In knowledge representation, ontology components and ontology engineering, including for object-oriented programming and design, is-a (also written as is_a or is a) is a subsumptive relationship between abstractions (e.g., types, classes), wherein one class A is a subclass of another class B (and so B is a superclass of A). In other words, type A is a subtype of type B when A's specification implies B's specification. That is, any object (or class) that satisfies A's specification also satisfies B's specification, because B's specification is weaker. For example, a cat 'is a[n]' animal, but not vice versa. All cats are animals, but not all animals are cats. Behaviour that is relevant to all animals is defined on an animal class, whereas behaviour that is relevant only for cats is defined in a cat class. By defining the cat class as 'extending' the animal class, all cats 'inherit' the behaviour defined for animals, without the need to explicitly code that behaviour for cats. == Related concepts == The is-a relationship is to be contrasted with the has-a (has_a or has a) relationship between types (classes); confusing the relations has-a and is-a is a common error when designing a model (e.g., a computer program) of the real-world relationship between an object and its subordinate. The is-a relationship may also be contrasted with the instance-of relationship between objects (instances) and types (classes): see Type–token distinction. To summarize the relations, there are: hyperonym–hyponym (supertype/superclass–subtype/subclass) relations between types (classes) defining a taxonomic hierarchy, where for a subsumption relation: a hyponym (subtype, subclass) has a type-of (is-a) relationship with its hyperonym (supertype, superclass); holonym–meronym (whole/entity/container–part/constituent/member) relations between types (classes) defining a possessive hierarchy, where for an aggregation (i.e. without ownership) relation: a holonym (whole) has a has-a relationship with its meronym (part), for a composition (i.e. with ownership) relation: a meronym (constituent) has a part-of relationship with its holonym (entity), for a containment relation: a meronym (member) has a member-of relationship with its holonym (container); concept–object (type–token) relations between types (classes) and objects (instances), where a token (object) has an instance-of relationship with its type (class).
Intelligent decision support system
An intelligent decision support system (IDSS) is a decision support system that makes extensive use of artificial intelligence (AI) techniques. Use of AI techniques in management information systems has a long history – indeed terms such as "Knowledge-based systems" (KBS) and "intelligent systems" have been used since the early 1980s to describe components of management systems, but the term "Intelligent decision support system" is thought to originate with Clyde Holsapple and Andrew Whinston in the late 1970s. Examples of specialized intelligent decision support systems include Flexible manufacturing systems (FMS), intelligent marketing decision support systems and medical diagnosis systems. Ideally, an intelligent decision support system should behave like a human consultant: supporting decision makers by gathering and analysing evidence, identifying and diagnosing problems, proposing possible courses of action and evaluating such proposed actions. The aim of the AI techniques embedded in an intelligent decision support system is to enable these tasks to be performed by a computer, while emulating human capabilities as closely as possible. Many IDSS implementations are based on expert systems, a well established type of KBS that encode knowledge and emulate the cognitive behaviours of human experts using predicate logic rules, and have been shown to perform better than the original human experts in some circumstances. Expert systems emerged as practical applications in the 1980s based on research in artificial intelligence performed during the late 1960s and early 1970s. They typically combine knowledge of a particular application domain with an inference capability to enable the system to propose decisions or diagnoses. Accuracy and consistency can be comparable to (or even exceed) that of human experts when the decision parameters are well known (e.g. if a common disease is being diagnosed), but performance can be poor when novel or uncertain circumstances arise. Research in AI focused on enabling systems to respond to novelty and uncertainty in more flexible ways is starting to be used in IDSS. For example, intelligent agents that perform complex cognitive tasks without any need for human intervention have been used in a range of decision support applications. Capabilities of these intelligent agents include knowledge sharing, machine learning, data mining, and automated inference. A range of AI techniques such as case based reasoning, rough sets and fuzzy logic have also been used to enable decision support systems to perform better in uncertain conditions. A 2009 research about a multi-artificial system intelligence system named IILS is proposed to automate problem-solving processes within the logistics industry. The system involves integrating intelligence modules based on case-based reasoning, multi-agent systems, fuzzy logic, and artificial neural networks aiming to offer advanced logistics solutions and support in making well-informed, high-quality decisions to address a wide range of customer needs and challenges.
Cloud Data Management Interface
ISO/IEC 17826 Information technology — Cloud Data Management Interface (CDMI) Version 2.0.0 is an international standard that specifies a protocol for self-provisioning, administering and managing access to data stored in cloud storage, object storage, storage area network and network attached storage systems. The CDMI standard is developed and maintained by the Storage Networking Industry Association, who makes a publicly accessible version of the specification available. CDMI defines new resource representations to enable standardized management of any URI-accessible data, and defines RESTful HTTP operations using these representations to discover the capabilities of the storage system, discover stored data, access and update management metadata, specify data storage protocols (such as iSCSI and NFS) through which the stored data is accessed, and provide cross-system and cross-cloud import and export in order to enable data portability. Management functions enabled by CDMI include managing data ownership, identity mapping, access controls, user-specified metadata, and to declaratively specify desired data protection, data retention, constraints on geographic placement, desired quality of service, data versioning and security requirements. CDMI also defines utility services to facilitate data management, such the ability to query data matching specific criteria, and includes extensions to perform bulk updates using CDMI Jobs. == Capabilities == Compliant implementations must provide access to a set of configuration parameters known as capabilities. These are either boolean values that represent whether or not a system supports things such as queues, export via other protocols, path-based storage and so on, or numeric values expressing system limits, such as how much metadata may be placed on an object. As a minimal compliant implementation can be quite small, with few features, clients need to check the cloud storage system for a capability before attempting to use the functionality it represents. Resource allocation assignments limited to the data management interface protocols must possess access bypass capabilities which extend beyond the layered framework. This integral function is vital to the prevention of transport layer session hijacking by unauthorized entities which may circumvent standard interfacing security parameters. == Containers == A CDMI client may access objects, including containers, by either name or object id (OID), assuming the CDMI server supports both methods. When storing objects by name, it is natural to use nested named containers; the resulting structure corresponds exactly to a traditional filesystem directory structure. == Objects == Objects are similar to files in a traditional file system, but are enhanced with an increased amount and capacity for metadata. As with containers, they may be accessed by either name or OID. When accessed by name, clients use URLs that contain the full pathname of objects to create, read, update and delete them. When accessed by OID, the URL specifies an OID string in the cdmi-objectid container; this container presents a flat name space conformant with standard object storage system semantics. Subject to system limits, objects may be of any size or type and have arbitrary user-supplied metadata attached to them. Systems that support query allow arbitrary queries to be run against the metadata. == Domains, Users and Groups == CDMI supports the concept of a domain, similar in concept to a domain in the Windows Active Directory model. Users and groups created in a domain share a common administrative database and are known to each other on a "first name" basis, i.e. without reference to any other domain or system. Domains also function as containers for usage and billing summary data. == Access Control == CDMI exactly follows the ACL and ACE model used for file authorization operations by NFSv4. This makes it also compatible with Microsoft Windows systems. == Metadata == CDMI draws much of its metadata model from the XAM specification. Objects and containers have "storage system metadata", "data system metadata" and arbitrary user specified metadata, in addition to the metadata maintained by an ordinary filesystem (atime etc.). == Queries == CDMI specifies a way for systems to support arbitrary queries against CDMI containers, with a rich set of comparison operators, including support for regular expressions. == Queues == CDMI supports the concept of persistent FIFO (first-in, first-out) queues. These are useful for job scheduling, order processing and other tasks in which lists of things must be processed in order. == Compliance == Both retention intervals and retention holds are supported by CDMI. A retention interval consists of a start time and a retention period. During this time interval, objects are preserved as immutable and may not be deleted. A retention hold is usually placed on an object because of judicial action and has the same effect: objects may not be changed nor deleted until all holds placed on them are removed. == Billing == Summary information suitable for billing clients for on-demand services can be obtained by authorized users from systems that support it. == Serialization == Serialization of objects and containers allows export of all data and metadata on a system and importation of that data into another cloud system. == Foreign protocols == CDMI supports export of containers as NFS or CIFS shares. Clients that mount these shares see the container hierarchy as an ordinary filesystem directory hierarchy, and the objects in the containers as normal files. Metadata outside of ordinary filesystem metadata may or may not be exposed. Provisioning of iSCSI LUNs is also supported. == Client SDKs == CDMI Reference Implementation Droplet libcdmi-java libcdmi-python .NET SDK
Initialization vector
In cryptography, an initialization vector (IV) or starting variable is an input to a cryptographic primitive being used to provide the initial state. The IV is typically required to be random or pseudorandom, but sometimes an IV only needs to be unpredictable or unique. Randomization is crucial for some encryption schemes to achieve semantic security, a property whereby repeated usage of the scheme under the same key does not allow an attacker to infer relationships between (potentially similar) segments of the encrypted message. For block ciphers, the use of an IV is described by the modes of operation. Some cryptographic primitives require the IV only to be non-repeating, and the required randomness is derived internally. In this case, the IV is commonly called a nonce (a number used only once), and the primitives (e.g. CBC) are considered stateful rather than randomized. This is because an IV need not be explicitly forwarded to a recipient but may be derived from a common state updated at both sender and receiver side. (In practice, a short nonce is still transmitted along with the message to consider message loss.) An example of stateful encryption schemes is the counter mode of operation, which has a sequence number for a nonce. The IV size depends on the cryptographic primitive used; for block ciphers it is generally the cipher's block-size. In encryption schemes, the unpredictable part of the IV has at best the same size as the key to compensate for time/memory/data tradeoff attacks. When the IV is chosen at random, the probability of collisions due to the birthday problem must be taken into account. Traditional stream ciphers such as RC4 do not support an explicit IV as input, and a custom solution for incorporating an IV into the cipher's key or internal state is needed. Some designs realized in practice are known to be insecure; the WEP protocol is a notable example, and is prone to related-IV attacks. == Motivation == A block cipher is one of the most basic primitives in cryptography, and frequently used for data encryption. However, by itself, it can only be used to encode a data block of a predefined size, called the block size. For example, a single invocation of the AES algorithm transforms a 128-bit plaintext block into a ciphertext block of 128 bits in size. The key, which is given as one input to the cipher, defines the mapping between plaintext and ciphertext. If data of arbitrary length is to be encrypted, a simple strategy is to split the data into blocks each matching the cipher's block size, and encrypt each block separately using the same key. This method is not secure as equal plaintext blocks get transformed into equal ciphertexts, and a third party observing the encrypted data may easily determine its content even when not knowing the encryption key. To hide patterns in encrypted data while avoiding the re-issuing of a new key after each block cipher invocation, a method is needed to randomize the input data. In 1980, the NIST published a national standard document designated Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) PUB 81, which specified four so-called block cipher modes of operation, each describing a different solution for encrypting a set of input blocks. The first mode implements the simple strategy described above, and was specified as the electronic codebook (ECB) mode. In contrast, each of the other modes describe a process where ciphertext from one block encryption step gets intermixed with the data from the next encryption step. To initiate this process, an additional input value is required to be mixed with the first block, and which is referred to as an initialization vector. For example, the cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode requires an unpredictable value, of size equal to the cipher's block size, as additional input. This unpredictable value is added to the first plaintext block before subsequent encryption. In turn, the ciphertext produced in the first encryption step is added to the second plaintext block, and so on. The ultimate goal for encryption schemes is to provide semantic security: by this property, it is practically impossible for an attacker to draw any knowledge from observed ciphertext. It can be shown that each of the three additional modes specified by the NIST are semantically secure under so-called chosen-plaintext attacks. == Properties == Properties of an IV depend on the cryptographic scheme used. A basic requirement is uniqueness, which means that no IV may be reused under the same key. For block ciphers, repeated IV values devolve the encryption scheme into electronic codebook mode: equal IV and equal plaintext result in equal ciphertext. In stream cipher encryption uniqueness is crucially important as plaintext may be trivially recovered otherwise. Example: Stream ciphers encrypt plaintext P to ciphertext C by deriving a key stream K from a given key and IV and computing C as C = P xor K. Assume that an attacker has observed two messages C1 and C2 both encrypted with the same key and IV. Then knowledge of either P1 or P2 reveals the other plaintext since C1 xor C2 = (P1 xor K) xor (P2 xor K) = P1 xor P2. Many schemes require the IV to be unpredictable by an adversary. This is effected by selecting the IV at random or pseudo-randomly. In such schemes, the chance of a duplicate IV is negligible, but the effect of the birthday problem must be considered. As for the uniqueness requirement, a predictable IV may allow recovery of (partial) plaintext. Example: Consider a scenario where a legitimate party called Alice encrypts messages using the cipher-block chaining mode. Consider further that there is an adversary called Eve that can observe these encryptions and is able to forward plaintext messages to Alice for encryption (in other words, Eve is capable of a chosen-plaintext attack). Now assume that Alice has sent a message consisting of an initialization vector IV1 and starting with a ciphertext block CAlice. Let further PAlice denote the first plaintext block of Alice's message, let E denote encryption, and let PEve be Eve's guess for the first plaintext block. Now, if Eve can determine the initialization vector IV2 of the next message she will be able to test her guess by forwarding a plaintext message to Alice starting with (IV2 xor IV1 xor PEve); if her guess was correct this plaintext block will get encrypted to CAlice by Alice. This is because of the following simple observation: CAlice = E(IV1 xor PAlice) = E(IV2 xor (IV2 xor IV1 xor PAlice)). Depending on whether the IV for a cryptographic scheme must be random or only unique the scheme is either called randomized or stateful. While randomized schemes always require the IV chosen by a sender to be forwarded to receivers, stateful schemes allow sender and receiver to share a common IV state, which is updated in a predefined way at both sides. == Block ciphers == Block cipher processing of data is usually described as a mode of operation. Modes are primarily defined for encryption as well as authentication, though newer designs exist that combine both security solutions in so-called authenticated encryption modes. While encryption and authenticated encryption modes usually take an IV matching the cipher's block size, authentication modes are commonly realized as deterministic algorithms, and the IV is set to zero or some other fixed value. == Stream ciphers == In stream ciphers, IVs are loaded into the keyed internal secret state of the cipher, after which a number of cipher rounds are executed prior to releasing the first bit of output. For performance reasons, designers of stream ciphers try to keep that number of rounds as small as possible, but because determining the minimal secure number of rounds for stream ciphers is not a trivial task, and considering other issues such as entropy loss, unique to each cipher construction, related-IVs and other IV-related attacks are a known security issue for stream ciphers, which makes IV loading in stream ciphers a serious concern and a subject of ongoing research. == WEP IV == The 802.11 encryption algorithm called WEP (short for Wired Equivalent Privacy) used a short, 24-bit IV, leading to reused IVs with the same key, which led to it being easily cracked. Packet injection allowed for WEP to be cracked in times as short as several seconds. This ultimately led to the deprecation of WEP. == SSL 2.0 IV == In cipher-block chaining mode (CBC mode), the IV need not be secret, but must be unpredictable (In particular, for any given plaintext, it must not be possible to predict the IV that will be associated to the plaintext in advance of the generation of the IV.) at encryption time. Additionally for the output feedback mode (OFB mode), the IV must be unique. In particular, the (previously) common practice of re-using the last ciphertext block of a message as the IV for the next message is insecure (for example, this method was used by SSL 2.0). If an attacker knows
Backdoor (computing)
A backdoor is a typically covert method of bypassing normal authentication or encryption in a computer, product, embedded device (e.g. a home router), or its embodiment (e.g. part of a cryptosystem, algorithm, chipset, or even a "homunculus computer"—a tiny computer-within-a-computer such as that found in Intel's AMT technology). Backdoors are most often used for securing remote access to a computer, or obtaining access to plaintext in cryptosystems. From there it may be used to gain access to privileged information like passwords, corrupt or delete data on hard drives, or transfer information within compromised networks. In the United States, the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act forces internet providers to provide backdoors for government authorities. In 2024, the U.S. government realized that China had been tapping communications in the U.S. using that infrastructure for months, or perhaps longer; China recorded presidential candidate campaign office phone calls—including employees of the then-vice president of the nation, and of the candidates themselves. A backdoor may take the form of a hidden part of a program, a separate program (e.g. Back Orifice may subvert the system through a rootkit), code in the firmware of the hardware, or parts of an operating system such as Windows, for example, device drivers. Trojan horses can be used to create vulnerabilities in a device. A Trojan horse may appear to be an entirely legitimate program, but when executed, it triggers an activity that may install a backdoor. Although some are secretly installed, other backdoors are deliberate and widely known. These kinds of backdoors have "legitimate" uses such as providing the manufacturer with a way to restore user passwords. Many systems that store information within the cloud fail to create accurate security measures. If many systems are connected within the cloud, hackers can gain access to all other platforms through the most vulnerable system. Default passwords (or other default credentials) can function as backdoors if they are not changed by the user. Some debugging features can also act as backdoors if they are not removed in the release version. In 1993, the United States government attempted to deploy an encryption system, the Clipper chip, with an explicit backdoor for law enforcement and national security access. The chip was unsuccessful. Recent proposals to counter backdoors include creating a database of backdoors' triggers and then using neural networks to detect them. == Overview == The threat of backdoors surfaced when multiuser and networked operating systems became widely adopted. Petersen and Turn discussed computer subversion in a paper published in the proceedings of the 1967 AFIPS Conference. They noted a class of active infiltration attacks that use "trapdoor" entry points into the system to bypass security facilities and permit direct access to data. The use of the word trapdoor here clearly coincides with more recent definitions of a backdoor. However, since the advent of public key cryptography the term trapdoor has acquired a different meaning (see: Trapdoor function), and thus the term "backdoor" is now preferred, only after the term trapdoor went out of use. More generally, such security breaches were discussed at length in a RAND Corporation task force report published under DARPA sponsorship by J.P. Anderson and D.J. Edwards in 1970. While initially targeting the computer vision domain, backdoor attacks have expanded to encompass various other domains, including text, audio, ML-based computer-aided design, and ML-based wireless signal classification. Additionally, vulnerabilities in backdoors have been demonstrated in deep generative models, reinforcement learning (e.g., AI GO), and deep graph models. These broad-ranging potential risks have prompted concerns from national security agencies regarding their potentially disastrous consequences. A backdoor in a login system might take the form of a hard coded user and password combination which gives access to the system. An example of this sort of backdoor was used as a plot device in the 1983 film WarGames, in which the architect of the "WOPR" computer system had inserted a hardcoded password-less account which gave the user access to the system, and to undocumented parts of the system (in particular, a video game-like simulation mode and direct interaction with the artificial intelligence). Although the number of backdoors in systems using proprietary software (software whose source code is not publicly available) is not widely credited, they are nevertheless frequently exposed. Programmers have even succeeded in secretly installing large amounts of benign code as Easter eggs in programs, although such cases may involve official forbearance, if not actual permission. == Examples == === Worms === Many computer worms, such as Sobig and Mydoom, install a backdoor on the affected computer (generally a PC on broadband running Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Outlook). Such backdoors appear to be installed so that spammers can send junk e-mail from the infected machines. Others, such as the Sony/BMG rootkit, placed secretly on millions of music CDs through late 2005, are intended as DRM measures—and, in that case, as data-gathering agents, since both surreptitious programs they installed routinely contacted central servers. A sophisticated attempt to plant a backdoor in the Linux kernel, exposed in November 2003, added a small and subtle code change by subverting the revision control system. In this case, a two-line change appeared to check root access permissions of a caller to the sys_wait4 function, but because it used assignment = instead of equality checking ==, it actually granted permissions to the system. This difference is easily overlooked, and could even be interpreted as an accidental typographical error, rather than an intentional attack. In January 2014, a backdoor was discovered in certain Samsung Android products, like the Galaxy devices. The Samsung proprietary Android versions are fitted with a backdoor that provides remote access to the data stored on the device. In particular, the Samsung Android software that is in charge of handling the communications with the modem, using the Samsung IPC protocol, implements a class of requests known as remote file server (RFS) commands, that allows the backdoor operator to perform via modem remote I/O operations on the device hard disk or other storage. As the modem is running Samsung proprietary Android software, it is likely that it offers over-the-air remote control that could then be used to issue the RFS commands and thus to access the file system on the device. === Object code backdoors === Harder to detect backdoors involve modifying object code, rather than source code—object code is much harder to inspect, as it is designed to be machine-readable, not human-readable. These backdoors can be inserted either directly in the on-disk object code, or inserted at some point during compilation, assembly linking, or loading—in the latter case the backdoor never appears on disk, only in memory. Object code backdoors are difficult to detect by inspection of the object code, but are easily detected by simply checking for changes (differences), notably in length or in checksum, and in some cases can be detected or analyzed by disassembling the object code. Further, object code backdoors can be removed (assuming source code is available) by simply recompiling from source on a trusted system. Thus for such backdoors to avoid detection, all extant copies of a binary must be subverted, and any validation checksums must also be compromised, and source must be unavailable, to prevent recompilation. Alternatively, these other tools (length checks, diff, checksumming, disassemblers) can themselves be compromised to conceal the backdoor, for example detecting that the subverted binary is being checksummed and returning the expected value, not the actual value. To conceal these further subversions, the tools must also conceal the changes in themselves—for example, a subverted checksummer must also detect if it is checksumming itself (or other subverted tools) and return false values. This leads to extensive changes in the system and tools being needed to conceal a single change. As object code can be regenerated by recompiling (reassembling, relinking) the original source code, making a persistent object code backdoor (without modifying source code) requires subverting the compiler itself—so that when it detects that it is compiling the program under attack it inserts the backdoor—or alternatively the assembler, linker, or loader. As this requires subverting the compiler, this in turn can be fixed by recompiling the compiler, removing the backdoor insertion code. This defense can in turn be subverted by putting a source meta-backdoor in the compiler, so that when it detects that it is compiling itself
List of Go software and tools
This is a list of Go software and tools, including compilers, development environments, build tools, testing frameworks, web frameworks, database tools, and related software for the Go programming language. == Core toolchain == Go — programming language and toolchain go command — build and package tool gofmt — source code formatter go vet — static analysis tool == Compilers and runtimes == gc — default Go compiler gccgo — GCC front end for Go GopherJS — Go-to-JavaScript compiler gollvm — Go compiler using the LLVM backend llgo — experimental Go frontend for LLVM TinyGo — compiler for embedded systems and WebAssembly Yaegi — Go interpreter == Development environments and editors == Emacs — text editor with Go support GoLand — JetBrains integrated development environment LiteIDE — Go-focused integrated development environment Neovim — text editor with Go support TextMate — text editor with Go support Vim — text editor with Go support Visual Studio Code — editor with Go support == Language servers and editor tools == delve — debugger gopls — Go language server golangci-lint — lint runner revive — linter staticcheck — static analysis tool == Build, dependency and release tools == Air — live reload development tool dep — deprecated dependency manager Go modules — dependency management system Goreleaser — release automation tool Mage — build tool Task — task runner == Testing and benchmarking == benchstat — benchmark comparison tool Ginkgo — testing framework GoMock — mock generation tool testify — testing toolkit testing — standard testing package == Web frameworks and HTTP tools == Beego — web framework Caddy — web server Chi — router Echo — web framework Fiber — web framework Gin — web framework Gorilla Mux — router Hugo — static site generator Revel — web framework Traefik — reverse proxy and load balancer == RPC and API tools == Goa — API design framework gRPC — remote procedure call framework grpc-gateway — REST gateway oapi-codegen — OpenAPI code generator Swag — OpenAPI documentation tool == Database and ORM tools == Bun — SQL toolkit and ORM CockroachDB client libraries — database drivers and tools ent — entity framework GORM — object–relational mapper sqlx — SQL toolkit == Command-line and terminal tools == Bubble Tea — terminal user interface framework Cobra — command-line framework pflag — flag parsing library urfave/cli — command-line framework Viper — configuration library == GUI toolkits and application frameworks == Fyne — cross-platform graphical user interface toolkit == Documentation, generation and analysis == errcheck — unchecked error checker godoc — documentation tool goimports — import management tool mockgen — mock generator pkgsite — package documentation site Prometheus — monitoring and alerting toolkit stringer — code generation tool wire — dependency injection code generator == Package hosting and community services == GoCenter — former Go package repository pkg.go.dev — package documentation and discovery site proxy.golang.org — module proxy == Major applications written in Go == Consul — service networking platform Docker — containerization platform InfluxDB — time-series database written in Go Kubernetes — container orchestration platform Ollama — platform for running and managing large language models locally Terraform — infrastructure as code tool Vault — secrets management tool
Online Safety Amendment (Social Media Minimum Age) Act 2024
The Online Safety Amendment (Social Media Minimum Age) Act 2024 is an Australian act of parliament that prohibits minors under the age of 16 from holding an account on certain social media platforms. It is an amendment to the Online Safety Act 2021 and was passed by the Parliament of Australia on 29 November 2024. It imposes monetary penalties on social media companies that fail to take reasonable steps to prevent minors under 16 that are located in Australia from having accounts on their services. The legislation allows the government to determine which social media platforms must ban age‑restricted users and proclaim a date for the commencement of the ban, with those provisions taking effect on 10 December 2025. Facebook, Instagram, Reddit, Snapchat, TikTok, Twitter, Threads, Twitch, Kick, and YouTube were age‑restricted on 10 December 2025, with the possibility that more platforms may be added. The act is being challenged in the High Court by the Digital Freedom Project. == Background == The ban on access to social media by young people by the federal government originated in November 2023, when shadow communications minister David Coleman introduced a private member's bill requiring the government to conduct a trial for age-verification technology on pornography and social media platforms. While the bill did not succeed, the Albanese government funded the trial in the 2024 Australian federal budget. In June 2024, opposition leader Peter Dutton pledged that a Coalition government would implement a ban on social media for under-16s within 100 days of taking office. The following month, prime minister Anthony Albanese announced the government would introduce legislation banning under-16s from social media. The Online Safety Amendment (Social Media Minimum Age) Bill 2024 was introduced into parliament by minister for communications Michelle Rowland on 21 November 2024, passing both houses on 28 November 2024. The ban on access to social media by young people by the federal government also gained momentum following an entreaty by the wife of the premier of South Australia, Peter Malinauskas, to her husband. She requested that he read The Anxious Generation by Jonathan Haidt and take action to address the impact of social media on the mental health of children. The couple have four young children, and, thinking of them, the premier thought that government should play a part in helping parents to regulate use of social media by their children at home. Malinauskas contacted former High Court chief justice Robert French, who agreed to look at the issue, and in September 2024 handed the premier a 267 page proposal, which he dubbed a "Swiss Army knife" rather than a machete, to adjust to social media's "changing landscape and its complexity". The leaders of other states and territories gave their support to Malinauskas's idea, and he took the French report to National Cabinet to collaborate with chief ministers, premiers, and the prime minister. Community support swelled after stories of parents who had lost their children to suicide after being bullied on social media were published. Albanese himself was moved by a personal letter received from Kelly O'Brien, whose 12-year-old daughter Charlotte had taken her own life due to bullying at school. An event took place at the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly session in September 2025 at which a mother spoke of her daughter's suicide as "death by bullying ... enabled by social media". The speech won support from world leaders in Greece, Fiji, Tonga and the president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen. In early September 2024, South Australia proposed legislation similar to the federal law now in place. The state-based version was intended to ban users under the age of 14, unlike the federal law, which bans those under 16. The state-based law also proposed to require parental consent for 14 and 15‑year‑olds. Later in September, prime minister Anthony Albanese announced that his government intended to introduce legislation to set a minimum age requirement for social media. In November 2024, the federal government indicated their intention to engage the Age Check Certification Scheme following a tender process for an age assurance technology trial. The Albanese government's proposed ban was supported by the governments of every state and territory. Albanese described social media as a "scourge", and said "I want people to spend more time on the footy field or the netball court than they're spending on their phones", that family members are "worried sick about the safety of our kids online", and that social media "is having a negative impact on young people's mental health and on anxiety". Albanese's statements followed an earlier pledge by Liberal opposition leader Peter Dutton who was pushed by the early advocacy of shadow communications minister David Coleman to implement a ban on social media for under 16s within 100 days of being elected. The opposition organised an open letter signed by 140 experts who specialise in child welfare and technology. The opposition was concerned about the invasion of privacy that will occur with the introduction of identification-based age checks. An advocacy group for digital companies in Australia called the plans a "20th Century response to 21st Century challenges". A director of a mental health service voiced concerns, stating that "73% of young people across Australia who accessed mental health support did so through social media". == Implementation == Social media companies will receive a transition period of one year after the legislation is enacted to introduce reasonable controls preventing minors under the age of 16 from holding accounts on their services while physically located in Australia. Enforcement will involve fines of up to A$49.5 million for companies failing to take such steps, with no consequences for parents and children who violate the restrictions. There are no parental consent exceptions to the ban, and while the use of virtual private networks (VPNs) to access these services remains legal in Australia, the services are expected to try to stop under 16s from using VPNs to pretend to be outside Australia. The expectation is to make best-efforts to implement the ban on platforms including Facebook, Instagram, Reddit, Snapchat, TikTok, Twitter, Threads, Twitch, Kick and YouTube. Some social media companies are now obligated to become good enough at profiling Australian children under 16 to satisfy the Australian government they tried to implement the ban to avoid being fined. Consequently, social media companies said they will try to identify restricted users using various methods including behavioural inferencing. On 5 November 2025, it was announced that online gaming platform Roblox will not be banned, but Reddit and live-streaming platform Kick will be added to the list of platforms to be banned. A report by Age Check Certification Scheme, a UK company recruited by the government to consult on the technology used to implement the restrictions, was issued in June 2025, ahead of the December deadline to implement the ban. In June 2025, the preliminary report was released, which stated that "there are no significant technological barriers" to implementing the ban. In late July 2025, Google warned that it would sue the Australian government if YouTube was included in the ban. On 30 July, the government announced that it would extend its social media age limit to include YouTube, following advice from Grant. On 30 July 2025, the minister for communications, Anika Wells, published the Online Safety (Age-Restricted Social Media Platforms) Rules 2025, which specify exactly which types of social media platforms will be banned for certain users. On 31 August 2025, the full report was released, which stated that it would technically be possible to implement the ban; however, coordination among different services is required to successfully implement it. It also highlighted the benefits and flaws of different methods of age verification. On 16 September 2025, it was announced that the eSafety Commissioner will be able to take legal action against social media companies that have not pursued reasonable steps to bar users under the age of 16, and that fines can range up to A$49.5 million against these companies in court. On 19 November 2025, Meta announced that from 4 December their platforms (Instagram, Facebook, and Threads) would be removing users under the age of 16 ahead of the 10 December deadline. Users will be able to scan a face or provide an identity document to prove their age. On 21 November 2025, the eSafety Commissioner announced that the live-streaming platform Twitch will be included in the ban, but that Pinterest would not be. In December 2025, eSafety Commissioner Julie Inman Grant suggested efforts to block users include use by social media companies of various "signals" to identify children that are