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  • Toad (software)

    Toad (software)

    Toad is a database management toolset from Quest Software for managing relational and non-relational databases using SQL aimed at database developers, database administrators, and data analysts. The Toad toolset runs against Oracle, SQL Server, IBM DB2 (LUW & z/OS), SAP and MySQL. A Toad product for data preparation supports many data platforms. == History == A practicing Oracle DBA, Jim McDaniel, designed Toad for his own use in the mid-1990s. He called it Tool for Oracle Application Developers, shortened to "TOAD". McDaniel initially distributed the tool as shareware and later online as freeware. Quest Software acquired TOAD in October 1998. Quest Software itself was acquired by Dell in 2012 to form Dell Software. In June 2016, Dell announced the sale of their software division, including the Quest business, to Francisco Partners and Elliott Management Corporation. On October 31, 2016, the sale was finalized. On November 1, 2016, the sale of Dell Software to Francisco Partners and Elliott Management was completed, and the company re-launched as Quest Software. == Features == Connection Manager - Allow users to connect natively to the vendor’s database whether on-premise or DBaaS. Browser - Allow users to browse all the different database/schema objects and their properties effective management. Editor - A way to create and maintain scripts and database code with debugging and integration with source control. Unit Testing (Oracle) - Ensures code is functionally tested before it is released into production. Static code review (Oracle) - Ensures code meets required quality level using a rules-based system. SQL Optimization - Provides developers with a way to tune and optimize SQL statements and database code without relying on a DBA. Advanced optimization enables DBAs to tune SQL effectively in production. Scalability testing and database workload replay - Ensures that database code and SQL will scale properly before it gets released into production. == Books == Toad Pocket Reference for Oracle plsql 1st Edition by Jim McDaniel and Patrick McGrath, O'Reilly, 2002 (ISBN 0596003374, ISBN 978-0-596-00337-1) Toad Pocket Reference for Oracle 2nd Edition by Jeff Smith, Bert Scalzo, and Patrick McGrath, O'Reilly, 2005 (ISBN 0596009712, ISBN 978-0-596-00971-7) TOAD Handbook by Bert Scalzo and Dan Hotka, Sams, 2003 (ISBN 0672324865, ISBN 978-0-672-32486-4) TOAD Handbook 2nd Edition by Bert Scalzo and Dan Hotka, Addison-Wesley Professional, 2009 (ISBN 0321649109, ISBN 978-0-321-64910-2). TOAD Handbook 2nd Edition by Bert Scalzo and Dan Hotka, Addison-Wesley Professional, 2009 (ISBN 0321649109, ISBN 978-0-321-64910-2).

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  • Bayesian programming

    Bayesian programming

    Bayesian programming is a formalism and a methodology for having a technique to specify probabilistic models and solve problems when less than the necessary information is available. Edwin T. Jaynes proposed that probability could be considered as an alternative and an extension of logic for rational reasoning with incomplete and uncertain information. In his founding book Probability Theory: The Logic of Science he developed this theory and proposed what he called "the robot," which was not a physical device, but an inference engine to automate probabilistic reasoning—a kind of Prolog for probability instead of logic. Bayesian programming is a formal and concrete implementation of this "robot". Bayesian programming may also be seen as an algebraic formalism to specify graphical models such as, for instance, Bayesian networks, dynamic Bayesian networks, Kalman filters or hidden Markov models. Indeed, Bayesian programming is more general than Bayesian networks and has a power of expression equivalent to probabilistic factor graphs. == Formalism == A Bayesian program is a means of specifying a family of probability distributions. The constituent elements of a Bayesian program are presented below: Program { Description { Specification ( π ) { Variables Decomposition Forms Identification (based on δ ) Question {\displaystyle {\text{Program}}{\begin{cases}{\text{Description}}{\begin{cases}{\text{Specification}}(\pi ){\begin{cases}{\text{Variables}}\\{\text{Decomposition}}\\{\text{Forms}}\\\end{cases}}\\{\text{Identification (based on }}\delta )\end{cases}}\\{\text{Question}}\end{cases}}} A program is constructed from a description and a question. A description is constructed using some specification ( π {\displaystyle \pi } ) as given by the programmer and an identification or learning process for the parameters not completely specified by the specification, using a data set ( δ {\displaystyle \delta } ). A specification is constructed from a set of pertinent variables, a decomposition and a set of forms. Forms are either parametric forms or questions to other Bayesian programs. A question specifies which probability distribution has to be computed. === Description === The purpose of a description is to specify an effective method of computing a joint probability distribution on a set of variables { X 1 , X 2 , ⋯ , X N } {\displaystyle \left\{X_{1},X_{2},\cdots ,X_{N}\right\}} given a set of experimental data δ {\displaystyle \delta } and some specification π {\displaystyle \pi } . This joint distribution is denoted as: P ( X 1 ∧ X 2 ∧ ⋯ ∧ X N ∣ δ ∧ π ) {\displaystyle P\left(X_{1}\wedge X_{2}\wedge \cdots \wedge X_{N}\mid \delta \wedge \pi \right)} . To specify preliminary knowledge π {\displaystyle \pi } , the programmer must undertake the following: Define the set of relevant variables { X 1 , X 2 , ⋯ , X N } {\displaystyle \left\{X_{1},X_{2},\cdots ,X_{N}\right\}} on which the joint distribution is defined. Decompose the joint distribution (break it into relevant independent or conditional probabilities). Define the forms of each of the distributions (e.g., for each variable, one of the list of probability distributions). ==== Decomposition ==== Given a partition of { X 1 , X 2 , … , X N } {\displaystyle \left\{X_{1},X_{2},\ldots ,X_{N}\right\}} containing K {\displaystyle K} subsets, K {\displaystyle K} variables are defined L 1 , ⋯ , L K {\displaystyle L_{1},\cdots ,L_{K}} , each corresponding to one of these subsets. Each variable L k {\displaystyle L_{k}} is obtained as the conjunction of the variables { X k 1 , X k 2 , ⋯ } {\displaystyle \left\{X_{k_{1}},X_{k_{2}},\cdots \right\}} belonging to the k t h {\displaystyle k^{th}} subset. Recursive application of Bayes' theorem leads to: P ( X 1 ∧ X 2 ∧ ⋯ ∧ X N ∣ δ ∧ π ) = P ( L 1 ∧ ⋯ ∧ L K ∣ δ ∧ π ) = P ( L 1 ∣ δ ∧ π ) × P ( L 2 ∣ L 1 ∧ δ ∧ π ) × ⋯ × P ( L K ∣ L K − 1 ∧ ⋯ ∧ L 1 ∧ δ ∧ π ) {\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}&P\left(X_{1}\wedge X_{2}\wedge \cdots \wedge X_{N}\mid \delta \wedge \pi \right)\\={}&P\left(L_{1}\wedge \cdots \wedge L_{K}\mid \delta \wedge \pi \right)\\={}&P\left(L_{1}\mid \delta \wedge \pi \right)\times P\left(L_{2}\mid L_{1}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)\times \cdots \times P\left(L_{K}\mid L_{K-1}\wedge \cdots \wedge L_{1}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)\end{aligned}}} Conditional independence hypotheses then allow further simplifications. A conditional independence hypothesis for variable L k {\displaystyle L_{k}} is defined by choosing some variable X n {\displaystyle X_{n}} among the variables appearing in the conjunction L k − 1 ∧ ⋯ ∧ L 2 ∧ L 1 {\displaystyle L_{k-1}\wedge \cdots \wedge L_{2}\wedge L_{1}} , labelling R k {\displaystyle R_{k}} as the conjunction of these chosen variables and setting: P ( L k ∣ L k − 1 ∧ ⋯ ∧ L 1 ∧ δ ∧ π ) = P ( L k ∣ R k ∧ δ ∧ π ) {\displaystyle P\left(L_{k}\mid L_{k-1}\wedge \cdots \wedge L_{1}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)=P\left(L_{k}\mid R_{k}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)} We then obtain: P ( X 1 ∧ X 2 ∧ ⋯ ∧ X N ∣ δ ∧ π ) = P ( L 1 ∣ δ ∧ π ) × P ( L 2 ∣ R 2 ∧ δ ∧ π ) × ⋯ × P ( L K ∣ R K ∧ δ ∧ π ) {\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}&P\left(X_{1}\wedge X_{2}\wedge \cdots \wedge X_{N}\mid \delta \wedge \pi \right)\\={}&P\left(L_{1}\mid \delta \wedge \pi \right)\times P\left(L_{2}\mid R_{2}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)\times \cdots \times P\left(L_{K}\mid R_{K}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)\end{aligned}}} Such a simplification of the joint distribution as a product of simpler distributions is called a decomposition, derived using the chain rule. This ensures that each variable appears at the most once on the left of a conditioning bar, which is the necessary and sufficient condition to write mathematically valid decompositions. ==== Forms ==== Each distribution P ( L k ∣ R k ∧ δ ∧ π ) {\displaystyle P\left(L_{k}\mid R_{k}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)} appearing in the product is then associated with either a parametric form (i.e., a function f μ ( L k ) {\displaystyle f_{\mu }\left(L_{k}\right)} ) or a question to another Bayesian program P ( L k ∣ R k ∧ δ ∧ π ) = P ( L ∣ R ∧ δ ^ ∧ π ^ ) {\displaystyle P\left(L_{k}\mid R_{k}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)=P\left(L\mid R\wedge {\widehat {\delta }}\wedge {\widehat {\pi }}\right)} . When it is a form f μ ( L k ) {\displaystyle f_{\mu }\left(L_{k}\right)} , in general, μ {\displaystyle \mu } is a vector of parameters that may depend on R k {\displaystyle R_{k}} or δ {\displaystyle \delta } or both. Learning takes place when some of these parameters are computed using the data set δ {\displaystyle \delta } . An important feature of Bayesian programming is this capacity to use questions to other Bayesian programs as components of the definition of a new Bayesian program. P ( L k ∣ R k ∧ δ ∧ π ) {\displaystyle P\left(L_{k}\mid R_{k}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)} is obtained by some inferences done by another Bayesian program defined by the specifications π ^ {\displaystyle {\widehat {\pi }}} and the data δ ^ {\displaystyle {\widehat {\delta }}} . This is similar to calling a subroutine in classical programming and provides an easy way to build hierarchical models. === Question === Given a description (i.e., P ( X 1 ∧ X 2 ∧ ⋯ ∧ X N ∣ δ ∧ π ) {\displaystyle P\left(X_{1}\wedge X_{2}\wedge \cdots \wedge X_{N}\mid \delta \wedge \pi \right)} ), a question is obtained by partitioning { X 1 , X 2 , ⋯ , X N } {\displaystyle \left\{X_{1},X_{2},\cdots ,X_{N}\right\}} into three sets: the searched variables, the known variables and the free variables. The 3 variables S e a r c h e d {\displaystyle Searched} , K n o w n {\displaystyle Known} and F r e e {\displaystyle Free} are defined as the conjunction of the variables belonging to these sets. A question is defined as the set of distributions: P ( S e a r c h e d ∣ Known ∧ δ ∧ π ) {\displaystyle P\left(Searched\mid {\text{Known}}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)} made of many "instantiated questions" as the cardinal of K n o w n {\displaystyle Known} , each instantiated question being the distribution: P ( Searched ∣ Known ∧ δ ∧ π ) {\displaystyle P\left({\text{Searched}}\mid {\text{Known}}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)} === Inference === Given the joint distribution P ( X 1 ∧ X 2 ∧ ⋯ ∧ X N ∣ δ ∧ π ) {\displaystyle P\left(X_{1}\wedge X_{2}\wedge \cdots \wedge X_{N}\mid \delta \wedge \pi \right)} , it is always possible to compute any possible question using the following general inference: P ( Searched ∣ Known ∧ δ ∧ π ) = ∑ Free [ P ( Searched ∧ Free ∣ Known ∧ δ ∧ π ) ] = ∑ Free [ P ( Searched ∧ Free ∧ Known ∣ δ ∧ π ) ] P ( Known ∣ δ ∧ π ) = ∑ Free [ P ( Searched ∧ Free ∧ Known ∣ δ ∧ π ) ] ∑ Free ∧ Searched [ P ( Searched ∧ Free ∧ Known ∣ δ ∧ π ) ] = 1 Z × ∑ Free [ P ( Searched ∧ Free ∧ Known ∣ δ ∧ π ) ] {\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}&P\left({\text{Searched}}\mid {\text{Known}}\wedge \delta \wedge \pi \right)\\={}&\sum _{\text{Free}}\left[P\left({\text{Searched}}\wedge {\text{Free}}\mid {\text{Known}}\wedge \delta \wedge \

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  • AI nationalism

    AI nationalism

    AI nationalism is the idea that nations should develop and control their own artificial intelligence technologies to advance their own interests and ensure technological sovereignty. This concept is gaining traction globally, leading countries to implement new laws, form strategic alliances, and invest significantly in domestic AI capabilities. == Global trends and national strategies == In 2018, British technology investor Ian Hogarth published an influential essay titled AI Nationalism. He argued that as AI gains more power and its economic and military significance expands, governments will take measures to bolster their own domestic AI industries, and predicted that the advancement of machine learning systems would lead to what he termed "AI nationalism." He anticipated that this rise in AI would accelerate a global arms race, resulting in more closed economies, restrictions on foreign acquisitions, and limitations on the movement of talent. Hogarth predicted that AI policy would become a central focus of government agendas. He also criticized Britain’s approach to AI strategy, citing the sale of London-based DeepMind—one of the leading AI laboratories, acquired by Google for a relatively modest £400 million in 2014—as a significant misstep. AI nationalism is chiefly reflected in the escalating rhetoric of an artificial intelligence arms race, portraying AI development as a zero-sum game where the winner gains significant economic, political, and military advantages. This mindset, as highlighted in a 2017 Pentagon report, warns that sharing AI technology could erode technological supremacy and enhance rivals' capabilities. The winner-takes-all mentality of AI nationalism poses risks including unsafe AI development, increased geopolitical tension, and potential military aggression (such as cyberattacks or targeting AI professionals). Several countries, including Canada, France, and India, have formulated national strategies to advance their positions in AI. In the United States, a leading player in the global AI arena, trade policies have been enacted to restrict China's access to critical microchips, reflecting a strategic effort to maintain a technological edge. The United States’ National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) frames AI development as a critical aspect of a broader technology competition crucial for national success. It emphasizes the need to outpace China in AI to maintain strategic advantage, reflecting AI nationalism by linking geopolitical power directly to advancements in AI. France has seen notable governmental support for local AI startups, particularly those specializing in language technologies that cater to French and other non-English languages. In Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is investing billions in AI research and development. The country has actively collaborated with major technology firms such as Amazon, IBM, and Microsoft to establish itself as a prominent AI hub. == Historical and cultural context == AI nationalism is seen as deeply connected to historical racism and imperialism. It is viewed not merely as a technological competition but as a contest over racial and civilizational superiority. Historically, technological achievements were often used to justify colonialism and racial hierarchies, with Western societies perceiving their advancements as evidence of superiority. In the context of AI, this historical context continues to shape views on intelligence and development. Some argue that AI nationalism reinforces the idea of fundamental civilizational divides, especially between the Western world and China. This perspective often frames China's progress in AI as a direct challenge to Western values, presenting the AI competition as a struggle over values. AI nationalism is said to draw from long-standing anti-Asian stereotypes, such as the "Yellow Peril," which portray Asian nations as threats to Western civilization. This viewpoint links Asian technological advances with dehumanization and artificiality, reflecting persistent anxieties about China's growing role in the global tech landscape. == Implications == AI nationalism is seen as a component of a broader trend towards the fragmentation of the internet, where digital services are increasingly influenced by local regulations and national interests. This shift is creating a new technological landscape in which the impact of artificial intelligence on individuals' lives can vary significantly depending on their geographic location. J. Paul Goode argues that AI nationalism may exacerbate existing societal divisions by promoting the development of systems that embed cultural biases, thereby privileging certain groups while disadvantaging others.

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  • Competition in artificial intelligence

    Competition in artificial intelligence

    Competition in artificial intelligence refers to the rivalry among companies, research institutions, and governments to develop and deploy the most capable artificial intelligence (AI) systems. The competition spans multiple domains, including large language models (LLMs), autonomous vehicles, robotics, computer vision systems, natural language processing (NLP), and AI-optimized hardware. == Background == Competition in AI is driven by potential economic, strategic, and scientific advantages. Breakthroughs in AI can enhance productivity, enable new products and services, and provide geopolitical leverage. The field has experienced rapid progress since the mid-2010s, particularly in machine learning and artificial neural networks, leading to intense rivalry among leading actors. == Corporate competition == Major technology companies are among the most visible competitors in AI. In the United States, firms such as OpenAI, Google DeepMind, Meta Platforms, Microsoft, Anthropic, and Nvidia compete in building advanced LLMs, generative AI platforms, and AI-optimized graphics processing units (GPUs). In China, companies such as Baidu, Alibaba Group, Tencent, and startups such DeepSeek have become leaders in AI deployment, often with state backing. The "[war for talent]" in AI research has become a defining feature of corporate competition. Leading firms often recruit top AI researchers from rivals, sometimes offering multi-million-dollar compensation packages. == National competition == Governments see leadership in AI as a strategic priority. The United States has funded AI research for military, economic, and societal applications, while China has set a target to lead the world in AI by 2030 through its "New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan". Other nations, including the UK, India, Israel, Russia, South Korea, and members of the European Union, have launched national AI strategies. In February 2026 Anthropic said Chinese companies - DeepSeek, Moonshot AI, and MiniMax - were conducting "distillation attacks" in an attempt to copy their model's capabilities, and warned that business wars were closely tied to geopolitical ones: "foreign labs that illicitly distill American models can remove safeguards, feeding model capabilities into their own military, intelligence, and surveillance systems." == Sectors of competition == === Large language models and chatbots competition === Competition to produce the most capable generative text models, with benchmarks such as MMLU and ARC used to evaluate performance has been on scale since the emergence of AI. These systems leverage deep learning, especially transformer architectures, to understand and generate human-like language. Companies and research groups globally compete to develop chatbots that are more capable, reliable, and context-aware. Among the most well-known chatbots is ChatGPT, developed by OpenAI. Since its public release in 2022, ChatGPT has rapidly gained widespread attention for its ability to engage in coherent and versatile conversations, assist with creative writing, and solve complex problems. In response, technology firms introduced competing chatbots aiming to challenge or surpass ChatGPT's capabilities. Notably, DeepSeek, a Chinese AI company, launched an advanced chatbot integrated with their R1 language model, emphasizing strong natural language understanding and multilingual support. Similarly, Grok, developed by xAI (company), integrates conversational AI into vehicles and digital assistants, combining natural language processing with real-time data for personalized user interaction. These chatbots not only compete in language tasks but also demonstrate strategic reasoning capabilities by playing complex games such as chess and Go. This form of competition is reminiscent of historic AI milestones set by programs such as Deep Blue and AlphaGo. The OpenAI’s ChatGPT has been tested in playing chess at various levels, while DeepSeek’s chatbot showcased its prowess in online chess tournaments in early 2024, winning several matches against human and AI opponents. Grok, leveraging Tesla's vast data infrastructure, has demonstrated real-time strategic decision-making in simulation environments that include chess-like games. The competition pushes rapid innovation, with firms racing to improve chatbot conversational depth, reduce biases, increase factual accuracy, and integrate multimodal inputs like images and videos. At the same time, the competition raises questions about AI safety, ethical use, and the societal impacts of increasingly human-like chatbots. === Autonomous vehicles === Companies such as Waymo, Tesla, and Baidu are racing to deploy safe and reliable self-driving car technology. === AI chips === Rivalry between Nvidia, AMD, Intel, and Huawei in designing processors optimized for AI workloads. === Military applications === Development of AI-enabled drones, surveillance systems, and decision-support tools, with associated ethical debates. == Events == In 2023, OpenAI released GPT-4, prompting competitors such as Google DeepMind to accelerate the release of their own models, including Gemini. In 2024, Chinese AI company DeepSeek launched the R1 model, leading OpenAI to release an open-source system, GPT-OSS, as a strategic countermeasure. In 2022, Tesla and Waymo both expanded autonomous taxi services in U.S. cities, competing for regulatory approval and public trust. The U.S. Department of Defense's Project Maven and China's AI-enabled surveillance programs have been cited as examples of military AI rivalry. In 2025, Microsoft hired several senior engineers from Google DeepMind, highlighting the ongoing "talent poaching" competition in the AI sector. == Risks and concerns == Critics warn that unrestrained competition in AI can undermine safety, ethics, and governance. Concerns include the proliferation of biased or unsafe models, escalation in autonomous weapons, and reduced cooperation on safety standards.

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  • Bazaart

    Bazaart

    Bazaart is an AI-powered design platform with image and video editing capabilities for iOS, Android, MacOS, and the web. == History == Bazaart was founded in 2012 in Israel. In April 2012, Bazaart launched a Facebook app called Pinvolve, which converts Facebook Pages into Pinterest pinboards. From June to August 2012, it participated in the DreamIt startup accelerator in New York and raised $25,000 from the accelerator. In July 2012, it launched its first version as an iPad app connected to Pinterest. In December 2013, it pivoted and launched a major version of its app, a "social" photoshop that allowed users to edit images which could be pulled in from the camera roll, social networks, and other sources. In July 2014, Bazaart reached one million downloads and in December was selected by Apple as Best of 2014. In 2015, Bazaart added Photoshop integration in a partnership with Adobe. In September 2020, Bazaart launched an Android app. In December 2020, Bazaart was selected by Google as Best of 2020. In January 2022, Bazaart added video editing capabilities. In 2023, the platform added AI-powered backgrounds and video background removal features.

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  • Non-human

    Non-human

    Non-human (also spelled nonhuman) is any entity displaying some, but not enough, human characteristics to be considered a human. The term has been used in a variety of contexts and may refer to objects that have been developed with human intelligence, such as robots or vehicles. == Organisms == === Animal rights and personhood === In the animal rights movement, it is common to distinguish between "human animals" and "non-human animals". Participants in the animal rights movement generally recognize that non-human animals have some similar characteristics to those of human persons. For example, various non-human animals have been shown to register pain, compassion, memory, and some cognitive function. Some animal rights activists argue that the similarities between human and non-human animals justify giving non-human animals rights that human society has afforded to humans, such as the right to self-preservation, and some even wish for all non-human animals or at least those that bear a fully thinking and conscious mind, such as vertebrates and some invertebrates such as cephalopods, to be given a full right of personhood. === The non-human in philosophy === Contemporary philosophers have drawn on the work of Henri Bergson, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, and Claude Lévi-Strauss (among others) to suggest that the non-human poses epistemological and ontological problems for humanist and post-humanist ethics, and have linked the study of non-humans to materialist and ethological approaches to the study of society and culture. == Software and robots == The term non-human has been used to describe computer programs and robot-like devices that display some human-like characteristics. In both science fiction and in the real world, computer programs and robots have been built to perform tasks that require human-computer interactions in a manner that suggests sentience and compassion. There is increasing interest in the use of robots in nursing homes and to provide elder care. Computer programs have been used for years in schools to provide one-on-one education with children. The Tamagotchi toy required children to provide care, attention, and nourishment to keep it "alive".

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  • Kernel embedding of distributions

    Kernel embedding of distributions

    In machine learning, the kernel embedding of distributions (also called the kernel mean or mean map) comprises a class of nonparametric methods in which a probability distribution is represented as an element of a reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS). A generalization of the individual data-point feature mapping done in classical kernel methods, the embedding of distributions into infinite-dimensional feature spaces can preserve all of the statistical features of arbitrary distributions, while allowing one to compare and manipulate distributions using Hilbert space operations such as inner products, distances, projections, linear transformations, and spectral analysis. This learning framework is very general and can be applied to distributions over any space Ω {\displaystyle \Omega } on which a sensible kernel function (measuring similarity between elements of Ω {\displaystyle \Omega } ) may be defined. For example, various kernels have been proposed for learning from data which are: vectors in R d {\displaystyle \mathbb {R} ^{d}} , discrete classes/categories, strings, graphs/networks, images, time series, manifolds, dynamical systems, and other structured objects. The theory behind kernel embeddings of distributions has been primarily developed by Alex Smola, Le Song, Arthur Gretton, and Bernhard Schölkopf. A review of recent works on kernel embedding of distributions can be found in. The analysis of distributions is fundamental in machine learning and statistics, and many algorithms in these fields rely on information theoretic approaches such as entropy, mutual information, or Kullback–Leibler divergence. However, to estimate these quantities, one must first either perform density estimation, or employ sophisticated space-partitioning/bias-correction strategies which are typically infeasible for high-dimensional data. Commonly, methods for modeling complex distributions rely on parametric assumptions that may be unfounded or computationally challenging (e.g. Gaussian mixture models), while nonparametric methods like kernel density estimation (Note: the smoothing kernels in this context have a different interpretation than the kernels discussed here) or characteristic function representation (via the Fourier transform of the distribution) break down in high-dimensional settings. Methods based on the kernel embedding of distributions sidestep these problems and also possess the following advantages: Data may be modeled without restrictive assumptions about the form of the distributions and relationships between variables Intermediate density estimation is not needed Practitioners may specify the properties of a distribution most relevant for their problem (incorporating prior knowledge via choice of the kernel) If a characteristic kernel is used, then the embedding can uniquely preserve all information about a distribution, while thanks to the kernel trick, computations on the potentially infinite-dimensional RKHS can be implemented in practice as simple Gram matrix operations Dimensionality-independent rates of convergence for the empirical kernel mean (estimated using samples from the distribution) to the kernel embedding of the true underlying distribution can be proven. Learning algorithms based on this framework exhibit good generalization ability and finite sample convergence, while often being simpler and more effective than information theoretic methods Thus, learning via the kernel embedding of distributions offers a principled drop-in replacement for information theoretic approaches and is a framework which not only subsumes many popular methods in machine learning and statistics as special cases, but also can lead to entirely new learning algorithms. == Definitions == Let X {\displaystyle X} denote a random variable with domain Ω {\displaystyle \Omega } and distribution P {\displaystyle P} . Given a symmetric, positive-definite kernel k : Ω × Ω → R {\displaystyle k:\Omega \times \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb {R} } the Moore–Aronszajn theorem asserts the existence of a unique RKHS H {\displaystyle {\mathcal {H}}} on Ω {\displaystyle \Omega } (a Hilbert space of functions f : Ω → R {\displaystyle f:\Omega \to \mathbb {R} } equipped with an inner product ⟨ ⋅ , ⋅ ⟩ H {\displaystyle \langle \cdot ,\cdot \rangle _{\mathcal {H}}} and a norm ‖ ⋅ ‖ H {\displaystyle \|\cdot \|_{\mathcal {H}}} ) for which k {\displaystyle k} is a reproducing kernel, i.e., in which the element k ( x , ⋅ ) {\displaystyle k(x,\cdot )} satisfies the reproducing property ⟨ f , k ( x , ⋅ ) ⟩ H = f ( x ) ∀ f ∈ H , ∀ x ∈ Ω . {\displaystyle \langle f,k(x,\cdot )\rangle _{\mathcal {H}}=f(x)\qquad \forall f\in {\mathcal {H}},\quad \forall x\in \Omega .} One may alternatively consider x ↦ k ( x , ⋅ ) {\displaystyle x\mapsto k(x,\cdot )} as an implicit feature mapping φ : Ω → H {\displaystyle \varphi :\Omega \rightarrow {\mathcal {H}}} (which is therefore also called the feature space), so that k ( x , x ′ ) = ⟨ φ ( x ) , φ ( x ′ ) ⟩ H {\displaystyle k(x,x')=\langle \varphi (x),\varphi (x')\rangle _{\mathcal {H}}} can be viewed as a measure of similarity between points x , x ′ ∈ Ω . {\displaystyle x,x'\in \Omega .} While the similarity measure is linear in the feature space, it may be highly nonlinear in the original space depending on the choice of kernel. === Kernel embedding === The kernel embedding of the distribution P {\displaystyle P} in H {\displaystyle {\mathcal {H}}} (also called the kernel mean or mean map) is given by: μ X := E [ k ( X , ⋅ ) ] = E [ φ ( X ) ] = ∫ Ω φ ( x ) d P ( x ) {\displaystyle \mu _{X}:=\mathbb {E} [k(X,\cdot )]=\mathbb {E} [\varphi (X)]=\int _{\Omega }\varphi (x)\ \mathrm {d} P(x)} If P {\displaystyle P} allows a square integrable density p {\displaystyle p} , then μ X = E k p {\displaystyle \mu _{X}={\mathcal {E}}_{k}p} , where E k {\displaystyle {\mathcal {E}}_{k}} is the Hilbert–Schmidt integral operator. A kernel is characteristic if the mean embedding μ : { family of distributions over Ω } → H {\displaystyle \mu :\{{\text{family of distributions over }}\Omega \}\to {\mathcal {H}}} is injective. Each distribution can thus be uniquely represented in the RKHS and all statistical features of distributions are preserved by the kernel embedding if a characteristic kernel is used. === Empirical kernel embedding === Given n {\displaystyle n} training examples { x 1 , … , x n } {\displaystyle \{x_{1},\ldots ,x_{n}\}} drawn independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) from P , {\displaystyle P,} the kernel embedding of P {\displaystyle P} can be empirically estimated as μ ^ X = 1 n ∑ i = 1 n φ ( x i ) {\displaystyle {\widehat {\mu }}_{X}={\frac {1}{n}}\sum _{i=1}^{n}\varphi (x_{i})} === Joint distribution embedding === If Y {\displaystyle Y} denotes another random variable (for simplicity, assume the co-domain of Y {\displaystyle Y} is also Ω {\displaystyle \Omega } with the same kernel k {\displaystyle k} which satisfies ⟨ φ ( x ) ⊗ φ ( y ) , φ ( x ′ ) ⊗ φ ( y ′ ) ⟩ = k ( x , x ′ ) k ( y , y ′ ) {\displaystyle \langle \varphi (x)\otimes \varphi (y),\varphi (x')\otimes \varphi (y')\rangle =k(x,x')k(y,y')} ), then the joint distribution P ( x , y ) ) {\displaystyle P(x,y))} can be mapped into a tensor product feature space H ⊗ H {\displaystyle {\mathcal {H}}\otimes {\mathcal {H}}} via C X Y = E [ φ ( X ) ⊗ φ ( Y ) ] = ∫ Ω × Ω φ ( x ) ⊗ φ ( y ) d P ( x , y ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {C}}_{XY}=\mathbb {E} [\varphi (X)\otimes \varphi (Y)]=\int _{\Omega \times \Omega }\varphi (x)\otimes \varphi (y)\ \mathrm {d} P(x,y)} By the equivalence between a tensor and a linear map, this joint embedding may be interpreted as an uncentered cross-covariance operator C X Y : H → H {\displaystyle {\mathcal {C}}_{XY}:{\mathcal {H}}\to {\mathcal {H}}} from which the cross-covariance of functions f , g ∈ H {\displaystyle f,g\in {\mathcal {H}}} can be computed as Cov ⁡ ( f ( X ) , g ( Y ) ) := E [ f ( X ) g ( Y ) ] − E [ f ( X ) ] E [ g ( Y ) ] = ⟨ f , C X Y g ⟩ H = ⟨ f ⊗ g , C X Y ⟩ H ⊗ H {\displaystyle \operatorname {Cov} (f(X),g(Y)):=\mathbb {E} [f(X)g(Y)]-\mathbb {E} [f(X)]\mathbb {E} [g(Y)]=\langle f,{\mathcal {C}}_{XY}g\rangle _{\mathcal {H}}=\langle f\otimes g,{\mathcal {C}}_{XY}\rangle _{{\mathcal {H}}\otimes {\mathcal {H}}}} Given n {\displaystyle n} pairs of training examples { ( x 1 , y 1 ) , … , ( x n , y n ) } {\displaystyle \{(x_{1},y_{1}),\dots ,(x_{n},y_{n})\}} drawn i.i.d. from P {\displaystyle P} , we can also empirically estimate the joint distribution kernel embedding via C ^ X Y = 1 n ∑ i = 1 n φ ( x i ) ⊗ φ ( y i ) {\displaystyle {\widehat {\mathcal {C}}}_{XY}={\frac {1}{n}}\sum _{i=1}^{n}\varphi (x_{i})\otimes \varphi (y_{i})} === Conditional distribution embedding === Given a conditional distribution P ( y ∣ x ) , {\displaystyle P(y\mid x),} one can define the corresponding RKHS embedding as μ Y ∣ x = E [ φ ( Y ) ∣ X ] = ∫ Ω φ ( y ) d P ( y ∣ x ) {\displaystyle \mu _{Y\mid x}=\mathbb {E} [\varphi (Y)\mid X]=\int _{\Omega

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  • Data-driven model

    Data-driven model

    Data-driven models are a class of computational models that primarily rely on historical data collected throughout a system's or process' lifetime to establish relationships between input, internal, and output variables. Commonly found in numerous articles and publications, data-driven models have evolved from earlier statistical models, overcoming limitations posed by strict assumptions about probability distributions. These models have gained prominence across various fields, particularly in the era of big data, artificial intelligence, and machine learning, where they offer valuable insights and predictions based on the available data. == Background == These models have evolved from earlier statistical models, which were based on certain assumptions about probability distributions that often proved to be overly restrictive. The emergence of data-driven models in the 1950s and 1960s coincided with the development of digital computers, advancements in artificial intelligence research, and the introduction of new approaches in non-behavioural modelling, such as pattern recognition and automatic classification. == Key Concepts == Data-driven models encompass a wide range of techniques and methodologies that aim to intelligently process and analyse large datasets. Examples include fuzzy logic, fuzzy and rough sets for handling uncertainty, neural networks for approximating functions, global optimization and evolutionary computing, statistical learning theory, and Bayesian methods. These models have found applications in various fields, including economics, customer relations management, financial services, medicine, and the military, among others. Machine learning, a subfield of artificial intelligence, is closely related to data-driven modelling as it also focuses on using historical data to create models that can make predictions and identify patterns. In fact, many data-driven models incorporate machine learning techniques, such as regression, classification, and clustering algorithms, to process and analyse data. In recent years, the concept of data-driven models has gained considerable attention in the field of water resources, with numerous applications, academic courses, and scientific publications using the term as a generalization for models that rely on data rather than physics. This classification has been featured in various publications and has even spurred the development of hybrid models in the past decade. Hybrid models attempt to quantify the degree of physically based information used in hydrological models and determine whether the process of building the model is primarily driven by physics or purely data-based. As a result, data-driven models have become an essential topic of discussion and exploration within water resources management and research. The term "data-driven modelling" (DDM) refers to the overarching paradigm of using historical data in conjunction with advanced computational techniques, including machine learning and artificial intelligence, to create models that can reveal underlying trends, patterns, and, in some cases, make predictions Data-driven models can be built with or without detailed knowledge of the underlying processes governing the system behavior, which makes them particularly useful when such knowledge is missing or fragmented.

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  • Dynamic epistemic logic

    Dynamic epistemic logic

    Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) is a logical framework dealing with knowledge and information change. Typically, DEL focuses on situations involving multiple agents and studies how their knowledge changes when events occur. These events can change factual properties of the actual world (they are called ontic events): for example a red card is painted in blue. They can also bring about changes of knowledge without changing factual properties of the world (they are called epistemic events): for example, a card is revealed publicly (or privately) to be red. Originally, DEL focused on epistemic events. Only some of the basic ideas are present in this entry of the original DEL framework; more details about DEL in general can be found in the references. Due to the nature of its object of study and its abstract approach, DEL is related and has applications to numerous research areas, such as computer science (artificial intelligence), philosophy (formal epistemology), economics (game theory) and cognitive science. In computer science, DEL is for example very much related to multi-agent systems, which are systems where multiple intelligent agents interact and exchange information. As a combination of dynamic logic and epistemic logic, dynamic epistemic logic is a young field of research. It really started in 1989 with Plaza's logic of public announcement. Independently, Gerbrandy and Groeneveld proposed a system dealing moreover with private announcement and that was inspired by the work of Veltman. Another system was proposed by van Ditmarsch whose main inspiration was the Cluedo game. But the most influential and original system was the system proposed by Baltag, Moss and Solecki. This system can deal with all the types of situations studied in the works above and its underlying methodology is conceptually grounded. This entry will present some of its basic ideas. Formally, DEL extends ordinary epistemic logic by the inclusion of event models to describe actions, and a product update operator that defines how epistemic models are updated as the consequence of executing actions described through event models. Epistemic logic will first be recalled. Then, actions and events will enter into the picture and we will introduce the DEL framework. == Epistemic logic == Epistemic logic is a modal logic dealing with the notions of knowledge and belief. As a logic, it is concerned with understanding the process of reasoning about knowledge and belief: which principles relating the notions of knowledge and belief are intuitively plausible? Like epistemology, it stems from the Greek word ϵ π ι σ τ η μ η {\displaystyle \epsilon \pi \iota \sigma \tau \eta \mu \eta } or ‘episteme’ meaning knowledge. Epistemology is nevertheless more concerned with analyzing the very nature and scope of knowledge, addressing questions such as “What is the definition of knowledge?” or “How is knowledge acquired?”. In fact, epistemic logic grew out of epistemology in the Middle Ages thanks to the efforts of Burley and Ockham. The formal work, based on modal logic, that inaugurated contemporary research into epistemic logic dates back only to 1962 and is due to Hintikka. It then sparked in the 1960s discussions about the principles of knowledge and belief and many axioms for these notions were proposed and discussed. For example, the interaction axioms K p → B p {\displaystyle Kp\rightarrow Bp} and B p → K B p {\displaystyle Bp\rightarrow KBp} are often considered to be intuitive principles: if an agent Knows p {\displaystyle p} then (s)he also Believes p {\displaystyle p} , or if an agent Believes p {\displaystyle p} , then (s)he Knows that (s)he Believes p {\displaystyle p} . More recently, these kinds of philosophical theories were taken up by researchers in economics, artificial intelligence and theoretical computer science where reasoning about knowledge is a central topic. Due to the new setting in which epistemic logic was used, new perspectives and new features such as computability issues were then added to the research agenda of epistemic logic. === Syntax === In the sequel, A G T S = { 1 , … , n } {\displaystyle AGTS=\{1,\ldots ,n\}} is a finite set whose elements are called agents and P R O P {\displaystyle PROP} is a set of propositional letters. The epistemic language is an extension of the basic multi-modal language of modal logic with a common knowledge operator C A {\displaystyle C_{A}} and a distributed knowledge operator D A {\displaystyle D_{A}} . Formally, the epistemic language L EL C {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{\textsf {EL}}^{C}} is defined inductively by the following grammar in BNF: L EL C : ϕ ::= p ∣ ¬ ϕ ∣ ( ϕ ∧ ϕ ) ∣ K j ϕ ∣ C A ϕ ∣ D A ϕ {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{\textsf {EL}}^{C}:\phi ~~::=~~p~\mid ~\neg \phi ~\mid ~(\phi \land \phi )~\mid ~K_{j}\phi ~\mid ~C_{A}\phi ~\mid ~D_{A}\phi } where p ∈ P R O P {\displaystyle p\in PROP} , j ∈ A G T S {\displaystyle j\in {AGTS}} and A ⊆ A G T S {\displaystyle A\subseteq {AGTS}} . The basic epistemic language L E L {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{EL}} is the language L E L C {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{EL}^{C}} without the common knowledge and distributed knowledge operators. The formula ⊥ {\displaystyle \bot } is an abbreviation for ¬ p ∧ p {\displaystyle \neg p\land p} (for a given p ∈ P R O P {\displaystyle p\in PROP} ), ⟨ K j ⟩ ϕ {\displaystyle \langle K_{j}\rangle \phi } is an abbreviation for ¬ K j ¬ ϕ {\displaystyle \neg K_{j}\neg \phi } , E A ϕ {\displaystyle E_{A}\phi } is an abbreviation for ⋀ j ∈ A K j ϕ {\displaystyle \bigwedge \limits _{j\in A}K_{j}\phi } and C ϕ {\displaystyle C\phi } an abbreviation for C A G T S ϕ {\displaystyle C_{AGTS}\phi } . Group notions: general, common and distributed knowledge. In a multi-agent setting there are three important epistemic concepts: general knowledge, distributed knowledge and common knowledge. The notion of common knowledge was first studied by Lewis in the context of conventions. It was then applied to distributed systems and to game theory, where it allows to express that the rationality of the players, the rules of the game and the set of players are commonly known. General knowledge. General knowledge of ϕ {\displaystyle \phi } means that everybody in the group of agents A G T S {\displaystyle {AGTS}} knows that ϕ {\displaystyle \phi } . Formally, this corresponds to the following formula: E ϕ := ⋀ j ∈ A G T S K j ϕ . {\displaystyle E\phi :={\underset {j\in {AGTS}}{\bigwedge }}K_{j}\phi .} Common knowledge. Common knowledge of ϕ {\displaystyle \phi } means that everybody knows ϕ {\displaystyle \phi } but also that everybody knows that everybody knows ϕ {\displaystyle \phi } , that everybody knows that everybody knows that everybody knows ϕ {\displaystyle \phi } , and so on ad infinitum. Formally, this corresponds to the following formula C ϕ := E ϕ ∧ E E ϕ ∧ E E E ϕ ∧ … {\displaystyle C\phi :=E\phi \land EE\phi \land EEE\phi \land \ldots } As we do not allow infinite conjunction the notion of common knowledge will have to be introduced as a primitive in our language. Before defining the language with this new operator, we are going to give an example introduced by Lewis that illustrates the difference between the notions of general knowledge and common knowledge. Lewis wanted to know what kind of knowledge is needed so that the statement p {\displaystyle p} : “every driver must drive on the right” be a convention among a group of agents. In other words, he wanted to know what kind of knowledge is needed so that everybody feels safe to drive on the right. Suppose there are only two agents i {\displaystyle i} and j {\displaystyle j} . Then everybody knowing p {\displaystyle p} (formally E p {\displaystyle Ep} ) is not enough. Indeed, it might still be possible that the agent i {\displaystyle i} considers possible that the agent j {\displaystyle j} does not know p {\displaystyle p} (formally ¬ K i K j p {\displaystyle \neg K_{i}K_{j}p} ). In that case the agent i {\displaystyle i} will not feel safe to drive on the right because he might consider that the agent j {\displaystyle j} , not knowing p {\displaystyle p} , could drive on the left. To avoid this problem, we could then assume that everybody knows that everybody knows that p {\displaystyle p} (formally E E p {\displaystyle EEp} ). This is again not enough to ensure that everybody feels safe to drive on the right. Indeed, it might still be possible that agent i {\displaystyle i} considers possible that agent j {\displaystyle j} considers possible that agent i {\displaystyle i} does not know p {\displaystyle p} (formally ¬ K i K j K i p {\displaystyle \neg K_{i}K_{j}K_{i}p} ). In that case and from i {\displaystyle i} ’s point of view, j {\displaystyle j} considers possible that i {\displaystyle i} , not knowing p {\displaystyle p} , will drive on the left. So from i {\displaystyle i} ’s point of view, j {\displaystyle j} might drive on the left as well (by the same argument as abov

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  • Artificial intelligence in spirituality

    Artificial intelligence in spirituality

    Some users of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, especially chatbots, may develop beliefs that AI has or can attain supernatural or spiritual powers. AI models such as ChatGPT are turned to for fortune telling, mysticism and remote viewing. Recent and sudden advances in large language models have led to folk myths about their origin or capabilities, as well as their deification or worship by some users. Tucker Carlson has made similar claims, including directly to Sam Altman. Pope Leo XIV advised priests against using LLM models when it came to the creation of sermons.

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  • Human-centered AI

    Human-centered AI

    Human-centered AI is the initiative at the intersection of the fields of artificial intelligence (AI) and human-computer interaction (HCI) to develop AI systems in a way that prioritizes human values, needs, and general flourishing. Emphasis is placed on the recognition that artificial intelligence systems are rapidly changing, and will continue to influence, many aspects of the human experience, in areas ranging from scientific inquiry, governance and policy, labor and the economy, and creative expression, with an aim set to adapt current developments and guide future developments on a trajectory which is most beneficial to the human population at large, with the goal of augmenting human intelligence and capacities across these areas, as opposed to replacing them. Particular attention is paid to mitigating negative effects of AI automation on the livelihoods of the labor force, the use of AI in healthcare fields, and imbuing AI systems with societal values. Human-centered AI is linked to related endeavors in AI alignment and AI safety, but while these fields primarily focus on mitigating risks posed by AI that is unaligned to human values and/or uncontrollable AI self-development, human-centered AI places significant focus in exploring how AI systems can augment human capacities and serve as collaborators. == Conceptual history == The importance of the alignment of artificial intelligence development towards human values in some sense predates artificial intelligence itself, as before the modern conception of artificial intelligence as coined at the 1956 Dartmouth Workshop, the conception of robots as constructed, autonomous agents entered the cultural consciousness as early as the 1920s, with Karel Capek's Rossum's Universal Robots. The imagined issues relating to robots' aims and values requiring intentional alignment and direction with those of humans followed soon after, most widely known from science fiction author Isaac Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics, dating to his 1942 short story “Runaround”. Two of the three eponymous laws are directly concerned with robots’ interaction with and positioned deference towards humans, and have in recent times been reexamined in the face of modern AI. In 1985, after artificial intelligence research had taken off and its effects were more acutely conceptualized, Asimov added a Rule Zero, treating robots' relationship with humanity as a whole, distinct from individual humans. While modern artificial intelligence is largely distinct from robotics, the conceptualization of both robots and AI systems as autonomous agents positions this as a foundation for conceptions of human-centered AI. Aside from robots, artificially intelligent autonomous agents in interaction with humans have been conceived of for at least 75 years. In 1950, Alan Turing published his famous "Imitation Game", often also called the Turing Test, a thought experiment that uses human-machine interaction as an assessor for the intelligence of a system. In recent times, artificial intelligence researchers such as Stanford's Erik Brynjolfsson have conceived of rapid AI development leading to a so-called "Turing Trap". == Augmentation and automation == A major stated aim of human-centered AI is to promote the development of AI in ways that augment human capabilities, rather than replacing them. To this end, organizations and initiatives that take a human-centered approach to AI development focus on frameworks that encourage collaboration between humans and artificial intelligence systems to build towards even greater progress, rather than attempting to automate tasks currently handled by humans. Such avenues include everything from data visualization for big data, allowing human engineers to better understand extremely large datasets, allowing for the design of better machine learning models to handle them, to AI-powered sensors to monitor vitals, allowing for better responsiveness from healthcare providers. Many human-centered AI initiatives often position it as a better alternative to the apparent mainstream in AI development, which is primarily concerned with automation. Driven by the pressures of the market economy, AI development that does replace tasks currently performed by humans with automated processes is incentivized, as it allows for greater profit margins; this often comes at the detriment of the human whose performance is replaced, thus leading to an environment wherein human workers are outcompeted by AI systems across various service-sector and technology-based industries. At the same time, automation and augmentation are not always incompatible; a major aim of human-centered AI is towards the automation of rote tasks that would otherwise hinder a human’s productivity or creativity, freeing them to direct their energy and intelligence towards higher-level tasks, thus achieving augmentation through automation. Empirical research in pharmaceutical sales has shown that a human-centered implementation - where work procedures, training, and incentives are designed around individuals' cognitive needs - improves augmentation performance, while implementation without such adaptation can worsen outcomes relative to a legacy system. == Research == Much of the work done on human-centered AI comes from research institutes, within universities, companies, and as freestanding organizations. The Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI (abbreviated to HAI) is one such group, engaging academics, industry professionals, and policymakers centered in Stanford University to conduct research and inform policy in various areas in human-centered AI, including on aspects of the intelligence itself, augmentation, and on measuring the impacts of AI systems on sociopolitcal and cultural institutions. Similar groups exist at other universities, including the Chicago Human + AI (CHAI) Lab at the University of Chicago, the HCAI@GU group at the University of Gothenburg, and the Human-Centered AI (HAI) Lab at the University of Oxford. Outside of the academy, companies such as IBM have research initiatives dedicated to advancements in human-centered AI. At Kenyon College, the Integrated Program for Humane Studies (IPHS) launched a human-centered AI program in 2016 integrating artificial intelligence research with humanities and social science inquiry. This approach treats computation and humanistic scholarship as a single unified field of research rather than as separate disciplines requiring collaboration. The program's researchers have published in both AI venues (such as the International Conference on Machine Learning and Frontiers of Computer Science) and humanities journals (such as PMLA and Poetics Today), and the lab was selected in December 2025 by Schmidt Sciences for its Humanities and AI Virtual Institute to apply AI methods to cultural heritage preservation.

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  • Right to explanation

    Right to explanation

    In the regulation of algorithms, particularly artificial intelligence and its subfield of machine learning, a right to [an] explanation is a right to be given an explanation for an output of the algorithm. Such rights primarily refer to individual rights to be given an explanation for decisions that significantly affect an individual, particularly legally or financially. For example, a person who applies for a loan and is denied may ask for an explanation, which could be "Credit bureau X reports that you declared bankruptcy last year; this is the main factor in considering you too likely to default, and thus we will not give you the loan you applied for." Some such legal rights already exist, while the scope of a general "right to explanation" is a matter of ongoing debate. There have been arguments made that a "social right to explanation" is a crucial foundation for an information society, particularly as the institutions of that society will need to use digital technologies, artificial intelligence, machine learning. In other words, that the related automated decision making systems that use explainability would be more trustworthy and transparent. Without this right, which could be constituted both legally and through professional standards, the public will be left without much recourse to challenge the decisions of automated systems. == Examples == === Credit scoring in the United States === Under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B of the Code of Federal Regulations), Title 12, Chapter X, Part 1002, §1002.9, creditors are required to notify applicants who are denied credit with specific reasons for the detail. As detailed in §1002.9(b)(2): (2) Statement of specific reasons. The statement of reasons for adverse action required by paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section must be specific and indicate the principal reason(s) for the adverse action. Statements that the adverse action was based on the creditor's internal standards or policies or that the applicant, joint applicant, or similar party failed to achieve a qualifying score on the creditor's credit scoring system are insufficient. The official interpretation of this section details what types of statements are acceptable. Creditors comply with this regulation by providing a list of reasons (generally at most 4, per interpretation of regulations), consisting of a numeric reason code (as identifier) and an associated explanation, identifying the main factors affecting a credit score. An example might be: 32: Balances on bankcard or revolving accounts too high compared to credit limits === European Union === The European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, enacted 2016, taking effect 2018) extends the automated decision-making rights in the 1995 Data Protection Directive to provide a legally disputed form of a right to an explanation, stated as such in Recital 71: "[the data subject should have] the right ... to obtain an explanation of the decision reached". In full: The data subject should have the right not to be subject to a decision, which may include a measure, evaluating personal aspects relating to him or her which is based solely on automated processing and which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her, such as automatic refusal of an online credit application or e-recruiting practices without any human intervention. ... In any case, such processing should be subject to suitable safeguards, which should include specific information to the data subject and the right to obtain human intervention, to express his or her point of view, to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the decision. However, the extent to which the regulations themselves provide a "right to explanation" is heavily debated. There are two main strands of criticism. There are significant legal issues with the right as found in Article 22 — as recitals are not binding, and the right to an explanation is not mentioned in the binding articles of the text, having been removed during the legislative process. In addition, there are significant restrictions on the types of automated decisions that are covered — which must be both "solely" based on automated processing, and have legal or similarly significant effects — which significantly limits the range of automated systems and decisions to which the right would apply. In particular, the right is unlikely to apply in many of the cases of algorithmic controversy that have been picked up in the media. The UK has also recently amended its implementation of Article 22. A second potential source of such a right has been pointed to in Article 15, the "right of access by the data subject". This restates a similar provision from the 1995 Data Protection Directive, allowing the data subject access to "meaningful information about the logic involved" in the same significant, solely automated decision-making, found in Article 22. Yet this too suffers from alleged challenges that relate to the timing of when this right can be drawn upon, as well as practical challenges that mean it may not be binding in many cases of public concern. Other EU legislative instruments contain explanation rights. The European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act provides in Article 86 a "[r]ight to explanation of individual decision-making" of certain high risk systems which produce significant, adverse effects to an individual's health, safety or fundamental rights. The right provides for "clear and meaningful explanations of the role of the AI system in the decision-making procedure and the main elements of the decision taken", although only applies to the extent other law does not provide such a right. The Digital Services Act in Article 27, and the Platform to Business Regulation in Article 5, both contain rights to have the main parameters of certain recommender systems to be made clear, although these provisions have been criticised as not matching the way that such systems work. The Platform Work Directive, which provides for regulation of automation in gig economy work as an extension of data protection law, further contains explanation provisions in Article 11, using the specific language of "explanation" in a binding article rather than a recital as is the case in the GDPR. Scholars note that remains uncertainty as to whether these provisions imply sufficiently tailored explanation in practice which will need to be resolved by courts. === France === In France the 2016 Loi pour une République numérique (Digital Republic Act or loi numérique) amends the country's administrative code to introduce a new provision for the explanation of decisions made by public sector bodies about individuals. It notes that where there is "a decision taken on the basis of an algorithmic treatment", the rules that define that treatment and its "principal characteristics" must be communicated to the citizen upon request, where there is not an exclusion (e.g. for national security or defence). These should include the following: the degree and the mode of contribution of the algorithmic processing to the decision- making; the data processed and its source; the treatment parameters, and where appropriate, their weighting, applied to the situation of the person concerned; the operations carried out by the treatment. Scholars have noted that this right, while limited to administrative decisions, goes beyond the GDPR right to explicitly apply to decision support rather than decisions "solely" based on automated processing, as well as provides a framework for explaining specific decisions. Indeed, the GDPR automated decision-making rights in the European Union, one of the places a "right to an explanation" has been sought within, find their origins in French law in the late 1970s. == Criticism == Some argue that a "right to explanation" is at best unnecessary, at worst harmful, and threatens to stifle innovation. Specific criticisms include: favoring human decisions over machine decisions, being redundant with existing laws, and focusing on process over outcome. Authors of study "Slave to the Algorithm? Why a 'Right to an Explanation' Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For" Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale argue that a right to explanation is not the solution to harms caused to stakeholders by algorithmic decisions. They also state that the right of explanation in the GDPR is narrowly defined, and is not compatible with how modern machine learning technologies are being developed. With these limitations, defining transparency within the context of algorithmic accountability remains a problem. For example, providing the source code of algorithms may not be sufficient and may create other problems in terms of privacy disclosures and the gaming of technical systems. To mitigate this issue, Edwards and Veale argue that an auditing system could be more effective, to allow auditors to loo

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  • Resilience week

    Resilience week

    Resilience week is an annual symposium established to enable cross-disciplinary and role based discussions to advance strategies and research that engenders resilience in critical infrastructure systems and communities. Damaging storms, cyber attack and the interconnection of critical infrastructure systems can lead to cascading events that not only affect local but also across regions. However, many of these interdependencies are not easily recognized and obscure and complicate the mitigation of risk. The purpose of the symposia series is hence to facilitate best practice in managing critical infrastructure risks, by bringing together businesses, government and researchers. == Background == Originally organized in 2008 as a focus on the new research area of resilient control systems, including the disciplinary areas of control system, cyber-security, cognitive psychology and any number of critical infrastructure domains. Resilience has long been recognized as an area that requires not only the contributions of multiple disciplines or multidisciplinary participation, but interdisciplinary interaction where there is a common language and familiarity of the contributors to what other disciplines (and roles) contribute. The resulting interactions developed by Resilience Week and associated activities are intended to culture this sharing environment as a safe zone for inclusion; more importantly, an environment that lends to developing the new science and practice. As the attributes of resilience are complex, the contributions and topics for the event have included both the disciplinary and the project considerations, in keynotes, panels and research presentations. Keynotes have included senior leadership in the Department of Energy, Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, the National Science Foundation, and other agencies in addition to National Academy and professional organization fellows and senior industry leaders. Project panels and research presentations include emergent topics in resilience to climate change, cyber attack, damaging storms and the energy assurance. Topics Areas of focus have included: Control Systems Cyber Systems Cognitive Systems Communications Systems Communities and Infrastructure Project Focus Areas have included: Dependencies and Interdependencies Cyber Resilience for Operating Technology Commercializing Research and Development Building Critical Infrastructure Resilience through Distributed Energy Resources Energy Equity and Community Resilience Proceedings are developed for each year of the event, documenting the diversity of the research and engagements within these topical areas. == Impacts for the future == Since its inception, the Resilience Week community has evolved from one that primarily included only university researchers to one that includes many government laboratories, universities and private industries in the US and internationally. This type of collaboration forms a feedback loop that informs the research with the current needs and hones best practices. The future of the event is to further advance discussions that advance investment, recognize priorities and expedite technologies and tools to proactively address our energy future, in light of the natural and manmade challenges, and rationalizing the complex relationships that exist in critical infrastructure.

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  • Accelerated Linear Algebra

    Accelerated Linear Algebra

    XLA (Accelerated Linear Algebra) is an open-source compiler for machine learning developed by the OpenXLA project. XLA is designed to improve the performance of machine learning models by optimizing the computation graphs at a lower level, making it particularly useful for large-scale computations and high-performance machine learning models. Key features of XLA include: Compilation of Computation Graphs: Compiles computation graphs into efficient machine code. Optimization Techniques: Applies operation fusion, memory optimization, and other techniques. Hardware Support: Optimizes models for various hardware, including CPUs, GPUs, and NPUs. Improved Model Execution Time: Aims to reduce machine learning models' execution time for both training and inference. Seamless Integration: Can be used with existing machine learning code with minimal changes. XLA represents a significant step in optimizing machine learning models, providing developers with tools to enhance computational efficiency and performance. == OpenXLA Project == OpenXLA Project is an open-source machine learning compiler and infrastructure initiative intended to provide a common set of tools for compiling and deploying machine learning models across different frameworks and hardware platforms. It provides a modular compilation stack that can be used by major deep learning frameworks like JAX, PyTorch, and TensorFlow. The project focuses on supplying shared components for optimization, portability, and execution across CPUs, GPUs, and specialized accelerators. Its design emphasizes interoperability between frameworks and a standardized set of representations for model computation. == Components == The OpenXLA ecosystem includes several core components: XLA – A deep learning compiler that optimizes computational graphs for multiple hardware targets. PJRT – A runtime interface that allows different back-ends to connect to XLA through a consistent API. StableHLO – A high-level operator set intended to serve as a stable, portable representation for ML models across compilers and frameworks. Shardy – An MLIR-based system for describing and transforming models that run in distributed or multi-device environments. Additional profiling, testing, and integration tools maintained under the OpenXLA organization. == Users and adopters == Several machine learning frameworks can use or interoperate with OpenXLA components, including JAX, TensorFlow, and parts of the PyTorch ecosystem. The project is developed with participation from multiple hardware and software organizations that contribute back-end integrations, testing, or specifications for their devices. This includes Alibaba, Amazon Web Services, AMD, Anyscale, Apple, Arm, Cerebras, Google, Graphcore, Hugging Face, Intel, Meta, NVIDIA and SiFive. == Supported target devices == x86-64 ARM64 NVIDIA GPU AMD GPU Intel GPU Apple GPU Google TPU AWS Trainium, Inferentia Cerebras Graphcore IPU == Governance == OpenXLA is developed as a community project with its work carried out in public repositories, discussion forums, and design meetings. Some components, such as StableHLO, began with stewardship from specific organizations and have outlined plans for more formal and distributed governance models as the project matures. == History == The project was announced in 2022 as an effort to coordinate development of ML compiler technologies across major AI companies, notably: Alibaba, Amazon Web Services, AMD, Anyscale, Apple, Arm, Cerebras, Google, Graphcore, Hugging Face, Intel, Meta, NVIDIA and SiFive.. It consolidated the XLA compiler, introduced StableHLO as a portable operator set, and created a unified structure for additional tools. Development continues within multiple repositories under the OpenXLA umbrella. It was founded by Eugene Burmako, James Rubin, Magnus Hyttsten, Mehdi Amini, Navid Khajouei, and Thea Lamkin from Google's Machine Learning organization.

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  • AI agent

    AI agent

    In the context of generative artificial intelligence, AI agents (also referred to as compound AI systems or agentic AI) are a class of intelligent agents that can pursue goals, use tools, and take actions with varying degrees of autonomy. In practice, they usually operate within human-defined objectives, constraints, and available tools. == Overview == AI agents possess several key attributes, including goal-directed behavior, natural language interfaces, the capacity to use external tools, and the ability to perform multi-step tasks. Their control flow is frequently driven by large language models (LLMs). Agent systems may also include memory components, planning logic, tool interfaces, and orchestration software for coordinating agent components. AI agents do not have a standard definition. NIST describes agentic AI as an emerging area requiring standards for secure operation, interoperability, and reliable interaction with external systems. A common application of AI agents is task automation: for example, booking travel plans based on a user's prompted request. Companies such as Google, Microsoft and Amazon Web Services have offered platforms for deploying pre-built AI agents. Several protocols have been proposed for standardizing inter-agent communication, with examples including the Model Context Protocol, Gibberlink, and many others. Some of these protocols are also used for connecting agents to external applications. In December 2025, Linux Foundation announced the formation of the Agentic AI Foundation (AAIF), with the goal of ensuring agentic AI evolves transparently and collaboratively. == History == AI agents have been traced back to research from the 1990s, with Harvard professor Milind Tambe noting that the definition of an AI agent was not clear at the time. Researcher Andrew Ng has been credited with spreading the term "agentic" to a wider audience in 2024. == Training and testing == Researchers have attempted to build world models and reinforcement learning environments to train or evaluate AI agents. For example, video games such as Minecraft and No Man's Sky as well as replicas of company websites, have also been used for training such agents. == Autonomous capabilities == The Financial Times compared the autonomy of AI agents to the SAE classification of self-driving cars, likening most applications to level 2 or level 3, with some achieving level 4 in highly specialized circumstances, and level 5 being theoretical. == Cognitive architecture == The following are some internal design options for reasoning within an agent: Retrieval-augmented generation ReAct (Reason + Act) pattern is an iterative process in which an AI agent alternates between reasoning and taking actions, receives observations from the environment or external tools, and integrates these observations into subsequent reasoning steps. Reflexion, which uses an LLM to create feedback on the agent's plan of action and stores that feedback in a memory cache. A tool/agent registry, for organizing software functions or other agents that the agent can use. One-shot model querying, which queries the model once to create the plan of action. === Reference architecture === Ken Huang proposed an AI agent reference architecture, which consists of seven interconnected layers, with each layer building on the functionality of the layers beneath it: Layer 1: Foundation models - provide the core AI engines to power agent capabilities. Layer 2: Data operations - manage the complex data infrastructure required for AI agent operations, including Vector database, data loaders, RAG. Layer 3: Agent frameworks - sophisticated software and tools that simplify the development and management of the AI agents. Layer 4: Deployment and infrastructure - provide the robust technical foundation for running AI agents. Layer 5: Evaluation and observability - focus on assessing the safety and performance of AI agents. Layer 6: Security and compliance - a crucial protective framework ensuring AI agents operate safely, securely, and conform to regulatory boundaries. At this layer security and compliance features embedded into all the AI agent stack layers are integrated together. Layer 7: Agent ecosystem - represents the AI agents' interface with real-world applications and users. == Orchestration patterns == To execute complex tasks, autonomous agents are often integrated with other agents or specialized tools. These configurations, known as orchestration patterns or workflows, include the following: Prompt chaining: A sequence where the output of one step serves as the input for the next. Routing: The classification of an input to direct it to a specialized downstream task or tool. Parallelization: The simultaneous execution of multiple tasks. Sequential processing: A fixed, linear progression of tasks through a predefined pipeline. Planner-critic: An iterative pattern where one agent generates a proposal and another evaluates it to provide feedback for refinement. == Multimodal AI agents == In addition to large language models (LLMs), vision-language models (VLMs) and multimodal foundation models can be used as the basis for agents. In September 2024, Allen Institute for AI released an open-source vision-language model. Nvidia released a framework for developers to use VLMs, LLMs and retrieval-augmented generation for building AI agents that can analyze images and videos, including video search and video summarization. Microsoft released a multimodal agent model – trained on images, video, software user interface interactions, and robotics data – that the company claimed can manipulate software and robots. == Applications == As of April 2025, per the Associated Press, there are few real-world applications of AI agents. As of June 2025, per Fortune, many companies are primarily experimenting with AI agents. The Information divided AI agents into seven archetypes: business-task agents, for acting within enterprise software; conversational agents, which act as chatbots for customer support; research agents, for querying and analyzing information (such as OpenAI Deep Research); analytics agents, for analyzing data to create reports; software developer or coding agents (such as Cursor); domain-specific agents, which include specific subject matter knowledge; and web browser agents (such as OpenAI Operator). By mid-2025, AI agents have been used in video game development, gambling (including sports betting), cryptocurrency wallets (including cryptocurrency trading and meme coins) and social media. In August 2025, New York Magazine described software development as the most definitive use case of AI agents. Likewise, by October 2025, noting a decline in expectations, The Information noted AI coding agents and customer support as the primary use cases by businesses. In November 2025, The Wall Street Journal reported that few companies that deployed AI agents have received a return on investment. === Applications in government === Several government bodies in the United States and United Kingdom have deployed or announced the deployment of agents, at the local and national level. The city of Kyle, Texas deployed an AI agent from Salesforce in March 2025 for 311 customer service. In November 2025, the Internal Revenue Service stated that it would use Agentforce, AI agents from Salesforce, for the Office of Chief Counsel, Taxpayer Advocate Services and the Office of Appeals. That same month, Staffordshire Police announced that they would trial Agentforce agents for handling non-emergency 101 calls in the United Kingdom starting in 2026. In December 2025, the Department of Neighborhoods in Detroit, Michigan, in partnership with a local business, deployed a pilot project in two Detroit districts for an AI agent to be used for customer service calls. In February 2025, Thomas Shedd, the director of the Technology Transformation Services, proposed using AI coding agents across the United States federal government. A recruiter for the Department of Government Efficiency proposed in April 2025 to use AI agents to automate the work of about 70,000 United States federal government employees, as part of a startup with funding from OpenAI and a partnership agreement with Palantir. This proposal was criticized by experts for its impracticality, if not impossibility, and the lack of corresponding widespread adoption by businesses. In December 2025, the Food and Drug Administration announced that it would offer "agentic AI capabilities" to its staff for "meeting management, pre-market reviews, review validation, post-market surveillance, inspections and compliance and administrative functions." That same month, the United States Department of Defense launched GenAI.mil, an internal platform for American military personnel to use generative AI-based applications based on Google Gemini, including "intelligent agentic workflows". Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth listed applications such as "[conducting] deep r

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