,000 square-foot learning laboratory provides training and applied education experiences in industries such as AI, cybersecurity, manufacturing and construction, and service technologies. == Career == In 1998, Houlne co-founded Working Solutions, a Plano, Texas-based U.S. outsourcing company that provides customer service using remote, home-based agents. As CEO, he oversaw the development of a virtual workforce model that routes service calls to either domestic or offshore agents, according to client needs and service requirements. In 2015, Houlne founded Humach, a customer experience outsourcing provider that uses human service agents with AI-based digital agents. The company derives its name from the combination of services provided by humans and machines. Its clients include Amazon, Carfax and McDonald's. The company acquired InfiniteAI in 2020, and Markets EQ in 2025. In 2013, Houlne was named a finalist for the Ernst & Young Entrepreneur of the Year Award (Southwest Region).He is the co-author of several books focused on the evolution of work, the gig economy, and the influence of AI in customer-facing roles. == Works == The New World of Work: From the Cube to the Cloud (2013) ISBN 0982562276 OCLC 813933360 The New World of Work, Second Edition: The Cube, the Cloud and What's Next (2023) ISBN 9781642258318 OCLC 1389815847 The Intelligent Workforce: How Humans & Machines Will Co-Create a Better Future (2024) ISBN 9798887501604 OCLC 1439598569

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  • Artificial intelligence

    Artificial intelligence

    Artificial intelligence (AI) is the capability of computational systems to perform tasks typically associated with human intelligence, such as learning, reasoning, problem-solving, perception, and decision-making. It is a field of research in engineering, mathematics and computer science that develops and studies methods and software that enable machines to perceive their environment and use learning and intelligence to take actions that maximize their chances of achieving defined goals. High-profile applications of AI include advanced web search engines, chatbots, virtual assistants, autonomous vehicles, and play and analysis in strategy games (e.g., chess and Go). Since the 2020s, generative AI has become widely available to generate images, audio, and videos from text prompts. The traditional goals of AI research include learning, reasoning, knowledge representation, planning, natural language processing, and perception, as well as support for robotics. To reach these goals, AI researchers have used techniques including state space search and mathematical optimization, formal logic, artificial neural networks, and methods based on statistics, operations research, and economics. AI also draws upon psychology, linguistics, philosophy, neuroscience, and other fields. Some companies, such as OpenAI, Google DeepMind and Meta, aim to create artificial general intelligence (AGI) – AI that can complete virtually any cognitive task at least as well as a human. Artificial intelligence was founded as an academic discipline in 1956, and the field went through multiple cycles of optimism throughout its history, followed by periods of disappointment and loss of funding, known as AI winters. Funding and interest increased substantially after 2012, when graphics processing units began being used to accelerate neural networks, and deep learning outperformed previous AI techniques. This growth accelerated further after 2017 with the transformer architecture. In the 2020s, an AI boom has coincided with advances in generative AI, which allowed for the creation and modification of media. In addition to AI safety and unintended consequences and harms from the use of AI, ethical concerns, AI's long-term effects, and potential existential risks have prompted discussions of AI regulation. == Goals == The general problem of simulating (or creating) intelligence has been broken into subproblems. These consist of particular traits or capabilities that researchers expect an intelligent system to display. The traits described below have received the most attention and cover the scope of AI research. === Reasoning and problem-solving === Early researchers developed algorithms that imitated step-by-step reasoning that humans use when they solve puzzles or make logical deductions. By the late 1980s and 1990s, methods were developed for dealing with uncertain or incomplete information, employing concepts from probability and economics. Many of these algorithms are insufficient for solving large reasoning problems because they experience a "combinatorial explosion": They become exponentially slower as the problems grow. Even humans rarely use the step-by-step deduction that early AI research could model. They solve most of their problems using fast, intuitive judgments. Accurate and efficient reasoning is an unsolved problem. === Knowledge representation === Knowledge representation and knowledge engineering allow AI programs to answer questions intelligently and make deductions about real-world facts. Formal knowledge representations are used in content-based indexing and retrieval, scene interpretation, clinical decision support, knowledge discovery (mining "interesting" and actionable inferences from large databases), and other areas. A knowledge base is a body of knowledge represented in a form that can be used by a program. An ontology is the set of objects, relations, concepts, and properties used by a particular domain of knowledge. Knowledge bases need to represent things such as objects, properties, categories, and relations between objects; situations, events, states, and time; causes and effects; knowledge about knowledge (what we know about what other people know); default reasoning (things that humans assume are true until they are told differently and will remain true even when other facts are changing); and many other aspects and domains of knowledge. Among the most difficult problems in knowledge representation are the breadth of commonsense knowledge (the set of atomic facts that the average person knows is enormous); and the sub-symbolic form of most commonsense knowledge (much of what people know is not represented as "facts" or "statements" that they could express verbally). There is also the difficulty of knowledge acquisition, the problem of obtaining knowledge for AI applications. === Planning and decision-making === An "agent" is any entity (artificial or not) that perceives and takes actions in the world. A rational agent has goals or preferences and takes actions to make them happen. In automated planning, the agent has a specific goal. In automated decision-making, the agent has preferences—there are some situations it would prefer to be in, and some situations it is trying to avoid. The decision-making agent assigns a number to each situation (called the "utility") that measures how much the agent prefers it. For each possible action, it can calculate the "expected utility": the utility of all possible outcomes of the action, weighted by the probability that the outcome will occur. It can then choose the action with the maximum expected utility. In classical planning, the agent knows exactly what the effect of any action will be. In most real-world problems, however, the agent may not be certain about the situation they are in (it is "unknown" or "unobservable") and it may not know for certain what will happen after each possible action (it is not "deterministic"). It must choose an action by making a probabilistic guess and then reassess the situation to see if the action worked. Alongside thorough testing and improvement based on previous decisions, having an explanation for why the agent took certain decisions is a way to build trust, especially when the decisions have to be relied upon. In some problems, the agent's preferences may be uncertain, especially if there are other agents or humans involved. These can be learned (e.g., with inverse reinforcement learning), or the agent can seek information to improve its preferences. Information value theory can be used to weigh the value of exploratory or experimental actions. The space of possible future actions and situations is typically intractably large, so the agents must take actions and evaluate situations while being uncertain of what the outcome will be. A Markov decision process has a transition model that describes the probability that a particular action will change the state in a particular way and a reward function that supplies the utility of each state and the cost of each action. A policy associates a decision with each possible state. The policy could be calculated (e.g., by iteration), be heuristic, or it can be learned. Game theory describes the rational behavior of multiple interacting agents and is used in AI programs that make decisions that involve other agents. === Learning === Machine learning is the study of programs that can improve their performance on a given task automatically. It has been a part of AI from the beginning. There are several kinds of machine learning. Unsupervised learning analyzes a stream of data and finds patterns and makes predictions without any other guidance. Supervised learning requires labeling the training data with the expected answers, and comes in two main varieties: classification (where the program must learn to predict what category the input belongs in) and regression (where the program must deduce a numeric function based on numeric input). In reinforcement learning, the agent is rewarded for good responses and punished for bad ones. The agent learns to choose responses that are classified as "good". Transfer learning is when the knowledge gained from one problem is applied to a new problem. Deep learning is a type of machine learning that runs inputs through biologically inspired artificial neural networks for all of these types of learning. Computational learning theory can assess learners by computational complexity, by sample complexity (how much data is required), or by other notions of optimization. === Natural language processing === Natural language processing (NLP) allows programs to read, write and communicate in human languages. Specific problems include speech recognition, speech synthesis, machine translation, information extraction, information retrieval and question answering. Early work, based on Noam Chomsky's generative grammar and semantic networks, had difficulty with word-sense disambiguation unless

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  • Hubert Dreyfus's views on artificial intelligence

    Hubert Dreyfus's views on artificial intelligence

    Hubert Dreyfus was a critic of artificial intelligence research. In a series of papers and books, including Alchemy and AI (1965), What Computers Can't Do (1972; 1979; 1992) and Mind over Machine (1986), he presented a skeptical and cautious assessment of AI's progress and a critique of the philosophical foundations of the field. Dreyfus' objections are discussed in most introductions to the philosophy of artificial intelligence, including Russell & Norvig (2021), a standard AI textbook, and in Fearn (2007), a survey of contemporary philosophy. Dreyfus argued that human intelligence and expertise depend primarily on yet-to-be understood informal and unconscious processes rather than symbolic manipulation and that these essentially human skills cannot be fully captured in formal rules. His critique was based on the insights of modern continental philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, and was directed at the first wave of AI research which tried to reduce intelligence to high level formal symbols. When Dreyfus' ideas were first introduced in the mid-1960s, they were met in the AI community with ridicule and outright hostility. By the 1980s, however, some of his perspectives were rediscovered by researchers working in robotics and the new field of connectionism—approaches that were called "sub-symbolic" at the time because they eschewed early AI research's emphasis on high level symbols. In the 21st century, "sub-symbolic" artificial neural networks and other statistics-based approaches to machine learning were highly successful. Historian and AI researcher Daniel Crevier wrote: "time has proven the accuracy and perceptiveness of some of Dreyfus's comments." Dreyfus said in 2007, "I figure I won and it's over—they've given up." == Dreyfus' critique == === The grandiose promises of artificial intelligence === In Alchemy and AI (1965) and What Computers Can't Do (1972), Dreyfus summarized the history of artificial intelligence and ridiculed the unbridled optimism that permeated the field. For example, Herbert A. Simon, following the success of his program General Problem Solver (1957), predicted that by 1967: A computer would be world champion in chess. A computer would discover and prove an important new mathematical theorem. Most theories in psychology will take the form of computer programs. The press dutifully reported these predictions of the imminent arrival of machine intelligence. Dreyfus felt that this optimism was unwarranted and, in 1965, argued forcefully that predictions like these would not come true. He would eventually be proven right. Pamela McCorduck explains Dreyfus' position: A great misunderstanding accounts for public confusion about thinking machines, a misunderstanding perpetrated by the unrealistic claims researchers in AI have been making, claims that thinking machines are already here, or at any rate, just around the corner. These predictions were based on the success of the cognitive revolution, which promoted an "information processing" model of the mind. It was articulated by Newell and Simon in their physical symbol systems hypothesis, and later expanded into a philosophical position known as computationalism by philosophers such as Jerry Fodor and Hilary Putnam. In AI, the approach is now called symbolic AI or "GOFAI". Dreyfus argued that "symbolic AI" was the latest version of the ancient program of rationalism in philosophy. Rationalism had come under heavy criticism in the 20th century from philosophers like Martin Heidegger and Edmund Husserl. The mind, according to modern continental philosophy, is not "rationalist" and is nothing like a digital computer. Cognitivism led early AI researchers to believe that they had successfully simulated the essential process of human thought, thus it seemed a short step to producing fully intelligent machines. Dreyfus' last paper detailed the ongoing history of the "first step fallacy", where AI researchers tend to wildly extrapolate initial success as promising, perhaps even guaranteeing, wild future successes. === Dreyfus' four assumptions of artificial intelligence research === In Alchemy and AI and What Computers Can't Do, Dreyfus identified four philosophical assumptions, at least one of which he deems necessary for AI to succeed. "In each case," Dreyfus writes, "the assumption is taken by workers in AI as an axiom, guaranteeing results, whereas it is, in fact, one hypothesis among others, to be tested by the success of such work." Dreyfus argues that AI would be impossible without accepting at least one of these four assumptions: The biological assumption The brain processes information in discrete operations by way of some biological equivalent of on/off switches. In the early days of research into neurology, scientists found that neurons fire in all-or-nothing pulses. Several researchers, such as Walter Pitts and Warren McCulloch, speculated with great confidence that neurons functioned similarly to the way Boolean logic gates operate, and so could be imitated by electronic circuitry at the level of the neuron. When digital computers became widely used in the early 50s, this argument was extended to suggest that the brain was a vast physical symbol system, manipulating the binary symbols of zero and one. Dreyfus was able to refute the biological assumption by citing research in neurology that suggested that the action and timing of neuron firing had analog components. But Daniel Crevier observes that "few still held that belief in the early 1970s, and nobody argued against Dreyfus" about the biological assumption. The psychological assumption The mind can be viewed as a device operating on bits of information according to formal rules. He refuted this assumption by showing that much of what we know about the world consists of complex attitudes or tendencies that make us lean towards one interpretation over another. He argued that, even when we use explicit symbols, we are using them against an unconscious and informal background including commonsense knowledge and that without this background our symbols cease to mean anything. This background, in Dreyfus' view, was not implemented in individual brains as explicit individual symbols with explicit individual meanings. The epistemological assumption All knowledge can be formalized. This concerns the philosophical issue of epistemology, or the study of knowledge. Even if we agree that the psychological assumption is false, AI researchers could still argue (as AI founder John McCarthy has) that it is possible for a symbol processing machine to represent all knowledge, regardless of whether human beings represent knowledge the same way. Dreyfus argued that there is no justification for this assumption, since so much of human knowledge is not symbolic or even expressible using formal constructs. The ontological assumption The world consists of independent facts that can be represented by independent symbols AI researchers (and futurists and science fiction writers) often assume that there is no limit to formal, scientific knowledge, because they assume that any phenomenon in the universe can be described by symbols or scientific theories. This assumes that everything that exists can be understood as objects, properties of objects, classes of objects, relations of objects, and so on: precisely those things that can be described by logic, language and mathematics. The study of being or existence is called ontology, and so Dreyfus calls this the ontological assumption. If this is false, then it raises doubts about what we can ultimately know and what intelligent machines will ultimately be able to help us to do. === Knowing-how vs. knowing-that: the primacy of intuition === In Mind Over Machine (1986), written (with his brother) during the heyday of expert systems, Dreyfus analyzed the difference between human expertise and the programs that claimed to capture it. This expanded on ideas from What Computers Can't Do, where he had made a similar argument criticizing the "cognitive simulation" school of AI research practiced by Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon in the 1960s. Dreyfus argued that human problem solving and expertise depend on our background sense of the context, of what is important and interesting given the situation, rather than on the process of searching through combinations of possibilities to find what we need. Dreyfus would describe it in 1986 as the difference between "knowing-that" and "knowing-how", based on Heidegger's distinction of present-at-hand and ready-to-hand. Knowing-that is our conscious, step-by-step problem solving abilities. We use these skills when we encounter a difficult problem that requires us to stop, step back and search through ideas one at time. At moments like this, the ideas become very precise and simple: they become context free symbols, which we manipulate using logic and language. These are the skills that Newell and Simon had demonstrated with both psy

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  • Planner (programming language)

    Planner (programming language)

    Planner (often seen in publications as "PLANNER" although it is not an acronym) is a programming language designed by Carl Hewitt at MIT, and first published in 1969. First, subsets such as Micro-Planner and Pico-Planner were implemented, and then essentially the whole language was implemented as Popler by Julian Davies at the University of Edinburgh in the POP-2 programming language. Derivations such as QA4, Conniver, QLISP and Ether (see scientific community metaphor) were important tools in artificial intelligence research in the 1970s, which influenced commercial developments such as Knowledge Engineering Environment (KEE) and Automated Reasoning Tool (ART). == Procedural approach versus logical approach == The two major paradigms for constructing semantic software systems were procedural and logical. The procedural paradigm was epitomized by Lisp which featured recursive procedures that operated on list structures. The logical paradigm was epitomized by uniform proof procedure resolution-based derivation (proof) finders. According to the logical paradigm it was “cheating” to incorporate procedural knowledge. == Procedural embedding of knowledge == Planner was invented for the purposes of the procedural embedding of knowledge and was a rejection of the resolution uniform proof procedure paradigm, which Converted everything to clausal form. Converting all information to clausal form is problematic because it hides the underlying structure of the information. Then used resolution to attempt to obtain a proof by contradiction by adding the clausal form of the negation of the theorem to be proved. Using only resolution as the rule of inference is problematical because it hides the underlying structure of proofs. Also, using proof by contradiction is problematical because the axiomatizations of all practical domains of knowledge are inconsistent in practice. Planner was a kind of hybrid between the procedural and logical paradigms because it combined programmability with logical reasoning. Planner featured a procedural interpretation of logical sentences where an implication of the form (P implies Q) can be procedurally interpreted in the following ways using pattern-directed invocation: Forward chaining (antecedently): If assert P, assert Q If assert not Q, assert not P Backward chaining (consequently) If goal Q, goal P If goal not P, goal not Q In this respect, the development of Planner was influenced by natural deductive logical systems (especially the one by Frederic Fitch [1952]). == Micro-planner implementation == A subset called Micro-Planner was implemented by Gerry Sussman, Eugene Charniak and Terry Winograd and was used in Winograd's natural-language understanding program SHRDLU, Eugene Charniak's story understanding work, Thorne McCarty's work on legal reasoning, and some other projects. This generated a great deal of excitement in the field of AI. It also generated controversy because it proposed an alternative to the logic approach that had been one of the mainstay paradigms for AI. At SRI International, Jeff Rulifson, Jan Derksen, and Richard Waldinger developed QA4 which built on the constructs in Planner and introduced a context mechanism to provide modularity for expressions in the database. Earl Sacerdoti and Rene Reboh developed QLISP, an extension of QA4 embedded in INTERLISP, providing Planner-like reasoning embedded in a procedural language and developed in its rich programming environment. QLISP was used by Richard Waldinger and Karl Levitt for program verification, by Earl Sacerdoti for planning and execution monitoring, by Jean-Claude Latombe for computer-aided design, by Nachum Dershowitz for program synthesis, by Richard Fikes for deductive retrieval, and by Steven Coles for an early expert system that guided use of an econometric model. Computers were expensive. They had only a single slow processor and their memories were very small by comparison with today. So Planner adopted some efficiency expedients including the following: Backtracking was adopted to economize on the use of time and storage by working on and storing only one possibility at a time in exploring alternatives. A unique name assumption was adopted to save space and time by assuming that different names referred to different objects. For example, names like Peking (previous PRC capital name) and Beijing (current PRC capital transliteration) were assumed to refer to different objects. A closed-world assumption could be implemented by conditionally testing whether an attempt to prove a goal exhaustively failed. Later this capability was given the misleading name "negation as failure" because for a goal G it was possible to say: "if attempting to achieve G exhaustively fails then assert (Not G)." == The genesis of Prolog == Gerry Sussman, Eugene Charniak, Seymour Papert and Terry Winograd visited the University of Edinburgh in 1971, spreading the news about Micro-Planner and SHRDLU and casting doubt on the resolution uniform proof procedure approach that had been the mainstay of the Edinburgh Logicists. At the University of Edinburgh, Bruce Anderson implemented a subset of Micro-Planner called PICO-PLANNER, and Julian Davies (1973) implemented essentially all of Planner. According to Donald MacKenzie, Pat Hayes recalled the impact of a visit from Papert to Edinburgh, which had become the "heart of artificial intelligence's Logicland," according to Papert's MIT colleague, Carl Hewitt. Papert eloquently voiced his critique of the resolution approach dominant at Edinburgh "…and at least one person upped sticks and left because of Papert." The above developments generated tension among the Logicists at Edinburgh. These tensions were exacerbated when the UK Science Research Council commissioned Sir James Lighthill to write a report on the AI research situation in the UK. The resulting report [Lighthill 1973; McCarthy 1973] was highly critical although SHRDLU was favorably mentioned. Pat Hayes visited Stanford where he learned about Planner. When he returned to Edinburgh, he tried to influence his friend Bob Kowalski to take Planner into account in their joint work on automated theorem proving. "Resolution theorem-proving was demoted from a hot topic to a relic of the misguided past. Bob Kowalski doggedly stuck to his faith in the potential of resolution theorem proving. He carefully studied Planner.”. Kowalski [1988] states "I can recall trying to convince Hewitt that Planner was similar to SL-resolution." But Planner was invented for the purposes of the procedural embedding of knowledge and was a rejection of the resolution uniform proof procedure paradigm. Colmerauer and Roussel recalled their reaction to learning about Planner in the following way: "While attending an IJCAI convention in September ‘71 with Jean Trudel, we met Robert Kowalski again and heard a lecture by Terry Winograd on natural language processing. The fact that he did not use a unified formalism left us puzzled. It was at this time that we learned of the existence of Carl Hewitt’s programming language, Planner. The lack of formalization of this language, our ignorance of Lisp and, above all, the fact that we were absolutely devoted to logic meant that this work had little influence on our later research." In the fall of 1972, Philippe Roussel implemented a language called Prolog (an abbreviation for PROgrammation en LOGique – French for "programming in logic"). Prolog programs are generically of the following form (which is a special case of the backward-chaining in Planner): When goal Q, goal P1 and ... and goal Pn Prolog duplicated the following aspects of Micro-Planner: Pattern directed invocation of procedures from goals (i.e. backward chaining) An indexed data base of pattern-directed procedures and ground sentences. Giving up on the completeness paradigm that had characterized previous work on theorem proving and replacing it with the programming language procedural embedding of knowledge paradigm. Prolog also duplicated the following capabilities of Micro-Planner which were pragmatically useful for the computers of the era because they saved space and time: Backtracking control structure Unique Name Assumption by which different names are assumed to refer to distinct entities, e.g., Peking and Beijing are assumed to be different. Reification of Failure. The way that Planner established that something was provable was to successfully attempt it as a goal and the way that it establish that something was unprovable was to attempt it as a goal and explicitly fail. Of course the other possibility is that the attempt to prove the goal runs forever and never returns any value. Planner also had a (not expression) construct which succeeded if expression failed, which gave rise to the “Negation as Failure” terminology in Planner. Use of the Unique Name Assumption and Negation as Failure became more questionable when attention turned to Open Systems. The following capabiliti

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  • SERVQUAL

    SERVQUAL

    SERVQUAL is a research tool that measures customer perception of service quality by comparing what customers expect from a service to their assessment of the service actually delivered. The instrument was developed in the United States in the mid-1980s by researchers A. Parasuraman, Valarie Zeithaml, and Leonard L. Berry, and is designed for use in after-service evaluation processes. It assesses service quality across five dimensions: reliability, assurance, tangibles, empathy, and responsiveness. SERVQUAL has been applied in sectors including healthcare, banking, education, and libraries. == Overview == The SERVQUAL questionnaire consists of matched pairs of items, 22 expectation items and 22 perception items, organized into five dimensions that correspond to the consumer's mental framework for evaluating service quality. Each item is part of a pair: one question asks what excellent organizations in a given industry should offer (expectation), and the other asks how the specific organization being evaluated performs (perception). == The model of service quality == The model of service quality, referred to as the gaps model, was developed by Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry during a systematic research program conducted in the 1980s. The model identifies five gaps that may cause customers to experience poor service quality. In this framework, gap 5 is the service quality gap, which represents the difference between customer expectations and their perceptions of the service. This is the only gap that can be directly measured, and the SERVQUAL instrument was designed specifically to capture it. Gaps 1 through 4 have diagnostic value and point to probable causes of service failures. == Development of the instrument == Development of the model of service quality began in 1983 and, after iterative refinements, led to the publication of the SERVQUAL instrument in 1988. The research team conducted in-depth interviews and focus groups in four service sectors: retail banking, credit card services, securities brokerage, and product repair and maintenance. The questionnaire was tested across multiple samples to verify its reliability, validity, and factor structure. == Adaptations and variants == SERVQUAL has been adapted for specific industries and contexts. Well‑known derivatives include: LibQUAL+ – a library service quality survey developed by the Association of Research Libraries. EDUQUAL – an instrument tailored for the evaluation of service quality in educational institutions. HEALTHQUAL – adapted for measuring patient perceptions of healthcare service quality. ARTSQUAL – used to evaluate visitor perceptions of quality in museums and performing arts venues. == Criticisms == Researchers have raised several concerns about SERVQUAL. Critics argue that the instrument's definition of expectations is ambiguous and that it does not adequately account for the dynamic nature of customer expectations over time. Other scholars question whether the five‑dimension structure is universally applicable across all service contexts, and whether a generic instrument can capture the unique attributes of specific industries without modification.

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  • Geometric primitive

    Geometric primitive

    In vector computer graphics, CAD systems, and geographic information systems, a geometric primitive (or prim) is the simplest (i.e. 'atomic' or irreducible) geometric shape that the system can handle (draw, store). Sometimes the subroutines that draw the corresponding objects are called "geometric primitives" as well. The most "primitive" primitives are point and straight line segments, which were all that early vector graphics systems had. In constructive solid geometry, primitives are simple geometric shapes such as a cube, cylinder, sphere, cone, pyramid, torus. Modern 2D computer graphics systems may operate with primitives which are curves (segments of straight lines, circles and more complicated curves), as well as shapes (boxes, arbitrary polygons, circles). A common set of two-dimensional primitives includes lines, points, and polygons, although some people prefer to consider triangles primitives, because every polygon can be constructed from triangles (polygon triangulation). All other graphic elements are built up from these primitives. In three dimensions, triangles or polygons positioned in three-dimensional space can be used as primitives to model more complex 3D forms. In some cases, curves (such as Bézier curves, circles, etc.) may be considered primitives; in other cases, curves are complex forms created from many straight, primitive shapes. == Common primitives == The set of geometric primitives is based on the dimension of the region being represented: Point (0-dimensional), a single location with no height, width, or depth. Line or curve (1-dimensional), having length but no width, although a linear feature may curve through a higher-dimensional space. Planar surface or curved surface (2-dimensional), having length and width. Volumetric region or solid (3-dimensional), having length, width, and depth. In GIS, the terrain surface is often spoken of colloquially as "2 1/2 dimensional," because only the upper surface needs to be represented. Thus, elevation can be conceptualized as a scalar field property or function of two-dimensional space, affording it a number of data modeling efficiencies over true 3-dimensional objects. A shape of any of these dimensions greater than zero consists of an infinite number of distinct points. Because digital systems are finite, only a sample set of the points in a shape can be stored. Thus, vector data structures typically represent geometric primitives using a strategic sample, organized in structures that facilitate the software interpolating the remainder of the shape at the time of analysis or display, using the algorithms of Computational geometry. A Point is a single coordinate in a Cartesian coordinate system. Some data models allow for Multipoint features consisting of several disconnected points. A Polygonal chain or Polyline is an ordered list of points (termed vertices in this context). The software is expected to interpolate the intervening shape of the line between adjacent points in the list as a parametric curve, most commonly a straight line, but other types of curves are frequently available, including circular arcs, cubic splines, and Bézier curves. Some of these curves require additional points to be defined that are not on the line itself, but are used for parametric control. A Polygon is a polyline that closes at its endpoints, representing the boundary of a two-dimensional region. The software is expected to use this boundary to partition 2-dimensional space into an interior and exterior. Some data models allow for a single feature to consist of multiple polylines, which could collectively connect to form a single closed boundary, could represent a set of disjoint regions (e.g., the state of Hawaii), or could represent a region with holes (e.g., a lake with an island). A Parametric shape is a standardized two-dimensional or three-dimensional shape defined by a minimal set of parameters, such as an ellipse defined by two points at its foci, or three points at its center, vertex, and co-vertex. A Polyhedron or Polygon mesh is a set of polygon faces in three-dimensional space that are connected at their edges to completely enclose a volumetric region. In some applications, closure may not be required or may be implied, such as modeling terrain. The software is expected to use this surface to partition 3-dimensional space into an interior and exterior. A triangle mesh is a subtype of polyhedron in which all faces must be triangles, the only polygon that will always be planar, including the Triangulated irregular network (TIN) commonly used in GIS. A parametric mesh represents a three-dimensional surface by a connected set of parametric functions, similar to a spline or Bézier curve in two dimensions. The most common structure is the Non-uniform rational B-spline (NURBS), supported by most CAD and animation software. == Application in GIS == A wide variety of vector data structures and formats have been developed during the history of Geographic information systems, but they share a fundamental basis of storing a core set of geometric primitives to represent the location and extent of geographic phenomena. Locations of points are almost always measured within a standard Earth-based coordinate system, whether the spherical Geographic coordinate system (latitude/longitude), or a planar coordinate system, such as the Universal Transverse Mercator. They also share the need to store a set of attributes of each geographic feature alongside its shape; traditionally, this has been accomplished using the data models, data formats, and even software of relational databases. Early vector formats, such as POLYVRT, the ARC/INFO Coverage, and the Esri shapefile support a basic set of geometric primitives: points, polylines, and polygons, only in two dimensional space and the latter two with only straight line interpolation. TIN data structures for representing terrain surfaces as triangle meshes were also added. Since the mid 1990s, new formats have been developed that extend the range of available primitives, generally standardized by the Open Geospatial Consortium's Simple Features specification. Common geometric primitive extensions include: three-dimensional coordinates for points, lines, and polygons; a fourth "dimension" to represent a measured attribute or time; curved segments in lines and polygons; text annotation as a form of geometry; and polygon meshes for three-dimensional objects. Frequently, a representation of the shape of a real-world phenomenon may have a different (usually lower) dimension than the phenomenon being represented. For example, a city (a two-dimensional region) may be represented as a point, or a road (a three-dimensional volume of material) may be represented as a line. This dimensional generalization correlates with tendencies in spatial cognition. For example, asking the distance between two cities presumes a conceptual model of the cities as points, while giving directions involving travel "up," "down," or "along" a road imply a one-dimensional conceptual model. This is frequently done for purposes of data efficiency, visual simplicity, or cognitive efficiency, and is acceptable if the distinction between the representation and the represented is understood, but can cause confusion if information users assume that the digital shape is a perfect representation of reality (i.e., believing that roads really are lines). == In 3D modelling == In CAD software or 3D modelling, the interface may present the user with the ability to create primitives which may be further modified by edits. For example, in the practice of box modelling the user will start with a cuboid, then use extrusion and other operations to create the model. In this use the primitive is just a convenient starting point, rather than the fundamental unit of modelling. A 3D package may also include a list of extended primitives which are more complex shapes that come with the package. For example, a teapot is listed as a primitive in 3D Studio Max. == In graphics hardware == Various graphics accelerators exist with hardware acceleration for rendering specific primitives such as lines or triangles, frequently with texture mapping and shaders. Modern 3D accelerators typically accept sequences of triangles as triangle strips.

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  • Hubert Dreyfus's views on artificial intelligence

    Hubert Dreyfus's views on artificial intelligence

    Hubert Dreyfus was a critic of artificial intelligence research. In a series of papers and books, including Alchemy and AI (1965), What Computers Can't Do (1972; 1979; 1992) and Mind over Machine (1986), he presented a skeptical and cautious assessment of AI's progress and a critique of the philosophical foundations of the field. Dreyfus' objections are discussed in most introductions to the philosophy of artificial intelligence, including Russell & Norvig (2021), a standard AI textbook, and in Fearn (2007), a survey of contemporary philosophy. Dreyfus argued that human intelligence and expertise depend primarily on yet-to-be understood informal and unconscious processes rather than symbolic manipulation and that these essentially human skills cannot be fully captured in formal rules. His critique was based on the insights of modern continental philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, and was directed at the first wave of AI research which tried to reduce intelligence to high level formal symbols. When Dreyfus' ideas were first introduced in the mid-1960s, they were met in the AI community with ridicule and outright hostility. By the 1980s, however, some of his perspectives were rediscovered by researchers working in robotics and the new field of connectionism—approaches that were called "sub-symbolic" at the time because they eschewed early AI research's emphasis on high level symbols. In the 21st century, "sub-symbolic" artificial neural networks and other statistics-based approaches to machine learning were highly successful. Historian and AI researcher Daniel Crevier wrote: "time has proven the accuracy and perceptiveness of some of Dreyfus's comments." Dreyfus said in 2007, "I figure I won and it's over—they've given up." == Dreyfus' critique == === The grandiose promises of artificial intelligence === In Alchemy and AI (1965) and What Computers Can't Do (1972), Dreyfus summarized the history of artificial intelligence and ridiculed the unbridled optimism that permeated the field. For example, Herbert A. Simon, following the success of his program General Problem Solver (1957), predicted that by 1967: A computer would be world champion in chess. A computer would discover and prove an important new mathematical theorem. Most theories in psychology will take the form of computer programs. The press dutifully reported these predictions of the imminent arrival of machine intelligence. Dreyfus felt that this optimism was unwarranted and, in 1965, argued forcefully that predictions like these would not come true. He would eventually be proven right. Pamela McCorduck explains Dreyfus' position: A great misunderstanding accounts for public confusion about thinking machines, a misunderstanding perpetrated by the unrealistic claims researchers in AI have been making, claims that thinking machines are already here, or at any rate, just around the corner. These predictions were based on the success of the cognitive revolution, which promoted an "information processing" model of the mind. It was articulated by Newell and Simon in their physical symbol systems hypothesis, and later expanded into a philosophical position known as computationalism by philosophers such as Jerry Fodor and Hilary Putnam. In AI, the approach is now called symbolic AI or "GOFAI". Dreyfus argued that "symbolic AI" was the latest version of the ancient program of rationalism in philosophy. Rationalism had come under heavy criticism in the 20th century from philosophers like Martin Heidegger and Edmund Husserl. The mind, according to modern continental philosophy, is not "rationalist" and is nothing like a digital computer. Cognitivism led early AI researchers to believe that they had successfully simulated the essential process of human thought, thus it seemed a short step to producing fully intelligent machines. Dreyfus' last paper detailed the ongoing history of the "first step fallacy", where AI researchers tend to wildly extrapolate initial success as promising, perhaps even guaranteeing, wild future successes. === Dreyfus' four assumptions of artificial intelligence research === In Alchemy and AI and What Computers Can't Do, Dreyfus identified four philosophical assumptions, at least one of which he deems necessary for AI to succeed. "In each case," Dreyfus writes, "the assumption is taken by workers in AI as an axiom, guaranteeing results, whereas it is, in fact, one hypothesis among others, to be tested by the success of such work." Dreyfus argues that AI would be impossible without accepting at least one of these four assumptions: The biological assumption The brain processes information in discrete operations by way of some biological equivalent of on/off switches. In the early days of research into neurology, scientists found that neurons fire in all-or-nothing pulses. Several researchers, such as Walter Pitts and Warren McCulloch, speculated with great confidence that neurons functioned similarly to the way Boolean logic gates operate, and so could be imitated by electronic circuitry at the level of the neuron. When digital computers became widely used in the early 50s, this argument was extended to suggest that the brain was a vast physical symbol system, manipulating the binary symbols of zero and one. Dreyfus was able to refute the biological assumption by citing research in neurology that suggested that the action and timing of neuron firing had analog components. But Daniel Crevier observes that "few still held that belief in the early 1970s, and nobody argued against Dreyfus" about the biological assumption. The psychological assumption The mind can be viewed as a device operating on bits of information according to formal rules. He refuted this assumption by showing that much of what we know about the world consists of complex attitudes or tendencies that make us lean towards one interpretation over another. He argued that, even when we use explicit symbols, we are using them against an unconscious and informal background including commonsense knowledge and that without this background our symbols cease to mean anything. This background, in Dreyfus' view, was not implemented in individual brains as explicit individual symbols with explicit individual meanings. The epistemological assumption All knowledge can be formalized. This concerns the philosophical issue of epistemology, or the study of knowledge. Even if we agree that the psychological assumption is false, AI researchers could still argue (as AI founder John McCarthy has) that it is possible for a symbol processing machine to represent all knowledge, regardless of whether human beings represent knowledge the same way. Dreyfus argued that there is no justification for this assumption, since so much of human knowledge is not symbolic or even expressible using formal constructs. The ontological assumption The world consists of independent facts that can be represented by independent symbols AI researchers (and futurists and science fiction writers) often assume that there is no limit to formal, scientific knowledge, because they assume that any phenomenon in the universe can be described by symbols or scientific theories. This assumes that everything that exists can be understood as objects, properties of objects, classes of objects, relations of objects, and so on: precisely those things that can be described by logic, language and mathematics. The study of being or existence is called ontology, and so Dreyfus calls this the ontological assumption. If this is false, then it raises doubts about what we can ultimately know and what intelligent machines will ultimately be able to help us to do. === Knowing-how vs. knowing-that: the primacy of intuition === In Mind Over Machine (1986), written (with his brother) during the heyday of expert systems, Dreyfus analyzed the difference between human expertise and the programs that claimed to capture it. This expanded on ideas from What Computers Can't Do, where he had made a similar argument criticizing the "cognitive simulation" school of AI research practiced by Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon in the 1960s. Dreyfus argued that human problem solving and expertise depend on our background sense of the context, of what is important and interesting given the situation, rather than on the process of searching through combinations of possibilities to find what we need. Dreyfus would describe it in 1986 as the difference between "knowing-that" and "knowing-how", based on Heidegger's distinction of present-at-hand and ready-to-hand. Knowing-that is our conscious, step-by-step problem solving abilities. We use these skills when we encounter a difficult problem that requires us to stop, step back and search through ideas one at time. At moments like this, the ideas become very precise and simple: they become context free symbols, which we manipulate using logic and language. These are the skills that Newell and Simon had demonstrated with both psy

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  • Lisp machine

    Lisp machine

    Lisp machines are general-purpose computers designed to efficiently run Lisp as their main software and programming language, usually via hardware support. They are an example of a high-level language computer architecture. In a sense, they were the first commercial single-user workstations. Despite being modest in number (perhaps 7,000 units total as of 1988) Lisp machines commercially pioneered some now-commonplace technologies, including networking innovations such as Chaosnet, and effective garbage collection. Several firms built and sold Lisp machines in the 1980s: Symbolics (3600, 3640, XL1200, MacIvory, and other models), Lisp Machines Incorporated (LMI Lambda), Texas Instruments (Explorer, MicroExplorer), and Xerox (Interlisp-D workstations). The operating systems were written in Lisp Machine Lisp, Interlisp (Xerox), and later partly in Common Lisp. == History == === Historical context === Artificial intelligence (AI) computer programs of the 1960s and 1970s intrinsically required what was then considered a huge amount of computer power, as measured in processor time and memory space. The power requirements of AI research were exacerbated by the Lisp symbolic programming language, when commercial hardware was designed and optimized for assembly- and Fortran-like programming languages. At first, the cost of such computer hardware meant that it had to be shared among many users. As integrated circuit technology shrank the size and cost of computers in the 1960s and early 1970s, and the memory needs of AI programs began to exceed the address space of the most common research computer, the Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) PDP-10, researchers considered a new approach: a computer designed specifically to develop and run large artificial intelligence programs, and tailored to the semantics of the Lisp language. To provide consistent performance for interactive programs, these machines would often not be shared, but would be dedicated to a single user at a time. === Initial development === In 1973, Richard Greenblatt and Thomas Knight, programmers at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (AI Lab), began what would become the MIT Lisp Machine Project when they first began building a computer hardwired to run certain basic Lisp operations, rather than run them in software, in a 24-bit tagged architecture. The machine also did incremental (or Arena) garbage collection. More specifically, since Lisp variables are typed at runtime rather than compile time, a simple addition of two variables could take five times as long on conventional hardware, due to test and branch instructions. Lisp Machines ran the tests in parallel with the more conventional single instruction additions. If the simultaneous tests failed, then the result was discarded and recomputed; this meant in many cases a speed increase by several factors. This simultaneous checking approach was used as well in testing the bounds of arrays when referenced, and other memory management necessities (not merely garbage collection or arrays). Type checking was further improved and automated when the conventional byte word of 32 bits was lengthened to 36 bits for Symbolics 3600-model Lisp machines and eventually to 40 bits or more (usually, the excess bits not accounted for by the following were used for error-correcting codes). The first group of extra bits were used to hold type data, making the machine a tagged architecture, and the remaining bits were used to implement compressed data representation (CDR) coding (wherein the usual linked list elements are compressed to occupy roughly half the space), aiding garbage collection by reportedly an order of magnitude. A further improvement was two microcode instructions which specifically supported Lisp functions, reducing the cost of calling a function to as little as 20 clock cycles, in some Symbolics implementations. The first machine was called the CONS machine (named after the list construction operator cons in Lisp). Often it was affectionately referred to as the Knight machine, perhaps since Knight wrote his master's thesis on the subject; it was extremely well received. It was subsequently improved into a version called CADR (a pun; in Lisp, the cadr function, which returns the second item of a list, is pronounced /ˈkeɪ.dəɹ/ or /ˈkɑ.dəɹ/, as some pronounce the word "cadre") which was based on essentially the same architecture. About 25 of what were essentially prototype CADRs were sold within and without MIT for ~$50,000; it quickly became the favorite machine for hacking – many of the most favored software tools were quickly ported to it (e.g. Emacs was ported from ITS in 1975). It was so well received at an AI conference held at MIT in 1978 that Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began funding its development. === Commercializing MIT Lisp machine technology === In 1979, Russell Noftsker, being convinced that Lisp machines had a bright commercial future due to the strength of the Lisp language and the enabling factor of hardware acceleration, proposed to Greenblatt that they commercialize the technology. In a counter-intuitive move for an AI Lab hacker, Greenblatt acquiesced, hoping perhaps that he could recreate the informal and productive atmosphere of the Lab in a real business. These ideas and goals were considerably different from those of Noftsker. The two negotiated at length, but neither would compromise. As the proposed firm could succeed only with the full and undivided assistance of the AI Lab hackers as a group, Noftsker and Greenblatt decided that the fate of the enterprise was up to them, and so the choice should be left to the hackers. The ensuing discussions of the choice divided the lab into two factions. In February 1979, matters came to a head. The hackers sided with Noftsker, believing that a commercial venture-fund-backed firm had a better chance of surviving and commercializing Lisp machines than Greenblatt's proposed self-sustaining start-up. Greenblatt lost the battle. It was at this juncture that Symbolics, Noftsker's enterprise, slowly came together. While Noftsker was paying his staff a salary, he had no building or any equipment for the hackers to work on. He bargained with Patrick Winston that, in exchange for allowing Symbolics' staff to keep working out of MIT, Symbolics would let MIT use internally and freely all the software Symbolics developed. A consultant from CDC, who was trying to put together a natural language computer application with a group of West-coast programmers, came to Greenblatt, seeking a Lisp machine for his group to work with, about eight months after the disastrous conference with Noftsker. Greenblatt had decided to start his own rival Lisp machine firm, but he had done nothing. The consultant, Alexander Jacobson, decided that the only way Greenblatt was going to start the firm and build the Lisp machines that Jacobson desperately needed was if Jacobson pushed and otherwise helped Greenblatt launch the firm. Jacobson pulled together business plans, a board, a partner for Greenblatt (one F. Stephen Wyle). The newfound firm was named LISP Machine, Inc. (LMI), and was funded by CDC orders, via Jacobson. Around this time Symbolics (Noftsker's firm) began operating. It had been hindered by Noftsker's promise to give Greenblatt a year's head start, and by severe delays in procuring venture capital. Symbolics still had the major advantage that while 3 or 4 of the AI Lab hackers had gone to work for Greenblatt, 14 other hackers had signed onto Symbolics. Two AI Lab people were not hired by either: Richard Stallman and Marvin Minsky. Stallman, however, blamed Symbolics for the decline of the hacker community that had centered around the AI lab. For two years, from 1982 to the end of 1983, Stallman worked by himself to clone the output of the Symbolics programmers, with the aim of preventing them from gaining a monopoly on the lab's computers. Regardless, after a series of internal battles, Symbolics did get off the ground in 1980/1981, selling the CADR as the LM-2, while Lisp Machines, Inc. sold it as the LMI-CADR. Symbolics did not intend to produce many LM-2s, since the 3600 family of Lisp machines was supposed to ship quickly, but the 3600s were repeatedly delayed, and Symbolics ended up producing ~100 LM-2s, each of which sold for $70,000. Both firms developed second-generation products based on the CADR: the Symbolics 3600 and the LMI-LAMBDA (of which LMI managed to sell ~200). The 3600, which shipped a year late, expanded on the CADR by widening the machine word to 36-bits, expanding the address space to 28-bits, and adding hardware to accelerate certain common functions that were implemented in microcode on the CADR. The LMI-LAMBDA, which came out a year after the 3600, in 1983, was compatible with the CADR (it could run CADR microcode), but hardware differences existed. Texas Instruments (TI) joined the fray whe

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  • Luciano Floridi

    Luciano Floridi

    Luciano Floridi (Italian: [luˈtʃaːno ˈflɔːridi]; born 16 November 1964) is an Italian and British philosopher. He is John K. Castle Professor in the Practice of Cognitive Science and Founding Director of the Digital Ethics Center at Yale University. He is also a Professor of Sociology of Culture and Communication at the University of Bologna, Department of Legal Studies, where he is the director of the Centre for Digital Ethics. Furthermore, he is adjunct professor ("distinguished scholar in residence") at the Department of Economics, American University, Washington D.C. He is married to the neuroscientist Anna Christina Nobre. Floridi is best known for his work on two areas of philosophical research: the philosophy of information, and information ethics (also known as digital ethics or computer ethics), for which he received many awards, including the Knight of the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit, Italy's most prestigious honor. According to Scopus, Floridi was the most cited living philosopher in the world in 2020. Between 2008 and 2013, he held the research chair in philosophy of information and the UNESCO Chair in Information and Computer Ethics at the University of Hertfordshire. He was the founder and director of the IEG, an interdepartmental research group on the philosophy of information at the University of Oxford, and of the GPI the research Group in Philosophy of Information at the University of Hertfordshire. He was the founder and director of the SWIF, the Italian e-journal of philosophy (1995–2008). He is a former Governing Body Fellow of St Cross College, Oxford. == Early life and education == Floridi was born in Rome in 1964, and studied at Rome University La Sapienza (laurea, first class with distinction, 1988), where he was originally educated as a historian of philosophy. He soon became interested in analytic philosophy and wrote his tesi di laurea (roughly equivalent to an M.A. thesis) in philosophy of logic, on Michael Dummett's anti-realism. He obtained his Master of Philosophy (1989) and PhD degree (1990) from the University of Warwick, working in epistemology and philosophy of logic with Susan Haack (who was his PhD supervisor) and Michael Dummett. Floridi's early student years are partly recounted in the non-fiction book The Lost Painting: The Quest for a Caravaggio Masterpiece, where he is "Luciano". During his graduate and postdoctoral years, he covered the standard topics in analytic philosophy in search of a new methodology. He sought to approach contemporary problems from a heuristically powerful and intellectually enriching perspective when dealing with lively philosophical issues. During his graduate studies, he began to distance himself from classical analytic philosophy. In his view, the analytic movement had lost its way. For this reason, he worked on pragmatism (especially Peirce) and foundationalist issues in epistemology and philosophy of logic, as well as the history of skepticism. == Academic career and previous positions == Floridi started his academic career as a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Warwick in 1990–1991. He joined the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Oxford in 1990 and the OUCL (Oxford's Department of Computer Science) in 1999. He was junior research fellow (JRF) in philosophy at Wolfson College, Oxford University (1990–1994), a Frances Yates Fellow in the History of Ideas at the Warburg Institute, University of London (1994–1995) and Research Fellow in philosophy at Wolfson College, Oxford University (1994–2001). During these years in Oxford, he held lectureships in different Colleges. Between 1994 and 1996, he also held a post-doctoral research scholarship at the Department of Philosophy, University of Turin. Between 2001 and 2006, he was Markle Foundation Senior Research Fellow in Information Policy at the Programme in Comparative Media Law and Policy, Oxford University. Between 2002 and 2008, he was associate professor of logic at the Università degli Studi di Bari. In 2006, he became Fellow by Special Election of St Cross College, Oxford University, where he played for the squash team. In 2008, he was appointed full professor of philosophy at the University of Hertfordshire, to hold the newly established research chair in philosophy of information and, in 2009, the UNESCO Chair in Information and Computer Ethics, a position which he held until 2013, when he moved back to Oxford. In 2017, Floridi became a fellow of the Alan Turing Institute and the chair of its Data Ethics Group, holding these positions until 2021 and 2020, respectively. Since 2010 he has been editor-in-chief of Philosophy & Technology (Springer). In January 2023, Floridi announced he would move to Yale at the beginning of the academic year 2023–2024, to take over the position of founding director of the Yale Digital Ethics Center. == Philosophical views == One of Floridi's key contributions is his formulation of the 'Philosophy of Information' (PoI). The PoI provides a framework for understanding the nature of information and its role in the world. According to Floridi, information is a vital resource that shapes our knowledge and understanding of the world. It is not simply a neutral representation of reality but a part of the world, with its own properties, effects, and moral implications. Floridi's PoI has several key components including an 'ontology of information', which defines the nature of information, an 'ethics of information', which provides a framework for evaluating the moral implications of information and information technologies, an 'epistemology of information', that analyses the role of information in the development of knowledge and science, and a 'logic of information', the concentrates on the more formal aspects. The PoI also includes a theory of the 'information environment', the infosphere, which encompasses the physical, social, and cultural contexts in which information is produced, used, and communicated. == Recognitions and awards == 2022 - Knight of the Grand Cross - First Class of the Order of Merit (Cavaliere di Gran Croce Ordine al Merito della Repubblica Italiana, the highest honor in the Italian Republic), awarded through a special decree by the president of the Italian Republic Sergio Mattarella for his work on the philosophy and ethics of information. 2022 - Fellow of the Accademia delle Scienze dell'Istituto di Bologna 2021 - Honorary Doctorate (Laurea honoris causa) in Informatics, University of Skövde, Sweden, for "his groundbreaking work on the philosophy of information". 2020 - Premio Udine Filosofia, Mimesis Festival, for The Logic of Information (OUP, 2019) 2020 - Premio Socrate, Cesare Landa Foundation, for philosophical communication 2019 - CogX Award, for "outstanding achievement in ethics of AI" 2019 - Gilbert Ryle Lectures, Trent University 2019 - Premio Aretè "Maestro della Responsabilità", Nuvolaverde, Confindustria, Gruppo 24 Ore Salone della CSR e dell'innovazione sociale, for ethics of communication 2018 - Thinker Award, IBM, for AI Ethics 2018 - Premio Conoscenza, Conferenza dei Rettori delle Università Italiane (CRUI, equivalent of Universities UK), for achievements in research and communication about digital ethics 2017 - Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences 2016 - J. Ong Award, Media Ecology Association, for The Fourth Revolution (OUP, 2016) 2016 - Copernicus Scientist Award, Institute for Advanced Studies of the University of Ferrara, in recognition of research in the ethics and philosophy of information 2015 - Fernand Braudel Senior Fellow, European University Institute 2014-15 - Cátedras de Excelencia, University Carlos III of Madrid, for research in philosophy and ethics of information 2013 - Member of the Académie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences 2013 - Fellow of the British Computer Society 2013 - Weizenbaum Award, International Society for Ethics and Information Technology, for "very significant contribution to the field of information and computer ethics, through his research, service, and vision" 2012 - Covey Award, International Association for Computing and Philosophy, for "outstanding research in computing and philosophy" 2011-12 - Fellow, Center for Information Policy Research, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee 2011 - Honorary Doctorate (Laurea honoris causa) in philosophy, University of Suceava, Romania, for "his leading research in the philosophy and ethics of information" 2011 - Fellow, World Technology Network, NY, in the category "ethics and technology" 2010 - Vice Chancellor Research Award, University of Hertfordshire 2009 - Fellow of the Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and the Simulation of Behaviour (AIBS) 2009-10 - Gauss Professor of the Akademie der Wissenschaften, Göttingen, in recognition of research in the philosophy of information (first philosopher to receive the award, generally given to mathematicians or physicists) 2009 - Barwise Prize, American Philosophical Asso

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  • Projection-slice theorem

    Projection-slice theorem

    In mathematics, the projection-slice theorem, central slice theorem or Fourier slice theorem in two dimensions states that the results of the following two calculations are equal: Take a two-dimensional function f(r), project (e.g. using the Radon transform) it onto a (one-dimensional) line, and do a Fourier transform of that projection. Take that same function, but do a two-dimensional Fourier transform first, and then slice the function through its origin, parallel to the projection line. In operator terms, if F1 and F2 are the 1- and 2-dimensional Fourier transform operators mentioned above, P1 is the projection operator (which projects a 2-D function onto a 1-D line), S1 is a slice operator (which extracts a 1-D central slice from a function), then F 1 P 1 = S 1 F 2 . {\displaystyle F_{1}P_{1}=S_{1}F_{2}.} This idea can be extended to higher dimensions. This theorem is used, for example, in the analysis of medical CT scans where a "projection" is an x-ray image of an internal organ. The Fourier transforms of these images are seen to be slices through the Fourier transform of the 3-dimensional density of the internal organ, and these slices can be interpolated to build up a complete Fourier transform of that density. The inverse Fourier transform is then used to recover the 3-dimensional density of the object. This technique was first derived by Ronald N. Bracewell in 1956 for a radio-astronomy problem. == The projection-slice theorem in N dimensions == In N dimensions, the projection-slice theorem states that the Fourier transform of the projection of an N-dimensional function f(r) onto an m-dimensional linear submanifold is equal to an m-dimensional slice of the N-dimensional Fourier transform of that function consisting of an m-dimensional linear submanifold through the origin in the Fourier space which is parallel to the projection submanifold. In operator terms: F m P m = S m F N . {\displaystyle F_{m}P_{m}=S_{m}F_{N}.\,} == The generalized Fourier-slice theorem == In addition to generalizing to N dimensions, the projection-slice theorem can be further generalized with an arbitrary change of basis. For convenience of notation, we consider the change of basis to be represented as B, an N-by-N invertible matrix operating on N-dimensional column vectors. Then the generalized Fourier-slice theorem can be stated as F m P m B = S m B − T | B − T | F N {\displaystyle F_{m}P_{m}B=S_{m}{\frac {B^{-T}}{|B^{-T}|}}F_{N}} where B − T = ( B − 1 ) T {\displaystyle B^{-T}=(B^{-1})^{T}} is the transpose of the inverse of the change of basis transform. == Proof in two dimensions == The projection-slice theorem is easily proven for the case of two dimensions. Without loss of generality, we can take the projection line to be the x-axis. There is no loss of generality because if we use a shifted and rotated line, the law still applies. Using a shifted line (in y) gives the same projection and therefore the same 1D Fourier transform results. The rotated function is the Fourier pair of the rotated Fourier transform, for which the theorem again holds. If f(x, y) is a two-dimensional function, then the projection of f(x, y) onto the x axis is p(x) where p ( x ) = ∫ − ∞ ∞ f ( x , y ) d y . {\displaystyle p(x)=\int _{-\infty }^{\infty }f(x,y)\,dy.} The Fourier transform of f ( x , y ) {\displaystyle f(x,y)} is F ( k x , k y ) = ∫ − ∞ ∞ ∫ − ∞ ∞ f ( x , y ) e − 2 π i ( x k x + y k y ) d x d y . {\displaystyle F(k_{x},k_{y})=\int _{-\infty }^{\infty }\int _{-\infty }^{\infty }f(x,y)\,e^{-2\pi i(xk_{x}+yk_{y})}\,dxdy.} The slice is then s ( k x ) {\displaystyle s(k_{x})} s ( k x ) = F ( k x , 0 ) = ∫ − ∞ ∞ ∫ − ∞ ∞ f ( x , y ) e − 2 π i x k x d x d y {\displaystyle s(k_{x})=F(k_{x},0)=\int _{-\infty }^{\infty }\int _{-\infty }^{\infty }f(x,y)\,e^{-2\pi ixk_{x}}\,dxdy} = ∫ − ∞ ∞ [ ∫ − ∞ ∞ f ( x , y ) d y ] e − 2 π i x k x d x {\displaystyle =\int _{-\infty }^{\infty }\left[\int _{-\infty }^{\infty }f(x,y)\,dy\right]\,e^{-2\pi ixk_{x}}dx} = ∫ − ∞ ∞ p ( x ) e − 2 π i x k x d x {\displaystyle =\int _{-\infty }^{\infty }p(x)\,e^{-2\pi ixk_{x}}dx} which is just the Fourier transform of p(x). The proof for higher dimensions is easily generalized from the above example. == The FHA cycle == If the two-dimensional function f(r) is circularly symmetric, it may be represented as f(r), where r = |r|. In this case the projection onto any projection line will be the Abel transform of f(r). The two-dimensional Fourier transform of f(r) will be a circularly symmetric function given by the zeroth-order Hankel transform of f(r), which will therefore also represent any slice through the origin. The projection-slice theorem then states that the Fourier transform of the projection equals the slice or F 1 A 1 = H , {\displaystyle F_{1}A_{1}=H,} where A1 represents the Abel-transform operator, projecting a two-dimensional circularly symmetric function onto a one-dimensional line, F1 represents the 1-D Fourier-transform operator, and H represents the zeroth-order Hankel-transform operator. == Extension to fan beam or cone-beam CT == The projection-slice theorem is suitable for CT image reconstruction with parallel beam projections. It does not directly apply to fanbeam or conebeam CT. The theorem was extended to fan-beam and conebeam CT image reconstruction by Shuang-ren Zhao in 1995.

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  • METR

    METR

    Model Evaluation and Threat Research (METR) (MEE-tər), is a nonprofit research institute, based in Berkeley, California, that evaluates frontier AI models' capabilities to carry out long-horizon, agentic tasks that some researchers argue could pose catastrophic risks to society. METR has worked with leading AI companies to conduct pre-deployment model evaluations and contribute to system cards, including OpenAI's o3, o4-mini, GPT-4o and GPT-4.5, and Anthropic's Claude models. METR's CEO and founder is Beth Barnes, a former alignment researcher at OpenAI who left in 2022 to form ARC Evals, the evaluation division of Paul Christiano's Alignment Research Center. In December 2023, ARC Evals was spun off into an independent 501(c)(3) nonprofit and renamed METR. == Research == A substantial amount of METR's research is focused on evaluating the capabilities of AI systems to conduct research and development of AI systems themselves, including RE-Bench, a benchmark designed to test whether AIs can "solve research engineering tasks and accelerate AI R&D". === Doubling time estimates === In March 2025, METR published a paper noting that the length of software engineering tasks that the leading AI model could complete had a doubling time of around 7 months between 2019 and 2024. In January 2026, METR released a new version of their time horizon estimates model (Time Horizon 1.1). According to the updated model, the rate of progress of AI capabilities has increased since 2023, with a post-2023 doubling time estimated at 130.8 days (4.3 months). Progress is thus estimated to be 20% more rapid. === Time horizon measurements === METR releases a "task-completion time horizon" for analysed AI models. This measures the "task duration (measured by human expert completion time) at which an AI agent is predicted to succeed with a given level of reliability." The metric is reported in two variants: the 50%-time horizon, which gives the task duration at which an AI model is estimated to succeed 50% of the time, and the 80%-time horizon, which gives the task duration at which an AI model is estimated to succeed 80% of the time. METR has published two versions of the underlying model: Time Horizon 1.0 and Time Horizon 1.1, the latter introduced in January 2026. As of 9 May 2026, the best-performing model is Claude Mythos, with a 50%-time horizon of likely at least 16 hours and an 80%-time horizon of 3 hours and 6 minutes. METR notes that "[m]easurements above 16 [hours] are unreliable with [their] current task suite". The following table provides time horizon estimates ordered by each model's release date:

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  • Catastrophic interference

    Catastrophic interference

    Catastrophic interference, also known as catastrophic forgetting, is the tendency of an artificial neural network to abruptly and drastically forget previously learned information upon learning new information. Neural networks are an important part of the connectionist approach to cognitive science. The issue of catastrophic interference when modeling human memory with connectionist models was originally brought to the attention of the scientific community by research from McCloskey and Cohen (1989), and Ratcliff (1990). It is a radical manifestation of the 'sensitivity-stability' dilemma or the 'stability-plasticity' dilemma. Specifically, these problems refer to the challenge of making an artificial neural network that is sensitive to, but not disrupted by, new information. Lookup tables and connectionist networks lie on the opposite sides of the stability plasticity spectrum. The former remains completely stable in the presence of new information but lacks the ability to generalize, i.e. infer general principles, from new inputs. On the other hand, connectionist networks like the standard backpropagation network can generalize to unseen inputs, but they are sensitive to new information. Backpropagation models can be analogized to human memory insofar as they have a similar ability to generalize, but these networks often exhibit less stability than human memory. Notably, these backpropagation networks are susceptible to catastrophic interference. This is an issue when modelling human memory, because unlike these networks, humans typically do not show catastrophic forgetting. == Discovery == The term catastrophic interference was originally coined by McCloskey and Cohen (1989) but was also brought to the attention of the scientific community by research from Ratcliff (1990). === The Sequential Learning Problem: McCloskey and Cohen (1989) === McCloskey and Cohen (1989) noted the problem of catastrophic interference during two different experiments with backpropagation neural network modelling. Experiment 1: Learning the ones and twos addition facts In their first experiment they trained a standard backpropagation neural network on a single training set consisting of 17 single-digit ones problems (i.e., 1 + 1 through 9 + 1, and 1 + 2 through 1 + 9) until the network could represent and respond properly to all of them. The error between the actual output and the desired output steadily declined across training sessions, which reflected that the network learned to represent the target outputs better across trials. Next, they trained the network on a single training set consisting of 17 single-digit twos problems (i.e., 2 + 1 through 2 + 9, and 1 + 2 through 9 + 2) until the network could represent, respond properly to all of them. They noted that their procedure was similar to how a child would learn their addition facts. Following each learning trial on the twos facts, the network was tested for its knowledge on both the ones and twos addition facts. Like the ones facts, the twos facts were readily learned by the network. However, McCloskey and Cohen noted the network was no longer able to properly answer the ones addition problems even after one learning trial of the twos addition problems. The output pattern produced in response to the ones facts often resembled an output pattern for an incorrect number more closely than the output pattern for a correct number. This is considered to be a drastic amount of error. Furthermore, the problems 2+1 and 1+2, which were included in both training sets, even showed dramatic disruption during the first learning trials of the twos facts. Experiment 2: Replication of Barnes and Underwood (1959) study In their second connectionist model, McCloskey and Cohen attempted to replicate the study on retroactive interference in humans by Barnes and Underwood (1959). They trained the model on A-B and A-C lists and used a context pattern in the input vector (input pattern), to differentiate between the lists. Specifically the network was trained to respond with the right B response when shown the A stimulus and A-B context pattern and to respond with the correct C response when shown the A stimulus and the A-C context pattern. When the model was trained concurrently on the A-B and A-C items then the network readily learned all of the associations correctly. In sequential training the A-B list was trained first, followed by the A-C list. After each presentation of the A-C list, performance was measured for both the A-B and A-C lists. They found that the amount of training on the A-C list in Barnes and Underwood study that lead to 50% correct responses, lead to nearly 0% correct responses by the backpropagation network. Furthermore, they found that the network tended to show responses that looked like the C response pattern when the network was prompted to give the B response pattern. This indicated that the A-C list apparently had overwritten the A-B list. This could be likened to learning the word dog, followed by learning the word stool and then finding that you think of the word stool when presented with the word dog. McCloskey and Cohen tried to reduce interference through a number of manipulations including changing the number of hidden units, changing the value of the learning rate parameter, overtraining on the A-B list, freezing certain connection weights, changing target values 0 and 1 instead 0.1 and 0.9. However, none of these manipulations satisfactorily reduced the catastrophic interference exhibited by the networks. Overall, McCloskey and Cohen (1989) concluded that: at least some interference will occur whenever new learning alters the weights involved in representing old learning the greater the amount of new learning, the greater the disruption in old knowledge interference was catastrophic in the backpropagation networks when learning was sequential but not concurrent === Constraints Imposed by Learning and Forgetting Functions: Ratcliff (1990) === Ratcliff (1990) used multiple sets of backpropagation models applied to standard recognition memory procedures, in which the items were sequentially learned. After inspecting the recognition performance models he found two major problems: Well-learned information was catastrophically forgotten as new information was learned in both small and large backpropagation networks. Even one learning trial with new information resulted in a significant loss of the old information, paralleling the findings of McCloskey and Cohen (1989). Ratcliff also found that the resulting outputs were often a blend of the previous input and the new input. In larger networks, items learned in groups (e.g. AB then CD) were more resistant to forgetting than were items learned singly (e.g. A then B then C...). However, the forgetting for items learned in groups was still large. Adding new hidden units to the network did not reduce interference. Discrimination between the studied items and previously unseen items decreased as the network learned more. This finding contradicts studies on human memory, which indicated that discrimination increases with learning. Ratcliff attempted to alleviate this problem by adding 'response nodes' that would selectively respond to old and new inputs. However, this method did not work as these response nodes would become active for all inputs. A model which used a context pattern also failed to increase discrimination between new and old items. == Proposed solutions == The main cause of catastrophic interference seems to be overlap in the representations at the hidden layer of distributed neural networks. In a distributed representation, each input tends to create changes in the weights of many of the nodes. Catastrophic forgetting occurs because when many of the weights where "knowledge is stored" are changed, it is unlikely for prior knowledge to be kept intact. During sequential learning, the inputs become mixed, with the new inputs being superimposed on top of the old ones. Another way to conceptualize this is by visualizing learning as a movement through a weight space. This weight space can be likened to a spatial representation of all of the possible combinations of weights that the network could possess. When a network first learns to represent a set of patterns, it finds a point in the weight space that allows it to recognize all of those patterns. However, when the network then learns a new set of patterns, it will move to a place in the weight space for which the only concern is the recognition of the new patterns. To recognize both sets of patterns, the network must find a place in the weight space suitable for recognizing both the new and the old patterns. Below are a number of techniques which have empirical support in successfully reducing catastrophic interference in backpropagation neural networks: === Orthogonality === Many of the early techniques in reducing representational overlap involved making either the input vecto

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